E F A T O reference thread: quality information only :-)

[SDQDI]

If you not taking off you will never have an efato but this thread is about efato so let's stick to talking about efato's

 

 

[Dafydd Llewellyn]

Well, you are entitled to your opinion, of course.

 

However, when using my aircraft for private business travel, I've made the odd precautionary landing due to weather (PA 28), or oiled-up plugs in one cylinder (Auster), or found that fuel wasn't available where it should have been (Jabiru), because the delivery truck broke down; there are a variety of things that can make it desirable to stop flying for the day, in a place that is not as good as one might wish for the subsequent takeoff. I've also made my share of outlandings in gliders, as well as aero tow retrieves, as a tug pilot; there are cases where one shakes one's head and says "go get the trailer, fellahs".

 

If one is to take into account the added strip length or clearway necessary for safety in an EFATO situation, the airstrip requirements are going to be more demanding than if one is prepared to just scrape over the fence. A precautionary landing in a paddock is surely preferable to trying to push on in marginal VMC. If you do a lot of cross-country flying under VFR, you are going to experience this. I know from these experiences that finding a paddock one can safely fly out of, is much harder than finding one solely to land in; so the freedom to choose what you need right now, rather than what you will need when the weather clears up, can be a considerable safety factor. And even more so, if you take EFATO risk into account.

 

This is what a trailer allows. Yes, it's a nuisance having to go home & get it; however, if you're using the aircraft for recreation, trailering it to where the fun is, is not necessarily such a silly idea. Also, you can perhaps use the trailer as an alternative to a tent under the wing; and have wheels available to go get fuel, or whatever.

 

 

[turboplanner]

Ho ho ho, I'm not the trailer guy!

 

Getting back to topic if someone can find Facthunter's brilliant assessment of the turn back issues and Motz decides to break the big story about his psychiatrist/psychologist this thread nearly beats the other two or three.

 

 

[motzartmerv]

Ill break the story through the proper channels Tubz.. Having the armchair brigade endorse it wont be high on the list of priorities..

 

 

[Bikky]

Despite all the differing opinions (I won't say bickering), this is the most useful thread on a vitally important topic I have read in a long time.

 

Thanks guys!

 

 

[Ultralights]

not many trailers around Bankstown airport!

 

 

[turboplanner]

 

Was this an EFATO Ultralights?

 

He apparently glided between two hangars when he found he was too low.

 

Have a look at the strength of that undercarriage!

 

 

[Oscar]

Despite your goading scepticism, Merv, I've HAD my moment of ignoring my better judgement and taking off when I felt very unsure about it, but did it anyway (an HF situation, well before HF was properly considered: fatigue, dehydration and a blazing sinus migraine - I only got in the damn thing because the CFI wanted someone capable to move it to the other strip in a nasty crosswind, and I happened to be standing around, not intending to fly that day anyway). I all but blacked out at 2000 feet, managed to force myself to stay awake long enough to pull full brake and get the thing safely on the ground, and then blacked out before the landing run was completed. I woke up with someone's fingers on my neck shouting 'it's ok, he has a pulse', parked most untidily on the strip but with an undamaged aircraft and an undamaged me.

 

In my book, you've used up your luck with one instance like that. So yes, if I am seriously concerned about the potential of the take-off, whether that's a result of the airfield situation or weather or mechanical factors, with the knowledge that I have another option available, I will use that option. I am more than happy to be labelled as an overly-cautious old coot than remembered as having ended up as a splat on the ground somewhere.

 

 

[motzartmerv]

Tubz. See the red aeroplane sitting there? ultralights was actually in that aeroplane when this engine failure on downwind occurred (i believe).

 

Oscar, that situation you described sounds nasty and thank god you had the sense to pull up. It would be a cold day in hell before I would argue with any pilot against the better judgement of not taking off in conditions or in an aircraft that they determined to be un suitable, above their capabilities etc.

 

Overly cautious is my middle name, and while your brothers stories of 'sitting it out" are useful, they are nothing that any pilot with any sort of experience would not have been through. Mate ive lost count of how many times ive been forced down, forced to over nght, forced to alter a plan etc. Its part of the game.

 

I, just 2 days ago, returned from a ferry job from perth to gladstone for a swap of aircraft, then gladstone to jaspers. All in 5 days (at 90kts) while racing weather I could see at my destination airfield 3 days in advance. But not once did I land at an airfield I had not called before I took off, to check if fuel was available, accommodation options etc. Its all part of planning.

