Chopper crossess my runway nearly killed us

[motzartmerv]

Yea doc. That's all good. Wasn't having a go or makin assumptions. I did ask you if there was any other aircraft and you said no. Now we have two more that havnt been mentioned. I wasn't assuming anything other than your answer was accurate;) I find it difficult to believe trees could obscure two big fire fighting helicopters from aircraft overhead or on downwind.

 

If you think your SA was good then that's great, I was offering you some more learning outcomes that you may not have thought of.

 

Again, not having a go, but it's got nothing to so with the airport manager. You were the pic, not him. It's not up to him to tell you what to do.

 

Clearly if the manger did have a chat it did t do any good if they havnt changed their ways.

 

How did you come up with 2.5 mins clearance?

 

 

[motzartmerv]

What airfield was this at?

 

 

[rankamateur]

Or helitack

I wasn't joking LimaMike08!

 

In fire fighting operations flight following is performed by Aviation Radio Operators trained by the rural fire service. Fire fighting aircraft callsigns fall into five catagories.

 

Firebird 200 is the only aircraft leased directly by NSW RFS, it is a Squirrel AS 350 light helicpoter based in NSW hence the 2xx number. Medium and heavy helicopters are referred to by Helitak callsigns. Fixedwing aircraft like Dromader and Air tractors are referred to as Bomber xxx, Fixed wing spotter aircraft as Firespotter xxx and Fixed wing remote sensing aircraft as Firescan xxx. When I trained for ARO the course assumed no radio telephony qualification so CASA require the radio training to be delivered by a pilot instructor, in our case the lovely lady pilot of Firebird 200, and the supplied refence manual is ATC Flight Radio for Pilots.

 

 

[Guest ozzie]

If i remember right about circuits and who who using them rotary wings still have to abide the rules. They airtaxy via normal taxy ways. Enter runways and depart on runway heading and fly the circuit like a fixed wing but at the circuit height of 800ft. They enter and depart circuit same as fixed wing using same radio calls.

 

 

[motzartmerv]

No they don't have to depart in the runways heading but they can't cross an active runway. Caap 92

 

 

[Head in the clouds]

I just read this whole thread and I have a few observations that I think are worth mentioning.

 

"i was recently certificated" - involved here are two firefighting helicopters and by requirement they are crewed by the most experienced pilots there are so the pilot of each probably has 10,000 command hours or more. The light plane was flown by a new pilot who has only recently been allowed to fly unsupervised and was flying an aircraft with which he was not at all familiar since he had only purchased it about a fortnight ago. In this case the helicopter pilot is likely to be pretty calm and collected and the light plane pilot is likely to have a relatively high workload.

 

"he was accelerating and climbing toward the runway.......I realized i could not turn right in case he stopped" - helicopters don't just suddenly stop except in a manoeuvre called a 'quickstop' in which case he would do the avoiding, no one else would need to do anything.

 

"so i turned sharp to the left" - to avoid a potential conflict you are supposed to turn right.

 

"He took no evasive action at all" - perhaps he didn't need to, or perhaps he did and you didn't see it, you said you lost sight of him ...

 

"They didn't learn from the situation" - I bet they did, at least to learn that amateur pilots in small planes might turn left when they should have turned right.

 

"What i learned from it was take evasive action as early as possible" - yup, that's what your instructor would have been teaching.

 

"In hindsight going right would have been better" - Yes, most likely, especially since you were headed 030 and he was 270 so, if there had actually been a risk of collision, i.e. the law of constant bearing was satisfied, by turning left you had to turn through 120 degrees before you were parallel to him and no longer risking crashing into him whereas had you turned right you only had to turn a few degrees to pass behind him.

 

"maybe up to say 12 people in the back ( huge) but the had say around 3 - 6 pob judging from subsequent days take off" - not sure how you can judge how many people were in a helicopter from how many they had in it a few days later ... but based on that you're saying a 14 seater was generally flown with two crew and between one and four pax?

 

"I know they have limited fuel etc etc so dont want to wait around" - how do you know how much fuel they had? If they were virtually empty of pax they might well have been full of fuel, surely?

 

"but this guy clearly didnt even look or listen" - I think this is a very offensive statement. Are you seriously suggesting that this highly experienced professional pilot didn't look or listen? How do you know that? You are the one who didn't see the unfolding situation and it would appear that when you noticed him moving you may have made some unfounded assumptions. In another thread Poteroo pointed out that you owed this helicopter pilot an apology for presumptuous comments you made then ...

 

"And i think this case is why they should never be allowed to cross the active runway" - special procedures for helicopter operations have been developed and refined over decades, based on their special needs and capabilities. They work well. Familiarising yourself with the differences in helicopters' (and other types of airspace users') procedures will help you to assimilate with them more smoothly and cause you less alarm when you interact with them during their normal operations.

