E F A T O reference thread: quality information only :-)

[Dafydd Llewellyn]

The sliding card on the altimeter while being a good idea doesn't take into account the main problem with turning back which is loss of control, now if experienced pilots are loosing control of the aircraft the main problem doesn't seem to be insufficient height for the turn but loss off control due to the stress of the EFATO so we can talk till we are blue in the face about how high we need to be to have enough room to turn but if we still lose control at low level we haven't even come close to solving the problem. I agree with those who have said we need to do more low level training and I think that is imperative to fixing the problem. Most of our training we are taught not to be doing turns below 500 feet and I think when we do it under stressful conditions that it is just asking for trouble.So while the altimeter slide card is a good idea it is useless without currency in low level manoeuvring, currency being the word if you haven't done it for a few weeks then your asking for trouble, seems that the straight ahead option while possibly doing damage to the plane is still the safest option for the majority of us.

Well, yes, you DO have to be able to FLY the aeroplane. The loss-of-control issue is surely about basic flying skill, rather than EFATO decision-making, n'est-ce pas?

 

 

[motzartmerv]

No that's not it at all..

 

 

[JUSTNUZZA]

The sliding card on the altimeter while being a good idea doesn't take into account the main problem with turning back which is loss of control, now if experienced pilots are loosing control of the aircraft the main problem doesn't seem to be insufficient height for the turn but loss off control due to the stress of the EFATO so we can talk till we are blue in the face about how high we need to be to have enough room to turn but if we still lose control at low level we haven't even come close to solving the problem. I agree with those who have said we need to do more low level training and I think that is imperative to fixing the problem. Most of our training we are taught not to be doing turns below 500 feet and I think when we do it under stressful conditions that it is just asking for trouble.So while the altimeter slide card is a good idea it is useless without currency in low level manoeuvring, currency being the word if you haven't done it for a few weeks then your asking for trouble, seems that the straight ahead option while possibly doing damage to the plane is still the safest option for the majority of us.

Not that I am an expert or anything on this matter, But what good is a altimeter slide card when you choose a day to take off in a 20 knot headwind, even if your ability to make the turn to return to the field downwind is achieved. The extra ground speed is not going to help you with the extra kinetic energy needed to be lost to make a low speed survivable landing unless you have a reasonably long runway.

 

 

[biggles]

A mate of mine told me a trick he uses when hes concerned about landing areas on upwind.He takes note of the airfield QNH, then before takeoff, sets 0 in his ALT regardless of elevation. He knows his machine very well and picks his turn back height mentally.

That way the alt is always reading height AGL so a quick glance is all thats needed. After departure he returns the Alt to AMSL.

 

A certain instructor may or may not have included this trick (in some circumstances) as part of his training..

Not a bad idea for those times of ......"concerned upwind landing options " ,particularly if a pilot already has difficulty with mental arithmetic ,which will be exacerbated by the stress of the event .

 

Bob

 

 

[SDQDI]

Well, yes, you DO have to be able to FLY the aeroplane. The loss-of-control issue is surely about basic flying skill, rather than EFATO decision-making, n'est-ce pas?

If it was a basic skill why have people with plenty of hours stuffed it up? It might be a basic skill at one or two thousand feet AGL but under stress at low level is a different kettle of fish.

 

 

[Dafydd Llewellyn]

Not that I am an expert or anything on this matter, But what good is a altimeter slide card when you choose a day to take off in a 20 knot headwind, even if your ability to make the turn to return to the field downwind is achieved. The extra ground speed is not going to help you with the extra kinetic energy needed to be lost to make a low speed survivable landing unless you have a reasonably long runway.

The slide card merely provides a simple means of deciding whether you have enough height to make a survivable turn-back without the ground getting in the way. After that, it's up to you. I'd think running off the far end of the runway with your wheels on the ground, a lot more survivable than colliding with the trees at the upwind end - or stalling into the ground in an attempt to stretch the glide.

