Flying Control System – Duplicate Inspection

[DonRamsay]

I don't think L1 is going to be too difficult to get.

 

 

[David Isaac]

So is the inference that our Pilot Certificate training is not as good as GFPT (soon to be RPL)?

 

 

[DonRamsay]

Let's make sure we don't have crossed wires here.

 

The 2nd sign off can be done by a person with a Pilot Cert or a L2, L3 or L4. Only two people are required to be involved - the person that does the work and one other being a Pilot Cert holder OR one of the other L2, L3 or L4.

 

Currently RA-Aus does not require anything in this regard that is not required for GA.

 

OK?

 

Any speculation of mine as to what may happen down the track is just that - speculation.

 

 

[Guest Maj Millard]

When I recently finished my 19 registered Jabiru UL 450 there was absolutely no way I was going to fly, or allow anybody else fly the aircraft without a full dual inspection. Laurie

Now there's a smart man !......

 

 

[Guest Maj Millard]

Sitting next to the pilot once in an amphib Caravan prior to takeoff out of Hamilton Island, I noticed he was paying particuar attention to the checklists mounted on the yokes. He did nothing without referring to the checklists....

 

I couldn't help but comment " like those checklists don't you "......."takes the human out of the loop" was his quick reply and "I've had a big day ".....made good sense to me, nobody is perfect not even a highly experienced commercial pilot..............Maj.........

 

 

[M61A1]

I think what needs some consideration here is the fact that some of us rig our aircraft every time we fly it. The tech manual uses the term "should", indicating not mandatory. I see no problem at all with extra inspection after maintenance, especially deeper maintenance, but to drag an extra person with me every time I fly is a bit excessive. I use a checklist for my rigging, them my preflight inspection. I suspect also that the duplicate inspection may be more directed aircraft that have controls in enclosed places, that don't get looked at every time you walk around the aircraft, rather that Drifter like aircraft, with almost everything where you can see it.

 

 

[David Isaac]

To my knowledge there is no requirement in GA to have a duplicate inspection when rigging an aircraft of the type that is rigged at every flight, such as trailerable types.

 

 

[Cosmick]

I think what needs some consideration here is the fact that some of us rig our aircraft every time we fly it. The tech manual uses the term "should", indicating not mandatory. I see no problem at all with extra inspection after maintenance, especially deeper maintenance, but to drag an extra person with me every time I fly is a bit excessive. I use a checklist for my rigging, them my preflight inspection. I suspect also that the duplicate inspection may be more directed aircraft that have controls in enclosed places, that don't get looked at every time you walk around the aircraft, rather that Drifter like aircraft, with almost everything where you can see it.

Hi M61A1

 

Do you Trailer the Drifter and what is Rig time ? - then ........

 

 

[M61A1]

Hi M61A1Do you Trailer the Drifter and what is Rig time ? - then ........

Yes, I trailer my Drifter, unless It's late afternoon, and good weather, I might tie it down overnight at our strip, if I'm going to fly first thing next morning.It usually takes around 40 min, at a methodical, don't rush, be thorough sort of pace, with only one person, usually still takes that with 2 people, because I check everything they're doing anyway.

 

 

[DonRamsay]

When you finish off your plane in RAA currently the inspector doesn't actualy inspect your plane he actualy watches you perform YOUR Final inspectionSomewhat different to what is now being requiered

Deborah, I don't think it is different. What was meant even if not clear in the AN is that the pilot does the work and is checked by one other person being a pilot or L2, etc.

 

 

[Dafydd Llewellyn]

Just to get some perspective on the controllability of an aircraft following a control system disconnect - how many of you have ever trimmed the aircraft and then taken your hands and feet off the controls, and watched what the aircraft does? A properly set-up, normally stable aircraft will pretty much fly itself; normally it will gradually drift off into a turn, which will gradually self-steepen; however if you keep it straight with either the rudder alone or the ailerons alone, you should be able (in smooth air) to fly like this for protracted periods. If it has sufficient dihedral on the wing, you should be able to perform up to rate one turns using the rudder alone; a good test is to fly a gentle figure eight on the rudder alone. It's advisable (cheap insurance) to get to know your aircraft in this way.

 

If it won't do this, it's not set up correctly, and you should find out why. All this should be true whether it uses a fixed tailplane and elevators, or an all-moving tailplane.