 

"i heard the first one clearly. I didnt hear the second one clearly but he did call" - it's well known that you can hear things more easily while not concentrating on other matters, the first would have transmitted while you were on downwind and not especially busy, the second while you were on short final and doing your checks, setting up your landing, at which time you would have been much busier than previously ...

 

"i probably could have landed and taxi under him or behind him" - if you were already at 50ft on climb and in your hindsight you feel you probably could have landed under him it doesn't sound like you were quite as close together as some of the description of this event suggests.

 

"but prob would have got flipped by his turbulence" - only if he was hovering, not if he was moving, again more familiarity with helicopters would reduce your concerns about them.

 

"Lucky the cessna was tied down because it was bouncing off the ground from the draft" - that would have been worthy of a video post!

 

"but i had no idea what he was doing at that stage" - Because you lost sight of him. If you had turned right in accordance with your training and the regulations then you wouldn't have lost sight of him and would have known exactly what he was doing and where he was and so been able to be certain to avoid him rather than hoping you were doing so. That is the main reason we turn right, because the command seat is the left seat, so when we turn right we keep each other in view. Helicopters often have the right seat as command seat because it is easier to let go the collective while hovering to adjust frequencies, than fly the cyclic with your knees but helicopters have excellent all-round view so they can see you just fine from either seat.

 

"I could see the left seat pilots shocked face looking at me..." - that's not too surprising really, he would most likely have been wondering what the hell you were doing turning left to parallel his flightpath and bring yourself into conflict with him by doing so. Keep in mind that if the "left seat pilot" was looking at you the helicopter probably had two crew members on watch since the likelihood is that the command seat is on the RHS.

 

"i would never have guessed the 2 nd one would have gone the way he did" - Why not? You say the previous one departed that way, I would think it would be very likely the next would do the same, they would hardly be expected to leave in random directions.

 

"but he should have looked, heard me turn downwind and base..." - I'm sure he would have looked, and heard you, and with his experienced judgement probably departed with plenty of room to spare. To you it may have seemed close but you probably have less information on which to judge his aircraft's performance, than he does. There is another thing to factor into this. We all feel affronted when someone steps into space that we perceive as 'ours'. By being on final approach and having declared your intentions you would most likely have mentally 'taken possession' of the runway - you were on short final, so the runway was 'yours'. Suddenly this alien machine (most people who don't fly helicopters have an unreasonable dislike and suspicion of them) intrudes into your space, so of course you feel affronted. Perhaps that made you continue with your intentions when in fact a quiet voice was telling you that you'd feel safer if you turned right early, or just powered on and went around? Who knows, but from your (increasingly breathless) descriptions it does seem as if the more you've thought about it after the event the more you've got yourself worked up about it.

 

"So it was just a stuff up by the pic of the chopper" - in your relatively inexperienced opinion. Have you wondered what he thought of your part in it?

 

"they are just being reckless / inconsiderate / dangerous as a matter of routine" - In your previous mention of this in another thread you also called them "morons". As Poteroo pointed out, you are talking about Australia's most experienced helicopter pilots who are very likely to be instructors as well and who are selected for this work because they not only have very high airtime but they have also demonstrated that they can work reliably and safely in highly dangerous and pressured situations. Only the best of the best are selected because without their hours and safety record they cannot get insurance for that kind of work. They would be unlikely to make basic mistakes when departing airports.

 

"airport manager interviewed me and decided it was best if he spoke with the other pilot and not me" - none of his business as motz said. If you had taken the time to speak with the pilot during the ensuing week of operations that you mentioned you might have learned a bit about helicopter operations that would stand you in good stead for the future.

 

Having lodged your report and since it involves a Commercial operation it will have to cross quite a number of desks and the pilot of the helicopter will be asked for his version of events. That could make interesting reading but sadly we'll probably not get to see it here. You may well be asked to explain your reasons for making a left turn when faced with a perceived conflict and had it turned out badly the blame would have rested with you since you departed from the correct procedure. Your former CFI may well be asked about what he teaches in regard of collision avoidance too, and this at a time when our FTFs are already under scrutiny. I'm not saying that is a bad thing but anything that brings question to our training standards is unfortunate.

 

"An eye witness that saw the whole thing and has 30 years airport exp said it was the closest thing he has seen" - if this fellow ends up being questioned as a result of any investigation that follows on from your report I wonder whether he would say that it would have been closer if you'd turned right, or if in fact it was the left turn that brought you closer together. If you draw out the relative flightpaths on a piece of paper, and assuming that there was a closing constant bearing condition initially, then your left turn brings you much closer together than a right turn ever could have regardless of height differences. Since you were approaching each other at an angle of 120 degrees the only way that a left turn could end up with you further away from each other than a right turn would have, is if there was never a closing constant bearing condition in the first place, and hence never a risk of collision.

 

Dr Zoos, none of this is intended as a criticism of you, I've spent the time on this in the hope that lessons are learnt, as one of your posts mentioned. We all make mistakes at times and whether it was you or the chopper pilot matters little in the scheme of it.