 

So yes, im more than in agreement with you that sitting it out when things aren't right is the ONLY option.

 

My contention is the notion that de rigging and trailering out is an option for us all with the determining factor being 'insufficient landing options in an EFATO". I dont think thats a reasonable option thats available to the majority of pilots.

 

 

[poteroo]

[GALLERY=media, 3221]Imported Item by poteroo posted Sep 30, 2013 at 4:22 PM[/GALLERY] Talk us through your EFATO actions here! happy days,

[motzartmerv]

...Strewth.. I will, if you talk me through getting a trailer to the top of mount whannahackaloogie in papua..lol

[Oscar]

My contention is the notion that de rigging and trailering out is an option for us all with the determining factor being 'insufficient landing options in an EFATO". I dont think thats a reasonable option thats available to the majority of pilots.

Merv - on this we are in agreement - trailering / trucking out is almost never a conscious option, (other than for gliders) because of the lack of equipment and people with suitable recovery experience, and certainly, the rules about who can touch what on what and in what circumstances. However - perhaps it's something that should be considered more, because in reality it doesn't cost a huge amount to set up a decent trailer. The relevance to EFATO training is simply this: the (surely) most certain way to avoid a nasty ending to an EFATO is to not take off in the first place?

 

Sounds glib? - it's worth consideration. If the risk element is too much to accept - whether that because of the terrain, the possible mechanical condition of the aircraft, or even simply an 'I don't think I have the skills to handle an EFATO here', what can one do? It's pretty easy to see the concept of 'I can't just leave it here' becoming the determinant of action, that's pretty natural. If it's a matter of lack of confidence in one's own skills (which I would have, until / unless my power flying skill level is far higher than it is at the moment), probably the first option is to see if someone who DOES have the skills is prepared to fly it out. If one landed at a marginal site because of a mechanical issue - even just a precautionary - the whole ball game is surely elevated to another notch unless you can absolutely guarantee the the 'issue' is 100% sorted. That N.Z. beach (non) take-off is a bit of a classic of having ended up where one wouldn't have wanted to be, and pushing on because the 'problem' was sorted - ignoring the other problems..

 

I would imagine that your psychologists could identify the likelihood of an extra factor of stress in the case of taking off already primed up with a feeling that 'if anything happens, I'm in deep cacky here'. Maybe it simply sharpens the reflexes, I don't know.

 

 

[motzartmerv]

Yes thats an interesting point. And one of the things we are trying to explain. How do we react when we have a preconceived idea about whats going to happen/ verses an abnormal situation jumping out of the blue.

 

The pre take off safety brief is pretty much standard issue these day (i hope). If it sh!ts, I will lower the nose, bla bla.

 

My psych friends are in agreement that this will help. But they think it needs to be elevated a notch to say:

 

" I am going to lift off and then land in that paddock over there, or that road over there etc. When your climbing out your setting yourself up mentally to land in the paddock. Not cringing hoping it doesnt fail. As your paddock (option) passes under you you move onto the next paddock where you are going to land.Or your next "path of least resistance"

 

They have data showing the reaction times when confronted with a sudden change vary greatly depending on the state of mind/ activity of the person when it happens.

 

Acting on an "existing mental plan" is by far the best result , as apposed to " calculating, judging heights, assessing etc" This takes time and mental 'space'

 

The thinking is the training should not be focused on sudden shocking reduction of power, but rather pre planned, pre organised approaches down into (towards) paddocks form various stages on upwind. Initiated by calm patter " the engine is about to fail and we are going to land in that paddock" Rather then " Silence" The engines failed, where are we going?"

 

The difference is subtle, but according to those that are in the know, this will set the pilot up in "landing mode" NOT takeoff mode, which we believe if performed often during AB intio, will embed in the " psyche" of the pilot and he will from then on, always be taking off in " Landing mode".

 

 

[Head in the clouds]

I think we're drifting away from the point of the thread here, with all this trailering business. Whilst trailers might be a great thing in some circumstances, and they are, I used to trailer my ultralights everywhere in the 1980s because I never had a hangar, and it was great, it meant that I went to many different places to fly from and camped in the trailer over the weekend. It made the flying far more varied and I met many more people than I do these days.

