CASA 292/14 - Conditions and direction about Jabiru engines

[geoffreywh]

Jetjr...........What you write is probably the correct way to go about improving J engines. BUT, it is not CASA"s brief.......That belonged to Jab...

 

 

[Guest Ornis]

My engine is S/n 425 and hardly any of the AD's apply to it. Last week I asked about changing the flywheel bolts and I was told it wasn't needed because there hadn't been any problems with those engines.

Does it have dowels? If it doesn't you should examine it, replacing the capscrews. (Dowels don't make it right necessarily but they do stop you disassembling it.) You'll possibly find bluish gunk in the joint.

If Jabiru knew what was needed it wouldn't be in this mess.

 

 

[jetjr]

Whilst i think more should be done to improve the engines, why do people think its Jabirus job to fix this.

 

They make an engine, market it as best they can, someone buys it. After warranty runs out, bottom line, its the owners problem.

 

You could argue its not fit for purpose but its a steep slippery hill and many are running fine.

 

Protection of the brand and future sales is all that attaches them to doing any more. They can continue improving it but they dont have to.

 

Dont assume market forces are correctly interpreted or have to be. The worse the damage the wide action like CASA has done, actually makes it LESS likely they will do much about it.

 

I dont think Jabiru are dishonest people and they would improve engines if a fix was there. It obviously isnt as simple as many think.

 

 

[Oscar]

Thanks, Oscar, and I do take you seriously, seriously, but this is not a question of metaphysics. The simple fact is there is a problem with Jabiru engines and my question is, what was CASA supposed to do?

I wasn't being metaphysical; the CASA action is based on a study (no matter for the moment of its disputed accuracy) that purports to represent a sudden outbreak of events - the equivalent in engineering terms of an 'epidemic'. Epidemiology isn't 'metaphysical' at all, it is the rational analysis of data - including conflicting data - to determine a reliable conclusion from a mass of data. Concluding that there is an 'unacceptable' rate of failure is an epidemiological conclusion in the absence of a defined standard of acceptance of performance. Since, according to CASA, the Rotax failure rate is the 'accepted' standard; then a greater failure rate over a specific time period that is deemed to be unacceptable, must be an 'epidemic' event.

 

In terms of loss of life, the commercial aviation result for 2014 is absolutely an epidemic, for instance, and it so happens that Airbus aircraft have been the ones in all of the high-loss-of-life accidents. Do we see signs on Airbus aircraft informing passengers that they run a higher risk of fatality/injury than for the other 'major' brand of airliner? Do we see limitations on Airbus aircraft flying over populated areas?

 

However, to return to your central question - what was CASA supposed to do? You are asking me to express a personal opinion; fair enough, I'll give it a go.

 

In terms of world standard practice, it generally requires evidence that a 'performance standard' has been breached (e.g. a QA requirement for an APMA, a breach of a production certificate, a material or manufacturing standard spec. has not been met etc.) or a 'new' condition is discovered (e.g. unanticipated environmental/operational causes for degradation of a particular metallurgy / process). There are huge 'graveyards' of aircraft that arrived there in fully operational condition, because an end-of-life condition was determined that made them unable /uneconomic to continue to fly. For other aircraft, serious AD's / SBs have to be observed: e.g. the Cessna SIDs programme.

 

CASA has broken new - and potentially fraught for the whole of recreational (at least) aviation - ground in the Jabiru case. It has not only not provided any metric to determine that an extant standard may have been breached ( which it cannot do because there is no such standard), it has decided that 'not as good as' a competitive product is unsatisfactory service - and it has not even applied that 'de-facto ' new standard across the board!

 

Seriously: an analogous action for passenger vehicles would be a decision that an ANCAP rating of (to pick a number at random) 4.5 is 'not acceptable' since the top vehicles are getting what - 4.9? - and further, that only one of the vehicles rating at 4.5 or below is going to be placed under restriction because all the others don't sell many so won't potentially kill so many people if they do have a crash. I think that most people contributing to this thread can see why that proposition has so many holes in it that it would sink in hard mud.

 

In my personal opinion, CASA has created a definition of 'unacceptable failure rate' that is unique to CASA, since it does not apply any international standard of 'unacceptable failure rate' - there is none. By so doing, CASA has set a precedent for the creation of a 'new' standard to apply in Australia. So, let's take that to a logical conclusion.

