Light Aircraft down near Camden

[facthunter]

Neither CASA or the RAAus would have the resources internally to properly analyse all this . They thought by pressurising everybody they would make something good happen. The DATA is not generally available is it? They wouldn't be game for the legal ramifications, now.. That isn't a situation I'm comfortable with. They have no face saving way out so on it goes.

 

Any evidence of FAULTS must not be kept under wraps for the sake of the people operating these engines, and the community generally. Anybody in Aviation who is aware of some occurrence affecting Aviation Safety is required by LAW to report it, not keep it under wraps, no matter who it is. No one is immune from the principle. Nev

 

 

[turboplanner]

Neither CASA or the RAAus would have the resources internally to properly analyse all this

We're in the Performance-Based era, remember; they don't have to do that.

 

There's a parallel situation where a Cootes Transport semi trailer rolled over and two people were killed. Some faults were found on the semi, and some other semis were checked, and the NSW Authority required Cootes to fix all the faults found, check its entire NSW fleet fix any faults and submit the trucks for inspection. Some more faults were found at the inspections, and a NSW Authority team went to Victoria and advised the Victorian transport authority on what to look for and the same cycle started in Victoria.

 

The cycles went on for months, cost the fleet millions of dollars, resulted in them selling at least one division after they lost contracts, and also resulted in them selling many fleet trucks prematurely.

 

Cootes had to hire specialists to solve some of the issues; the Authorities didn't analyse what the causes of the issues were, just acted on the results.

 

Any evidence of FAULTS must not be kept under wraps for the sake of the people operating these engines, and the community generally. Anybody in Aviation who is aware of some occurrence affecting Aviation Safety is required by LAW to report it, not keep it under wraps, no matter who it is. No one is immune from the principle.

The old days of the DCA Inspector, in his grey coat, arriving at the operator's premises with the faulty valve and the solution are gone. I don't think they are keeping the faults under wraps, I don't think they even know what they are, and these days don't need to. They are just working on the fact that a large number of engines have been failing and the manufacturer needs to do something about it and in the meantime operators should limit some operations.

 

 

[turboplanner]

So given to level apparent either incompetence or maliciousness involved so far - Turbo, I think we can be seriously suspicious that this water contamination will make its way into any future quoted failures to justify their actions or their continued adherence to an untenable position.

It is a pity they can't bring themselves to say "Sorry, we made a mistake with those two, but the other 38 were definitely engine failures", since they really didn't need a specific number to take action.

 

Given the horde of hostile owners who will descend on them (and should), I suspect this one will not be added to any mythical scorecard.

 

 

[facthunter]

I don't disagree with what you say but you can't just can something without regard for the consequences. they haven't properly analysed the problem, even now.

 

If the engine(s) ran cooler, better ducting/cowling the flywheel remained tight (put it up the front like a lycoming, {being done anyhow for the starter drive}) and the fuel was of better quality( not stale ) as an example maybe most of the problems would go away.. It's still not a perfect engine but all aero engines are compromised by having to be as light as possible and put up with some unpredictable treatment. Nev

 

 

[Jaba-who]

Turbo. You are perpetuating the CASA position. CASA said and I quote "a large and increasing number number of failures". That is an outright falsehood - they did not know what the number was and they did not know whether or not the number was increasing.

 

(In fact the number seems to be decreasing! Though that is not from official figures that's from a personal communications so don't necessarily quote me on it.) But the point is it WAS NEVER known to be increasing because they did not have any idea what the number was just that the noise from grumbles was increasing.

 

You just said " a large number of engines have been failing". Well you have been told multiple times by multiple posters on this list that there were not a known large number. There was no known number! When it was known or at least reluctantly squeezed out of them the number was actually very low but bolstered by other numbers ( the undefined major malfunctions) to justify it.

 

It carries no similarity to the Cootes Transport because it was the exact antithesis. Cootes - an absolutely certain crash was followed by investigations and inspections which DID reveal current mechanical problems. Evidence existed to show no remedial action had been taken to correct problems. Indeed it appears to have been a systemic specific action in maintenance by the company to not conduct maintenance to limit costs.

