The opening shots of the Falklands War.

[Phil Perry]

The Opening Shots of the Falklands War – The Invasion of Port Stanley 2nd April 1982

 

 

The shaming of a Nation

 

The Governor of the Falkland Islands and dependent territories Rex Hunt, received a telegram from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on 1st April 1982. In blunt language it warned of a possible invasion of the Falkland Islands by the Armed Forces of Argentina. It offered the Governor no advice or external help:

 

We have apparently reliable evidence that an Argentine task force could be assembling off Stanley at dawn tomorrow. You will wish to make your dispositions accordingly.

 

Hunt summoned the two senior officers of Naval Party 8901 to Government House in Port Stanley, outlined the situation and observed somewhat dryly: “Sounds like the buggers mean it!”

 

Because of his seniority, Major Mike Norman was given overall command of all defence forces and Major Gary Noott was appointed Military Advisor to Governor Hunt. The Royal Marines Naval Party was larger than normal due to this being a hand-over, take-over or a Relief in Place. Major Norman had under his command fifty-seven marines, eleven RN sailors and around thirty members of the Falkland Islands Defence Force (FIDF), a volunteer force under the command of Captain Phil Summers FIDF. The actual numbers of FIDF is difficult to quantify as differing accounts give differing numbers. I have chosen to quote the median. Twenty-two marines had been dispatched under the command of Lt Mills RM to South Georgia and they were having their own problems to deal with.

 

Phil Summers tasked the members of the FIDF, which included his son, with guarding key installations such as the telephone exchange, power station and radio station. The civilian coastal ship Forrest operated as an ad-hoc radar warning off Port Stanley. Major Norman concentrated his main force in and around Port Stanley, while smaller units were pushed out to cover the approaches to the capital from the airport isthmus with observation posts overlooking Port William and Port Harriet to the south.

 

Operation Rosario – The Argentine attack.

 

 

Sequence of events during the attack on Port Stanley

 

The Argentine amphibious landing Operation Rosario (Rosary) began during the late evening of 1st April 1982. The Destroyer ARA Santísima Trinidad landed naval Special Forces of the 1st Amphibious Commandos Group, south of Port Stanley in Port Harriet. The plan had been to land in Mullet Creek, but the commandos’ twenty-one small, inflatable boats became entangled in rafts of kelp and headed for the nearest beach at Lake Pont (A&B). The commandos split into two groups. The first under the command of Lieutenant-Commander Giachino, headed directly north towards Government House with the objective of its capture. The second commanded by Lieutenant-Commander Sabarots, skirted to the south west of Stanley with the objective of taking Moody Brook Barracks.

 

Lieutenant-Commander Sabarots’ troops had difficult and arduous terrain to cross until they were in position around the barracks. Here the Argentine and British accounts differ. The Argentines maintain that they used tear gas to clear the barracks, forcing the marines out where they would be captured. After the surrender the Royal Marines were allowed to collect kit from the barracks and found the buildings riddled with machine gun bullets and burns from phosphorous grenades. In any case, Major Norman recalls fire coming from the direction of the barracks, so it was fortunate that the barracks were unoccupied (D).

 

The Argentine submarine ARA Santa Fe had been conducting reconnaissance in Port William since 31st March and it had spotted the trawler Forrest. It was clear that the British were aware of a likely attack, so orders were changed. Fourteen members of the Tactical Divers Group were landed from the submarine at Yorke Bay ©, where they planted beacons for the main landings. They then headed towards the Pembroke Peninsular, where the airport was located. They captured the airport and lighthouse without meeting any resistance (J). This team also mopped up the stragglers and isolated defenders over the next couple of days.

 

The Landing at Yorke Bay

 

At 06:30 on the 2nd April, the tank landing ship ARA Cabo San Antonio moved into Yorke Bay and began landing twenty US-built LVTP-7A1 Argentine tracked amphibious armoured personnel carriers (Amtracs) (F). The vehicles carried D and E Companies of the 2nd Marine Infantry Battalion (BIM-2) from Puerto Belgrano. The landings were observed by a section of Royal Marines commanded by Lieutenant Bill Trollope and the information was radioed to Government House.