 

I see two possible courses for action available to CASA.

 

The first is, a new set of standards for engine performance that supercede /augment the JAR 22H certification and the ASTM certifying standards, to introduce 'reliability' metric parameters. I suggest that such a move might not just catch out Jabiru engines - or perhaps certain configurations of Jabiru engines - but also quite possibly some models of Rotax and all of the auto-conversions. Ul Power and d-motor engines, just to name two, are not even in the frame for use because they are already NOT conforming to either JAR 22H or ASTM standards. I suspect that this line of action could have very, very serious effects on the entire recreational fleet and might well decimate the numbers of recreational aircraft allowed to fly.

 

The second option - and the one that I believe makes more sense - would be for CASA to remove the obstacles for the replacement of Jabiru engines in certificated / ASTM certified aircraft with other engines that can meet the CASA-mandated reliability factor metrics. That would blow the underlying rationale for the ASTM standards for LSA aircraft apart- that the manufacturer has the only say in what components are allowed in their aircraft . It would allow, for example, the substitution of (standards-meeting) Rotax, Continental 0200D, CAE (when JAR 22H certificated/ ASTM certified), etc. engines in LSA aircraft. Jabiru would not be disadvantaged - all they have to do is get their engines to meet the 'new' reliability standard and they compete on price/performance basis with everybody else. Owners and operators of Jabiru airframes would be able to choose the mix of cost/performance/reliability to the minimum mandated standard that suits their flying profile.

 

 

[kgwilson]

There are certainly plenty of armchair experts out there who without any real expertise but with a vociferous opinion KNOW how to fix the problems but haven't, or they don't have a Jabiru engine but get on the bandwagon because they heard that their mates brothers uncle had major problems. There are also those who haven't had problems so wonder what all this is about and others that have had problems, analysed them, got expert advice and put in fixes and now are happy with their engine.

 

 

[Old Koreelah]

Thanks, Oscar, and I do take you seriously, seriously, but this is not a question of metaphysics. The simple fact is there is a problem with Jabiru engines and my question is, what was CASA supposed to do?

Gather evidence. Analyse it. Consult widely with all stakeholders. Act in a holistic way (so that the cure is not worse than the disease.) Be accountable for that action.

 

 

[Camel]

CASA website. http://casa.gov.au/scripts/nc.dll?WCMS:STANDARD::pc=PC_102365.

 

Mark Skidmore comments and down page Jabiru precautionary limitation still in place.

 

To me I find the comments contradicting, what are your thoughts ?

 

Also jabiru number was 40 I think now seems to be 45,

 

 

[Guest Ornis]

When examining data at an epistemological level

I wasn't being metaphysical; the CASA action is based on a study (no matter for the moment of its disputed accuracy) that purports to represent a sudden outbreak of events - the equivalent in engineering terms of an 'epidemic'. Epidemiology isn't 'metaphysical' at all

You can understand my comment.

 

The fact remains, if CASA decide there is a problem it can take action. One hopes that the matter is then investigated and any problems rectified. My personal view is CASA has turned a blind eye to problems for a long time. Jabiru has been bluffing, bulling and bullying for years.

 

CASA hasn't grounded aircraft. It has insisted student pilots and passengers be properly warned. That's the least it can do. It has stopped overflying built-up areas. This has meant aircraft can't land/takeoff from some aerodromes, which is a nuisance, but otherwise not too much of an inconvenience.

 

In six months the instrument expires. If there isn't a problem the matter resolves itself, doesn't it?

 

 

[facthunter]

I wouldn't assume the matter finishes there. It is a sunset clause. It may be re-activated or replaced with something else. Nev

 

 

[jetjr]

Just because I know theres some who love to argue about numbers.

 

Im sure the normal fact police will find these assessments incorrect in some way

 

There are 50 Accidents & Incidents in the RAA reported data for 2014 involving Jabiru and that includes ALL causes

 

54 in 2013, many not detailed on the web.

