CASA 292/14 - Conditions and direction about Jabiru engines

[01rmb]

The analogous action would be for cars with ANCAP ratings of, let's say, less than 4 to be similarly limited.

With the exception that CASA are not sharing what the ANCAP ratings for each car (aircraft) is and the rating is assessed using data and methodology they don't share with anybody - Merely a pass or fail assessment... The problem is it is not a defendable or transparent process even if there is a basis for things to be better. For ANCAP at least manufacturers know where they can improve to obtain a higher rating.

 

 

[kgwilson]

When you are a totalitarian regime and you make the rules, then bend them and break them it is all OK and above board because you don't answer to anyone who has any interest in fair play or reasonableness. You do it in the name of the 3rd letter in your acronym with no definitions or limits.

 

 

[fly_tornado]

It has just occurred to me that there is an identified risk in driving a motor car, apparently hundreds are killed each year in Australia, the government must act now and stop these vehicles being used around the public and get all who wish to travel within to sign a waiver.

You could have picked up a Cherry [chinese death traps] for a song last year as they are no longer able to meet the more stringent safety requirements.

 

 

[Oscar]

When you are a totalitarian regime and you make the rules, then bend them and break them it is all OK and above board because you don't answer to anyone who has any interest in fair play or reasonableness. You do it in the name of the 3rd letter in your acronym with no definitions or limits.

And in fact, exactly that is done by CASA in contraveyance of its own regulations - and not just in this case. The phrase 'applying the regulation by what CASA wants it to say, not what it actually says' has been used correctly on quite a number of occasions - the extension of the limitation on Jabiru engines to experimental class aircraft being a glaring example.

 

 

[Guest Ornis]

And in fact, exactly that is done by CASA in contraveyance of its own regulations - and not just in this case.

Let's take a hypothetical case. Great claims are made about an engine but evidence starts to emerge there are serious issues with reliability. Eventually everybody knows about it but the company denies any problems and blames poor maintenance; stating the numbers show its aircraft are safe. Can and should CASA, as the government organisation responsible for safety, act to limit operations? When?

The number of reported incidents is:

 

1. One

 

2. Two

 

3. 10

 

4. 50

 

6. 100

 

7. 200

 

8. 500

 

9. 1000

 

10. 10,000

 

The answer is, in this hypothetical case:

 

1. CASA can never act because it is contrary to its rules.

 

2. CASA can act if it believes it is in the public interest.

 

 

[facthunter]

Perhaps in a hypothetical case , they might have some idea of what outcomes might be possible/likely as a result of their actions? The question of how soundly based the action is, should be clear, and it isn't. The TIMING of it is very curious also if any good outcome might be sought. Nev

 

 

[turboplanner]

Why would the timing be curious FH?

 

 

[facthunter]

Right before Christmas where no one is contactable, in the real sense. Nev

 

 

[gandalph]

Right before Christmas where no one is contactable, in the real sense. Nev

I would describe it as Machiavellian rather than curious.

 

 

[turboplanner]

Right before Christmas where no one is contactable, in the real sense. Nev

True, but another equally plausible reason is people clearing their desks, doing the things they'd put off all year. Locally we're faced with a large flow of planning applications and decisions which the Council Officers made in the final days before Christmas.

The public comment period was over, there was enough time to make a safety decision (you never want to leave that ball in your court for any longer than days), they made the safety decision and they published it.

 

 

[gandalph]

(snip) True, but another equally plausible reason is people clearing their desks, doing the things they'd put off all year.

Exactly. The exiting Director clearing his desk before his successor could arrive and consider the issue. In government there is the "caretaker convention" where the outgoing government won't (well, shouldn't) make policy decision that bind the incoming government. That convention is also observed in when the occupants of senior public service positions change. It clearly wasn't in this case.

 

 

[Oscar]

The existing (Acting) DAS 'clearing his desk?' As a euphemism, that's up there with 'the expanding Canetoad population in Australia is an unfortunate consequence of slight oversights in the research behind the promulgation of biological control mechanisms'. More like a 'scorched-earth action as the retreat continues'...

 

Mark Skidmore had been liaising with RAA over this issue; he had also publicly stated his intention of embracing the Forsyth Review recommendations - in line with Government stated policy on those. CASA moved in the face of serious questions (that remain unanswered) on the validity of the data they claimed supported their action and without any discussion of alternative courses of action proposed by RAA.

 

The phrase 'bloody-minded intransigence' seems appropriate. Since Skidmore was the selected candidate for the position of DAS over any continuation of Farqharson's seigneurship, one is tempted to also use the phrase 'vindictive bastardy'. Of course, you might say that but I could NEVER comment on it.

 

 

[gandalph]

Trying for the world's longest euphemism Oscar?

