AN INTERESTING WAR STORY - AUSTRALIAN SQUADRON INVOLVED

[Phil Perry]

Operation Jericho Part One - The Bombing of Amiens Prison

 

 

FEBRUARY 18th, 1944

 

EMERGENCY FORM “B” (Copy)

 

HNO T 140 A/F

 

UGI T 11 GROUP

 

V GPB GPB 5/18 ‘O’ FORM ‘B’

 

FROM 2 GROUP 180940A

 

TO 140 WING/AIRFIELD

 

INFO 11 GROUP, HQ T A F MAIN, HQ A D G B, HQ A E A F

 

SECRET QQX BT

 

AO,241 18th Feb.

 

Information: Mosquitos of 140 Airfield are to attack the prison at AMIENS in an attempt to assist 120 prisoners to escape. These prisoners are French patriots condemned to death for assisting the Allies. This air attack is only part of the plan as other assistance will be at hand at the time.

 

Date and Time: 18th February, 1944.

 

Zero 1200 hours.

 

Route: Base – LITTLEHAMPTON – Via appropriate lattice to TOCQUEVILLE – SENARPONT – BOURDON – One mile South DOULLENS – BOUZINCOURT – 2 miles west south west ALBERT – Target – Turn right – ST. SAVEUR – SENARPONT – TOCQUEVILLE – HASTINGS – Base.

 

Bomb Load: 2 x 500lb M C Mk.IV fused T.D. 11 secs.

 

2 x 500lb S A P fused T.D. 11 secs.

 

Method of Attack: All aircraft to attack at low level.

 

1st Attack: Six Mosquitos as detailed by O.C. 140 Airfield.

 

Intention: To break the outer wall in at least two places.

 

Method: Leading three aircraft to attack eastern wall using main road as lead in. Second section of three aircraft when ten miles from target will break away to the right at sufficient height to allow them to watch leading three aircraft and then attack northern wall on a North-South run, immediately following the explosion of the bombs of the leading section.

 

Timing: Attacks to be made at Zero hours.

 

2nd Attack: Six Mosquitos as detailed by O.C. 140 Airfield.

 

Intention: To bomb the main prison buildings.

 

Method: Leading three aircraft to attack south eastern end of main building and second section of three aircraft to attack the north western end of building. Attacks to be carried out in a similar manner to first attack above.

 

Timing: Attack to be made at Zero plus 3 mins.

 

3rd Attack: Six Mosquitos as detailed by O.C. 140 Airfield.

 

Intention: This force is a reserve, and will approach the target as in the previous two attacks, one section from east and one from north, but will only bomb if it is seen that one of the previous attacks has failed.

 

Method: As in 1st attack. Target will be decided by leader on approach.

 

Timing: Attack to be made at Zero plus 13 mins.

 

Fighter Support: Each formation of six Mosquitos will have one squadron of Typhoons as close escort. Fighters will rendezvous with Mosquitos as follows:-

 

1st Attack: 1 mile east of LITTLEHAMPTON at Zero minus 45 mins.

 

2nd Attack: 1 mile west of LITTLEHAMPTON at Zero minus 42 mins.

 

3rd Attack: LITTLEHAMPTON at Zero minus 32 mins.

 

Signals:

 

1st Attack: Bomber call sign: D Y P E G.

 

Ground control call sign: A I L S O M E on 2 Group guard 1.

 

Bomber leader may call escort direct in emergency on 11 Group guard 1.

 

2nd Attack: Bomber call sign: C A N O N.

 

Ground control call sign: B E L L F I E L D on 2 Group guard 1.

 

Bomber leader may call escort direct in emergency on 11 Group guard 1.

 

3rd Attack: Bomber call sign: B U C K S H O T.

 

Ground control call sign: G R E E N S H I P on 2 Group guard 1.

 

Bomber leader may call escort direct in emergency on 11 Group guard 1.

 

Fighter call sign: D U N L O P.

 

General: Emergency homing to FRISTON on 2 Group guard.