 

The Amtracs trundled up the road heading west into Port Stanley. In the vicinity of the Ionospheric Research Station, the armoured vehicles were engaged with heavy and accurate machine gun fire and fire from rocket launchers (H). Lt Bill Trollope’s account gives this engagement more justice than I could:

 

Six Armoured Personnel Carriers began advancing at speed down the Airport Road. The first APC was engaged at a range of about 200 to 250 metres. The first three missiles, two 84 mm and one 66 mm, missed. Subsequently one 66 mm fired by Marine Gibbs, hit the passenger compartment and one 84 mm Marines [George] Brown and [Danny] Betts hit the front. Both rounds exploded and no fire was received from that vehicle. The remaining five APCs which were about 600 to 700 metres away deployed their troops and opened fire. We engaged them with GPMG, SLR and sniper rifle [sergeant Ernie Shepherd] for about a minute before we threw a white phosphorus smoke grenade and leap-frogged back to the cover of gardens. Incoming fire at that stage was fairly heavy, but mostly inaccurate.

 

The Royal Marines withdrew through the town, attempting make it to Government House. They fought their way through gardens, over walls and fences, coming under friendly fire as they skirted a football pitch. Eventually they reached a house near Government House and were ordered upstairs and given defensive positions by Major Noote.

 

A section commanded by Corporal York had been manning their lonely position at Navy Point, Overlooking Stanley Harbour on the Camber Peninsular. They fired a Karl Gustav anti-tank missile at an approaching Argentine Landing Craft Vehicle Personnel (LCVP). In their debrief they claim the round penetrated the side of the LCPV killing all on board. The Argentine accounts of course dispute this.

 

The Battle of Government House

 

 

Government House

 

Lieutenant-Commander Giachino and his force of sixteen men and a useless radio faced quite a task in taking Government House. All semblance of surprise had gone, and suspecting after what had happened at Moody Brook Barracks, the Royal Marines were unlikely to go down without a fight. This was where the bulk of the British defenders were located and Giachino’s unit was outnumbered.

 

The attack on Government House commenced at around 06:30 with Argentine commandos and Royal Marines exchanging shots and sniper fire. Giachino and four men attempted to enter the building via the servant’s quarters, an annex at the rear of the main building. This attempt to gain entry was repulsed by Corporals Sellen and Fleet with Marine Dorey who were covering this part of the building. Lieutenant Commander Giachino was cut down as he burst through the door and Lieutenant Quiroga was hit in the arm. The other three retreated upstairs into the maids’ quarters.

 

Giachiano was critically wounded and a paramedic attempting to reach him was wounded with a grenade. Giachiano pulled the pin from his grenade and threatened to use it. The Royal Marines tried to persuade him to throw the grenade away so that he could receive medical treatment, but he refused. Giachiano kept hold of the grenade until the British surrender some three hours later. He died in Port Stanley Hospital from hypovolemic shock.

 

The Argentine commandos were good at their craft, despite being outnumbered by the defenders. They kept firing and moving positions under the cover of smoke and phosphorous grenades, making the defenders of Government house think they were facing a much larger force. Governor Hunt telephoned the radio station and asked them to relay to London that Government House was under attack by around 200 Argentine troops.

 

At 08:00, Hunt decided to have talks with the Argentine forces. He liaised with Vice-Commodore Hector Gilobert who was head of the local Argentine Government’s Airline. Gilobert and Hunt’s deputy went to the Argentine headquarters, which had been set up in the town hall under a white flag and a de-facto cease fire was established. This was continually breached by exchanges of fire. During the negotiations, the three Argentine commandos who had retreated into the maids’ quarters, moved in the upstairs room, trying to sneak away. Major Noott fired his Sterling SMG up through the roof and the commandos tumbled down the stairs and lay down their weapons. Bizarrely, they became POW’s at the point the British were negotiating terms of surrender.

 

The Surrender

 

 

Marine prisoners being searched

 

The Argentine Amtracs of the 2nd Marine Infantry Battalion had pushed into Port Stanley (I), effectively capturing and occupying the town. They then advanced on to Moody Brook to link up with Lieutenant-Commander Sabarots’ troops, having dropped off units at Government house to reinforce Giachiano’s commandos. Argentine troops took some prisoners in the vicinity of the racecourse and Government House was surrounded.

 

Major Norman suggested mounting a breakout and setting up an alternative Governorship in the country. Perhaps understandably, Rex Hunt was not keen on the idea. At 09:30, British forces formally surrendered to the Argentine Commander, Admiral Büsser. The defenders had fired over 6,000 rounds of ammunition.