 

Really rough count (even rougher grouping) or 2014 incidents shows

 

Non engine related

 

21 incidents related to Pilot or operation

 

4 gear/tyre/brakes/prop related

 

2 electrical

 

27 TOTAL

 

4 Cyl Engine

 

10 unknown engine

 

8 throughbolts

 

18 TOTAL

 

6cyl Engine

 

4 unknown engine

 

0 throughbolts

 

1 flywheel

 

5 TOTAL

 

So we have maximum 23 engine related incidents in RAA 2014

 

Long way off 45 CASA talks about.

 

 

[turboplanner]

....but reasonably consistent with the yearly figures from 2007 thru 2012. (I only started with 2007, so it's possible there will be earlier statistics).

 

You can add to that:

 

• incidents unreported to RAA which CASA might have found out about - like reading the press as we all do, reading accidents and incidents on RF
   
   
  
• unreported incidents that have been helpfully reported to CASA by others
   
   
  
• VH incidents reported, and unreported as discovered by CASA or ATSB
   
   
  
• Used ads with engine TT vs airframe TT anoamlies
   
   
  
• and so on
   
   
  

 

 

 

 

[facthunter]

As you could to a greater or lesser extent with the Rotax or any other engine. The figures are dodgy IF there are any unrelated to an engine failure caused by the engine, and not an operator . There seems to be a difficulty accepting a fault found in a routine required check and a failure in flight. A top overhaul is not an engine failure. Especially with leaded fuel. If you don't repair a cylinder that has poor compression it will continue to deteriorate and at a rapid rate, and FAIL.. Nev

 

 

[Guest Ornis]

CASA website. http://casa.gov.au/scripts/nc.dll?WCMS:STANDARD::pc=PC_102365.

Jabiru precautionary operating limitations

A set of precautionary operating limitations on aircraft powered by Jabiru engines remains in place. The precautionary limitations follow a high number of Jabiru engine failures and power loss incidents, some of which resulted in aircraft forced landings. More than 45 Jabiru engine failures or in-flight engine incidents were reported in 2014, with CASA recently becoming aware of incidents in previous years. Problems with Jabiru engines include failures of through bolts, flywheel bolts and valve train assemblies, as well as cylinder cracking. The failures affect a range of Jabiru engine models and have occurred in aircraft used in different flying activities, although many have been reported in aircraft used for flying training. CASA is currently working with Jabiru and other stakeholders to identify the causes of the engine problems and to implement appropriate solutions. Causes being investigated include design and mechanical issues, how aircraft are flown, and maintenance-related issues. While this investigative work is ongoing, the precautionary limitations have been introduced to reduce risks for people on the ground, passengers and trainee pilots flying solo. The limitations ensure that trainee pilots flying solo and passengers understand and accept the risk of a Jabiru engine failure.

 

 

 

The limitations restrict flights to day time under the visual flight rules, require aircraft to be flown so they can at all times glide clear of a populous area, require passengers and trainee pilots flying solo to sign a statement saying they are aware of and accept the risk of an engine failure and require trainee pilots to have recently and successfully completed engine failure exercises before solo flights. CASA consulted with the aviation community on the Jabiru limitations, receiving more than 630 comments. CASA revised the proposed limitations after taking account of the consultation comments and other relevant information and considers the limitations now appropriately manage the safety risks.

 

 

Now the dust has settled I wonder if Jabiru will actually do something right.

 

 

[turboplanner]

The RAA reports while of poor standard (quite often the engine designation isn't specific, IDs missing, cylinder number etc not mentioned), what is reported is usually enough to decide whether the event was a fuel exhaustion, valve failure, through bolt failure etc, operator etc. I found it quite easy to distinguish between an engine failure and someone doing an overhaul.

 

 

[facthunter]

Ornis, What specifically would YOU suggest they do? There's nothing in the long quote above that changes anything. It's very non specific. Tells us little.

 

It isn't a matter of whether you can tell the difference Turbs have CASA?

 

ALL the carburetter floats are suspect.. . That is a REAL safety issue . Is anything being done about that? Nev

 

 

[Guest Ornis]

Ornis, What specifically would YOU suggest they do?

Talk to Ian Bent.

 

 

[Oscar]

In six months the instrument expires. If there isn't a problem the matter resolves itself, doesn't it?

Well, I don't think that there CAN be an outcome within six months where 'the matter resolves itself.' Let's look at the practicalities.

