Lismore accident

[RKW]

Trish and Kathy, the faith and hope that you refer to, is all we have. As for closure, there is no such thing. I think it is an American invention. We cannot erase the memories of our loved ones, nor should we. The terrible tradgedy is unfortunately part of those memories. The pain does ease in time. If you think I sound like I speak from experience, you are correct. God Bless you both.

 

Bob

 

 

[Kathy Kunz]

Trish and Kathy, the faith and hope that you refer to, is all we have. As for closure, there is no such thing. I think it is an American invention. We cannot erase the memories of our loved ones, nor should we. The terrible tradgedy is unfortunately part of those memories. The pain does ease in time. If you think I sound like I speak from experience, you are correct. God Bless you both.Bob

Hello Bob, Memories are what keeps us going . I agree with you that the tragedy will always be a part of those memories .Thank God we do have wonderful memories of Chris. God Bless you too .

 

 

[Paul L Romaine]

Kathy, God is merciful.. Remember, He knows and cares when even so much as a sparrow falls from the sky, so how much more so for Chris and Michael on that day. I believe they would have been asleep in the twinkling of an eye and did not suffer. Continue to rest on that Hope you have, because we know for sure that Hope does not ultimately disappoint us. Faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things, unseen.The Lismore Coroner conducted a thorough fact-finding inquest into Michael and Josef's deaths, which took a long time. The Inquest took place exactly two years following the accident.

There were a couple of threads on this Forum, first about the tragedy and secondly reporting after the Inquest.

 

The Coroner's Report is published on the internet as it is for the general public to read. The boys' names are Michael James O'Keeffe and Josef Hainaut.

 

May God continue to uphold you as you face each day.

 

Shalom

 

Trish

Hi Trish, Thank You for your very comforting words...Cheer's Paul

 

 

[Paul L Romaine]

Trish and Kathy, the faith and hope that you refer to, is all we have. As for closure, there is no such thing. I think it is an American invention. We cannot erase the memories of our loved ones, nor should we. The terrible tradgedy is unfortunately part of those memories. The pain does ease in time. If you think I sound like I speak from experience, you are correct. God Bless you both.Bob

Hi Bob, Yes i must agree with you on the word "Closure"....Cheer's Paul

 

 

[Phil Perry]

I have always been apalled since the SPIN was removed form the PPL syllabus. This was, as has been proven over and over again with monotonous regularity, probably a contributing factor in many aircraft accidents. I am NOT COMMENTING on the one at the start of this thread by the wayl as I have no idea what caused it.

 

Why the industry dropped SPIN training is totally beyond me, as most three axis aircrafdt are capable of this if mis handled. Yeah, yeah,. . . I've heard all the bulldust about "Unspinnable" three axis airframes, but a lot of those with this label I have ACTUALLY flown, and it just ISN'T true. they will all spin, or perform a damn good facsimilie of it if you put them into the right situation either deliberately, or due to inexperience. The "Coffin Corner" or final turn spin is of course the worst case scenario, this must have killed more pilots than most other reasons. . . . .

 

Phil

 

 

[Paul L Romaine]

Hi Phil, Thank You for your input....Cheer's Paul

 

 

[Guest trishok]

Thanks Trish . Yes , God is merciful . Please keep our family in prayer , especially his wife Donna & sons Ryan and Jordan and my Dad .God Bless

Kathy

[Guest trishok]

Agree

 

Trish and Kathy, the faith and hope that you refer to, is all we have. As for closure, there is no such thing. I think it is an American invention. We cannot erase the memories of our loved ones, nor should we. The terrible tradgedy is unfortunately part of those memories. The pain does ease in time. If you think I sound like I speak from experience, you are correct. God Bless you both.Bob

.

 

 

[Guest trishok]

I do not intend to put a damper on the absolute enjoyment you aviators and aviatrix glean from your flying experiences, HOWEVER, every time the news broadcast screams the words "ULTRALIGHT plane", I cannot but relive the Channel 9 6 o'clock news report of 7th May showing my grandson's plane crashed in a paddock, with his and his best friend's bodies inside. Time does lessen the pain, but does nothing to take away the memories, thankfully the good as well as the bad.

 

It is how we deal with all our life experiences that builds our character and enables us to have empathy with others.

 

Today, another ULTRALIGHT plane is in the news headlines, and there is another tragedy to report. My sympathies are with the families and friends of the lady pilot who crashed near the Glasshouse Mountains yesterday.