 

Meanwhile, across the harbour, Corporal York decided to withdraw his section. After booby trapping their Karl Gustav anti-tank missile launcher, they headed north across Port William in a Gemini assault boat, pursued and fired upon by the corvette ARA Granville. They hid in the shadow of an anchored Polish fishing vessel, before landing on a beach. They stayed at large until 4th April and surrendered to Argentine forces to avoid reprisals against the civilians who sheltered them at Long Island Fam. They were badly mistreated by their Argentine captors.

 

The defenders of Government House and the FIDF were herded onto the sports field and made to lie on the ground while they were being searched. The Argentines filmed this and widely broadcast the images. This backfired in Britain and increased public support for assembling a task force to re-capture the islands. The Royal Marines were flown by C130 to Argentina and then on to Montivado. As they boarded the C130, one of the Marines said to his Argentine captor: “Don’t make yourself too comfy. We’ll be back.” Members of the FIDF were disarmed and allowed to return to their homes.

 

At 16:30 local time on 2 April 1982, the last telex conversation between the operator in the Falklands and an operative in London, announced that the islands were under Argentine control.

 

LON (London): HELLO THERE WHAT ARE ALL THESE RUMOURS WE HEAR THIS IS LON

 

FK (Falklands): WE HAVE LOTS OF NEW FRIENDS

 

LON: WHAT ABOUT INVASION RUMOURS

 

FK: THOSE ARE THE FRIENDS I WAS MEANING

 

LON: THEY HAVE LANDED

 

FK: ABSOLUTELY

 

LON: ARE YOU OPEN FOR TRAFFIC (i.e. normal telex service)

 

FK: NO ORDERS ON THAT YET ONE MUST OBEY ORDERS

 

LON: WHOSE ORDERS

 

FK: THE NEW GOVERNORS

 

LON: ARGENTINA

 

FK: YES

 

LON: ARE THE ARGENTINIANS IN CONTROL

 

FK: YES YOU CAN’T ARGUE WITH THOUSANDS OF TROOPS PLUS ENORMOUS NAVY SUPPORT WHEN YOU ARE ONLY 1800 STRONG. STAND BY PLEASE.

 

( More to follow. )

 

Author - Blown Periphery

 

going postal blog 2017

 

 

[yampy]

Just seems Iike yesterday , I suppose a product of getting old ! ..I recall the QE2 and the Canberra sailing down to the South Atlantic full of British troops , everyone of them thinking it was going to be a more of a cruise than a war , anticipating , wrongly as it happened that the Argies would be retreating as soon as the ships appeared on the horizon .

 

My sister in laws neighbour was a Sea Harrier Pilot , and later a Red Arrows Pilot who flew in combat down there . I asked him after the event if he fired a missile . He said he never saw an Argentinian plane except on radar , when as soon as they knew they had been picked up , they without delay did a 180and headed back to the mainland . Of course the UK sustained losses , the Exocet missile proving to be the main culprit .

 

Dave

 

 

[Geoff13]

They lost the Atlantic Conveyor which by the reports of items that went missing from the MOD over the next 5 years and reported as having been on that vessel must have been 10 times her actual 15,000 tonnes.

 

When I was posted to England in 1986 and doing kit checks of Squadies tool boxes, the standard answer to missing items was "That was on the Altlantic Conveyor Sarge". Who was I to argue with these honest upstanding young men

 

 

[Phil Perry]

Just seems Iike yesterday , I suppose a product of getting old ! ..I recall the QE2 and the Canberra sailing down to the South Atlantic full of British troops , everyone of them thinking it was going to be a more of a cruise than a war , anticipating , wrongly as it happened that the Argies would be retreating as soon as the ships appeared on the horizon .My sister in laws neighbour was a Sea Harrier Pilot , and later a Red Arrows Pilot who flew in combat down there . I asked him after the event if he fired a missile . He said he never saw an Argentinian plane except on radar , when as soon as they knew they had been picked up , they without delay did a 180and headed back to the mainland . Of course the UK sustained losses , the Exocet missile proving to be the main culprit .