 

Some aircraft may start to "porpoise" slowly; this is called the "phugoid" pitch oscillation. It normally is quite slow - around 20 to 30 seconds per cycle, and it should damp out after a few cycles. If it does not, the aircraft has a form of instability that will make it more difficult to fly on the pitch trim system.

 

If your aircraft is properly set up, and you always fly it in trim, a control circuit disconnect need not be a particularly exciting event - especially if the controls are fully mass-balanced.

 

The main danger with a control system disconnect is that the loose part of the control system may jam - this is a particular hazard with pushrod systems.

 

 

[storchy neil]

If your rigging is true you can take off and land using rudder and trim only Neil.

 

 

[M61A1]

Yes, I was having a play the other day. My Drifter has no trims at all, with power off, it occilates once, slightly nose up to around 55kts, the nose down to around 65kts, then settles around 60 kts. I easily managed a circuit with rudder only.

 

 

[geoffreywh]

Having re-read the directive I see that I wrongly assumed that the directive was aimed at ALL maintenance, not just Flight Surfaces. My Apologies to Darren. Could be a problem finding someone to counter sign without seeing the WHOLE assembly process though... I would not be to0 happy being presented with a "Fait Acompli" and hearing someone say , "Have a look and just sign here would you?"

 

 

[M61A1]

Having re-read the directive I see that I wrongly assumed that the directive was aimed at ALL maintenance, not just Flight Surfaces. My Apologies to Darren. Could be a problem finding someone to counter sign without seeing the WHOLE assembly process though... I would not be to0 happy being presented with a "Fait Acompli" and hearing someone say , "Have a look and just sign here would you?"

As Dazza was saying earlier about the military 3 tiered approach.....the final inspector (the "independent inspector"), is not allowed to be involved in carrying out the work, his/her whole job is to independently inspect that the tradesman and supervisor have correctly assembled and correctly locked whatever bit they're working on. Of course, if it's behind a panel, it's done before panel fitment. So, in regard to the above post, as long as the "inspector" understands his role before the job is undertaken, it really should not be difficult, as long as you have someone available.

 

 

[nong]

Let's make sure we don't have crossed wires here.The 2nd sign off can be done by a person with a Pilot Cert or a L2, L3 or L4. Only two people are required to be involved - the person that does the work and one other being a Pilot Cert holder OR one of the other L2, L3 or L4.

 

Currently RA-Aus does not require anything in this regard that is not required for GA.

 

OK?

 

Any speculation of mine as to what may happen down the track is just that - speculation.

Err, Don.... You might want to read what the our Tech Manager REALLY published in 23072014.

 

Pilot Cert holders are EXCLUDED. His document only refers to those lucky enough to be a member of the diminishing pool of L1 Pilot Cert holders.

 

I note the Tech Manager's lack of justification. "Recent investigations have identified potential areas of concern" Duh.. What? Those vague words do not a justification make.

 

I also note the bizarre requirement to "dob in" the person who performed the work. If, for example, a split pin was found to be of an incorrect diameter, the person conducting the second inspection is required to "if any issues are identified, a Recreational Aviation Australia incident report is to be completed and sent to the Technical Manager."

 

This then gives the Tech Manager a "justification" to strip the person who performed the work of his/her technical "Authority".

 

It might also ruin a few friendships.

 

This document, I think, is another shot in the Tech Manager's war against us.

 

 

[Mriya]

Err, Don.... You might want to read what the our Tech Manager REALLY published in 23072014.Pilot Cert holders are EXCLUDED. His document only refers to those lucky enough to be a member of the diminishing pool of L1 Pilot Cert holders.

 

I note the Tech Manager's lack of justification. "Recent investigations have identified potential areas of concern" Duh.. What? Those vague words do not a justification make.

 

I also note the bizarre requirement to "dob in" the person who performed the work. If, for example, a split pin was found to be of an incorrect diameter, the person conducting the second inspection is required to "if any issues are identified, a Recreational Aviation Australia incident report is to be completed and sent to the Technical Manager."

 

This then gives the Tech Manager a "justification" to strip the person who performed the work of his/her technical "Authority".

 

It might also ruin a few friendships.

