E F A T O reference thread: quality information only :-)

[Oscar]

I can't comment at all on an EFATO turn-back scenario, but I can comment on some of the things we were taught (and DID learn, and apply - because whether it's a bang-off or a full actual break, the end result is the same - you end up back on the ground) about cable breaks.

 

First reaction - and when your feet are at about or above your face, you really do understand the imperative - push the stick forward, all the way, fast. In a Blanik with first-stage flap, you won't hesitate - the thing feels as if it's going to fall backwards. You had one hand on the cable release already, so you pulled that as the opposite movement to the stick.

 

Then you hold the stick fully forward as the earth comes back into view and continue to hold it forward and centralised until you can feel your bum back down on the seat. It takes quite sufficient time for that to happen for you to have a look forwards and decide what options you have, and also - by eye - what height you have to (possibly) turn in. By the time you've got the weight back on the bum you should have sorted whether to go straight or turn, so it's either keep the nose travelling down and pull brake and full flap for a forward descent, a variation of that if the bug-out landing spot is beyond the threshold, or check airspeed and carefully start your turn - and if the ailerons feel too light, kick the bugger straight and centre the stick immediately, then re-commence with some more speed in hand.

 

By the time you've done about 90 degrees of turn, the rest of the way down becomes pretty clear to plan and execute.

 

 

[Dafydd Llewellyn]

Firstly this is not coming from experience - I have far, far too little to suggest that.But I have been thinking about this a lot and wonder about a very simple 3 step technique.

 

1. Quickly get the nose down until your attitude visual looks like a final approach.

 

2. Trim full back - do not move the elevator from this position.

 

(Not forward. Not backward. Not at all)

 

3. Do what ever turns are going to get you to the best landing option at this attitude.

 

The logic for each point is as follows.

 

1 Obviously from a climb attitude we need to regain or at least maintain speed somewhere near best glide which is probably around where you were at Vx – Vy. But without power this will take a significant change in pitch. This is basic stuff. But the point is - without looking at your laggy ASI - pitch down until it looks like your approach attitude – something everyone even a low time student should recognise. This will be close to what you need.

 

2. I believe there is some reg which prevents any trim condition that allows a stall - so this is safe. Importantly, full back trim can be set without looking. On power systems they cut out automatically. Full back trim will give you an attitude for “near to” best glide. Necessarily best glide at less than MTOW, not necessarily best glide for wind penetration but the best glide you have time to set at only a few hundred feet AGL. Even you you don't get to full back trim. keep that "final approach" attitude

 

3. Now you can focus on manoeuvring - safely. Just make turns - as steep as you need - but no pitch changes. Provided you don’t pull back any further you can’t stall. If you can’t stall you can’t enter a spin- no matter how messy you footwork is. The attitude set is going to give you the best practical and safe use of the energy you have. Because without power that’s all you have.

 

The last thing to do flare to minimise contact angle and speed. But I think this is instinctive enough. This should be the only point you pull back.

 

At no time in this process did you look down at your airspeed, altitude or anything else. Your eyes and mind were always outside flying the plane.

 

Alright - I have put it out there - fire away...

Do you normally fly without looking at your speed? If so, I suggest you go and do some gliding; because in a glider it becomes very obvious that your only control of speed is via the pitch attitude (that's really true in any aeroplane; power just gives you a greater choice of pitch attitudes). You'll soon learn to maintain speed by pitch attitude; it becomes automatic. If you have trouble watching the skid ball, try putting a yaw string on the windscreen.

 

Next, the speed you need to fly at whilst you're turning is 1.5 times the flaps-up stall speed, NOT the speed for best glide. AFTER you have finished turning, you can reduce the speed to the best glide speed.

 

Thirdly, the trim setting will vary according to the centre of gravity. There's no requirement that full back trim should not stall the aircraft; it just happens that way at the forward CG limit. So you should trim for 1.5 Vs1, AND keep an eye on the ASI.

 

All this is just normal flying; the whole of the turn-back manoeuvre is simply a pre-planned piece of normal flying. Keep your adrenalin under control.