Dave

Exocets. . .yeah, I reckon our dear 'Friends' the FRENCH were the main culprits for selling those missiles to the Argies. . . the Brit security services perpetrated a brilliant scam though, setting up fake arms companies and buying large quantities of their Exocet stock ( which was never actually paid for ) and then stashing them out of the way in Europe somewhere. . . Superb scam by MI6 that. . .

 

 

[Phil Perry]

I've sent this in the wrong order actually, . .I've got Part One somewhere, ie, the attack on South Georgia, and it's defence by a handful of Royal Marines,. . I'll see if I can find where I've put it, as it's very good. . . BP says he's going to send Part three some time next week. . .

 

 

[Phil Perry]

Here Ya go. . .

 

 

 

The Opening Shots of the Falklands War- South Georgia 3rd April 1982

 

 

HMS Endurance prior to her hurried new paint job and a flying Supermarket Trolley (Wasp)

 

PART ONE

 

On 19th March 1982, the Argentine Navy’s Fleet Auxiliary the ARA Bahía Buen Suceso sailed into Leith Harbour on the Island of South Georgia and put ashore a party of Argentine scrap metal workers. Once ashore, the workers raised the Argentine flag; the so-called scrap metal workers had been infiltrated by Argentine Marines who were posing as civilian scientists. The reason for the Argentine workers’ landing on South Georgia was a contract between Constantino Davidoff and the British company Christian Salversen, for the scrapping of the abandoned whaling factories and facilities on the island. Aware of the contract, the Argentine Navy used Davidoff’s front to establish a covert base on the disputed territory. The plan was given the code name Operation ALPHA.

 

The only British personnel at Leith were a small contingent of the British Antarctic Survey (BAS) headed up by Trefor Edwards. He handed the captain of the Bahía Buen Suceso a message from London that the Argentine flag was to be struck immediately and demanded that the party should leave the island. They were to report to the main party of the BAS at Grytviken before returning to the Argentine mainland. The scrap metal workers removed the flag but refused to either leave South Georgia or report to the BAS leader in Grytviken. A message was sent to the Governor of the Falkland Isles, Rex Hunt, who consulted with the FCO in London. The Governor was ordered to dispatch HMS Endurance to South Georgia with a detachment of twenty-two Royal Marines, in order to evict the Argentine workers.

 

“You have landed illegally at Leith without obtaining proper clearance. You and your party must go back on board the Bahía Buen Suceso immediately and report to the Base Commander at Grytviken for further instructions. You must remove the Argentine flag from Leith. No military personnel are allowed to land on South Georgia. No firearms are to be taken ashore.”

 

Although the Bahía Buen Suceso left Leith of her own accord, on 22nd March, the personnel remained and the Argentine Navy deployed the Corvettes ARA Drummond and ARA Granville to the area between South Georgia and the Falklands. This meant the Argentine ships could intercept the Endurance and remove any Argentine personnel who were on board. To further complicate matters, the Endurance found on its arrival at South Georgia the Argentine Survey Ship ARA Bahía Buen Suceso at anchor. The Marines under the command of Acting Lieutenant Mills RM were put ashore, under the most uncertain of situations. The young officer planned his dispositions and defences and waited. Mills was fortunate to have as his right-hand-man, the experienced Sergeant Leach. By now both countries were on the brink of conflict.

 

 

Map of South Georgia

 

The Endurance and the Bahía Buen Suceso played a game of cat and mouse around the ice floes and growlers around South Georgia. The captain of the Endurance had ordered the ships bright red hull to be overpainted white to aid concealment, but by 31st March the two ships lost contact with each other. The British orders, pathetic though they were, were to wait until the Argentine forces showed their hand. Mills received a radio message from the Endurance, that he should make only a token resistance to any Argentine violation of British territory. Lieutenant Keith Mills’ reply should go down in the annals of British military history: “Sod that, I’ll make their eyes water.” In the Interim, Mills learned by a message from the Endurance, that the Falkland Islands had been invaded, Port Stanley had fallen and he and his band of twenty-two brothers were very much on their own.

 

The Argentine Navy ordered the Corvette ARA Guerrico to join Bahía Buen Suceso at Leith. The Corvette was equipped with two helicopters, an Army Puma and a navy Alouette III and had a compliment of 40 marines. The aim was the capture of Grytviken. The group would be called Grupo de Tareas 60.1 (Task Force 60.1), under the command of Captain Trombetta, on board Bahía Buen Suceso.