 

The jabiru story is that NO known certainties existed. CASA commenced a rule-making WITHOUT any evidence of How or why or even how many engine failures existed. They essentially instituted the rules based on numbers they did not have. They only then sought information from the manufacturer and user groups such as RAAus about engine problems. Since the maintenance is carried out by diverse operators and owners and facilities there can be no suggestion of systemic failure of maintenance as occurred in Cootes. Sure there probably is maintenance failures because many of the maintainers are amateurs. But that is not jabirus fault per se.

 

Cootes had made attempts to not do maintenance. CASa was not even aware that jabiru had made any upgrades in its engine since inception and was not aware that any efforts had been made to address the specific issues of valve and through bolt problems. ( which if you are not aware consists of about two pages of upgrades etc - freely available on the jabiru website )

 

To compare jabiru to Cootes is a bit disingenuous.

 

 

[bexrbetter]

We also have reasonable grounds for suspecting that much of the drive to do something was little more than feeling a need to appease a loud minority (sadly many on this very forum)

Nah, it's been going on for a long time and very International. I was aware of it a long time before I knew of this forum.

 

Google "Jabiru engine failure" objectively.

 

 

[Jaba-who]

Not saying it was all just from this forum. But again the numbers ( not the noise) does not appear to be actually high at all even internationally. Just because you heard about it is not a marker of problems. It's still just a marker of noise.

 

I don't know what the international numbers are like. ( although I do have the FAA numbers and jabirus are among the best not the worst) And if anyone has them I would like to hear them because I am not putting my head in the sand. If there's a real problem I want to know because I am not into taking excessive risk or exposing my passengers to excessive risk. But equally I don't want to stop flying just because of background noise by a loud small group ( and CASA trying to appease them) if there is no need.

 

 

[turboplanner]

I don't disagree with what you say but you can't just can something without regard for the consequences. they haven't properly analysed the problem, even now.

If you are talking about CASA or RAA, as I mentioned before they are not obligated to analyse the problem, just act on the results. Personally I would have confined my concerns to "forced landings" which directly relates to potential risk.

 

If you are talking about Jabiru, perhaps they have by now, perhaps they haven't, but we were talking about CASA primarily, and they can sit and wait until the statistics improve.

 

 

[Jaba-who]

If you are talking about CASA or RAA, as I mentioned before they are not obligated to analyse the problem, just act on the results. Personally I would have confined my concerns to "forced landings" which directly relates to potential risk.If you are talking about Jabiru, perhaps they have by now, perhaps they haven't, but we were talking about CASA primarily, and they can sit and wait until the statistics improve.

Well actually they are obliged to analyze the problem. That's the point.

 

They are not obliged to find the answer to the problem but they are obliged to prove there is a problem first before they act.

 

They are not an isolated planetoid whose actions are not going to affect us here on earth.

 

If they are the regulator they must actually analyze an issue before they act and cause damage to an operator or a manufacturer or the large number of owners of those aircraft. The value of my ( and many other owners investment) has plummeted since this rule was announced and I dare say Jabiru's value has done the same.

 

For instance, Just say that a number (unspecified number ) of aircraft which crash this year are painted blue and say CASA made a rule that all blue aircraft are now subject to the same rules as Jabiru - there would be incredulity from society and then demands (quite reasonable demands) to analyze if the blue colour really was associated with increased numbers and then had anything to do with the crash before they issued such a rule.

 

We would expect them to have data to justify it. This is because all sensible people know that blue colour can not have any effect.

 

But we don't know if Jabiru engines are really have a problem so it is possible they do have a problem.

 

But that does not does not absolve CASA from actually analysing the numbers first before they wreck part of an industry.

 

 

[turboplanner]

"Problem" used here = "analyse the engine symptoms to determine the cause of each engine failure" - they don't have to do that; they can act when they notice engine failures and require the manufacturer/operator to do the analysis to solve the "problem"

 

 

[facthunter]

I don't agree Turbs. They could adopt that attitude because they can, but that doesn't justify a half baked investigation and a conclusion that's not up to being substantiated by the known facts. They didn't do a proper job of assessment, and it shows. They have had to change some crazy conclusions in the past, usually by pressure from AOPA. It's on record they said you couldn't take a plane of the ground in Australia without an ASIC. They are always reluctant to admit an error. (But they expect pilots to). Nev

 

 

[Jaba-who]

"Problem" used here = "analyse the engine symptoms to determine the cause of each engine failure" - they don't have to do that; they can act when they notice engine failures and require the manufacturer/operator to do the analysis to solve the "problem"

Sorry but you're trying to redefine the English language to something that CASA did not even use. They themselves said they were making the rule because of the NUMBER of failures which was high and rising. They did not state they were making the decision because of the type of engine symptoms nor the cause of the failures.