 

If it was a basic skill why have people with plenty of hours stuffed it up? It might be a basic skill at one or two thousand feet AGL but under stress at low level is a different kettle of fish.

Well, that's Merv's point, isn't it? My question would be, did those pilots have a lot of hours, or the same hour a lot of times?

 

 

[Head in the clouds]

...... HIC if what we are already doing was working, then why do we still see this type of fatality so heavily represented? .....

I didn't say anything about whether what we are/were already doing was working or not. The point I made in post #215 is that what you've said the psych's are proposing is no different from what we were doing 25 yrs ago and unless schools are presently doing less than we were then, it's no different from what the schools are doing now either.

 

As for "seeing this type of fatality so heavily represented" - well is that actually the case? I'm not saying it isn't, I'm asking a straight question - is the turn-back causing as many fatalities as is being suggested?

 

In my post #144 I asked you where you are getting your stats from but you haven't mentioned your source yet. I quite appreciate that you're in the industry and have your ear turned to the 'happenings' far more than I do, which is why I was/am asking for some real-world numbers. I'll go through the ATSB database when I have more time available but earlier this morning I read through all of the published accident/incident data on the RAAus site. There are 56 entries for 2014 and 177 for 2013. The 2014 descriptions are fairly complete, the majority of 2013 entries are missing details.

 

Based on what information is there, there have been five EFATOs reported in 2014, all with successful outcome, three were turn-backs from well above 500ft one was a return from engine trouble and a restart at 350ft and one landed ahead from 700ft. No apparent problems this year although I think two entries didn't have details due to pending investigation.

 

In 2013 a Storm went into trees after EFATO, the Super Diamond fatality doesn't have details, the Maverick at Texas didn't return to the airfield but may have been an attempted turn-back though there'd be no reason for it as the paddocks are clear for miles around according to the photos. The Lightwing in Tas lacks details but is perhaps mishandling after EFATO.

 

Like everyone else, I'm of the opinion that any fatal at all is too many but it would be unrealistic to expect that we will ever achieve a perfect safety record and so - and given the admittedly sketchy details available from that source alone - it wouldn't seem that we do have too serious an issue here from the few instances recorded there. However, if you have a better set of stats compiled could you please let us have access to them?

 

Something interesting did come out of my quick data-mining this morning though, I was shocked to keep reading the same thing over and over again, virtually every other entry, and that is clearly something the schools should be taking notice of, even more particularly if the same 'dead feet' or 'wrong feet' issue is partly responsible for EFATO and final turn mismanagement.

 

Loss of directional control......loss of directional control.......loss of directional control.......loss of directional control.......loss of directional control.......loss of directional control.......loss of directional control.......loss of directional control.......

 

 

[Pilot Pete]

E.F.A.T.O Engine Failure At Take Off

 

It means just that..............at take off. Not 500 + ft, not at crosswind turn, not downwind, base or final, but At Take Off. I still can't understand why there is a debate on this subject when all Kev said was if you attempt to turn around at take off it will not end nicely for you.

 

 

[Head in the clouds]

E.F.A.T.O Engine Failure At Take OffIt means just that..............at take off. Not 500 + ft, not at crosswind turn, not downwind, base or final, but At Take Off. I still can't understand why there is a debate on this subject when all Kev said was if you attempt to turn around at take off it will not end nicely for you.

EFATO actually means Engine Failure After Take Off - meaning soon after take-off/during the initial climb.

 

 

[Guest Crezzi]

He takes note of the airfield QNH, then before takeoff, sets 0 in his ALT regardless of elevation. He knows his machine very well and picks his turn back height mentally.That way the alt is always reading height AGL so a quick glance is all thats needed. After departure he returns the Alt to AMSL.