 

 

[David Isaac]

The ATSB have published their final report on this tragedy in which I lost my friend Chris Bowles and his instructor friend Michael on the 9th of November 2012.

 

It is hard to understand the circumstances that could have occurred that meant that the instructor could not regain control of the aircraft until you read the report and realise just how 'hot' the TB20 Trinidad is.

 

The ATSB report goes into a fair bit of detail into my friends training and his struggle with getting used to maintaining accurate speed control and balance in this high performance aircraft and may in part explain how they came to lose control on the base turn. Data from Socata (the TB20 Trinidad manufacturer) in the report states the aircraft will stall at 83 knots clean at a 45 degree angle of bank and that the Trinidad may need up to 800' to recover if the aircraft stalls unbalanced and the nose is allowed to drop to a steep down attitude. This seems plausible as witnesses and the evidence point to the aircraft being in a recovered attitude at or before ground impact. We have to assume the gear was down and at least 10 degrees of flap extended in the base turn because the undercarriage was torn off in the impact.

 

It would seem that this accident was clearly preventable and though I don't want to admit, it appears to be a simple loss of control scenario bought on by a lack of concentration where the airspeed was allowed to decay to the aerodynamic stall stage with insufficient height to recover. My friends reaction to the stall may have contributed to the complexity of the situation (we will never know for sure). A real lesson for pilots and instructors when transferring students from training type aircraft to the more sophisticated high wing loading types.

 

The accident may have in fact been survivable if they hadn't hit the concrete troughs (not mentioned in the report) and had not inverted.

 

I still struggle with the loss of Chris in this incident almost two years ago.

 

Motz, I would appreciate any input you may have after you have read the report here http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/4720120/ao-2012-149_final.pdf

 

 

[Paul L Romaine]

The ATSB have published their final report on this tragedy in which I lost my friend Chris Bowles and his instructor friend Michael on the 9th of November 2012.It is hard to understand the circumstances that could have occurred that meant that the instructor could not regain control of the aircraft until you read the report and realise just how 'hot' the TB20 Trinidad is.

 

The ATSB report goes into a fair bit of detail into my friends training and his struggle with getting used to maintaining accurate speed control and balance in this high performance aircraft and may in part explain how they came to lose control on the base turn. Data from Socata (the TB20 Trinidad manufacturer) in the report states the aircraft will stall at 83 knots clean at a 45 degree angle of bank and that the Trinidad may need up to 800' to recover if the aircraft stalls unbalanced and the nose is allowed to drop to a steep down attitude. This seems plausible as witnesses and the evidence point to the aircraft being in a recovered attitude at or before ground impact. We have to assume the gear was down and at least 10 degrees of flap extended in the base turn because the undercarriage was torn off in the impact.

 

It would seem that this accident was clearly preventable and though I don't want to admit, it appears to be a simple loss of control scenario bought on by a lack of concentration where the airspeed was allowed to decay to the aerodynamic stall stage with insufficient height to recover. My friends reaction to the stall may have contributed to the complexity of the situation (we will never know for sure). A real lesson for pilots and instructors when transferring students from training type aircraft to the more sophisticated high wing loading types.

 

The accident may have in fact been survivable if they hadn't hit the concrete troughs (not mentioned in the report) and had not inverted.

 

I still struggle with the loss of Chris in this incident almost two years ago.

 

Motz, I would appreciate any input you may have after you have read the report here http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/4720120/ao-2012-149_final.pdf

Hi David,

 

Many Thank's for the Message...Kathleen and Myself and her son and wife have just returned from Sri Lanka...We left on 29th June and arrived back on 17th July...Will let Kathy know of your Post..

 

Kind Regard's....Paul.....VK2UPR

 

 

[David Isaac]

Hi David,Many Thank's for the Message...Kathleen and Myself and her son and wife have just returned from Sri Lanka...We left on 29th June and arrived back on 17th July...Will let Kathy know of your Post..

Kind Regard's....Paul.....VK2UPR

Paul,

You will note from the ATSB report that Chris and Michael died from impact related injuries, not the fire. Also the report said the autopsies revealed that Chris suffered from moderately serious coronary artery disease but they could not ascertain whether that was any factor in the accident.

 

There is a lot to be learned from this accident.

 

 

[poteroo]

Paul,You will note from the ATSB report that Chris and Michael died from impact related injuries, not the fire. Also the report said the autopsies revealed that Chris suffered from moderately serious coronary artery disease but they could not ascertain whether that was any factor in the accident.