The ATSBs role is to analyse the causes of the engine failures - let's not attempt to redefine whether " problems" is referring to the nuts and bolts issue or the numbers of engines which suffer those nuts and bolts issues. ATSB does the nuts and bolts stuff. Not CASA.

 

CASA's role is then to decide if those causes and the numbers relating to them are serious enough to warrant things like ADs or rules restricting use.

 

CASA has the obligation to look at how many of these engines suffered a nuts and bolts issues and then after analysing the numbers of failures do what must or should morally and legally be done.

 

CASA should not be making rules based on anything other than reliable factual data. Given that their reason for issuing the rules was that data, which by implication we were expected to believe they were in possession of, was the numbers of failures ( their statement) which was high and rising. They are obliged to actually have those numbers - not to have just a list of examples of nuts and bolts issues that have occurred but the numbers of times those events have happened. Because that's what they themselves said they were basing their decision to make the rule.

 

 

[jetjr]

Think youll find it was around half that number FT, not just 2 overcounts

 

In cootes example someone actually died and action was taken againt ONE operator not a brand of truck

 

 

[turboplanner]

In cootes example someone actually died and action was taken againt ONE operator not a brand of truck

Two people died...after the crash.... when they decided to walk downhill instead of uphill, and were consumed by fire when the flowing fuel ignited.

 

Both of you have missed the point of the comparison which was that a government started detailed safety action across the entire fleet on the basis of a very limited number of issues.

 

I don't mind if you want to play on words, make up stories, or attack CASA in any way you can, but bear in mind that if you don't grasp the principles at play here, you are likely to suffer the same pain in other areas.

 

 

[Jaba-who]

Ok this is my last posting on this issue as it's obviously going no where.

 

You are just wrong turbo.

 

They did not close down an entire trucking fleet. (fleet being a widespread number of vehicles across the Entire industry) They closed down one company and its trucks regardless of brand of truck)

 

That's a fact.

 

The next absolute fact is they started to look - found issues and then acted.

 

In CaSAs case the absolute fact is they acted on noise from the industry but without facts or data. Then they sought the data. It now turns out the data does not support the action and the fact is the limitations have not been lifted and CASA has not issued any form of statement saying that the data is not as bad as they thought.

 

 

[facthunter]

Australia's watch dog on aviation has done some magnificent work in the past. An example is the wing spar on the Aero Commander. The spar was failing at a certain point and they traced that back to a fault where a bend was formed during manufacture. No one else had done this research and the process was applauded world wide, because it was done methodically.

 

"We" did the first full fatigue analysis of the Dassault Mirage wing structure.

 

There was a lot of work done on Lycoming 540 crankshaft faulures, where many crankshafts had to be replaced with different material spec parts. We are running out of the expertise to do these things. Nev

 

 

[coljones]

Australia's watch dog on aviation has done some magnificent work in the past. An example is the wing spar on the Aero Commander. The spar was failing at a certain point and they traced that back to a fault where a bend was formed during manufacture. No one else had done this research and the process was applauded world wide, because it was done methodically."We" did the first full fatigue analysis of the Dassault Mirage wing structure.

There was a lot of work done on Lycoming 540 crankshaft faulures, where many crankshafts had to be replaced with different material spec parts. We are running out of the expertise to do these things. Nev

Successive government have worked on the basis that they are running an economy not a society and that the experts in the field are the manufacturers not the consumers. So the government (a commonwealth) now does not act for its members and even on its own behalf fails the test of informed client - how can they receive good advice on fx engineering and mining when they don't engage professional engineers and scientists to provide this advice rather than lawyers and accountants. DCA used to be an engineering organisation - I'm buggered if I know what it is now.