 

A.S.R. on 2 Group guard.

 

Special V.H.F. codeword: RENOVATE.

 

Notes: (1) Following each attack sections of three aircraft of each formation are to endeavour to regain close company as soon as possible.

 

BT 180940A.

 

XS

 

BARON AS FOR K WITH R +

 

On Friday the 18th February 1944, Raymond Vivant was preparing for lunch in his cell in Amiens prison. He was the Sub-Prefect of Abbeville and had been arrested by the Gestapo on 12th February 1944, for suspected Resistance activities. He heard the drone of aircraft engines, then there was a huge explosion that rocked walls of the prison and he was engulfed with smoke and dust. There were further explosions, the wall on the left side of his cell split open and as the dust settled, Vivant saw that his cell door had been blown open. Outside of his cell the corridor and opposing wing was gone and only a heap of smoking rubble remained. Beyond the debris he saw the snow-covered open countryside, through a breach in the outer walls. Along with 258 other prisoners, Vivant ran for his life.

 

In early 1944 the French Resistance movement in the Amiens district was in crisis. Due to carelessness and the nefarious activities of collaborators, large numbers of French men and women had been arrested for suspected Resistance activities and it looked as if entire networks had been compromised. Many of the men were being held in Amiens prison and twelve had been shot. It was reported that another 100 were to be shot on the 19th February. When two British intelligence officers were captured by the Germans and sent to Amiens prison, a precision air attack on the prison was requested.

 

The 2nd Tactical Air Force (TAF) was ordered to carry out the task and quick planning was undertaken. The stated mission was to attack the prison in Amiens in order to allow 120 prisoners to escape (highlighted in the operational signal). What exactly the “other assistance at hand at the time,” has never been ascertained. The immediate problem for the planners was how to blow holes in the buildings’ infrastructure without killing everyone inside. It was decided to use eleven second delay fuses on the bombs so that the resulting explosion of the bombs didn’t catch the aircraft that had dropped them. But it was essential that the mess hall of the prison guards was destroyed, in order to prevent them from shooting the prisoners as they made their escape. Lunchtime was chosen for the time on target as most of the guards would be gathered in the mess hall.

 

No 140 Wing of 2nd TAF, based at RAF Hunsdon in Hertfordshire, was chosen to mount the operation. It was comprised of eighteen aircraft from elements of three squadrons. The Squadrons were equipped with Mosquito Mk XI Fighter Bombers. No 487 Squadron RNZAF was to attack the German mess hall and breaching the outer walls in two places. No 464 Squadron RAAF was to bomb the walls if no prisoners were seen to be escaping. No 21 Squadron RAF was to be the executioner if there were no escapees and was ordered to obliterate the prison and everyone in it.

 

21 Squadron was commanded by Group Captain Percy Charles Pickard, DSO with two bars and a DFC. He was a highly experienced pilot, but had only had ten hours conversion training on the Mosquito and very little experience at flying at low level. The operation was to be conducted entirely at low level, 50 feet or less both inbound and homebound below the enemy radar. Close escort for the fighter bombers was provided by Hawker Typhoons from 174, 245 and 198 Squadrons RAF.

 

The operation was to have been led by Air Vice-Marshall Basil Embry the Air Officer Commanding No 2 Group RAF that had been subsumed into the 2nd TAF. He was an energetic commander who believed in leading his crews from the front and had been shot down over France in 1940. Although captured, he escaped and evaded for two months before being returned to the UK. Unfortunately Embry was closely involved in the planning for D-Day and was forbidden from flying. Pickard took his place despite his inexperience at low level flying. Pickard was to fly with the second wave to observe and provide command and control as the raid progressed. It was to be his decision to totally destroy the prison if all else failed.