 

Let's assume, for the sake of illustration, that Jabiru amazingly came up with a number of engineering fixes that gave serious promise of addressing the CASA-designated problem target areas tomorrow. Perhaps if Rod Stiff went for an early-morning walk to ponder life, the universe and everything and happened to stumble over - golly gee - such an engine, capable of being immediately fitted into Jabirus without changing things that themselves required other engineering, testing etc., tomorrow. 'Wow', he says to himself, 'here's the answer!'

 

That engine needs to be certified to ASTM (for the LSA-reg Jabirus) and JAR 22H (for the certificated aircraft). Since there is only one suitable test facility in Australia (as far as I know) that means sequential tests: one of 50 hours actual running for the 2200 certificated engine, and two of at least 200 hours - one for the 2200 to be ASTM certified and one of 200 hours for the 3300 engine to be certified.

 

Just the JAR runs will take - realistically - about two and a half weeks to complete (and that assumes CASA has observers just waiting for the chance to spend a couple of weeks observing, to be deployed virtually immediately.) About four hours per day of actual running - two two-hour blocks - is as much as one can expect to be accomplished. Then there's all the data documentation and formal paperwork to be created (by the aero engineers) and approved (by CASA.) Some of that data prep. work can be done concurrently with the actual test running, but short of having a 'backroom' team doing that while another team conducts the tests, most of the work will be done sequentially, not concurrently.

 

To do 200 hours of running to ASTM standards, at two runs (four hours) per day, is 50 days of test running... times two to cover both engines. Plus the data documentation etc, though see above re the possibility of concurrent data prep. - if there are resources available.

 

So we are looking at nearly six months before just all the testing and approval stuff is completed. All that does, is get a different engine to the same status as the existing Jab engines!. Better reliability is not assured any more than it was by the testing that Jabiru originally undertook - because the tests are the same!. ll that can be said for the new engines is - they haven't proven to be unreliable.... I would think that at a minimum, a test of reliability would be 1000 hours of typical service - and that's about three years of average FTF use!

 

So - where does that leave CASA when the current instrument expires? CASA can hardly say: 'well, we see signs of good intent / potential progress, we will withdraw the instrument'. There are still a thousand or more Jabirus (and others) out there with Jabiru engines in them and the new engines are not limited by the instrument anyway - if they are not Jabiru engines - but are limited if they are Jabiru engines. Remember, the test there is if the engine is manufactured by a person under licence from, or under a contract with Jabiru. If Jabiru is the 'manufacturer', then it's a Jabiru engine!

 

Nothing has changed for the existing Jab. engines; so if CASA were to withdraw the instrument, it would be an admission that the instrument was 'wrong'. Would they do that anyway? - hardly likely for an authority that can be sued...

 

If Jabiru itself comes out with a suite of engineering modifications, tests them according to JAR 22H / ASTM standards - the situation is really the same: there is still no explicit 'guarantee' of reliability. Back to the roundabout of in-service 1000 hours (or whatever) of proving...

 

The underlying problem here, is that CASA by the language and the timing of its action ( and by that I mean the way in which it was progressed, over and above the extremely dubious date of enactment - about which I'd be surprised if some in CASA aren't dreading a call to visit the new DAS and explain why it was done in the way it was done..) has effectively left itself with no realistic exit strategy. Rather like a parasite that ultimately kills its host, unless there is a very sudden and drastic change by CASA in its way of handling the situation that it has now created, I see few reasons to be optimistic about the outcomes.

 

 

[Guest Ornis]

Yes, Oscar, but some people are arguing there isn't a problem. If there isn't, and CASA is so persuaded, the restrictions lapse.

 

Of course there is a problem. Of course Jabiru can't fix it. Of course there isn't time for testing. What was CASA to do? Give Jabiru another 20 years to produce another abysmal engine, like the hydraulic-lifter?

 

Perhaps if Rod Stiff went for an early-morning walk to ponder life, the universe and everything and happened to stumble over ...

the truth? a cliff?

 

In six months CASA can extend the limitations. It has options.

 

 

[Oscar]

Talk to Ian Bent.

I think that if CASA had been genuinely interested in finding a fix to the problem, they'd have done that very early in the proceedings. What they have done, is try to find a way around the situation, and that is not the same thing.