 

 

[nickduncs84]

BlurE I think there is danger in trying to over simplify something like you have. The issue centres on the fact that stall speed increases greatly with bank angle angle, which can sneak up and bite you if you are focused on making the turn instead of maintaining a safe AoA. I think in the real world it's a lot safer to do 3 things. Firstly, go out and practice how much altitude you lose making a 270 degree turn and then lining up for what would be a straight in to the departing runway. Make sure you wait a couple of seconds after pulling the power. Take the result and add a generous margin to it. Secondly, use that information to come up with various decision heights based on the conditions and airfield of the day. Finally, as you pass through each altitude, call it out loud and expect it to happen. So it may be:

 

1) takeoff, straight ahead

 

2) 300 ft, cross strip, some grass area of the field, whatever

 

3) 500 ft straight ahead to some predetermined crash zone off field

 

4) 700 ft established cross wind, coming back in on downwind runway

 

I think the mentality and practice is more important than trying to create rules about how you fly. If you've practiced it a thousand times and you know what the game plan is straight away, you give yourself the best chance.

 

The only other thing that I think would add to the safety margin is an AoA indicator both during your practice and in a real EFATO event.

 

Nick

 

 

[BlurE]

I suppose I am looking at it from a different perspective but I think it's worth some consideration if you bare with me.

 

Stall is the issue. Possibly stall leading to spin. But stall firstly. Good and experienced pilots are not coming to grief because they glided in 300 ft short of the fence - it's because of the extreme nose down attitude and 1000+ft/min rate - resulting from trying to reach too far and stalling.

 

Stall can occur at any speed, any attitude, any power setting - but at the same AoA. (We know bank angle + speed + load factor is a just clumsy process to get to an answer when you are not measuring AoA)

 

But Stall is also directly linked to sick position. Had that drummed in to me too.

 

Stick position is linked to elevator position so if to set the elevator (by trim) you just can't stall. Can't. (ok unless you CoG is way rearward- probably outside limits?)

 

It's sort of an extension a technique I read about fighter pilots that set an elevator position (by trim)and then that gives them the tightest maneuver - turn, climb, whatever. That's the curvy boundary of the flight envelope.

 

By trimming the point is - that the glide you achieve won't be perfect for you exact configuration - and you might still land short, but at least you didn't end up like those rather disturbing videos earlier in the thread.

 

I am trying to think of a way where even if distracted/terrified and not looking at your ASI or thinking am -am I at 35 or 45 degrees and how many g's and what is 1.4 times Vs anyway. Even if you are focused on the view outside - you don't get that stick back into you belly. You can focus on turns just turns to get you into that clear field, or road of edge of the strip of whatever. You can even change your mind when its clear that you can't reach. But as soon as you get that stick back trying to reach - it gets dangerous.

 

To be clear I am not advocating do any of this. As Nick says I am trying to simplify the whole thing. Maybe too much.

 

 

[turboplanner]

Here's an extract from "Stick and Rudder" by Wolfgang Langewiesche published in 1944 and renewed by him in 1972 and still one of the defining books of aircraft handling.

 

“Obviously it would be unsound to attempt to mininmize the seriousness of a forced landing when it does come, but it is important to point out that we often go a whole year without a fatality in the type of forced landing that the average pilot would regard as typical – a fatality growing out of a landing on rough terrain, with resulting overturning, ground looping, and that sort of thing – or from collisions with objects during the approach.

 

“What the pilot does not realize is that usually in a whole year’s crop of fatal accidents following a motor failure every one of the airplanes was found with the nose in the ground, tail in the air, spun in.

 

“That can only mean that the greatest hazard following motor failure is a loss of control of the airplane growing out of the pilots misusing the controls in attempting to maneuver excessively and abruptly.

 

“An airplane can spin only with the pilots help.

 

“Pilots who sustain a motor failure should instantly regard their then major risk as spinning the airplane.

 

“And they should realize that these spins are almost always out of turns – tight and quickly entered ones made in an effort either to get back to the take-off field or to get into position for an emergency landing in a random field.

