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Posted

I have also just heard that one of the survivors is improving slowly but steadily.

 

 

  • 1 year later...
Posted

Ive said it before and ill say it again, i reckon the nvfr rating is a very dodgy rating. Your not fully IFR trained but are faced with many of the same problems.

 

It would seem in this case that a few factors may have combined into a nasty scenario, and it all started in the morning of the accident.

 

250 kilos is quite a bit over MTOW but I doubt it would have been glaringly obvious to the PIC at the time. Its quite probable that the CofG would have moved aft as the fuel was burnt off, and the report estimated the all up weight t be 90 kgs over mtow at the time of the accident. Right on or beyond the aft limit pitch stability would have been an issue, particularly with the reduction in IAS as you would expect on an approach.

 

Some pretty obvious lesson for us all. Even though the cofg issue isn't as big a problem with our types it is still something that needs close attention. If your under MTOW and things are stored in the proper locations you should never have too much of a problem.

 

 

Posted

I've been following this this thread too Andy, and to me, your words of wisdom make so much sense to what was a sad outcome.

 

As the tanks empty, their Cof G situation would have got worse.

 

 

Posted

Tail heavy is dangerous. NVFR is VFR. Not IFR. also. Lack of recency could be a significant factor. No VASIS It is common to get low on approach if you don't pay a lot of attention to NOT doing it. The pilot was wearing and required to wear glasses. How long since they were prescribed?. Nev

 

 

Guest pookemon
Posted
250 kilos is quite a bit over MTOW but I doubt it would have been glaringly obvious to the PIC at the time.

If he'd done his Weight & Balance then it would have been blatantly obvious I would think.

 

 

Posted

Conditions reported are such that NVMC was not marginal and any rated and current pilot should have handled the approach and landing without difficulty. The QNH was properly set, yet the aircraft became low on the approach. On that approach, a 'black hole' effect seems very unlikely.

 

When a pilot is based at an airport, and flys regularly off that airport, and probably always off the main runway - there's the possibility of a 'familiarity factor.' The taxiway entrance to MOR 19 is just far enough in for many pilots to probably short land and turn into it - during daylight hours! At night, despite all good intentions, it's possible that one flys the very same 'flat' and close approach - rather than turning final higher and using an aim point further 'into' the runway. Sheer speculation, of course.

 

An additional 'factor' in this accident may have been currency - certainly night currency,which, at about 2-3 hrs annually is likely to be very marginal. It's also possible that the pilots' overall flying skills, ie, 1100 hours spread over 43 years, had degraded, and this in itself was a factor leading into the overload and the low approach.

 

For me, this accident was a personal loss, as I once lived in Moree, and played RU with one of the passengers many, many years ago. RIP Dig.

 

 

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