 

However, RAA is not just sitting on its hands here, nor are some other key people. There may well be useful news forthcoming fairly soon. However, what that news may be has to be left to the principals involved in the current activity - this is not an area for any second-hand information to precede the careful release of properly authenticated ( and qualified in any way/s that need clarification) statements.

 

 

[jetjr]

"More than 45 Jabiru engine failures or in-flight engine incidents were reported in 2014"

 

RAA sees just 23.......

 

Your saying a further 22 engine failures came from 131 VH reg aircraft?

 

If its reported ..... its reported and published. If not then it isnt strong enough information to act upon.

 

All rubbish about unreported and info from for sale ads, this has nothing to do with engine failures. Can be simply better value to replace than fix a service problem.

 

Reporting will be the same for all makes and models.

 

CASA should have been working to improve reporting and working WITH manufacturers for some time. If only to gather accurate data with which to take action.

 

To say they recently heard of previous events is simple horse s^&t. Two of the key guys there used to work for RAA.

 

 

[01rmb]

Talk to Ian Bent.

Ornis - you obviously have an issue with Rod Stiff and are happy to accept that Ian Bent the answers needed to achieve an acceptable level of reliability in what is largely the same engine. I have nothing against Ian and I am happy to accept that he has identified enough areas for improvements to achieve a more reliable engine but it is going to take a few years of real world use with several hundred engines doing 1,000's hours and making TBO without any problems to really be able to prove that the improvements have achieved the desired outcome. Since a handful of engines doing the typical private 50 hours a year is as good as myself and several hundred others with the same yearly usage not having any major problems with their Jabiru engines.

Acknowledging that reliability in some environments especially flight schools with heavy usage can be improved how are you supposed to prove that any modifications made or any service bulletins released has actually made a difference? Even if Rod were to wake up with the revelation that he has missed the boat and invites Ian in to implement all the suggested changes how do they prove to CASA that the holy grail of reliability has actually been achieved? Really, in the same vein, how would Rod prove that the improvements that Jabiru has implemented over the last few years have or have not already achieved improvements?

 

What's to say that after I were to drop $20-30k to change my engine to a CAE to obtain the promised improved reliability, that after a failure or two of a CAE engine in the hard life of a FTF, that CASA decides to not make a difference between the Jabiru and CAE and impose the same restrictions on all of them?

 

The real problem with the CASA ruling is how does any engine manufacturer or by extension and aircraft producer demonstrate that they have achieved the necessary reliability needed to avoid CASA placing restrictions on them? It seems the standards to be met are pretty arbitrary if the requirement is to not have failures increase from previous years and to be no worse than the leading competitor.

 

 

[Oscar]

The continual reference to 'unreported' incidents, is simply justification used by a few people to rubbish the documented data because the documented data does not provide the evidence they seek. A while ago, one of those who continually uses this 'argument', initiated a 'survey' on this site; it failed to provide the answer he sought. It is not unreasonable to connect the dots here.

 

One has to ask: what is the plausible reason why people would NOT meet the reporting requirements when penalties apply?

 

 

[facthunter]

Probably a similar reason why people speed on the road. Are you suggesting that there is anything like 100% reporting? Nev

 

 

[Oscar]

Probably a similar reason why people speed on the road. Are you suggesting that there is anything like 100% reporting? Nev

No - but if you accept that the reporting is not accurate, then you must de facto accept that 'comparison' of reported incidents is a false premise of accuracy.

 

 

[turboplanner]

The continual reference to 'unreported' incidents, is simply justification used by a few people to rubbish the documented data because the documented data does not provide the evidence they seek.

This is one of the more idiotic threads I've seen on this site, with people immediately shooting off at a tangent whenever someone makes a post.

 

Jet raised the difference between RAA statistics he'd checked for one year and said they fell short of what CASA reported for that year.

 

I made a few suggestions as to why the CASA figures might have been higher.

 

No more, No less

 

Hypothetically, I could well know of four unreported forced landings in one weekend at one FTF, but it's irrelevant to me. Other posters have mentioned forced landings over the years which don't show up in the reports. All that means is that there are an undetermined number of forced landings not in the reported figures. That in itself only indicates the reported figures are the minimum known instances.