 

"These guys live on adrenalin and can become very fixated on the task at the end of the flight, perhaps to the detriment of their thinking processes about getting there" - sorry Kaz3g, I normally agree with what you post but in my experience this is not so, you must have been crewing with the exceptions rather than the norm. An excess of adrenalin is the last thing you need if you want to do rotary airwork and also live a long time.

 

Ozzie - yes helicopters generally do follow standard reduced height circuit procedures whenever appropriate but hover-taxying is usually minimised since it is hard on the machinery. At other times helicopters may choose to use special procedures that don't always appear logical to fixed-wing operators but which have perfectly good and safe reasons for rotary wing operations. In many cases the onus for safety and separation will fall onto the rotary operator at times when they are not using standard procedures.

 

 

[Camel]

landing aircraft have right of way ! but what if you breach Cap 166 ? Too much radio talk and you may miss someone else's broadcast. Also the touch and go would need to be broadcast on base or final. Can you take off again if it is not clear to do so ? Some extacts below from relevant rules.

 

Read CAAP 166. http://www.casa.gov.au/wcmswr/_assets/main/download/caaps/ops/166-1.pdf

 

5.7 Fixed wing and rotary wing aerial application (agricultural) aircraft operations

 

5.7.1 Pilots should be aware there are non-towered aerodromes from where ‘aerial

 

application’ operations are conducted.

 

5.7.2 Aerial application (agricultural) aircraft are permitted to conduct aerial application

 

operations which involves low level maneouvering after take-off and prior to landing. These low

 

level maneouvres are not required to conform to the standard traffic circuit. However, pilots of

 

other aircraft can expect aerial application (agricultural) aircraft to:

 

 maintain a listening watch and broadcast their intentions on the CTAF; and

 

 give priority to other traffic.

 

5.7.3 The requirements for these operations, and also their separation from RPT flights, are

 

specified in CASR 137.155 and CASR 137.160.

 

6. Radio broadcasts

 

6.1 CAR 166C requires a pilot to make a broadcast whenever it is reasonably necessary to

 

do so to avoid a collision, or the risk of a collision, with another aircraft. A broadcast must

 

include:

 

 the name of the aerodrome;

 

 the aircraft’s type and call sign; and

 

 the position of the aircraft and the pilot’s intentions.

 

6.2 Effective radio communication involves using standard aviation phraseology as detailed

 

in the Flight Radiotelephone Operator Licence (FROL) syllabus and in the AIP. Pilots are

 

expected to maintain a listening watch and respond appropriately to applicable transmissions.

 

7.3 Take-off and landing separation

 

7.3.1 When waiting to take off behind another aircraft, pilots should be aware of the

 

separation standards published in the AIP, i.e.:

 

 Wait until the departing aircraft has crossed the upwind end of the runway or has

 

commenced a turn;

 

 If the runway is longer than 1800 metres, then wait until the departing aircraft has

 

become airborne and is at least 1800 metres ahead; or

 

 If both aircraft have a MTOW under 2000 KG, wait until the departing aircraft has

 

become airborne and is at least 600 metres ahead.

 

7.3.2 For a landing aircraft, the approach should not be continued beyond the runway

 

threshold until:

 

 A preceding departing aircraft has commenced a turn or is beyond the point on the

 

runway at which the landing aircraft could be expected to complete its landing roll and

 

there is sufficient distance to manoeuvre safely in the event of a missed approach; or

 

 A previous landing aircraft has vacated the runway.

 

7.3.3 Pilots should be vigilant when using another runway that is not the active runway and

 

ensure that they do not create a hazard to aircraft that are using the active runway. Conversely,

 

pilots using the active runway should ensure that aircraft operating on the non-active runway

 

have held short or crossed the active runway before commencing a take off or continuing to land.

 

7.5.3 Most collisions occur on downwind or on final approach. There are many distractions

 

that include configuring the aircraft, completing checklists, setting equipment and

 

communicating, however, this is precisely the time to be looking outside. Early completion of

 

checklists will help to avoid distractions. Good height and speed control to maintain separation

 

(including use of flaps) is essential. If a pilot determines that adequate separation cannot be

 

maintained during any part of the approach, a go around should be initiated sooner rather than

 

later.

 

7.5.4 CAR 161 and CAR 162 detail the rules and procedures for right of way and prevention

 

of collisions. Pilots should have a sound understanding of these rules when giving way,

 

approaching head on, and overtaking in the circuit. The CARs are published on the ComLaw

 

website at the following internet address:

 

http://www.comlaw.gov.au/comlaw/management.nsf/lookupindexpagesbyid/IP200400553?Open

 

Document

 

CIVIL AVIATION REGULATIONS 1988 - REG 161

 

Right of way

 

(1) An aircraft that is required by the rules in this Division to keep out of the way of another aircraft shall avoid passing over or under the other, or crossing ahead of it, unless passing well clear.

