I often think about that........I watched a doco a while back about the German war machine. When they started mass production of the BF-109 (these are rough figures from memory), in the first year they made about 3000, the second around 7000 and the third around 13000.Amazing things can be achieved in wartime.
I've deliberately left the Aussie stuff out....I can't think of any successful military designs we've had. Maybe someone will come up with something? The Wirraway, Boomerang and Nomad were nothing to be proud of.On 18 February 1942, the Australian War Cabinet authorised an order for 105 CA-12 aircraft. On 29 May 1942, the prototype Boomerang, A46-1, conducted its maiden flight from Fisherman's Bend, flown by CAC pilot Ken Frewin. This initial prototype had been completed within only three months of having received the order to proceed. Admittedly, a lot of the components used in its construction were already on hand, being parts of the Wirraway and Beaufighter.
I can't argue with your facts, but the point I was trying to make was just how quickly new machines were developed and manufactured on both sides compared to the timeframes today. I know that today's airframes are far more complex, but there are other regulatory hindrances at play too.But the several areas where the Nazis set themselves up to fail in their air war strategies, was -
1. Both Hitler and Goering insisted on every aircraft part that was produced, being used to build aircraft. They failed to understand the need to keep around 10% of production in stock as spares.
As a result, when the pressure really came on the Nazis in the attack on Russia, a sizeable percentage of the Luftwaffe aircraft were grounded for a lack of spares.
This then meant the ground crews started to cannibalise working aircraft that were grounded due to easily repairable damage, to keep other aircraft airborne, that had suffered mechanical failures.
2. Hitler in particular, was not really interested in aircraft, or air wars. He was an Army man who believed Wars were won by men on the ground with tanks, artillery and powerful ground-based weapons. He failed to understand the major importance of air warfare.
3. The Nazis War Planning and Armaments Production Planning was initially erratic and lacked cohesion. It was not until Albert Speer was placed in charge of Industrial Production, that Nazi armaments output ran efficiently and effectively.
Speer was a superb manager, and the Nazi regime would have collapsed much earlier without his brilliant industrial production strategies.
It's interesting to see the figures for Nazi war production. There's talk of the "lost years" of Nazi armaments production between 1939 and 1941. But there were two factors at play there. One was, German industry was still fragmented and operating on a basically peacetime basis, and it wasn't until Speer was appointed Minister for Armaments and Arms Production in Feb 1942, that armaments and industrial production started to soar.
Secondly, German industry produced ammunition and explosives on a huge scale between 1939 and 1941, and by 1942, the Nazis had mind-boggling amounts of ammunition and explosives on hand - so ammunition output was curtailed in 1942, in favour of increased armaments production.
Interestingly, in the 1939-1940 period, German tank production increased by 120%, naval construction (mostly U-boats) increased by 170% - yet aircraft production only increased by 8%.
The problem with Nazi aircraft production was that, even after Speer was appointed, he had no direct control over aircraft production - as compared to the many other production facilities he administered.
This problem was compounded by the Nazis deciding to continue and increase production of proven aircraft designs from 1942 - thus leading to bigger numbers of available aircraft - but at the expense of the development of improved and faster aircraft designs - which was where the Allies concentrated their efforts.
Thirdly, German industry spent a lot of the 1939-1941 period on construction works for the Wermacht - increased and improved housing for troops, POW and concentration camp facilities, and bunkers and other major Wermacht projects - as well as substantial amounts of civilian construction work.
This construction activity impinged on armaments production in that period, and it wasn't until 1942 that Nazi construction activities were reduced, in favour of greatly increased armaments production.
Along with Speers organisation, this made for a substantial surge in armaments production. This was also helped by conquered countries facilities, and forced labour, being added to the output of Germany itself.
These will be the same idiot beancounters that have a fit about penalties built into contracts being applied because spares weren't available, but because it's from a "different bucket of money" despite being from the same company, can't see any connection between the two.One thing is for sure - during WW2, regulatory hindrances were not even part of the equation. What was needed, got done - fast.
The spares problem is simply because bean counters rule at all times, in peacetime. The "Overheads" cost of "Major Inventory" and the associated warehousing, fills multiple books on economics.
"Successful" is a subjective term. I agree that the products of the Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation were not up to dealing with the Zero and its like, as could the stuff that the Yanks were producing, but the Boomerang was a successful army co-operation aircraft, either attacking ground targets directly, or marking them for the New Zealand Corsairs. Our Beaufighter out-flew the original British one. The Wirraway was never meant to be a combat aircraft, but needs must. And everyone forgets the CAC-15 of which only one was made, but whose performance put it in the class of other late WWll developments from the US and Britain.I've deliberately left the Aussie stuff out....I can't think of any successful military designs we've had.