 

BUT - if we discuss trailering the aircraft out, however wise an option that may be on occasions, then granted we won't have EFATOs in unsuitable terrain/conditions/whatever, but this is supposed to be about EFATO management rather than EFATO avoidance.

 

I, for one, welcome Poteroo's contribution of the mountain airstrip and dozens of strips like that are used many times daily for basic supply and transport in remote areas. I've flown out of some like that and many more cut out of horizon-to-horizon tropical forest and when doing so you need more than blind faith that the engine will keep running AND a plan other than crashing straight ahead if it doesn't. Knowing the height and position at which you can consider turning back is critical to improved safety in those circumstances.

 

 

[Head in the clouds]

Yes thats an interesting point. And one of the things we are trying to explain. How do we react when we have a preconceived idea about whats going to happen/ verses an abnormal situation jumping out of the blue.The pre take off safety brief is pretty much standard issue these day (i hope). If it sh!ts, I will lower the nose, bla bla.

My psych friends are in agreement that this will help. But they think it needs to be elevated a notch to say:

 

" I am going to lift off and then land in that paddock over there, or that road over there etc. When your climbing out your setting yourself up mentally to land in the paddock. Not cringing hoping it doesnt fail. As your paddock (option) passes under you you move onto the next paddock where you are going to land.Or your next "path of least resistance"

 

They have data showing the reaction times when confronted with a sudden change vary greatly depending on the state of mind/ activity of the person when it happens.

 

Acting on an "existing mental plan" is by far the best result , as apposed to " calculating, judging heights, assessing etc" This takes time and mental 'space'

 

The thinking is the training should not be focused on sudden shocking reduction of power, but rather pre planned, pre organised approaches down into (towards) paddocks form various stages on upwind. Initiated by calm patter " the engine is about to fail and we are going to land in that paddock" Rather then " Silence" The engines failed, where are we going?"

 

The difference is subtle, but according to those that are in the know, this will set the pilot up in "landing mode" NOT takeoff mode, which we believe if performed often during AB intio, will embed in the " psyche" of the pilot and he will from then on, always be taking off in " Landing mode".

This all sounds terrific, there's no doubt that it's the way to go, but isn't that just exactly what we're doing now?

 

In the first introduction of EFATO with our students we would have a classroom briefing explaining what we proposed to do. All early EFATO exercises involved progressively (slowly) closing the throttle during the climb-out at around 500ft and the student was well briefed about it, and they had been briefed to lower the nose as quickly as necessary to not lose any airspeed, and that it would mean lowering the nose faster than they ever had before in upper air engine failure practice, and they were to plan to land ahead in a clear area selected from about 30* each side of straight ahead. Before doing it themselves it was demonstrated to them, as all training exercises were.

 

Then we'd practice it intermixed with other training exercises. In the early stages the power was reduced after a verbal warning, later it was with a very gradual reduction of power without any verbal warning and later still it might be done at any time and quite abruptly on occasions.

 

Later, as the student became fully proficient and not at all fazed when simulated power failures occurred we would progress to EFATOs at lower level with landing ahead and then later still to EFATOs at a sufficient height where returning to the strip was straightforward. Just prior to that we would conduct downwind landing practice, beginning with one-way strips where you land downwind/uphill and take-off into wind downhill, we're fortunate to have a few to choose from around here.

 

Once that was all instilled we'd move on to the 'difficult decision' phase where power failures might happen at a height or in wind/loading/temperature conditions where it's harder to judge whether you'd make it back safely or not. Trying, but then discovering that they wouldn't make it back and having to re-apply power provided the student with benchmarks to use in judging whether to return or to choose to land ahead even if the ground wasn't the best.

 

There wasn't ever any " calculating, judging heights, assessing etc" because there wasn't a need for it, the student learned to make judgements based on the sight picture i.e. angles, not calculations or actual height assessment. That doesn't mean that Dafydd's altimeter mark method wouldn't be useful as an extra go/no go decision point aide.

 

So I can't see that your psychs are proposing anything new or different, unless instructors these days are just slamming the throttle shut on their students and letting them work it out for themselves without prior briefings and discussions, and/or aren't introducing the whole EFATO thing gently and progressively - mind you I have come across a couple of 'instructors' like that.