 

 

[facthunter]

Buckpasser's Society of Sheltered Workshops. Nev

 

 

[turboplanner]

Australia's watch dog on aviation has done some magnificent work in the past. An example is the wing spar on the Aero Commander. The spar was failing at a certain point and they traced that back to a fault where a bend was formed during manufacture. No one else had done this research and the process was applauded world wide, because it was done methodically."We" did the first full fatigue analysis of the Dassault Mirage wing structure.

There was a lot of work done on Lycoming 540 crankshaft faulures, where many crankshafts had to be replaced with different material spec parts. We are running out of the expertise to do these things. Nev

Yes they did, but that was back in the Prescriptive era. You need to study why that changed and why governments operate the way they do today.

 

 

[turboplanner]

Successive government have worked on the basis that they are running an economy not a society and that the experts in the field are the manufacturers not the consumers. So the government (a commonwealth) now does not act for its members and even on its own behalf fails the test of informed client - how can they receive good advice on fx engineering and mining when they don't engage professional engineers and scientists to provide this advice rather than lawyers and accountants. DCA used to be an engineering organisation - I'm buggered if I know what it is now.

Same as for Facthunter's post. In the prescriptive era, yes Government Departments employed engineers, scientists, technicians, and they inspected, investigated, wrote Certificates (certifying something was safe), and no one thought of suing them. The manufacturers and operators rorted the system, often cheating the inspectors who signed off hoists, cranes, vehicles, food premises etc. and as industries gradually degenerated and people started to sue governments for injuries and deaths the governments switched away from prescriptive legislation where they were the arbiters to performance legislation where they operated at arms length. The safety costs and financial burdens are now carried by the people engaged in the activities.

 

Most people who work in medium to large companies lived through the changes as new policies were introduced for the protection of the Company. The most obvious of these changes has been safety clothing, vehicle use policies, safety work areas, indoctrinations, exclusion of some staff (sales accountants etc) from work areas they were not qualified to enter (the most popular change), and the ATO (Authority To Operate) certificate which helps to stop untrained maintenance workers using fork lifts for ladders, or teachers using chainsaws etc.

 

Most of these changes occurred during the 1980s, and the part I will never forgive the governments for is that they changed their legislation and closed down departments on the quiet - the main ingredient being to shift costs from themselves to the people engaged in the activities.

 

So we can't point to a series of announcements for you Col, you just have to trawl through about thirty years of ACTS and compare them with their Prescriptive predecessors.

 

Even though the financial burden had shifted by the end of the 1980s, this stealthy change meant that many people were not aware that they now were the front line, that they had to make up their own rules (Safety Management Systems, Safety Policies, Operational Policies etc) to protect themselves when sued, and those people sometimes loudly proclaimed that the rules they had to work to (National Codes, Bulletins etc) were only "guidelines" so the States introduce "Safety Legislation" in 1998-1991 which made the safety codes mandatory.

 

For example in Victoria, the Motor Car Act 1958 was backed up by the Road Safety (Vehicles) Act 1999 which made these codes mandatory with penalties for non-compliance. It didn't prescribe the details in the Codes, just made it mandatory to comply with the Code.

 

So the governments stayed at arms length from prescription, just as, today CASA stays at arms length from the work DCA used to do.

 

Understand that, and you'll understand how CASA can notice that an airfield, or some airfields is/are non ALA compliant and issue an instruction to restrict operations until it/they are brought into compliance with the code, and they don't have to measure the length or splays or get involved in giving advice on how to fix it/them, and they don't have to have a magical number, or a number which the industry agrees with.

 

 

[turboplanner]

Ok this is my last posting on this issue as it's obviously going no where.

That's right it's not.

 

You are not focusing on the basic principle that RTA/RMS did not have a number of incidents before they took unilateral action - it doesn't have to be a single make of engine, it doesn't have to be a single make of truck, it could be several warehouses supplying bananas, one of which contained salmonella bacteria.

 

 

[jetjr]

All of your examples bear no relevance

 

Clear regs on roadwothiness, not just a requirement to be equal or better than competitors

 

ALA have strict guidelines, ill guarantee thet wouldnt restrict use of an ALA without proof it didnt meet spec

 

 

[gandalph]

For example in Victoria, the Motor Car Act 1958 was backed up by the Road Safety (Vehicles) Act 1999 which made these codes mandatory with penalties for non-compliance. It didn't prescribe the details in the Codes, just made it mandatory to comply with the Code.