 

At Grytviken Lieutenant Mills ordered that King Edward Point at the entrance of the bay should be fortified with wire and mines and defences dug in around the BAS building, Shackleton House. Endurance remained in the vicinity of South Georgia to act as a communications node between the Marine detachment and London. Mills was given his new rules of engagement, which authorised him to “Fire in self-defence after having issued a warning.”

 

The Argentine plans were for an invasion on 2nd April, but bad weather delayed this. Special Forces under the command of veteran torturer of the Argentinian “Dirty War,” Captain Alfredo Astiz, were to land at Hope Point near Grytviken to secure the area for the arrival of main force by helicopters. The ARA Guerrico would provide fire support with her main gun after having forced entry into Grytviken harbour. The Argentine force thought they were only dealing with the unarmed scientists of the BAS.

 

On the 3rd April the Bahía Buen Suceso contacted South Georgia by radio, demanding the surrender of all British personnel on the island. Mills said he would communicate with London to buy time and suggested that the BAS personnel take cover inside the church, away from the defensive positions and he issued his quick battle orders. But by then an Alouette helicopter was over the town and the Corvette was rounding King Edward Point.

 

At 11:40 Local, the Alouette came to a hover over the dock at the British Antarctic Survey station. As it flared in to land, 23-year old Marine Robert Ashton shouted that he had the helicopter in his sights. He was ready to open fire with his 7.62mm LMG machine gun but Marine John Stonestreet yelled “don’t shoot!” Ashton assumed that the order had come from Lieutenant Mills, so he held his fire while Lieutenant Luna and his men landed from the helicopter and quickly dispersed among the buildings at the point. A few minutes later, a shot was fired by one of the Argentine Marines, beginning the engagement. (1)

 

A Puma helicopter attempted to land fifteen Argentine Marines on King Edward Point at 1141. The Royal Marines dug in on King Edward Point didn’t hesitate this time and opened fire on the Puma with everything they had, little though it was. The Puma was hit and veered across the Bay, crash landing on the southern bank with two killed and four wounded (2). The Corvette Guerrico, according to the Argentine version of events withdrew because the captain was reluctant to have her exposed in such narrow waters (3)

 

 

Map of Cumberland bay and The Corvette Guerrico’s track

 

A party of Argentine Marines that had landed earlier began to work their way round the Bay, through the town towards the British positions (4). However, and most irritatingly for the Argentine forces, Lieutenant Mills was having the temerity of not following his rules of engagement to the letter. Fortunately for young Mills, Phil Shiner and Public Interest Lawyers weren’t in business in 1982. The Royal Marines pinned down the Argentine forces trying to outflank them with sustained and accurate fire and their commander, Captain Luna asked the Guerrico for urgent fire support.

 

The Argentine Corvette once again headed into the harbour and opened fire at 1155. To her commander’s frustration, the Guerrico;s 20mm guns jammed after the first salvo, as did the 100mm main gun. The 40mm mounting jammed after firing just six rounds. As she swung about to head back out to sea, Mills and the Marines unleashed severe hate on the Argentine ship with sustained automatic fire and rounds of anti-tank missiles from their 84mm Karl-Gustav launcher.

 

Sergeant Leach was armed that day with a L42A1 rifle. A conversion of the Lee–Enfield No. 4, Mk. 1(T). The L42A1 was chambered for the 7.62x51mm NATO cartridge and mounted the 3.5-power No. 32 scope. Lying on the table on the second floor of Shackleton House, the Sergeant sighted on the approaching ship’s bridge. By then, the Guerrico was once again facing the channel and closing on King Edward Point. A moment later, as the other Royal Marines began hammering away at the ship for a second time, Sergeant Leach began firing carefully aimed shots at the vessel. He directed his opening rounds at the five windows across the front of the bridge. At this point, only Captain Alfonso, the helmsman, and the quartermaster were manning that station as glass began to shatter. The three men were forced to crouch down behind ship’s structures to avoid being struck by the rapid succession of accurate shots coming from Leach’s sniper rifle. In his subsequent post operational report, Mills estimated that they engaged the Corvette at 550 metres and killed one sailor and injured four others. An Exocet launcher was put out of action and electrical cables to the 40mm gun were damaged.