 

 

[Ultralights]

 

yep, i was there that day, pilot did a good job to get it down, and no, it wasnt an EFATO, he ran out of fuel on downwind, but thats a different matter altogether, he did keep the nose a bit high and stalled it on, but he did a good job in that he didnt try to turn onto the runway, and landed across the grass..

there is another student here at the school at bankstown who wanted thurther training in planning after he landed at fairfield after running out of fuel on a trip from ballina... the training levels at some GA schools can be atrocious

 

as for the EFATO... its part of the advanced aircraft control training at some schools, its not about making it back to the field, but how not to loose control of the aircraft in a steep turn on the limit of the stall... as Merv has pointed out, the issue isnt making it back, its the loss of control trying to perform manoeuvres at the edge of the envelope in a high stress and high pressure situation... most, including myself at first, found themselves pushing hard rudder to quicken the turn back, while flying close to the stall, thats what kills most who attempt the tunrback.

 

 

[Head in the clouds]

..... most, including myself at first, found themselves pushing hard rudder to quicken the turn back, while flying close to the stall, thats what kills most who attempt the tunrback.

I think you've hit the nail on the head there. Would you say that more attention needs to be paid to ensuring that trainees have not only embraced the theoretical understanding, but also adopted the physical practice of the quickest way to turn an aeroplane - i.e. in balance, or is stress always going to lead to poor handling practices?

 

 

[facthunter]

Rob has told us he was applying extra rudder and someone picked it up. That's fine. Unbalanced turns (of the normal type) are not safe. They should be balanced end of story. It's a bad habit. If you make a point of NOT doing them, you should not revert to them easily under "pressure".. IF you believe there are times when they help to increase the turn rate, YOU have a problem to sort out. Talk it through with a good instructor and go do some flying and try a few things. Nev

 

 

[Oscar]

Taking a couple of Merv's points and trying to join the dots...

 

I believe very strongly that 'having a plan of action' firmly in mind is likely to be a major factor in effectively managing an emergency situation. The human mind operates to a very considerable degree on using 'templates' it has established through experience (it's too complicated to discuss in a thread, but the phenomenon of 'deja vu' is regarded as the ultimate connection of an existing 'template' with a particular set of conditions, that makes us think we have been here before..) The closer we are to a 'template' situation, the less likely we are to be discombobulated by a situation in an emergency and we can initiate the correct sequences of actions as a reflex action rather than having to compute the situation. That's what 'training' instills: 'X' happens: do 'Y', and 'Z' is the result.

 

Having a 'template' established allows us to concentrate on the differences of the specific situation. That's an enormous advantage in terms of the headspace we have (or call it, if you like, 'bandwidth' to manage the situation). If we have 'muscle memory' for things like feeling the aircraft reaction in terms of whether we are headed for an incipient spin in the turn, we have more cognitive space left for selecting the best option for that current situation. More cognitive space = less tendency to freeze from overload.

 

The idea of having a pre-determined 'turn-back is possible' indicator attached to the altimeter seems to me to be a rather useful idea. We have various speed settings inscribed on the ASI, we are used to checking the instruments before initiating an action. We are (supposedly, at least, although I suspect the ATSB files would show that too many pilots don't do the stuff correctly, or at all) required to make a number of calculation before take-off: W&B, fuel, pressure altitude and temp. T/O distance etc.. I think that setting a 'turn-back option' height indicator indicator on the altimeter would be a damn good exercise that reinforces the EFATO 'template' idea - or in less obscure terms, the 'plan of action' to be followed. Being in a position to 'tick-off' an EFATO response action of 'turn back' as one climbs out, would reduce the decision-making load and the 'oh, sh1t load'. Effectively, it opens up the strip behind one as a 'potential paddock', as Merv has said.

 

As an aside: with modern electronics, one doesn't need a damn slide rule and a chart to do these calculations, the average 'smart' mobile phone has enough power for apps. that a suitable app. could be developed that spits out the 'set it here' figure - then you add your personal estimate of a fudge factor for your capability, the terrain, etc. Punch in the numbers, think about the actual situation, set the indicator...

 

Now here's a serious (and not intended to be combative) question for Merv. Merv, you are the CFI of a commercial FTF. Can I take it as accepted that a safe landing that does not damage the aircraft, automatically ensures the safety of the aircraft occupants (apart from, perhaps, flipping their wigs)? In the case of an EFATO, would you rather have: a) the aircraft land in the best possible situation - that being a safe turn-back - or b) landing in a paddock requiring at the minimum expensive retrieval (unless you have a handy trailer..) with likely damage that you have to have repaired at cost to your insurance premiums and loss of income for the aircraft while repairs are carried out, or c): having tried a turn-back with inadequate height and seriously damaged the aircraft and themselves?