 

(2) The pilot in command of an aircraft that has the right of way must maintain its heading and speed, but nothing in the rules in this Division shall relieve the pilot in command of an aircraft from the responsibility of taking such action as will best avert collision.

 

Penalty: 25 penalty units.

 

(3) An offence against subregulation (2) is an offence of strict liability.

 

Note: For strict liability , see section 6.1 of the Criminal Code .

 

CIVIL AVIATION REGULATIONS 1988 - REG 162

 

(8) An aircraft that is about to take-off shall not attempt to do so until there is no apparent risk of collision with other aircraft.

 

(9) The pilot in command of an aircraft must give way to another aircraft that is compelled to land.

 

 

[DrZoos]

Well i think i just read the biggest load of bs ive ever seen in my life.... amazing

 

Such an expert for someone that wasn there. If he had seen me mid way to the runway and stopped then that was a dead set collision if i had gone right. At which point how was i still to know if he was going to hold, going to cross or what...

 

Also if i had gone right and a third chopper unsighted had lifted off i would go straight thru him. See your reading stuff into it which you have no clue.

 

Absolute crap

 

 

[DrZoos]

I think next time others should not bother posting too many know alls

 

I will leave this thread to the expert that wasnt there , im sure he can answer all your questions and what he doesnt know, he will make up.

 

To those that have some common sense thanks for your input. bye bye from this thread,

 

 

[motzartmerv]

What airfield were you at doc?

 

 

[Bluey]

landing aircraft have right of way ! but what if you breach Cap 166 ? Too much radio talk and you may miss someone else's broadcast. Also the touch and go would need to be broadcast on base or final. Can you take off again if it is not clear to do so ? Some extacts below from relevant rules.Read CAAP 166. http://www.casa.gov.au/wcmswr/_assets/main/download/caaps/ops/166-1.pdf

5.7 Fixed wing and rotary wing aerial application (agricultural) aircraft operations

 

5.7.1 Pilots should be aware there are non-towered aerodromes from where ‘aerial

 

application’ operations are conducted.

 

5.7.2 Aerial application (agricultural) aircraft are permitted to conduct aerial application

 

operations which involves low level maneouvering after take-off and prior to landing. These low

 

level maneouvres are not required to conform to the standard traffic circuit. However, pilots of

 

other aircraft can expect aerial application (agricultural) aircraft to:

 

 maintain a listening watch and broadcast their intentions on the CTAF; and

 

 give priority to other traffic.

 

5.7.3 The requirements for these operations, and also their separation from RPT flights, are

 

specified in CASR 137.155 and CASR 137.160.

 

6. Radio broadcasts

 

6.1 CAR 166C requires a pilot to make a broadcast whenever it is reasonably necessary to

 

do so to avoid a collision, or the risk of a collision, with another aircraft. A broadcast must

 

include:

 

 the name of the aerodrome;

 

 the aircraft’s type and call sign; and

 

 the position of the aircraft and the pilot’s intentions.

 

6.2 Effective radio communication involves using standard aviation phraseology as detailed

 

in the Flight Radiotelephone Operator Licence (FROL) syllabus and in the AIP. Pilots are

 

expected to maintain a listening watch and respond appropriately to applicable transmissions.

 

7.3 Take-off and landing separation

 

7.3.1 When waiting to take off behind another aircraft, pilots should be aware of the

 

separation standards published in the AIP, i.e.:

 

 Wait until the departing aircraft has crossed the upwind end of the runway or has

 

commenced a turn;

 

 If the runway is longer than 1800 metres, then wait until the departing aircraft has

 

become airborne and is at least 1800 metres ahead; or

 

 If both aircraft have a MTOW under 2000 KG, wait until the departing aircraft has

 

become airborne and is at least 600 metres ahead.

 

7.3.2 For a landing aircraft, the approach should not be continued beyond the runway

 

threshold until:

 

 A preceding departing aircraft has commenced a turn or is beyond the point on the

 

runway at which the landing aircraft could be expected to complete its landing roll and

 

there is sufficient distance to manoeuvre safely in the event of a missed approach; or

 

 A previous landing aircraft has vacated the runway.

 

7.3.3 Pilots should be vigilant when using another runway that is not the active runway and

 

ensure that they do not create a hazard to aircraft that are using the active runway. Conversely,

 

pilots using the active runway should ensure that aircraft operating on the non-active runway

 

have held short or crossed the active runway before commencing a take off or continuing to land.

 

7.5.3 Most collisions occur on downwind or on final approach. There are many distractions

 

that include configuring the aircraft, completing checklists, setting equipment and

 

communicating, however, this is precisely the time to be looking outside. Early completion of

 

checklists will help to avoid distractions. Good height and speed control to maintain separation

 

(including use of flaps) is essential. If a pilot determines that adequate separation cannot be

 

maintained during any part of the approach, a go around should be initiated sooner rather than

 

later.