 

 

[Oscar]

Trying for the world's longest euphemism Oscar?

I regard that as an intensely personal question, though I am aware that some of my past lady acquaintances have compared favourable impressions. However, I am quite, quite sure that there are Canetoads around who are far bigger euphemisms than me. It's not all about distance; consistency counts.

 

 

[turboplanner]

Which was accepted by the Court in the case of Noel Campbell v Rodney Victor Hay [2013] NSWDC 11

Some more reading for you Oscar, you missed the critical disclaimer condition of your quote, which was present in this case.

 

 

[turboplanner]

I have and will continue to fly many hundreds of hours with my kids in the plane. Its no more dangerous than it was in November or the previous 7 years

I think this is at least the second time you've said this, and you've go things back to front. No one is disputing that statement (except perhaps anyone who has evidence that the trend is increasing.)

 

What has changed is that where in the past, people would coin phrases like "Jab Bashers" and tell others there were no problems, the issue is now official.

 

The "foreseeable risk" is now up there in neon lights, not by a "Jab Basher" but by the Safety Authority.

 

Pay particular attention to the "good Neighbour" part of this link. The random in TT nature of this engine issue makes an argument that you can reasonably foresee a potential forced landing on any flight. http://lawgovpol.com/case-study-donoghue-v-stevenson-1932/

 

In the case of a severe injury or fatality it may even help to click it up to culpable negligence.

 

With that increased financial risk I would expect that by now PL Premiums may have gone up in price, and if they haven't the question is whether you have advised your insurer of the risk increase (increased cost that is).

 

For whatever reason, in almost 1500 hrs in Jabs I haven't had one issue from engine reliability. And many hundreds of others are the same.

That's quite understandable; in fact based on the reported engine failures/forced landings, several hundred/thousand may not have had a problem. But as I've said previously, this is a nightmare for an engine manufacturer - random faults at random hours. Many engines will easily see out TBO, but the few which will not, make it a safety issue.

In your case, 1500 successful hrs or not, you can't definitively say that yours will not let go next flight.

 

Numbers touted now indicate 12 engine outs in 90,000 movements.

I found 40 in the RAA figures from 2007 to 2012, which were reported to RAA from the RAA fleet

I haven't had a good look at the ATSB figures, but since ATSB only started taking an interest in RAA registered aircraft recently they may be VH registered aircraft. Will have a more detailed look.

 

 

[coljones]

In a major phone company, and probably common practise in all phone companies, there was a hands off policy except for system failures in the week before Christmas and January to prevent f****ups becoming embedded in the system while customers were grumpy and and staff were making sure things didn't fall over. Perhaps CASA should try this.

 

With the deskilling and deprofessionalisation of the public service I suspect that there are very few inside CASA capable of making a qualified review of the facts or even being able to formulate the questions to ask.

 

 

[jetjr]

I believe CASA only lookd at 2014 data, claimed increasing problem and some 40 failures in that year.

 

ATSB, RAA and Jabiru all disagree with these assertions.

 

Your legal angle confuses me, for many liability insurance is handled by RAA policy so assume these guys are aware of the issue. They are covering 1000x the affected aircraft.

 

Your indicating the penalty for an accident has risen, im saying the risk of the incident is the same.

 

 

[Guest Ornis]

Let's say Lotto releases one million scratch cards per month; the top prize is $1,000,000. So the chance of winning one million is one in a million. You know that. The odds are not great but you buy a ticket. You gotta be in to win... Unfortunately the winning ticket for that month has already been sold, but you don't know (the buyer didn't scratch it). What are the chances of winning the million? But as far as you know it's ...

 

Of course the number of engine failures is not fixed; none could fail or all could fail.

 

So that brings us to jetjr's point, the risk of any particular engine failing is no greater due to CASA's intervention. True. But you don't know what it was before and you don't know now. The risk of your engine failing cannot be calculated by looking at the number of engine failures unless the failures are randomly distributed. They are not. Furthermore, the number is not indeterminate. There is a reason, cause and effect. In fact, you are counting on that.

 

But this does not concern CASA, CASA is concerned with the total number failing, or at least the proportion. Reported and, I suspect, unreported.

 

So we have two aspects:

 

1. CASA acting because it is concerned about Jabiru engines in general, especially recent and current production. CASA made a judgement. A Jabiru cannot overfly congested areas - takeoff is a time engines fail; passengers and student pilots must be properly warned. The alternative? Have a quiet word with Rodney Stiff, get him to see the error of his ways...

 

2. Individuals concerned with their own engines. We should be able to agree that if a Jabiru engine is installed and operated according to Jabiru it is unlikely to reach 1000 hours without serious problems. We know that from experience. That's why people who know what they'd doing invest a lot more time and effort in the installation, virtually ignoring Jabiru. How is CASA meant to exempt such aircraft? Your say-so?