 

“Actually, then, the real hazard following a motor failure is not the forced landing but the spin.

 

“When there isn’t any spin, airplanes are landed throughout the year in incredibly small places are unbelievably damaged in nose-overs, ground loops, and collisions without fatal injury to the occupants.”

 

From “The Killing Zone, How and Why Pilots die” by Paul A. Craig

 

“An engine failure on takeoff may be the pilot’s greatest challenge.

 

“The pilot’s immediate action will be the difference between life and death.

 

“If you get airborne over the runway and the engine gives you any trouble, your best solution is to reduce power and land straight ahead on the remaining runway. This is why we leave retractable gear down while there is any runway or clear zone ahead.

 

“The toughest problem exists between a point after the runway has passed behind and before enough altitude has been gained to turn around to the runway.

 

“More altitude will be lost in a gliding turn-around than in a straight-ahead glide. This fact makes the 180 degree turn at low altitude very hazardous. IN fact such a turn would actually be greater than 180 degrees.

 

“The turn back to the same runway as the takeoff would be more of a teardrop shape with an initial 210 degree turn followed by at least a 30 degree turn in the opposite direction to line up with the runway.

 

“The attempt to turn around and get back to the runway after an immediate engine failure has been termed the “impossible turn”

 

“Review the “Aerodynamic of a Turn” in Chapter 4 and you will understand that a turn places additional load on the airplane and raises the stall speed.

 

“In the instant that an engine failure occurs on takeoff, the pilot must remember that a turn back to the runway from a low altitude may be physically impossible.

 

The author then goes on to compare two incidents: one where the engine lost power crossing the end of the runway, the pilot spent time radioing that he had an engine failure, he was observed at 200 feet in a steep left bank and then the nose and left wing dropped and it went in nose first killing the pilot.

 

In the second incident when the engine failure occurred the pilot attempted a straight ahead landing and the worst case happened – the aircraft hit power lines, the empennage separated and remained entangled in the lines, the fuselage landed at the base of the surrounding trees and burned. The CFO rated pilot and student pilot were not injured.

 

 

[Dafydd Llewellyn]

I suppose I am looking at it from a different perspective but I think it's worth some consideration if you bare with me.Stall is the issue. Possibly stall leading to spin. But stall firstly. Good and experienced pilots are not coming to grief because they glided in 300 ft short of the fence - it's because of the extreme nose down attitude and 1000+ft/min rate - resulting from trying to reach too far and stalling.

Stall can occur at any speed, any attitude, any power setting - but at the same AoA. (We know bank angle + speed + load factor is a just clumsy process to get to an answer when you are not measuring AoA)

 

But Stall is also directly linked to sick position. Had that drummed in to me too.

 

Stick position is linked to elevator position so if to set the elevator (by trim) you just can't stall. Can't. (ok unless you CoG is way rearward- probably outside limits?)

 

It's sort of an extension a technique I read about fighter pilots that set an elevator position (by trim)and then that gives them the tightest maneuver - turn, climb, whatever. That's the curvy boundary of the flight envelope.

 

By trimming the point is - that the glide you achieve won't be perfect for you exact configuration - and you might still land short, but at least you didn't end up like those rather disturbing videos earlier in the thread.

 

I am trying to think of a way where even if distracted/terrified and not looking at your ASI or thinking am -am I at 35 or 45 degrees and how many g's and what is 1.4 times Vs anyway. Even if you are focused on the view outside - you don't get that stick back into you belly. You can focus on turns just turns to get you into that clear field, or road of edge of the strip of whatever. You can even change your mind when its clear that you can't reach. But as soon as you get that stick back trying to reach - it gets dangerous.

 

To be clear I am not advocating do any of this. As Nick says I am trying to simplify the whole thing. Maybe too much.

Sorry, but you have some very wrong-headed ideas. The stick position (and elevator angle) at which the wing stalls is entirely variable according to the aircraft CG position. So stick position IS NOT a reliable indicator of the proximity to stall. I know there's a school of thought that imagines that stick position can be used for this purpose, but that is not correct.