 

7.5.4 CAR 161 and CAR 162 detail the rules and procedures for right of way and prevention

 

of collisions. Pilots should have a sound understanding of these rules when giving way,

 

approaching head on, and overtaking in the circuit. The CARs are published on the ComLaw

 

website at the following internet address:

 

http://www.comlaw.gov.au/comlaw/management.nsf/lookupindexpagesbyid/IP200400553?Open

 

Document

 

CIVIL AVIATION REGULATIONS 1988 - REG 161

 

Right of way

 

(1) An aircraft that is required by the rules in this Division to keep out of the way of another aircraft shall avoid passing over or under the other, or crossing ahead of it, unless passing well clear.

 

(2) The pilot in command of an aircraft that has the right of way must maintain its heading and speed, but nothing in the rules in this Division shall relieve the pilot in command of an aircraft from the responsibility of taking such action as will best avert collision.

 

Penalty: 25 penalty units.

 

(3) An offence against subregulation (2) is an offence of strict liability.

 

Note: For strict liability , see section 6.1 of the Criminal Code .

 

CIVIL AVIATION REGULATIONS 1988 - REG 162

 

(8) An aircraft that is about to take-off shall not attempt to do so until there is no apparent risk of collision with other aircraft.

 

(9) The pilot in command of an aircraft must give way to another aircraft that is compelled to land.

5.7.2 clearly states these aircraft need to give priority to other traffic.

 

5.7.2 Aerial application (agricultural) aircraft are permitted to conduct aerial application

 

operations which involves low level maneouvering after take-off and prior to landing. These low

 

level maneouvres are not required to conform to the standard traffic circuit. However, pilots of

 

other aircraft can expect aerial application (agricultural) aircraft to:

 

 maintain a listening watch and broadcast their intentions on the CTAF; and

 

 give priority to other traffic.

 

 

[Bluey]

Crossing an active runway the way they did is plain dumb in my opinion. Just asking for trouble. The pilots of these large choppers (and smaller ones) while they do a magnificent job need to be aware of the risks of operating at small airfields where light aircraft are the norm. Landing or taxing or taking off near a parked aircraft can easily cause an aircraft to be flipped and possibly written off. Lucky that cesna was tied down. I wonder if they even bothered to check that it was secured before they landed.

 

I once saw a trike flipped by a rescue chopper while it taxied prior to take off. Luckily the pilot was un injured.

 

Bluey

 

 

[Bluey]

I just read this whole thread and I have a few observations that I think are worth mentioning."i was recently certificated" - involved here are two firefighting helicopters and by requirement they are crewed by the most experienced pilots there are so the pilot of each probably has 10,000 command hours or more. The light plane was flown by a new pilot who has only recently been allowed to fly unsupervised and was flying an aircraft with which he was not at all familiar since he had only purchased it about a fortnight ago. In this case the helicopter pilot is likely to be pretty calm and collected and the light plane pilot is likely to have a relatively high workload.

 

"he was accelerating and climbing toward the runway.......I realized i could not turn right in case he stopped" - helicopters don't just suddenly stop except in a manoeuvre called a 'quickstop' in which case he would do the avoiding, no one else would need to do anything.

 

"so i turned sharp to the left" - to avoid a potential conflict you are supposed to turn right.

 

"He took no evasive action at all" - perhaps he didn't need to, or perhaps he did and you didn't see it, you said you lost sight of him ...

 

"They didn't learn from the situation" - I bet they did, at least to learn that amateur pilots in small planes might turn left when they should have turned right.

 

"What i learned from it was take evasive action as early as possible" - yup, that's what your instructor would have been teaching.

 

"In hindsight going right would have been better" - Yes, most likely, especially since you were headed 030 and he was 270 so, if there had actually been a risk of collision, i.e. the law of constant bearing was satisfied, by turning left you had to turn through 120 degrees before you were parallel to him and no longer risking crashing into him whereas had you turned right you only had to turn a few degrees to pass behind him.

 

"maybe up to say 12 people in the back ( huge) but the had say around 3 - 6 pob judging from subsequent days take off" - not sure how you can judge how many people were in a helicopter from how many they had in it a few days later ... but based on that you're saying a 14 seater was generally flown with two crew and between one and four pax?

 

"I know they have limited fuel etc etc so dont want to wait around" - how do you know how much fuel they had? If they were virtually empty of pax they might well have been full of fuel, surely?

 

"but this guy clearly didnt even look or listen" - I think this is a very offensive statement. Are you seriously suggesting that this highly experienced professional pilot didn't look or listen? How do you know that? You are the one who didn't see the unfolding situation and it would appear that when you noticed him moving you may have made some unfounded assumptions. In another thread Poteroo pointed out that you owed this helicopter pilot an apology for presumptuous comments you made then ...