 

A disc of perspex with a line on it and a dob of glycerine to attach it to the altimeter is what - $2.00? An app. for the pilot to easily calculate where to set the line - say $25? The reinforcement of what action to take when the fan stops: maybe not priceless, but what value would you place on it?

 

 

[motzartmerv]

Oscar I would have to go with b)

 

Any situation tht resulted in the survival of the occupants is my only concern. The aeroplanes ae insured and are of secondary consideration. .

 

HIC if what we are already doing was working, then why do we still see this type of fatality so heavily represented?

 

We also do stalling training but people are still stalling turning base aren't they. I for one am always lookig for ways to improve my techniques, and wish never to be stuck on " this is how I do it and it's the only way". Maybe when I'm a cranky old bastard that's been training people dor 190 years I'll feel differently. But until then I'll avoid the dangerous and stagnate attitude that I have all the answers and how I do it now is the only way. Never stop learning as they say;)

 

 

[Guest Andys@coffs]

I reckon Merv hit it on the head " I had turned back with my failure on early crosswind before I logically thought about it... I don't remember the first 45ish degrees of the turn or making the decision to do it......As soon as my logical brain was back on line and out of bypass, I reacted to events that were happening and I made the best of them, but in that first 45 degrees of turn if I got it wrong then as soon as I was back on line (and it may only have been 1 sec or less) life would have been infinitely more difficult trying to recover from a stalled wing etc.....

 

I cant help but think I could practise and talk to myself about what I would do if X occurs till blue in the face, if the same small micro period of loss of awareness and associated decision making occurs then I'll again have a completely different set of circumstances to deal with than what was the case when the engine conked.....

 

I don't know if that's a failing of me, where I loose for a period of time conscious thought of what I will do, or would it be better to simply freeze and do nothing.....I do know its not under conscious control in my case and therefore there doesn't seem to me to be much I can do to combat it. I accept that some of you wont have any loss of conscious control, and I equally accept that some of you will, but will freeze, and therefore when you come back on line may not even realise you were off line for some time.... In any case I all I have is the cards I was dealt!

 

Andy

 

 

[pmccarthy]

A level of confusion is added because your altimeter does not show height above aerodrome as usually set. So what about a small instrument that does? Taking that thought further, a single lamp that glows red until 700 feet, then Amber to 1000 feet then green. Parameters to be adjustable easily, like an App, to suit load, wind etc conditions. A turn- back lamp.

 

 

[SDQDI]

The sliding card on the altimeter while being a good idea doesn't take into account the main problem with turning back which is loss of control, now if experienced pilots are loosing control of the aircraft the main problem doesn't seem to be insufficient height for the turn but loss off control due to the stress of the EFATO so we can talk till we are blue in the face about how high we need to be to have enough room to turn but if we still lose control at low level we haven't even come close to solving the problem. I agree with those who have said we need to do more low level training and I think that is imperative to fixing the problem. Most of our training we are taught not to be doing turns below 500 feet and I think when we do it under stressful conditions that it is just asking for trouble.

 

So while the altimeter slide card is a good idea it is useless without currency in low level manoeuvring, currency being the word if you haven't done it for a few weeks then your asking for trouble, seems that the straight ahead option while possibly doing damage to the plane is still the safest option for the majority of us.

 

 

[Dafydd Llewellyn]

[GALLERY=media, 3221]Imported Item by poteroo posted Sep 30, 2013 at 4:22 PM[/GALLERY] Talk us through your EFATO actions here! happy days,

Um- is this relevant to RECREATIONAL flying? Looks like Twin Otter territory to me.

 

 

[motzartmerv]

A mate of mine told me a trick he uses when hes concerned about landing areas on upwind.

 

He takes note of the airfield QNH, then before takeoff, sets 0 in his ALT regardless of elevation. He knows his machine very well and picks his turn back height mentally.

 

That way the alt is always reading height AGL so a quick glance is all thats needed. After departure he returns the Alt to AMSL.

 

A certain instructor may or may not have included this trick (in some circumstances) as part of his training..