The best stall warning devices are either (i) an angle of attack indicator, or (ii) a device on the leading edge of the wing that detects when the front stagnation point moves past it; most stall-warning devices work on this principle, and they don't care what the CG position is.

 

I suggest you get hold of a copy of "Flight without Formulae" by Kermode, and read it thoroughly.

 

 

[djpacro]

Plus - a stall warning device on the leading edge of one wing - may not give any warning at all in a skidded turn.

 

 

[Head in the clouds]

Bandit, I really enjoy your posts too, so please don't take anything I say personally. I've given a lot of thought to your response and, whilst outwardly taking me to task, doesn't the broad message of your post seem to support what I said ...?

 

... hence many psychologists are better at diagnosis than treatment. That is where the science is at the moment ...

OK, so if this is in response to my statement about the labelling of ADHD, my comment suggested that ADHD was always there and was managed by schools and parents in earlier times, resulting in these ADHD 'sufferers' going on to make useful lives for themselves, whereas now with their label as an excuse they are 'entitled' to live off welfare and crime. As a further result I think it's the rest of us, the public in general, that have become the sufferers of their ADHD, but again that's just my opinion. You can call it diagnosis but I don't see how 'diagnosis' in this case is any different from the way I described it as 'giving it a label'. As you've said "many psychologists are better at diagnosis than treatment" so having given ADHD a name, and given that psychologists "aren't able to prescribe", what do they actually do to fix the problem? Precious little, based on the discussions I've had with the psychologists I know personally. And they are big-city ones BTW.

 

And that's just the point - labels are nothing more than labels, they don't fix the problem. There was a time when a couple of combatants would go outside the pub and trade a right cross and a left hook until one got satisfaction. More recently the media was full of reports of seriously injured or killed people as a result of being 'King hit'. It was clear that something had to be done, certain individuals were gaining street cred for their abilities to knock someone down with a single hit. Some bright spark decided the problem was the 'label', we must change the label. Call it the bully punch? No, better still, call it the 'coward punch'. So did that label, designed to bring shame upon the perpetrator, solve the problem? No, of course not, the occurrences are still on the increase, because the punch isn't the problem. At the time of delivering the punch the perpetrator doesn't see himself as a bully or a coward, he's drunk and whatever he does he has to be right, it should be called the 'hero punch', in his opinion. Sooner or later someone will twig to the real cause, it's the alcohol, all night drinking is the problem and no amount of labels given to the actions of drunks will fix it.

 

... is clearly flavoured by your belief (not knowledge) of how psychologists work ...

Now that's a bit rich - I'll have you know I've watched every single episode of Cracker

 

... For the naysayers who question the value of psychological research into aviation, I challenge you to answer this. What good (on a broad scale) is talking about it on a forum doing? And if the industry and pilots continue to do the same as they are currently, how do you expect anything to change? If the psychologists and researchers come out with nothing useful, the chances are that nothing will be any worse ...

I hope I don't come across as a naysayer, because I certainly am not. I support anything at all that might further the development or safety of aviation. But that doesn't mean I'm a yes man either, I do question everything because, as discussed above, I believe there is too much emphasis placed on 'someone gotta do something' and then 'it's all OK, someone did something'. When we don't closely examine what 'someone did' we often assume all is well/has been fixed when it isn't/hasn't.

 

And I sincerely hope that psychologists and researchers would generally enter into a program with more than a hope that the outcome would be no worse than the present situation, otherwise it would seem a bit futile even starting out ...

 

There's a good example in helicopters that closely resembles this turn-back thing. Flying too slow close to the ground, or hovering too high, or hover-climbing, all place you below a curved line on a chart where it is supposedly impossible to make an auto-rotational landing in event of a power failure. That chart is called the Height/Velocity Chart and unfortunately pilots frequently operated below the curve and often paid the price if they had an engine or power transmission failure while doing so. So - a label was needed. The schools started calling it the 'Dead man's curve'. That ought to scare people into taking notice surely? Interestingly, and co-incidentally, the associated crash occurrences did reduce but it was due to the advent of small turbine power-trains with greatly increased reliability, in fact you see people deliberately operating under the Dead-man's curve more frequently than ever these days.