 

"And i think this case is why they should never be allowed to cross the active runway" - special procedures for helicopter operations have been developed and refined over decades, based on their special needs and capabilities. They work well. Familiarising yourself with the differences in helicopters' (and other types of airspace users') procedures will help you to assimilate with them more smoothly and cause you less alarm when you interact with them during their normal operations.

 

"i heard the first one clearly. I didnt hear the second one clearly but he did call" - it's well known that you can hear things more easily while not concentrating on other matters, the first would have transmitted while you were on downwind and not especially busy, the second while you were on short final and doing your checks, setting up your landing, at which time you would have been much busier than previously ...

 

"i probably could have landed and taxi under him or behind him" - if you were already at 50ft on climb and in your hindsight you feel you probably could have landed under him it doesn't sound like you were quite as close together as some of the description of this event suggests.

 

"but prob would have got flipped by his turbulence" - only if he was hovering, not if he was moving, again more familiarity with helicopters would reduce your concerns about them.

 

"Lucky the cessna was tied down because it was bouncing off the ground from the draft" - that would have been worthy of a video post!

 

"but i had no idea what he was doing at that stage" - Because you lost sight of him. If you had turned right in accordance with your training and the regulations then you wouldn't have lost sight of him and would have known exactly what he was doing and where he was and so been able to be certain to avoid him rather than hoping you were doing so. That is the main reason we turn right, because the command seat is the left seat, so when we turn right we keep each other in view. Helicopters often have the right seat as command seat because it is easier to let go the collective while hovering to adjust frequencies, than fly the cyclic with your knees but helicopters have excellent all-round view so they can see you just fine from either seat.

 

"I could see the left seat pilots shocked face looking at me..." - that's not too surprising really, he would most likely have been wondering what the hell you were doing turning left to parallel his flightpath and bring yourself into conflict with him by doing so. Keep in mind that if the "left seat pilot" was looking at you the helicopter probably had two crew members on watch since the likelihood is that the command seat is on the RHS.

 

"i would never have guessed the 2 nd one would have gone the way he did" - Why not? You say the previous one departed that way, I would think it would be very likely the next would do the same, they would hardly be expected to leave in random directions.

 

"but he should have looked, heard me turn downwind and base..." - I'm sure he would have looked, and heard you, and with his experienced judgement probably departed with plenty of room to spare. To you it may have seemed close but you probably have less information on which to judge his aircraft's performance, than he does. There is another thing to factor into this. We all feel affronted when someone steps into space that we perceive as 'ours'. By being on final approach and having declared your intentions you would most likely have mentally 'taken possession' of the runway - you were on short final, so the runway was 'yours'. Suddenly this alien machine (most people who don't fly helicopters have an unreasonable dislike and suspicion of them) intrudes into your space, so of course you feel affronted. Perhaps that made you continue with your intentions when in fact a quiet voice was telling you that you'd feel safer if you turned right early, or just powered on and went around? Who knows, but from your (increasingly breathless) descriptions it does seem as if the more you've thought about it after the event the more you've got yourself worked up about it.

 

"So it was just a stuff up by the pic of the chopper" - in your relatively inexperienced opinion. Have you wondered what he thought of your part in it?

 

"they are just being reckless / inconsiderate / dangerous as a matter of routine" - In your previous mention of this in another thread you also called them "morons". As Poteroo pointed out, you are talking about Australia's most experienced helicopter pilots who are very likely to be instructors as well and who are selected for this work because they not only have very high airtime but they have also demonstrated that they can work reliably and safely in highly dangerous and pressured situations. Only the best of the best are selected because without their hours and safety record they cannot get insurance for that kind of work. They would be unlikely to make basic mistakes when departing airports.

 

"airport manager interviewed me and decided it was best if he spoke with the other pilot and not me" - none of his business as motz said. If you had taken the time to speak with the pilot during the ensuing week of operations that you mentioned you might have learned a bit about helicopter operations that would stand you in good stead for the future.

 

Having lodged your report and since it involves a Commercial operation it will have to cross quite a number of desks and the pilot of the helicopter will be asked for his version of events. That could make interesting reading but sadly we'll probably not get to see it here. You may well be asked to explain your reasons for making a left turn when faced with a perceived conflict and had it turned out badly the blame would have rested with you since you departed from the correct procedure. Your former CFI may well be asked about what he teaches in regard of collision avoidance too, and this at a time when our FTFs are already under scrutiny. I'm not saying that is a bad thing but anything that brings question to our training standards is unfortunate.

 

"An eye witness that saw the whole thing and has 30 years airport exp said it was the closest thing he has seen" - if this fellow ends up being questioned as a result of any investigation that follows on from your report I wonder whether he would say that it would have been closer if you'd turned right, or if in fact it was the left turn that brought you closer together. If you draw out the relative flightpaths on a piece of paper, and assuming that there was a closing constant bearing condition initially, then your left turn brings you much closer together than a right turn ever could have regardless of height differences. Since you were approaching each other at an angle of 120 degrees the only way that a left turn could end up with you further away from each other than a right turn would have, is if there was never a closing constant bearing condition in the first place, and hence never a risk of collision.