There is a lot to be learned from this accident.

I agree with your last statement David. I'm going to highlight a few of what I thought were the really important lessons from this accident report.

 

Time-on-type is just so important - in this case it was < 10 hrs total for either pilot. IMHO - this isn't enough to safely fly the aircraft yourself - let alone train someone else. I've long been sceptical of how CASA can allow a junior instructor to obtain an endorsement, (eg, t/w, r/g,), and then immediately go out and conduct training of an often very unskilled pilot. And it need not just be junior instructors - a high hours CFI at Jandakot, (but with only a few t/w hours), did, many years ago, groundloop a C180 on the 1st circuit of a t/w endo. I also have some suspicion that instructor-to-instructor endorsements may not be as thorough as they could - sometimes it could be a little cursory just to get the capability into the flying school. CASA are quick to apply some, (arguably impractical), rules - but here's one example of where they could immediately improve safety. 25hrs on type?

 

Flying-in-balance is a skill which has been in general decline for years. I watch unknown pilots like a wedgetail eagle when it comes to turns in the circuit. (If a pilot can't perform a continuous series of 45 deg left and right turns without the ball moving from the centre-then they are, IMHO, fundamentally unsafe).The number who lead with, or overapply, left rudder in turns from downwind-to-base, and base-to-final is an eyeopener. As we know, skidding the aircraft into the turn is a recipe for it to spin under = unrecoverable. Many pilots also load the wing up during the base-to-final turn by steepening the turn without lowering the nose, or adding some power to at least maintain airspeed. If you can feel some wing loading in the base-to-final turn then you need to have the student minimise this - don't sit there and assume they know what the risk is. This all becomes more obvious in higher performance aircraft where the added drag from gear and flaps down requires more power to hold a stabilised descent - 500fpm and no more!

 

The owner/pilot effect is another factor. Instructors do tend to relax more with owners and this is dangerous. I've noticed an approach of 'well, they are going to fly it more often in future so they'll work things out for themselves' attitude. They might - or they might bingle it with only low total hours on type. They need to be treated with restraint - even to the point of being a bit pedantic about it. As an example: I have a new RV6 owner with 200TT and have done 25 hrs dual endorsing - then sent him off on a few trips - and now doing a little more to cover wheel landings in x/w's. At 45 hrs time on type he is now able to position the aircraft accurately for x/w ops. Sure - it's far more than most pilots want to do - but if you think this is expensive - try having an accident!

 

Comment?

 

 

[Teckair]

Flying-in-balance is a skill which has been in general decline for years. I watch unknown pilots like a wedgetail eagle when it comes to turns in the circuit. (If a pilot can't perform a continuous series of 45 deg left and right turns without the ball moving from the centre-then they are, IMHO, fundamentally unsafe).The number who lead with, or overapply, left rudder in turns from downwind-to-base, and base-to-final is an eyeopener. As we know, skidding the aircraft into the turn is a recipe for it to spin under = unrecoverable.

Yes I agree but not everybody does. Some time ago I started a thread about steering on final with rudder and was surprised at how many people thought that was a good idea and it is being taught in some flying schools.

 

 

[pylon500]

but here's one example of where they could immediately improve safety. 25hrs on type?

While I agree with you on most of what you say, basically too many 'boy' instructors trying to build hours while teaching (with how much real knowledge of their own??) others.

But looking at your aircraft bio, if someone wanted you to teach them in say an Erocoupe;

 

 

Or Wasp;

 

 

Or a Drifter;

 

 

Do you think YOU would need 25 hours in it before you started teaching?

 

I have no problems with making lessor experienced pilots/instructors (sub ~500hrs/10 types) jump through the experience hoops for their own good, but I think we need to be able to draw the line somewhere to avoid more and more onerous rules being thrown at us...

 

Me, I have around 3000+hrs, have flown around 85+ types, and am quite happy to fly something for a couple of hours, then grab the owner/student and get on with it.

 

I've done the 25 hour TEST flying of something new, and that's usually a worthwhile exercise before training a new owner/builder, but for common, proven aircraft, 25 hours familiarisation seems a bit excessive.......

 

 

[David Isaac]

Arthur, I think you may have taken Potts out of context.