 

This document, I think, is another shot in the Tech Manager's war against us.

Let's not get too carried away. I just went back and read the Airworthiness Notice but didn't see anything sinister. Maybe some wording could be 'tidied up' a bit, but then most of us have probably written and sent something only to later re-read it and see better ways of wording it.

Bottom line of how I believe it should be interpreted is that two independent (and qualified) people need to inspect and certify for flight control maintenance work when the controls have been disturbed. It is acceptable for one of these people to have been the one doing the work. The important thing is that both people certifying act independently of each other during their inspection/certification. The other aspect is with regards to reporting requirements. I interpret this as the requirement to report control system design defects or failures that are found during inspection (which have always been subject to reporting requirements) and are not a demand to 'dob in a mate' in the event of errors found within the course of applying this maintenance procedure.

 

The time when a maintenance report would be in order is when the normal independant inspection procedure fails to detect an issue and the aircraft is released from maintenance with faults that are then detected at a later time.

 

Finally, although Darren is not able to link this notice to recent events for legal reasons, I'd have thought 2 people dying in a recent accident that appears to have been caused by a control system failure that an independent inspection process is designed to detect is ample reason to highlight a longstanding requirement that has existed since the very early days of aviation regulations.

 

So in summary, no conspiracies here. Just a simple reminder of regulations and requirements that we have always been required to observe.

 

 

[DonRamsay]

. . . Pilot Cert holders are EXCLUDED. His document only refers to those lucky enough to be a member of the diminishing pool of L1 Pilot Cert holders.

Nong, last count there were something like 10,000 RA-Aus Pilot Certificate holders who also had a L1. While we've lost a few members and gained some new ones "diminishing pool" would probably sound like a gross overstatement to most.

 

The intent with L1 accreditation is that all Pilot Certificate holders should have little or no difficulty being accredited via an online exam. It is not going to be that big a deal. What it will do is require somebody who has zero previous mechanical experience to learn a bit about the subject before snapping spark plugs off at the stem. You have to remember that the Gen X and Y in particular have lived in a time of very reliable cars that don't need weekly attention to the distributor and spark plugs and are too complex for most people to touch. They've probably never had to service even a lawnmower.

 

I note the Tech Manager's lack of justification. "Recent investigations have identified potential areas of concern" Duh.. What? Those vague words do not a justification make.

Mriya responded to this reasonably and the less said about it the better.

 

I also note the bizarre requirement to "dob in" the person who performed the work. . . .

Again, Mriya has put this bizarre assertion in its proper perspective. There is no question in my mind that RA-Aus incidents are massively under-reported. Incident reporting actually allows you to draw conclusion using statistical analysis which is pretty useless in looking at statistically rare events like fatalities. But, when there is massive under-reporting, statistical analysis of minor incidents including things like near-misses can be less than helpful and even misleading.

 

This document, I think, is another shot in the Tech Manager's war against us.

I think if you could see the incredible effort Darren and his predecessor put in to helping us and our passengers and the people we fly over to be safer you would regret making a statement like that. These people are not 5 day, 9 to 5 workers - I've often had responses from Darren on weekends including last Sunday morning, hours before he was due on an overseas flight. FFS, what on earth would motivate our Tech Manager to go to war against us?

 

 

[Mriya]

I should add as a chief engineer in a CASA maintenance org I have had to conduct an investigation (and report to CASA) a maintenance error where a Cessna elevator trim system was installed in reverse sense and managed to escape detection despite the involvement of 4 LAME's. The error was only discovered after takeoff on a test flight. It was a classic case of multiple factors (including incorrect maintenance data) and highlighted the various Human Factors which lead to maintenance errors.

 

So why do i tell this story? Simply because the evidence of history teaches us that errors will occur in maintenance. In fact it is estimated that on average 1 in 10 defects or errors will be missed (even by experienced people). Personally I was shocked by this figure as I would like to think that my personal performance is better than that, however in my experience I am now inclined to believe this statistic. Using this scary statistic you can deduce that with one person only working on a flight control system will result in 1 in 10 defects or errors going unnoticed. By complying with the independant inspection requirements this failure to detect rate will statistically drop to 1 in 100 defects.

 

The airlines learnt the importance of mitigating these risks some time back. In my Qantas days we were told to avoid as an individual to even doing simple engine tasks on multiple engines during maintenance visits.