 

Dr Zoos, none of this is intended as a criticism of you, I've spent the time on this in the hope that lessons are learnt, as one of your posts mentioned. We all make mistakes at times and whether it was you or the chopper pilot matters little in the scheme of it.

 

"These guys live on adrenalin and can become very fixated on the task at the end of the flight, perhaps to the detriment of their thinking processes about getting there" - sorry Kaz3g, I normally agree with what you post but in my experience this is not so, you must have been crewing with the exceptions rather than the norm. An excess of adrenalin is the last thing you need if you want to do rotary airwork and also live a long time.

 

Ozzie - yes helicopters generally do follow standard reduced height circuit procedures whenever appropriate but hover-taxying is usually minimised since it is hard on the machinery. At other times helicopters may choose to use special procedures that don't always appear logical to fixed-wing operators but which have perfectly good and safe reasons for rotary wing operations. In many cases the onus for safety and separation will fall onto the rotary operator at times when they are not using standard procedures.

This is pretty self righteous. I think it's pretty obvious the pilot of the chopper did not see the aircraft on the active runway because if he had he wouldn't in his right mind have cut him off thinking, hey, I'll just pass in front of him by just a few metres. That should be enough clearance. Come on, pull the other one, you cannot be serious! After all the bloke had 10000 plus hours of experience as you so eloquently put it. Blokes with this much experience just don't ever f##k up, right?

 

Bluey.

 

 

[motzartmerv]

Ok. Things are getting a little heated. Lets just all take a step back and get back to being productive.

 

Clearly there was a breakdown here. Lets assume all the info Drzoos gave us is %100 correct.

 

There was a clear breakdown in 2 main and very distinct areas.

 

1. Communication- Either The DRzoos calls were not heard, given or were dual transmitted. Which happens.

 

2. Situational awareness- Both the choppa crews and DR Zoos could learn from this aspect I feel. Yes, blasting off across an active runway is a silly thing to do. The DR said he had done 10 ccts, thats plenty of time for the crews of the choppas to see him doing touch n go's so the argument that they weren't aware of him is moot.

 

However the same goes for the DR. I would give him a quiet nudge (and did) to say that perhaps one of the things he could learn from the event was to have a better look around when your doing cct's. Windsocks, runways, taxiways etc, give them a good scan. Then you will see beacons flashing, rotors turning, choppas lifting off etc.

 

There was a collision at Tyab only a couple of weeks ago. A Cessna and a Jab came together on the runway.

 

http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2013/aair/ao-2013-205.aspx

 

Apparently, there was a dual transmission. This happens all the time and only illustrates the need to have more than just the radio as a means of avoidance. Situational awareness is the key here for both parties I feel. The DR did display good SA in some respects but I still maintain that there is room for improvement for him there and hope he accepts that for the friendly advice that it is.

 

 

[jimmy2shoes]

another explanation is that the chopper pilot has at least 2 other fire radios in use and may have missed your last call and was unaware you were on a touch and go.

 

 

[facthunter]

The most dreadful loss of life ever happened when the ace of the airline took off without a clearance just because he was keen to get home as quick as possible. 2 747's collide on a runway. He ignores the F/O's call that he has not been cleared. Biggest loss of life ever in an aviation accident . High hours is no guarantee of perfect decision making. Anyhow turning right is when aircraft on reciprocal headings are approaching each other. Other wise when the object is moving in your windscreen you manoeuver your aircraft so you go in the opposite direction. if it's climbing you dive. if it's going to the left you turn right. If it sits in a constant position in the windscreen you will hit it. pilots should know these things. If you have TCAS you obey it. Works on the same principle, because it has analysed the behaviour of the other aircraft..Nev

 

 

[motzartmerv]

That accident also involved a double transmission didn't it?

 

 

[facthunter]

It's well documented Andy. there were a lot of factors involved . Congestion at the airport over taxing the resources, bad visibility but the circumstances I highlight put paid (I hope) to the idea that high hours experienced people are not subject to errors of a "human factors" nature . Nev

 

 

[Gnarly Gnu]

I think next time others should not bother posting too many know alls...

Mate thanks for posting about this incident, it does help us (the non-pompous types anyway) to be more aware of what can happen. Given what happened to the ABC heli and similar awful accidents having many k hours of experience isn't ever a guarantee of perfection. I was reminded of this just yesterday travelling behind a senior looking traffic cop who changed lanes without looking & very nearly shunted a car alongside him into oncoming traffic. Never too old or too wise to stuff up.

 

 

[rankamateur]

another explanation is that the chopper pilot has at least 2 other fire radios in use and may have missed your last call and was unaware you were on a touch and go.