 

He was specifically talking about the circumstances in the ATSB report on the TB20 Trinidad accident that killed a personal friend of mine and his instructor at Lismore November 2012. Potts is talking about the lessons from the accident in endorsing low time/experience pilots in complex aircraft when the instructor is also low time. If you read the ATSB report you would see what he and I are concerned about. In the report data from the manufacturer warns about the height loss in a deep unbalance stall needing up to 800' to recover. Stall it on a base or final turn and you are in real trouble. The damn thing stalls at 83 knots in a 45 degree angle of bank turn, drop the dunlops and pull the power and there is a rapid drop in speed. How did this situation get away from a 3900 hour CPL with an instrument command rating and kill them both?

 

 

[David Isaac]

Potts, as always a good informative post, thanks. It would be interesting to hear from some of the other instructors on here in this one. DJP? Motz? Thanks

 

 

[facthunter]

Time to competent on a new type depends on overall experience and how varied it is. Some can't get the last plane they flew out of their head and some don't like change much.. If you fly a lot of types you put more effort in to allow for the differences as you can't rely on familiarity as you do when you fly just one. It's a lot more mental effort. Similar with changing seats. Relax and not keep your wits about you and you will do something inappropriate. Faster planes get ahead of you at first, but the number of actions is about the same. Like they say if you are getting lost at 500 mph , you are getting lost FAST. Speed decay on small planes is quite fast even though the figures you are seeing on the dial are not high Nev

 

 

[dazza 38]

Arthur, I think you may have taken Potts out of context.He was specifically talking about the circumstances in the ATSB report on the TB20 Trinidad accident that killed a personal friend of mine and his instructor at Lismore November 2012. Potts is talking about the lessons from the accident in endorsing low time/experience pilots in complex aircraft when the instructor is also low time. If you read the ATSB report you would see what he and I are concerned about. In the report data from the manufacturer warns about the height loss in a deep unbalance stall needing up to 800' to recover. Stall it on a base or final turn and you are in real trouble. The damn thing stalls at 83 knots in a 45 degree angle of bank turn, drop the dunlops and pull the power and there is a rapid drop in speed. How did this situation get away from a 3900 hour CPL with an instrument command rating and kill them both?

Hi David, to me, the "83 knots stall in a 45 degree turn " is a serious "got you", I can see how that could end in tears quickly if the airspeed was not monitored.

 

 

[David Isaac]

Hi David, to me, the "83 knots stall in a 45 degree turn " is a serious "got you", I can see how that could end in tears quickly if the airspeed was not monitored.

So can I Dazz, and that is my point and I think Potts point. You would have to be very vigilant with a low time student like my friend was, to ensure he was on the numbers all the time in the circuit, especially on the turns. It was my friends aircraft and he had not long before imported it from the US, but he was a newby and spent all his training time flying C172s, very docile safe aircraft and certainly nothing like the performance of the TB20 Trinidad with its IO-540 up front.

 

 

[motzartmerv]

As usual, a very thorough investigation and report from the ATSB.

 

Theres a couple of things that really stick out for me in this accident. Pots has covered most of them above.

 

The biggest lessons to come from this accident (I feel) are for Instructors. The Instructor involved with this accident had almost 4000 hours, quite a reasonable amount of experience by anybodys standards. Its appears he was bitten by a cranky 'type' during a critical phase of flight and was unable t0 recover the aeroplane in time. The sad thing is, it looks like it was 'almost' recovered.

 

Something I talk about with other instructors quite often is the fact that experience does not always work for you, it can work against you.

 

The captain of the Titanic, had crossed the Atlantic literally hundreds of times in his long career. He knew the waters well, he knew the weather well. But he didnt know 'his machine'. The Titanic was a beast of a thing to turn, normally when an ice burg was spotted, they would manourvre around it.

 

But on the night of the sinking, a few things worked against them. But the last line of defence, the turn to avoid, was simply impossible due to the turning radius of the massive ship.

 

The captain was chosen due to his vast experience and knowledge of the waters. He had driven full speed across the berg field many many times before, so thats what he did this time.

 

When flying any new type, it would be easy for an experienced instructor to fall victim to the same thinking. Yea sure, when doing a conversion he/she may do a few stalls, a few steep turns etc. And the other edge of the sword is, the guy checking HIM out on the new type would know hes experienced and any conversion would be likely to be more of a pleasure flight with a stall or a glide chucked in. And to be honest, in MOST types of training aircraft ( the types where most Instructors spend the majority of those thousands of hours) this perfectly fine. But in a type like this, there are demons lurking just beneath the surface.