Its called QFE & is routinely used in the UK

 

Cheers

 

John

 

 

[Dafydd Llewellyn]

I didn't say anything about whether what we are/were already doing was working or not. The point I made in post #215 is that what you've said the psych's are proposing is no different from what we were doing 25 yrs ago and unless schools are presently doing less than we were then, it's no different from what the schools are doing now either.As for "seeing this type of fatality so heavily represented" - well is that actually the case? I'm not saying it isn't, I'm asking a straight question - is the turn-back causing as many fatalities as is being suggested?

 

In my post #144 I asked you where you are getting your stats from but you haven't mentioned your source yet. I quite appreciate that you're in the industry and have your ear turned to the 'happenings' far more than I do, which is why I was/am asking for some real-world numbers. I'll go through the ATSB database when I have more time available but earlier this morning I read through all of the published accident/incident data on the RAAus site. There are 56 entries for 2014 and 177 for 2013. The 2014 descriptions are fairly complete, the majority of 2013 entries are missing details.

 

Based on what information is there, there have been five EFATOs reported in 2014, all with successful outcome, three were turn-backs from well above 500ft one was a return from engine trouble and a restart at 350ft and one landed ahead from 700ft. No apparent problems this year although I think two entries didn't have details due to pending investigation.

 

In 2013 a Storm went into trees after EFATO, the Super Diamond fatality doesn't have details, the Maverick at Texas didn't return to the airfield but may have been an attempted turn-back though there'd be no reason for it as the paddocks are clear for miles around according to the photos. The Lightwing in Tas lacks details but is perhaps mishandling after EFATO.

 

Like everyone else, I'm of the opinion that any fatal at all is too many but it would be unrealistic to expect that we will ever achieve a perfect safety record and so - and given the admittedly sketchy details available from that source alone - it wouldn't seem that we do have too serious an issue here from the few instances recorded there. However, if you have a better set of stats compiled could you please let us have access to them?

 

Something interesting did come out of my quick data-mining this morning though, I was shocked to keep reading the same thing over and over again, virtually every other entry, and that is clearly something the schools should be taking notice of, even more particularly if the same 'dead feet' or 'wrong feet' issue is partly responsible for EFATO and final turn mismanagement.

 

Loss of directional control......loss of directional control.......loss of directional control.......loss of directional control.......loss of directional control.......loss of directional control.......loss of directional control.......loss of directional control.......

Yes, I've noticed that, too. However, any pilot who can get a glider to gain height in a thermal, certainly does not suffer from lazy feet . . . .

 

 

[Yenn]

We will need to do more than stop fatalities to get a perfect safety record. You can survive a crash and be worse off than if you died, so we need to get a zero injury rate for perfection. Better cabins, better seat belts, head protection and whatever else you can think of would help, but stop all that loss of control.

 

 

[turboplanner]

My policy in Speedway was that it was a sport, not work, and you not only shouldn't expect to die enjoying it, but you also should not return home injured.

 

It's surprising what happens when everyone starts to think that way; for a few years the only injuries we were getting were green stick fractures from steering lash when hitting the fence and the odd broken leg.

 

 

[M61A1]

We will need to do more than stop fatalities to get a perfect safety record. You can survive a crash and be worse off than if you died, so we need to get a zero injury rate for perfection. Better cabins, better seat belts, head protection and whatever else you can think of would help, but stop all that loss of control.

We have the same issue on our roads, everyone is working to reduce injury, while completely ignoring the concept of "Don't Crash".

 

 

[turboplanner]

We have the same issue on our roads, everyone is working to reduce injury, while completely ignoring the concept of "Don't Crash".

You'd be surprised what we are working on and how pissed off we are that things like geometrically correct suspensions which absorb jounce and don't have bump steer (marketed as "radial tunes suspensions", and braking systems that are light years ahead of where we were are not as recognised as they should be.

 

 

[M61A1]

You'd be surprised what we are working on and how pissed off we are that things like geometrically correct suspensions which absorb jounce and don't have bump steer (marketed as "radial tunes suspensions", and braking systems that are light years ahead of where we were are not as recognised as they should be.