 

Hopefully, with the appropriate scrutiny of more aviation-based people than just those currently embarked on this particular piece of psychological research into the 'turn-back manoeuvre' (I'll be sticking with the original name until something convinces me otherwise) we might come out with more than just a new name (label) for it. New labels would just be a case of being "better at diagnosis than treatment" and won't do anything to fix the problem. That's already been tried as we know - someone decided to call it the 'Impossible Turn' instead. All that does is encourage some of us (yes, I'd probably be one) to demonstrate that there's nothing impossible about it, it's just a turn-back manoeuvre. Sure, it's very unforgiving if you get it wrong. If you're too low, if you skid the turn, if you fail at downwind ground-related flying, or a number of other possibilities, you will probably crash. Would calling it the 'Improbable Turn' be better, or perhaps the 'Inadvisable Turn'?

 

Would it stop people trying it if we call it the 'Stupid Dumb-Ass Turn'? I doubt it. If we just keep practicing it over and over, with idling engine, at different heights and in different conditions our students will soon learn to recognise when it's the Impossible Turn and when it's the Better Option - it's just a matter of practice, practice and practice, in my opinion.

 

 

[Dafydd Llewellyn]

There is no substitute for competence.

 

 

[facthunter]

Intelligent commentary may lead to loneliness. Nev

 

 

[M61A1]

There is no substitute for competence.

Is competence then, well educated or well practiced, or both? It seems that we sure get a lot of education thrown our way.

 

 

[facthunter]

It's for your edification. Nev

 

 

[Dafydd Llewellyn]

Is competence then, well educated or well practiced, or both? It seems that we sure get a lot of education thrown our way.

Both. I see this issue as being fundamentally one of inadequate training. It comes down to this:

1. Either you have sufficient height to perform the turn-back manoeuvre at the point of engine failure, or you do not.

 

2. If you do not, then DO NOT TURN BACK.

 

3. To know that you have sufficient height to turn back, you need three things:

 

(a) A knowledge of the typical height loss YOUR AIRCRAFT will undergo in the turn-back manoeuvre AS FLOWN BY YOU. You should find this by performing the manoeuvre necessary to get you back to the point at which the engine stopped, heading in the opposite direction. Do this test at 5000 feet AGL, a number of times, average the resultant height loss, and multiply it by 1.5 or so. Add 100 feet for obstacle clearance. This becomes the "safety height" at which you must cross the upwind end of the runway, on climb out, in order to have sufficient height to turn back.

 

(b) A means to readily verify that your height exceeded the "safety height" as you take-off - e.g. a mark on the altimeter glass.

 

© Your climb gradient up to the point of engine failure, must exceed the best glide gradient for your aircraft. This will set a maximum density altitude beyond which the foregoing criteria will not be valid. The necessary information to determine that should be available in the flight manual; if it is not, you will have to determine it by test (something to do whilst you are flying-off the mandatory hours, on a -19 or experimental aircraft). If you change the propeller, this will need to be re-established.

 

One could constitute the criterion in other ways; however it needs to be a black-or-white criterion, so the decision is already made for you as you cross the upwind end of the runway.

 

 

[Oscar]

Surely, the AGL criterion needs to be varied according to terrain? For instance, if taking off from Mittagong (YMIG) on 24 with a bit of headwind, you could get to 600 AGL fairly quickly- and before the curl-over from the hill south of the 24 runway, but the turn back would have you end up in the downwash, dumping you on the ground rather sooner than a simple climb gradient/glide gradient calculation would indicate?

 

 

[Dafydd Llewellyn]

Surely, the AGL criterion needs to be varied according to terrain? For instance, if taking off from Mittagong (YMIG) on 24 with a bit of headwind, you could get to 600 AGL fairly quickly- and before the curl-over from the hill south of the 24 runway, but the turn back would have you end up in the downwash, dumping you on the ground rather sooner than a simple climb gradient/glide gradient calculation would indicate?