 

An example. A lot of people take some flap before turning base. In cessnas and pipers etc. Fine, no dramas. But if you do that in a type like this, and you dirty up just before turning base, you could easily be behind the drag very quickly as the attitude changes due to flap, AND you crack on a turn.

 

Thats just an example of ' negative transfer' from one benign type to another.

 

A less experienced pilot, would maybe have that little element of " hhmmm, she feels different this one" and may be less likely to allow things to get out of hand.

 

I once flew with a nervous young (low time) instructor who was so jumpy and nervous, but he wold react with lightening speed if I got 1 knott slow, or went to take flap when the white arc wasnt quite reached.

 

The hardest part of the instructing, IMHO is warding off complacency. Its so so easy to fall into a lull, a false sence of security. A real " ive done this sequence thousands of times, this one will be no different".. Theres a real lesson for ALL pilots but particularly Instructors in this accident.

 

The other factor I see being significant is the way stalling is handled 'in general" and how it very rarely relates to a stall thats likely to kill us.

 

We climb up high, we do some checks, we crack idle and try and remain level etc. Advanced stalling we may use power and flap, And maybe even try it in a turn...Scarey hey?

 

But who ever lost control at 3500 feet and spun in while flying the mother in law around looking for whales.?

 

Its the slow, mushy, out of balanced turn onto base and final that kills people. And the thing with this type of stall, is the nose is almost invariably "DOWN" as the stall is encountered. Not pitched up like pilots are shown in " stalling'. Very very confusing, and by the time the pilot works out hes in a spin, its well too late.

 

I believe that 10 hours would be sufficient time on type for an experienced instructor PROVIDING a good portion of that time was spent in the "nasty zone" and actually spent getting to 'feel' the aeroplane.

 

 

[David Isaac]

Thanks Motz. XX

 

 

[Old Koreelah]

Excellent response, Motz. Even the most experienced pilot can stuff up. How do we shake people out of that complacency?

 

On Q&A the other night there was discussion of the need to re-awaken the community to the danger of HIV/AIDS. People are becoming complacent about protection and infection rates are on the rise. Yet there was opposition to re-using the most effective wake-up tool of all: the grim reaper ad.

 

I recently got a rude awakening when I nudged the boundary and it bit me severely. That experience was far more instructive than all the vocal warnings an instructor could give. Sometimes the most effective training is a slap in the face.

 

 

[facthunter]

Experience can be a good teacher, provided you survive the particular lesson. It is also true that a person who never made a mistake never made anything, the cheapest way to learn (and the safest) is to learn by other's mistakes. You don't live long enough to make them all yourself..

 

A lot of us think accidents only happen to others. Aviation is very intolerant of errors. Make sure your "checks" are done thoroughly, not just a cursory repetition of a few words and when you LOOK for traffic make sure it is a real look..

 

Its more a culture of SAFETY you need to adopt. Never be rushed and if you are doing something critical, don't have distractions around like someone talking to you, or be stressed out about something else. It's not SISSY to be careful. Nev

 

 

[David Isaac]

Yep, I can remember my instructor years ago when I was a lot younger reached across the cockpit, grabbed me round the neck and literally said to me ... "What the F*** are you doing, where are you? You are wasting your money and my time. Lets land and come back and do it again next week." ... and we did next week and he said 'That's better now we are back on song". He was a cranky ol bugga, but I still respect him immensely today. He would allow you latitude to get into trouble and see if you could get out of it, but he was always on the numbers with me ... "watch your speed Dave ...", not too steep Dave ... use your feet Dave ... well you saved that one Dave, well done, now you know what you did wrong ...".

 

He was tough ... when I did my PPL flying test, after we took off he said ... "well you have just failed the test but lets go fly and see why" I had chosen to continue with my PPL test on a forecast of moderate to severe turbulence ... instant fail. Guess what ... that day I learned what that really meant, first hand experience, while we were in severe turbulence he put a diversion on me and that was obviously impossible, so he made his point. When we landed at Albion Park into a very strong headwind, I swear the 172 rolled to stop in about 50 metres. He did all my T/W, CSU, retractable and aerobatic endorsements as well.

 

As a result to day, I am still critically aware of the things he drummed into me and especially my speeds in the circuit and the setup on approach to land. But above all he taught me that asking for a check flight and some review is an honourable thing to do. And to that point when I do my next BFR and I am gong to ask him to put me through the ringer in every aspect especially in light of recent accident events.

 

I must admit I am in love with living and sharing life with all you mongrels ...LOL.