 

During the battle in the bay, the Argentines continued to land more troops and once safely out of small arms range, the Guerrico brought its 100mm main gun back into action. The Royal Marines were now coming under effective fire from Argentine Marines and the Corvette’s main armament. His small force was taking casualties and Mills knew that the writing was on the wall. At 1248 he ordered his men to cease fire and finding a white coat, he surrendered to the Argentine troops. He had achieved his aim and had followed his vague and inadequate orders, making the best use of his limited resources. Lieutenant Mills and the Marines had made their eyes water.

 

The Royal Marines were treated well by their Argentine captors, disarmed and ferried to the Argentine mainland, then flown to Montevideo. There was a mutual respect between enemies of the same operational arm. Lieutenant Mills was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross and Sergeant Leach RM the Distinguished Service Medal. The scrap metal merchants remained on the island with a garrison of fifty-five Marines, which would be increased. The Endurance lurked in the area intelligence gathering until the 5th April.

 

 

The twenty-two at Grytviken before the first battle.

 

 

 

 

Author -Blown Periphery Nov 2017

 

Going postal blog

 

 

[bexrbetter]

Exocets. . .yeah, I reckon our dear 'Friends' the FRENCH were the main culprits for selling those missiles to .

... anybody, and now they get reprisal attacks that they call terrorist attacks.

 

 

[yampy]

I think most if not all losses due to the damned Exocet , were attributed to the rocket motors setting fire to the aluminium hulls of the British warships , and not the warheads . British warships at the time , and possibly still were of lightweight Aluminium construction and hence burnt well . The ships were designed around a likely North Atlantic war and were built for speed , a mistake in hindsight .

 

 

[Phil Perry]

I think most if not all losses due to the damned Exocet , were attributed to the rocket motors setting fire to the aluminium hulls of the British warships , and not the warheads . British warships at the time , and possibly still were of lightweight Aluminium construction and hence burnt well . The ships were designed around a likely North Atlantic war and were built for speed , a mistake in hindsight .

Agreed Dave, mind you,. . the temperatures in the South Atlantic were not exactly warm either,. . . BUT in the Baltic and environs, they WERE extremely low temps. . .the greatest problem aboard HMS Sheffield, along with most of the casualties, was the fire damage as you say, which is why they scuttled her in the end. Not worth saving, and too far from home to tow anyhow.

 

I'm, looking forward to BP's part three in this series. . .he's a damned good writer. ( His fictional writing is edge of the seat stuff - the man was Obviously a soldier,. . .he just knows Too much ! ) His series about the Iraq war in the early days was really good, some history there that I'd never read. Might paste those too if there's anyone interested. ( Pre WW2 )

 

 

[Hargraves]

Will working in austrailian defence support infrastructure building and repairing warships and their systems at the time I had need to remind some dear english expat friends of mine that their is no such thing as a conscript fighter pilot and that the greatest racing driver know at that time was an argentine. The poms were very lucky to win that one and did so largely on the training and determination of their men not their leadership which should be very obvious to any one who researched it. I also think that lomy dozo? Was very worried of the possible reaction consequences of a sucsessful defeat of the taskforce as he would have known the only way to defeat a layered antiair defence system is to swamp it with every assett at once not with three aircraft sorties one sancarlos was confirmed. but thats just an opinion.

 

 

[Phil Perry]

Will working in austrailian defence support infrastructure building and repairing warships and their systems at the time I had need to remind some dear english expat friends of mine that their is no such thing as a conscript fighter pilot and that the greatest racing driver know at that time was an argentine. The poms were very lucky to win that one and did so largely on the training and determination of their men not their leadership which should be very obvious to any one who researched it. I also think that lomy dozo? Was very worried of the possible reaction consequences of a sucsessful defeat of the taskforce as he would have known the only way to defeat a layered antiair defence system is to swamp it with every assett at once not with three aircraft sorties one sancarlos was confirmed. but thats just an opinion.

Sorry Mr. Hargreaves, I'm having difficulty understanding what you are saying here, But then again, I've always been a bit thick. . . . what is 'lomy dozo' ? Genuine question here.

 

 

[Hargraves]

G,day sir, its the incorrectly spelt name of the argentine air commander responsible for their air war.

 

 

[Phil Perry]

G,day sir, its the incorrectly spelt name of the argentine air commander responsible for their air war.

Thanks for that Sir. It is mildly ironic to note that for at least 15 years prior to the Falklands conflict, Argentinian military pilots received their basic training at Kidlington Airfield in Oxfordshire, UK.. . .