There are a number of factors that would bear on a simple criterion; however, since it's based on a still-air condition, if you're taking off into a headwind, your upwind climb gradient will be increased and your downwind glide will take you further, so to a degree, the downwash due to the headwind coming over the ridge would be compensated for by the advantage due to the direct wind velocity. The further upwind you get before the engine quits, the greater the effects from both causes, so it all balances out, to a degree. I've outlined the basic principle; the refinements to it will surely become obvious as people start to apply it.

 

 

[nomadpete]

This is a very interesting thread. I have just discovered it so please bear with my comments which hark back somewhat. There has been much valuable discourse about the physics of the 'turn back maneuver'. There has also been a lot about psychology and training. I only wish to comment on these last items.

 

Firstly, here is my anecdote:

 

A RAAus Instructor was providing type conversion training. Upon landing, the student bounced the aircraft. The instructor called 'My aircraft' and the student (having already given full power and levelled the wings) handed control over. The instructor took hold of the stick and.............. did nothing. He froze. The aircraft proceeded through a ditch and came to rest without it's undercarriage. Later enquiries revealed that another pilot had previously experienced a similar scenario with the same instructor, but had saved the aircraft. They reported "If I hadn't taken the control back we'd still be bouncing down the strip".

 

My point is this:

 

How can we identify those people who are prone to Freeze (instead of Fight or Flight or Reason), from becoming pilots? Especially how can we prevent this type from becoming signed out as an instructor? Don't just say that my story is a isolated case because there are probably many folk who may freeze regardless of their training and we should be able to use psychology to identify the cause and address it. And here, I'm not just referring to the accepted 3 or 4 seconds required for logical reasoning to be activated. When the instructor took control, all of his automated training should have had him 'fly the plane' away from the ground.

 

In the turn back scenario, reaction time lost means the difference between success and tragedy.

 

Peter

 

 

[Dafydd Llewellyn]

I'm not an RAA instructor; I used to be a GFA instructor, in the '70s and '80s. Back then, we understood that everybody has a "freeze" point, and at ab-initio stage it's likely to be pretty low; and it is the function of the instructor to progressively raise the student's "freeze" point by gradually increasing his level of competence and responsibility; spin training was an important part of that process. So "freezing" IS related to training - but there are varying levels of performance between individuals. An instructor who "freezes" is a clear indication of a failure of the system. This was the reason why the GFA had senior instructors, and (back then) a categorizing instructor who had flown ME 109s in WW2. There weren't any "freezing" instructors who got past him. That's one way, and it works. Maybe there's another, via psychological screening, but does it work?

 

 

[Bandit12]

Bandit, I really enjoy your posts too, so please don't take anything I say personally. I've given a lot of thought to your response and, whilst outwardly taking me to task, doesn't the broad message of your post seem to support what I said ...?

HITC, I couldn't agree more with regards to the mostly pointless use of labels, and even more so to the changing of a name in the hopes that somehow something else will change. I was particularly highlighting the dramatic overuse of labelling, and it is part of a much bigger systemic failure to cope. There are lots of contributors, including health services and insurers that won't provide services without a diagnosis, that are also driving the label industry. I was teaching psychological assessment this year in the Masters program, and hopefully imparted my dislike of labelling to the next generation of psychs - except where the label is useful of course.

 

As far as a hope to make a difference through research, that is of course always the goal. Don't forget though that hypothesis testing also includes the null hypothesis - that the fancy new theory we came up with will do nothing at all. I have no doubt that there is lots that could be done, but the impact on everyone might be perceived to be worse than what it cures. I signed up as a participant recently in a motorcycle study, looking at the use of automatic braking for collision avoidance. I'm curious but not so sure I'm keen on having braking control run by a computer, nor the increased cost of the system when a new bike is purchased. Similarly I reckon that we could design a psych assessment for turn backs, risk taking behaviour, or even instructors or pilots that are at risk of freezing (as nomadpete was describing) but then we run the risk of it being enforced as a barrier to stop these people from even getting to fly.