 

Bad weather with low cloud and snow across Europe delayed the attack until the 18th February, by which time the operation had to go ahead. The eighteen Mosquitos plus O-Orange, a Photo Recce PR aircraft were armed and fuelled in the freezing darkness. The fighter bombers were armed with four 500lb bombs, two medium capacity high explosive and two 500lb armour piercing. Two bombs would be carried in the internal bomb bay, two on hard points under each wing. The PR Mosquito only carried cameras and a cameraman. The crews received their final briefings at 0800 and this was the first time they discovered what their target was. Pickard was ironically flying in “F for Freddie,” the same call sign as the Wellington bomber he had flown in the 1941 propaganda film: “Target for Tonight,” and he would give the signal for the success or otherwise of the operation. If Pickard was lost, the PR Mosquito would broadcast the signal.

 

 

Flight Lieutenant Broadley helps Pickard into his flying kit.

 

(H/T my friend BP for research and writing )

 

MY comment,. . .it is a refection of the times that one ( 21 Sqn RAF ) were to be the 'Executioners' should no prisoners be seen to escape. One has to wonder if the ONLY reason for this raid was to rescue, or Silence forever the two British intelligence officers who were also in the prison.

 

There has been much recent criticism of this raid in the British media, basically saying that it was a war crime. However several local French people who were alive at the time, as well as some of their relatives, said the opposite. Not ONE condemned the raid as barbaric, nor stupid at all. I have to commend the BBC on this occasionm for providing both sides of the story, with this well made and uncharacteristically unbiased programme.

 

It was also interesting to see that both RAAF and RNZAF squadrons were involved in this well planned and coordinated attack.

 

The two British Intelligence officers managed to get back to England though many of the escapees were recaptured and shot by the Germans. The obvious theory behind this operation was that if many escaped, in all directions. . . this would give the two Brits a far better chance to avoid detection and re capture.

 

Was this a price too high to pay for two intelligence personnel ?. . .I suppose that would depend upon what they knew, and could be tortured into revealing. . .After all, D-Day was imminent, and they would have obviously known much about the planning. . .this information could NOT be allowed to fall into the hands of the Germans. . .

 

I'll post Part Two as soon as It plummets into my inbox. . . .UNLESS you'd rather I not bother with this 'Istorical Guff ?

 

 

[Phil Perry]

On a similar note, I just watched the old movie 'The man who never was' about the deceased person dressed in a British uniform, given a new 'Identity' and history as a British officer, carrying a briefcase handcuffed to one arm. He was dropped into the sea by a submarine just off a Neutral port, well staffed by German intelligence officers. He carried false plans for the D-Day invasion and this plan actually worked . . .they even infused the body with water, to make it look like a genuine drowning. . .although he had died from pneumonia, which produces a very similar effect. . .

 

It was a really clever but extremely complicated and involved plan to convince the German intelligence services who were no fools. The British embassy officials made a big fuss about claiming the body and this attracted the German spies to covertly photograph everything in the briefcase. . . the rest is history. The Germans believed that the main invasion force was going to be at Greece and Sardinia, not the beaches of Normandy. . . Good film,. .. if you like that sort of stuff. . . Quite a lot of Pinewood studios fictional hype which didn't happen, but still a good story ! I haven't checked what WIKI has to say about this,. . . but I've no doubt that it's well covered. . . 'Operation Mincemeat'

 

 

[Phil Perry]

Operation Jericho Part Two - Low Level Over the Target

 

 

The run-in along the Albert/Amiens road for the first wave, first section: Smith, Sparks and Jennings

 

The first take-off was delayed until 1000 hours due to the weather and mission timings. The first wave took off in appalling weather conditions, some of the worst the crews had seen. Visibility was hampered by snow squalls and four Mosquitos were forced to return due to technical problems. The fighter escort group from 198 Squadron was having its own problems. Three Typhoons at the rear of the formation lost sight of Flight Lieutenant Dall who was lead and returned to RAF Manston. Unfortunately due to hasty allocations and briefings, Dall was the only one of the fighter escorts who knew exactly where they were going. The fighters flew into a complete whiteout until over the channel, when they burst out into blue skies. Although they may have been at the rendezvous point, no other aircraft were in sight. Dall circled the formation off the French coast, but made no effort to fly inland. The first wave of six Mosquitos of 487 Squadron had been delayed by a matter of minutes, but such is the significance of timing in air operations, they missed Dall’s circling Typhoons and pressed on into France unescorted.