.

The Federal Office Of Road Safety would dispute that. The ACSVP wrote prescriptive standards for the performance of vehicle components and the ACSVD wrote prescriptive design standards that were incorporated into the Australian Design Rules for Motor Vehicles ( ADR's).

 

 

[Camel]

All of your examples bear no relevanceClear regs on roadwothiness, not just a requirement to be equal or better than competitors

ALA have strict guidelines, ill guarantee thet wouldnt restrict use of an ALA without proof it didnt meet spec

1.1 Previously, aircraft with a maximum take-off weight not exceeding 5,700 kg engaged in private, aerial work or charter operations were permitted to operate from places other than licensed aerodromes. Such places had to be authorised by the Authority under Civil Aviation Regulation CAR 89. Details of the requirements for fixed wing aeroplanes were set out in Section 6 of the Aerodrome and Ground Aids (AGA 6) section of the Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP) and the requirements for helicopters were set out in AGA 7. These places were known as “Authorised Landing Areas”.

 

1.2 On 9 August 1991, CAR 89 was omitted and CAR 92(1) was amended by Statutory Rule 91/247, to allow pilots engaged in other than regular public transport operations to determine suitable places for the operation of their aircraft. Such a place is now called an “Aircraft Landing Area”, which may be an aeroplane landing area for fixed wing aircraft or a helicopter landing area for hover aircraft. AGA 6 and AGA 7 were cancelled on 12 December 1991.

 

2. RESPONSIBILITY FOR AN AIRCRAFT LANDING AREA

 

2.1 There is no requirement to seek CASA sanction for the establishment of an Aircraft Landing Area. Unless specifically requested by the owner, the Authority will not normally inspect an Aircraft Landing Area, or publish its information in the AIP.

 

2.2 CAR 92(1) puts the responsibility on the pilot to ensure that the place is suitable for use as an aerodrome; and having regard to all the circumstances of the proposed landing or take-off (including the prevailing weather conditions), that the aircraft can land at, or take- off from, the place in safety.

 

2.3 Were an Aircraft Landing Area is provided by a person other than the pilot, then as far as the Authority is concerned, it would still be the pilot’s responsibility to ensure that the facility provided is suitable for the intended aircraft operations.

 

AIRCRAFT LANDING AREAS 1. INTRODUCTION

 

 

[turboplanner]

The Federal Office Of Road Safety would dispute that. The ACSVP wrote prescriptive standards for the performance of vehicle components and the ACSVD wrote prescriptive design standards that were incorporated into the Australian Design Rules for Motor Vehicles ( ADR's).

Yes, you are correct, this part doesn't fit the overview I gave.

 

However the Federal Government has a fairly tight control there because they apply to Australian Manufacturers, Importers (through the requirement for Ministerial approval in writing for all imported new vehicles).

 

In general, the following all involve the general public and fit the "performance legislation" era

 

• Importers of second hand vehicles are controlled by the Motor Vehicle Standards Act, 1989
   
   
  
• Modifications, Bodies, Trailers are controlled by a series of Codes (Vehicle Standards Bulletins)
   
   
  
• Specification Compliance (Registration) has been moved from Government to Industry
   
   
  
• Operational Compliance (dynamic loading for safety) has been moved from Government to Industry Code
   
   
  

 

 

For example:

 

If you buy a truck, it will have been complianced to a prescriptive standard of braking so that at maximum gross mass it will stop in a given distance without sliding out of a given lane width. (The reason for the prescription at this level is that ALL vehicles can be made to a design standard in which the "feel" and "actions" and location of the controls, and the ride, handling and stopping of all vehicles is basically the same).

 

If you put a body on it you must ensure it complies with a Code, which ensures that dynamic loading will produce the same characteristics as those complianced for the ADR, and this is self administration.

 

If an operator then loads that vehicle, he has to conform to a code which ensures the dynamic loading is also the same as that when the truck is complianced, this also being self administration.

 

In all of the dot points and the three examples I gave, the governments don't prescribe how you go about doing that.