 

Put simply the independent inspection process is designed to save lives. I don't know specifics, however it is possible there would be at least two more people would be alive today if a particular flight control defect had been identified during assembly or maintenance.

 

Not only is it illegal to skip this regulatory requirement, but it also stack the odds against you of encountering a flight control defect or failure sooner or later, no matter how good you may think you are as a maintainer.

 

 

[AVOCET]

I should add as a chief engineer in a CASA maintenance org I have had to conduct an investigation (and report to CASA) a maintenance error where a Cessna elevator trim system was installed in reverse sense and managed to escape detection despite the involvement of 4 LAME's. The error was only discovered after takeoff on a test flight. It was a classic case of multiple factors (including incorrect maintenance data) and highlighted the various Human Factors which lead to maintenance errors.So why do i tell this story? Simply because the evidence of history teaches us that errors will occur in maintenance. In fact it is estimated that on average 1 in 10 defects or errors will be missed (even by experienced people). Personally I was shocked by this figure as I would like to think that my personal performance is better than that, however in my experience I am now inclined to believe this statistic. Using this scary statistic you can deduce that with one person only working on a flight control system will result in 1 in 10 defects or errors going unnoticed. By complying with the independant inspection requirements this failure to detect rate will statistically drop to 1 in 100 defects.

The airlines learnt the importance of mitigating these risks some time back. In my Qantas days we were told to avoid as an individual to even doing simple engine tasks on multiple engines during maintenance visits.

 

Put simply the independent inspection process is designed to save lives. I don't know specifics, however it is possible there would be at least two more people would be alive today if a particular flight control defect had been identified during assembly or maintenance.

 

Not only is it illegal to skip this regulatory requirement, but it also stack the odds against you of encountering a flight control defect or failure sooner or later, no matter how good you may think you are as a maintainer.

I agree with major maintenance ,

 

But what about me needing to adjust a rod end a couple of turns on a jabiru aileron or whatever ??

 

Seems a bit odd .

 

Mike

 

 

[DonRamsay]

Does sound a bit severe.

 

The AN does require it though:

 

"1.2 Following adjustment . . . . etc."

 

 

[Mriya]

Does sound a bit severe.The AN does require it though:

"1.2 Following adjustment . . . . etc."

I second that reply. Unfortunately the law rarely allows for pragmatism in these matters. As a maintenance org this issue is unlikely to be a problem as we can invariably find an appropriate person to conduct a proper independant inspection. However this is more problematic for an owner who is a long way from other pilots or maintainers. Best suggestion to remain legal would be plan to do such maintenance when or where someone is available. Yes this may be a pain, but sometimes the law is like that.

 

 

[jetjr]

A significant issue in private aviation is the restrictions continue to be placed on owners and pilots without much basis or risk analysis.

 

This can mean the ones who always do the right thing continue however many just do whatever they like and hide it.

 

Dont assume further regs makes for compliance, in fact often goes the other way.

 

Why are these maintenance rules being made as if everyone has an L2 available?

 

Dont mention the trim tab or aileron adjustment, don reveal the head or heart issues suffered last week .......as either means your not flying.

 

 

[turboplanner]

1. This is NOT a new regulation (".....continue to be placed")

 

2. In at least one case, if it had been observed, two people would be alive today.

 

3. The most likely action, if RAA members recommend publicly that rules not be complied with and medical conditions be fudged or hidden is that

 

CASA will be forced to cancel self maintenance privileges, and medical checks by anyone other than a DAME.

 

 

[jetjr]

TP, if you think some GA pilots arent covering health issues to keep their medical intact your dreaming. Also making things up if you think im recommending it.

 

Knowing next to nothing of fact on the recent accidents, it could appear making rule ammendments (new inspection requirements) based on them is, even by CASA stds,is wide ranging. Has an accident report been released?

 

I have no problem with the dual inspection requirements for significant works but as avocet said and myria too, it can easily mean simple safety works not being done till later on or not done at all.

 

The issue here is creating system to pick up flawed maint works. We have restrictions in place on the whole RAA catagory linked with reduced maint and medical.

 

Has to keep in mind aircraft are mostly non certified, and do require more simple maint regularly than GA or certified types