 

We also know, whatever the reasons, over 20 years, only 500 out of 7000 have reached 1000 hours. 14%. However cautiously you interpret this, as you must, I don't find it very reassuring. It certainly does not suggest thousands of engines reached or will 1000 hours without serious problems.

 

 

[Tex]

Some more reading for you Oscar, you missed the critical disclaimer condition of your quote, which was present in this case.

Hi TP

What was the critical disclaimer condition?

 

 

[David Isaac]

.......We also know, whatever the reasons, over 20 years, only 500 out of 7000 have reached 1000 hours. 14%. However cautiously you interpret this, as you must, I don't find it very reassuring. It certainly does not suggest thousands of engines reached or will 1000 hours without serious problems.

Ornis, I don't know what you are on but you keep quoting this figure in a very mischievous manner. The Jabiru document did NOT say that in 20 years only 500 engines made 1,000 hrs.

This what is exactly what the document stated on page 9 of 13:

 

"4 Service History

 

At the time of writing:

 

- The Jabiru 2200 engine has been in production for over 20 years in various configurations.

 

- Approximately 7,000 Jabiru engines of various models have been manufactured.

 

- It is estimated that around 500 engines have exceeded 1,000 hours TIS.

 

- Annual fleet hours are estimated at in excess of 20,000 hours."

 

How can you draw any failure inference from that????

 

 

[rhysmcc]

It does suggest some are no longer operating, in that 20,000 across 7000 engines is only 2.8 hours each a year, however you can't really draw any facts out of it.

 

 

[coljones]

Let's say Lotto releases one million scratch cards per month; the top prize is $1,000,000. So the chance of winning one million is one in a million. You know that. The odds are not great but you buy a ticket. You gotta be in to win... Unfortunately the winning ticket for that month has already been sold, but you don't know (the buyer didn't scratch it). What are the chances of winning the million? But as far as you know it's ...Of course the number of engine failures is not fixed; none could fail or all could fail.

 

So that brings us to jetjr's point, the risk of any particular engine failing is no greater due to CASA's intervention. True. But you don't know what it was before and you don't know now. The risk of your engine failing cannot be calculated by looking at the number of engine failures unless the failures are randomly distributed. They are not. Furthermore, the number is not indeterminate. There is a reason, cause and effect. In fact, you are counting on that.

 

But this does not concern CASA, CASA is concerned with the total number failing, or at least the proportion. Reported and, I suspect, unreported.

 

So we have two aspects:

 

1. CASA acting because it is concerned about Jabiru engines in general, especially recent and current production. CASA made a judgement. A Jabiru cannot overfly congested areas - takeoff is a time engines fail; passengers and student pilots must be properly warned. The alternative? Have a quiet word with Rodney Stiff, get him to see the error of his ways...

 

2. Individuals concerned with their own engines. We should be able to agree that if a Jabiru engine is installed and operated according to Jabiru it is unlikely to reach 1000 hours without serious problems. We know that from experience. That's why people who know what they'd doing invest a lot more time and effort in the installation, virtually ignoring Jabiru. How is CASA meant to exempt such aircraft? Your say-so?

 

We also know, whatever the reasons, over 20 years, only 500 out of 7000 have reached 1000 hours. 14%. However cautiously you interpret this, as you must, I don't find it very reassuring. It certainly does not suggest thousands of engines reached or will 1000 hours without serious problems.

Point 2 and the last paragraph might have some sustance and validity if you were able to validate your assertion. Very few Rotaxes make it beyond 2000 hours but that doesn't mean that the ones that are not reached TBO have failed. You need to plot the data points for the age of failure of each engine and include all of the engines that have not yet failed.

 

A 990 hour TBO engine may well be an acceptable engine with the owner dying of boredom or fear of the unknown before anything happens to the engine.

 

If you feel that your 14% is not reassuring then I suggest you try something other than maths or stats.

 

 

[Guest Maj Millard]

Point 2 and the last paragraph might have some sustance and validity if you were able to validate your assertion. Very few Rotaxes make it beyond 2000 hours but that doesn't mean that the ones that are not reached TBO have failed. You need to plot the data points for the age of failure of each engine and include all of the engines that have not yet failed.

 

A 990 hour TBO engine may well be an acceptable engine with the owner dying of boredom or fear of the unknown before anything happens to the engine.

 

If you feel that your 14% is not reassuring then I suggest you try something other than maths or stats.

Col, I know of quite a few 912s that have well beyond 2000 hours............

 

 

[Oscar]

Flogging the merits of Rotax 912's is irrelevant to the consideration of the failure rate of Jabiru engines. It may be in the commercial interests of those associated with Rotax engines but provides precisely zero additional information to the consideration of the situation that Jabiru engine owners have been placed.