 

Personally I am not against the impossible turn, or whatever the heck we want to call it. Obviously it has been demonstrated plenty of times, and failed in many more occasions. I figure it is better to train people to it - at least demonstrating the circumstances (height/wind conditions/particular aircraft) in which it really is impossible. Even doing it in a simulator would probably help to improve awareness of the complexities and risks involved. But it is perhaps something that needs to be retrained every BFR to really stay current. While we are at it, bring back spin training and unusual attitudes as well!

 

 

[Bandit12]

Maybe there's another, via psychological screening, but does it work?

Probably not without being unnecessarily prohibitive. To weed out those at risk on the basis of screening would also involve weeding out a lot more who aren't really at risk just to be effective. I suspect that freezing is more or less just cognitive overload - stress getting on the way of processing information effectively. Training techniques will reduce stress responses, just look at the heart rate of an aerobatic pilot in a spin vs someone who has never done it. You can also train people to cope with stress better.

 

 

[Dafydd Llewellyn]

Well, it comes down to getting out there and doing it, n'est-ce pas?

 

 

[metalman]

Went for a lap with a mate in his RV last week, his pre take off included no turn back below 1000agl,,,,,,,I personally have the same decision height,,,,,and his 23000 hours flying everything but the box they came in makes me feel good about having the same attitude.

 

I'm not sure of the figure but I've heard it said that you'll lose a percentage of your skill in an emergency ,,,,very hard to factor that into the degrees, feet and angle equations,,,,,simple is better.

 

My first instructor taught turn backs at 500agl,,,,,,,I count him as a f**kwit in my aviation journey,,,,my next instructor taught 30 degrees either side of the nose on climb and no thought of turning back till the downwind turn( he is a much better instructor ), it's possible to make it below that but the stakes are high if you get it " just a little wrong"

 

Matty

 

 

[Gnarly Gnu]

...a categorizing instructor who had flown ME 109s in WW2. There weren't any "freezing" instructors who got past him. That's one way, and it works.

He shot them?

 

 

[Dafydd Llewellyn]

Only figuratively; he was a cheerful Bavarian type, very friendly - lovely fellow. They just did not get to be CFIs.

 

 

[Dafydd Llewellyn]

Went for a lap with a mate in his RV last week, his pre take off included no turn back below 1000agl,,,,,,,I personally have the same decision height,,,,,and his 23000 hours flying everything but the box they came in makes me feel good about having the same attitude.I'm not sure of the figure but I've heard it said that you'll lose a percentage of your skill in an emergency ,,,,very hard to factor that into the degrees, feet and angle equations,,,,,simple is better.

My first instructor taught turn backs at 500agl,,,,,,,I count him as a f**kwit in my aviation journey,,,,my next instructor taught 30 degrees either side of the nose on climb and no thought of turning back till the downwind turn( he is a much better instructor ), it's possible to make it below that but the stakes are high if you get it " just a little wrong"

 

Matty

Well, unless you go and test your decision height systematically, you won't know, will you?

 

 

[facthunter]

Nothing beats knowing what you are doing. Just using numbers will not work fully though it may help define some quickly assessed limits .There are so many different factors to take into account on single engine A/C engine failure just after initial take off. ie Head wind, cross wind, climb angle achieved, height lost in a turn, ROD at best glide speed the existence of other runways, the nature of the landing area ahead etc ( Add some of your own).

 

A few points stand out. A strong headwind makes the landing ahead more safe. IF you have a crosswind , turning into it helps after take off. You must not lose control of the aircraft. This is the cause of most damage.

 

With aircraft having the stall speeds of RAAus planes, with a bit of headwind the landing straight ahead (and a 30 degree turn possibility) is eminently survivable, with minor damage to the plane, whereas a turn back not guaranteed to work, has the potential for the pilot, and anyone else on board, to be severely injured or killed.

 

I have no intention of discussing ways of minimising the energy use in the turn technique(s) here on this forum. You can easily practice course reversals at a safe height and note the height loss for a reversal for yourself and a particular AEROPLANE. The time you spend in the turn becomes a factor so there is a need to steepen it. This requires you practice to a stage where YOUR steep turns execution and spiral recognition and QUICK recovery are sharp.. Nev