 

The second wave was also delayed by two minutes, but successfully rendezvoused with the Typhoons of 174 Squadron and the PR Mosquito over Littlehampton. The third wave held back for ten minutes as per the planning, had lost two Mosquitos due to technical problems but these too made the RV with the six Typhoons from 245 Squadron. There should have been air cover over Amiens provided by Tempest fighters from No 3 Squadron RAF, but the Squadron Commander refused to take off due to the weather conditions.

 

 

At fifty feet the heavy swell of the channel was a juddering blur. The Mosquitos flew in a compact formation, like cavalrymen tucked in stirrup-to-stirrup. The enemy coast was at first an indistinct line, but became clearer as the aircraft hurtled towards it. A couple of aircraft suffered bird strikes, alarming but not so disastrous to non-jet turbine engines. The wipers swept the mess of blood and feathers off the armoured windscreens. The aircraft climbed slightly to clear the cliffs and swept over the snow covered fields and the Forêt d’Eu. At 1147 they made the first turn at Sénarpont, heading northeast. Visibility was around four miles and the cloud base was at 2,000 feet. Over the valley of the Somme they were flying so low, that the propellers whipped snow flurries from the treetops. Between Flixecourt and Belloy-sur-Somme, they spotted a large German convoy of military vehicles, heavy artillery and tanks. The vehicles were heading towards Amiens and they fired on the aircraft in the later waves. For Pilot Officer Fowler in “J for Johnny,” the temptation was too much and he lowered his Mosquito’s nose and opened fire on the convoy.

 

One Mosquito from the first wave suffered an engine failure and aborted, heading back to Hunsdon alone. At 1159 the first wave made the final turn southwest onto the Roman road from Albert to Amiens. They were three minutes behind schedule. The second section broke away to make their perpendicular attack on the norther wall, after watching the placement of the bombs against the wall.

 

Wing Commander Smith leading the first wave saw the red-brick wall of the prison racing towards him and released his four bombs at what he estimates was ten feet, barely clearing the prison roof. A 500lb bomb bounced off the outer wall and exploded, breaching it just past the main gate in a fireball of exploding bricks. The second bomb exploded adjacent to the administration block, breaching the wall and blowing off the building’s roof. The third and fourth bomb overshot. Pilot officer Sparks followed Smith and his bombs exploded on the south wing of the building. The third Mosquito (Jennings) overshot because it attacked from too high at around fifty feet.

 

 

Photograph probably taken from Sparks’ Mosquito. The third aircraft (Jennings) is behind. The bombs have not yet exploded. The apparent smoke is dust from the kinetic energy of four tons of bombs bouncing off the walls and off the main road. Jennings is clearly higher than Sparks and is climbing out of his run-in. It’s all just a matter of feet and inches at 250 knots

 

The second section came in from the north at a higher altitude of around thirty feet. The two mosquitos were aiming for inner walls within the compound, so bombs skipping over the outer walls wasn’t a problem. Four bombs destroyed the inner and outer wall while two overshot and exploded in the prison. The Mosquitos cleared the prison and hard turned to the right, loosening the tiles on the roofs of Amiens.

 

The second wave was now approaching the target actually on time, but as they could see the first wave over the target it would mean they would be attacking just as the first waves bombs were exploding. Wing Commander Iredale led his wave into a left hand circuit to gain time and they re-joined the Albert/Amiens road after a couple of minutes. Again this wave split into two sections, to attack the triple buildings on the ends of the east and west wings, the German messes and quarters. The first section went in and comprehensively destroyed the buildings on the end of the east wing, but the outer walls were not breached. The second section undershot and the bombs destroyed the outer walls on the northwest corner. However, one bomb overshot and exploded right inside the central axis of the prison.