I bet it still wouldn't stop them crashing into stuff, we lack competence, not technology.

 

 

[eightyknots]

And im being simplistic...... What a helpful statement....

 

In the first .2 of a second after a threat is perceived the human body undergoes a massive massive change.:

 

• Acceleration of heart and lung action
   
   
  
• Paling or flushing, or alternating between both
   
   
  
• Inhibition of stomach and upper-intestinal action to the point where digestion slows down or stops
   
   
  
• General effect on the sphincters of the body
   
   
  
• Constriction of blood vessels in many parts of the body
   
   
  
• Liberation of metabolic energy sources (particularly fat and glycogen) for muscular action
   
   
  
• Dilation of blood vessels for muscles
   
   
  
• Inhibition of the lacrimal gland (responsible for tear production) and salivation
   
   
  
• Dilation of pupil (mydriasis)
   
   
  
• Relaxation of bladder
   
   
  
• Inhibition of erection
   
   
  
• Auditory exclusion (loss of hearing)
   
   
  
• Tunnel vision (loss of peripheral vision)
   
   
  
• Disinhibition of spinal reflexes
   
   
  
• Shaking
   
   
  

 

 

And my favourite, an absolute blast of adrenaline and other yummy chemicals.

 

...

Wow, that is a lot of things to happen to (a male) pilot in only 1/5 of a second M-M!

 

 

[motzartmerv]

Lol.. Sure is!!

 

 

[turboplanner]

A Formula 1 driver react in about 15/100 to 20/100 of a second and is on his way.

 

 

[eightyknots]

A level of confusion is added because your altimeter does not show height above aerodrome as usually set. So what about a small instrument that does? Taking that thought further, a single lamp that glows red until 700 feet, then Amber to 1000 feet then green. Parameters to be adjustable easily, like an App, to suit load, wind etc conditions. A turn- back lamp.

That is a brilliant idea PmcC:spot on: Now here is something for an entrepreneur to develop!

 

 

[David Isaac]

It is interesting that we use words like 'competency', 'experience' and 'hours' in the same sentence implying they are mutually inclusive. I would argue that such a conclusion is part of the problem. Stick the word 'currency' in and the whole dynamic changes.

 

 

[M61A1]

It is interesting that we use words like 'competency', 'experience' and 'hours' in the same sentence implying they are mutually inclusive. I would argue that such a conclusion is part of the problem. Stick the word 'currency' in and the whole dynamic changes.

I think that experience and currency are needed to be competent, but experience and currency do not necessarily guarantee competency.

 

 

[Ultralights]

experience and hours dont necessarily go together, as is this confession from a 32,000 hour B747 pilot......

 

" in the 747, i have 30,000 hours, not 30,000 hours experience, but 1 hours experience, 30,000 times"

[facthunter]

YOUR Attitude and the aircrafts are what matters. By 600 hours of good experience you could reach a high level of competence. At 1500 hours you may have fallen into dangerous complacency with short cuts in your procedures creeping in and " I am invincible, Accidents happen to OTHER people" being your attitude. Boredom is commonplace , and if you let it creep in you are not the right person for a job which has a high percentage of repetition but a need for very precise and appropriate decision making at short notice. Depending on the complexity , a large amount of good training is required, and this doesn't come cheaply. Knowing what is happening and what you are doing, can't be overstated in Aviation. You can't dumb it down without risks. Nev

 

 

[turboplanner]

Very interesting comment FH, and I assume that's for RPT pilots. It's a mirror for the theme of the book "The Killing Zone" by Paul A. Craig aimed at private pilots which look in great detail at what causes accident from after the pilot is out of the clutches of his training regime to about 300 hours, and one of the best books in understanding aviation safety I've seen. It instantly cured me of some nasty little habits I'd got into, and that same complacency.