To be contracted to RFS they are required to carry at least 5 different radios and 2 of those are VHF comms, but if they were actively involved in an operation they turn them up and down to suit themselves, but may very well have an incoming transmission on more than one at a time, hopefully the VHF was turned up around the shared airfield, but nothing is certain.

 

 

[motzartmerv]

Yes nev I know what you were getting at. Has any body looked at port maq airfield in the ersa? There's some interesting stuff there about the helicopter movement area which is the grass runway ( currently decommissioned but still there) . The easy west runway;) I'm just wondering if that is a factor in this. IMHO it get rid of the notion that these crews took of f willy billy across the active runway when you factor in an east west runway .

 

 

[facthunter]

I believe conflicting runways or flight paths, need a positive control procedure. Absolutely needed when there are visibility problems at any end of a runway/strip. It's a no brainer. Isn't it always inferred that any operations other than the normal into wind make allowance for the "normal" traffic and assume a greater "onus" to maintain separation. Nev

 

 

[motzartmerv]

Yes of course. There's no doubt or argument that there was a breakdown in procedure and communication.

 

Experience is no Garuntee against making such mistakes that's for sure, but non experience isn't either.

 

I'm worried that Drs ability to learn from the incident is being restricted by the notion that the choppa crews were both 100 % to blame and there's nothing he could have done differently.

 

My only concern is him, I don't have direct input to the choppa crews "attitudes" so we can only offer advice for our RAA brother.

 

 

[Oscar]

Above and beyond (no pun intended) the specifics of the whole thing, can I point out the potential here for an extremely harmful outcome for recreational aviation had there in fact been a collision? I am talking about the public perception of us as reasonable and responsible users of airspace.

 

I suggest that the general public perception had there been a collision and probably considerable loss of life would have been very negative indeed. On the one hand, there is (presumably) an on-going fire-fighting operation which by definition is aimed at the preservation of life and property and usually involves volunteer fire-fighting resources (RFS members in addition to the professional aircrew). On the other, there is a lone pilot engaged in a purely recreational activity occupying the same patch of airspace. Two aircraft - one engaged on a mission that most would consider to be of great public value, the other flying purely for his own purposes (aka enjoyment) without any discernible public value.

 

Now, add to that the fact that the recreational pilot by his own admission executed a non-standard avoidance manouever. Whether or not that was in fact the only realistic option (and again, by his own admission 'perhaps he should have turned right'), so I think we can conclude that it was NOT the only available option.

 

What is going to come out in the Coronial investigation? A situation of contested airspace between a high-public-value operation and an (apparently) selfish private operator who failed to execute an avoidance manuoever in accordance with the rules. The death(s) of selfless volunteers, highly skilled and relatively scarce professional aircrew and the destruction of vital and highly-valuable fire-fighting infrastructure (these emotive terms are not injected by me for effect but I believe an accurate reflection of the likely public reaction).

 

You can see where this could be headed. Immediate restriction of access to airspace where emergency operations are taking place. Public resentment of recreational aviation. Reinforcement in the public perception that RAA pilots are pointless and dangerous hoons in the air who couldn't give a damn about the general public good.

 

The umbrage exhibited by this pilot about the incident conveys an attitude of selfish entitlement that does none of us any good. There is nothing in the regulations (yet) that explicitly state that emergency operations have a blanket precedence over normal operations (at least, I don't think there are) but common sense and common decency say to me that if emergency operations are taking place, one should suspend shooting circuits for one's own enjoyment and get the hell out of the way. If indeed there is a fire-fighting emergency situation under way, you have no idea whether a specific flight is 'routine', in which case it is reasonable to expect the fire-fighting aircraft to observe normal airfield conventions, or a response to a call for immediate assistance to say a fire-crew trapped in a life-threatening situation where response-time minutes can make the difference between life and death.

 

The general public would applaud any action taken to limit the possibility of an accident between an RAA aircraft and a emergency-response aircraft - even if they did not understand the rules and conventions of the actual situation and who was 'in the wrong'. We would lose out again, somewhere in the equation.

 

Whether we like it or not, and whether the 'rules' say we have acted properly, we still need to be conscious of our public image if we are to gain / hold onto our relative freedom to use airspace. Getting tangled up with emergency services operations is a really, really bad idea.

 

 

[Guest ozzie]

And we all wonder why people do not want to report an incidence that they are involved in.

 

Hope our newbie to the skies can see through all the BS and armchair experts and accept that he did the right thing in the end and avoided the other aircraft, a miss is a miss.

 

It is up to the real experts to do the interviews, listen to the radio recordings if they exist and come down to what really matters and that is that it does not happen again. Our newbie has filed a report I wonder if the pilot of the helicopter has done the same? After all he is required to as well.

 

Let's just back off a bit, let newbie catch his breath, get a change of undies and let the due process take over.