 

During the attacks of the second wave, Group Captain Pickard circled over the target, waiting for the smoke to clear, in order to assess the success of the primary objective. By necessity he was at a higher altitude of 500 feet and he waited until he saw tiny figures clambering out of the rubble and heading at a run towards cover. He signalled for the third wave not to bomb and to head for home, then sent out the message: “Red Daddy, Red Daddy,” signifying that the raid had been a success. As Pickard headed for home, his aircraft was bounced by a Focke-wulf 190 fighter flown by Feldwebel Wilhelm Mayer of 7/JG 26. During the ensuing chase the Focke-wulf severed the tail of Pickard’s Mosquito with a burst of cannon fire, causing the aircraft to immediately flip over and crash into a field. Pickard and Broadley were killed instantly.

 

One other Mosquito was lost on the operation, an aircraft of 464 Squadron. It was hit in the cockpit by flak as it left the target. The navigator Flight Lieutenant Samson was killed instantly, the aircraft crash landed near Dieppe and Squadron Leader McRitchie was taken prisoner.

 

There were 700 prisoners in Amiens at the time of the attack. 102 were killed, 74 wounded, 258 escaped and 182 were recaptured.

 

 

Pickard’s final moments.

 

Credit to friend BP for researching this article.

 

 

[djpacro]

One of the Typhoon pilots Honours and Awards: Harry Victor Markby | Australian War Memorial I got to know Harry quite well and did some flying with him some years ago. Top guy.

 

 

[walrus]

Ian McRitchie went on to an illustrious career as a metallurgist and private pilot.

 

 

[Phil Perry]

My Journo friend has sent an epilogue to ths story,. . .Got no time now, I'll tag it on later this evening when I've earned my daily bread. . . .

 

 

[Phil Perry]

Operation Jericho Part Three - Intelligence Services' Skulduggery

 

 

Taken at face value, Operation JERICHO was yet another example of the 2nd Tactical Air Force’s capabilities in an outstanding multi-roll aircraft. At the request of the French Resistance, the RAF RNZAF and RAAF crews had carried out a daring, low-level precision attack in broad daylight, allowing hundreds of brave Resistance fighters to escape. They would go on to carry out acts of sabotage behind enemy lines, in support of the D-Day Landings. Unfortunately this theory doesn’t survive first contact with the facts and common sense.

 

The French Resistance requested the raid because Resistance Fighters were to be shot by the Gestapo

 

Twelve members of the Resistance had been executed in Amiens prison, by the Germans in December 1943. No executions were planned around the time or even after the raid. Following the Liberation of Amiens in 1944, the RAF sent Squadron Leader Edwin Houghton to the city to ascertain who from the Resistance had been involved with the request to the RAF to bomb the prison. He found out nothing and couldn’t find any list of planned executions, nor even the names of any men who had escaped from the prison. French historian Jean-Pierre Ducellier calls the RAF’s version of events; “sheer lies,” but excellent as his book is, it offers no credible, alternative theories.

 

Another version given out at the time was that the men being held in Amiens Prison would rather face death being bombed than a German firing squad. Really? Strange then that no list of executions could be found. This tends to put a bit of positive spin on the deaths of 120 prisoners. For their part the French Resistance only sent details of the prison to the UK when it was requested on behalf of the RAF.

 

Two Allied intelligence officers were captured in northern France and were being held at Amiens Prison

 

If this were the case, why carry out such a risky enterprise as blowing holes in the prison walls in the off chance that these two men could make their escape and presumably not get recaptured. If the mission was to silence them permanently, why not dispatch 200 heavy bombers and saturate the target with 1,000lb Medium Capacity and 4,000lb High Capacity bombs. The prison was well clear of the town and any risk of collateral damage.

 

The theory is that these two agents had vital information regarding the planned D-Day landings. Again significantly, no trace of these men has ever been found. No intelligence organisation requested the raid according to the official history, so why would any intelligence agency give details of the Allied landings to agents then send them to France? Prior to D-Day, Resistance cells were activated by coded radio messages sent from London and the Jedburgh Teams who were to coordinate Resistance activities parachuted into France the night before the landings.

 

The Vice-Prefecture of Abbeville, knew about the plans for D-Day

 

Again this is extremely unlikely. Monsieur Vivant was arrested and held in Amiens prison for suspected Resistance activities. While he may have been privy to Operation FORTITUDE disinformation, he would under no credible circumstances be aware of the plans for landing in Normandy. Any information that he may give the Germans would almost certainly have been planted to convince the Germans that the landings were to take place in the Pas de Calais region. If so, why try to kill him? He may well have been able to provide details of the Resistance’s structure, but this had already been well-compromised following the arrests of SOE agents.

 

One theory is that the raid was intended to draw attention of the German intelligence services, to Allied activities in the area around the Pas de Calais. This being a likely site for an Allied invasion. But why Amiens prison and why risk releasing as well as possible Resistance fighters, a horde of common-or-garden criminals back into French society? Picardy was a target rich environment as it was, packed full of communications nodes, V weapon sites, tank parks, railway sidings and headquarters complexes.

 

The tense relationship between MI6 and the Special Operations Executive

 

After the German occupation of Europe, Churchill wrote to the Secretary at War, stating that he wanted to “Set Europe Ablaze.” This was to be achieved by the newly-formed Special Operations Executive (SOE) initially a part of MI6 also known as the SIS, but later to become an organisation in its own right. MI6 was understandably concerned that this new organisation would be in competition for personnel, resources, training and transport. The head of MI6 Stewart Menzies regarded the SOE as a bunch of dangerous amateurs. The Raison d'être of the two intelligence organisations was so diametrically opposed as to make harmonious relations between them almost impossible.

 

The SOE activities consisted of the assassination of known collaborators, causing civil unrest in the occupied countries and acts of sabotage. Not for nothing was it known as “The Ministry for Ungentlemanly Warfare.” The SOE had carried out Operation ANTHROPOID, the assassination in Prague of Reinhard Heydrich, deputy Reichsfuhrer SS and architect of the “Final Solution.” The reprisals for this act of what the Germans saw as terrorism, was brutal with over 13,000 people arrested, deported and many of them murdered in concentration camps.

 

During the inter-war years. MI6 had spent a great deal of time and effort setting up intelligence networks in Europe, in the fight against Communism. In the 1930s MI6 cooperated with the Gestapo, sharing intelligence on Communist activity in Europe. It preferred a stable environment for its clandestine tasks of gathering intelligence, and was horrified by the often ultraviolent escapades of SOE. As MI6 ran all codebreaking activities, it remained circumspect at passing this intelligence on to what they saw as a usurper organisation. This resulted in some SOE missions operating at a disadvantage. MI6 was aware that SOE’s French operation (Section F) had been comprehensively infiltrated by German Abwehr’s counter intelligence unit with many agents lost, so this unwillingness to share information is perhaps understandable.

 

Who ordered Operation JERICO and why?

 

Maurice Buckmaster who ran SOE’s F Section, was adamant that neither SOE nor any of the Resistance groups that the organisation ran in France, had ordered that the raid take place. However, after the war correspondence from the head of MI6 was found, thanking the RAF for carrying out the operation. The reason for the raid has never been satisfactorily explained and remains shrouded in archived documents that may never be released into the public domain. As Churchill so succinctly put it: “In wartime, truth is so precious she should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies.”

 

 

If you should be visiting Amiens, the prison is still there in a grim suburb that has swallowed it up, due to the expansion of the city. The repaired breaches in the walls are clearly visible. Group Captain Pickard and Flight Lieutenant Broadley are buried in St Pierre War Cemetery north east of Amiens on the northern side of the D929. Pickard is laid to rest in plot 3, row B, grave 13. Broadley lies in plot 3, row B grave 11. The cemetery overseen by the Commonwealth War Graves Commission, is an oasis of peace, the traffic a distant grumble. As always when I visit these places, I find it hard to look on the simple, white headstones and the roses without a burning sensation behind the eyes, like the distantly remembered sting of CS.