 

 

[Phil Perry]

Will working in austrailian defence support infrastructure building and repairing warships and their systems at the time I had need to remind some dear english expat friends of mine that their is no such thing as a conscript fighter pilot and that the greatest racing driver know at that time was an argentine. The poms were very lucky to win that one and did so largely on the training and determination of their men not their leadership which should be very obvious to any one who researched it. I also think that lomy dozo? Was very worried of the possible reaction consequences of a sucsessful defeat of the taskforce as he would have known the only way to defeat a layered antiair defence system is to swamp it with every assett at once not with three aircraft sorties one sancarlos was confirmed. but thats just an opinion.

I'm inclined to agree with your take on this Mr. Hargreaves . . . San Carlos was a disgraceful leadership Clusterfeck of giant proportions, and No senior Naval nor Army officer ever took responsibility for leaving all those men exposed at anchor in those two troopships. . .What a juicy target for an air attack that was. . .fish in a bloody barrel. Shameful.

 

 

[Hargraves]

Its not generally known but the Royal Navy hasen,t changed it selection for advancment and command proceedures to any great extent for at least a century and this system manifested its self exactly during the Falklands conflick. Vis a Vis to excell and standout as promotion material requires a massive effort of determination and concentration in a particular branch of the service as no one could completly excell at all of them, its just too complex a job to do so, the nett result of this (second to none I believe) system is the anomily of an overall amphibious invasion taskforce comander being selected for the position whose brilliant career was accieved to a great extent in the submarine branch, and who, being human was biased towards antisubmarine protection of the taskforce, at the expence of more effective anti air protection, which is my opinion only, but supported by Sharky Wards book Falklands Harrier pilot. Cheers Hargraves

 

 

[Phil Perry]

Its not generally known but the Royal Navy hasen,t changed it selection for advancment and command proceedures to any great extent for at least a century and this system manifested its self exactly during the Falklands conflick. Vis a Vis to excell and standout as promotion material requires a massive effort of determination and concentration in a particular branch of the service as no one could completly excell at all of them, its just too complex a job to do so, the nett result of this (second to none I believe) system is the anomily of an overall amphibious invasion taskforce comander being selected for the position whose brilliant career was accieved to a great extent in the submarine branch, and who, being human was biased towards antisubmarine protection of the taskforce, at the expence of more effective anti air protection, which is my opinion only, but supported by Sharky Wards book Falklands Harrier pilot. Cheers Hargraves

Have not read Sharky's book but have heard of it. .. There are manifold massive clusterwhatsits in the history of British High Militatry command. . .always the wrong specialists in the wrong job, and politicians putting their oar in. . .

 

Been reading stuff on WW1,. . .Jeeze. . . 'several .someones' should have been hanged for the utter stupidity and basically murder of British soldiers, AND those of other countries with their damned stupid battle plans. . . but a whole new thread would be needed to even scratch the surface . . . .

 

 

[bexrbetter]

the utter stupidity and basically murder of British soldiers, .

It's not exactly unnoticed in Australia that ANZACS were sent in before the Brit Soldiers ...

 

 

[Birdseye]

It's not exactly unnoticed in Australia that ANZACS were sent in before the Brit Soldiers ...

And that most of those ANZACS would be excluded these days from senate and lower house due to their country of birth citizenship.

 

 

[Hargraves]

Sorry for this drift guys but its relavent to command structure at least, in Gallipolie, that, had the first sea lord not already lost major capital ships (battle cruisers) trying to force the dardanells, to mines, I believe he may well have been more dissposed, with his own land warfare experience, to the placement of one capital ship bow first hard aground at anzac cove to provide the essential element that was missing, that would have made his excellent tactical plan a success, Their is no substitute for NGS in amphibious assault operations and one that could,nt be sunk is even better, that would have made all the differance I believe. And as far as systems progress is concerned several times during the Falklands campain NGS had to be withdrawn due to the single barrel automatic quick firing main gun breaking down. ( you would,nt want to have one of those old twin barrel 4.5 MK 7 DP semi fixed amunitioned turret guns would you, it might just keep going eh)

 

 

[Phil Perry]

Exocet – the missile that almost cost Britain the Falklands War

 

2nd February 2018

 

 

Exocet is the French word for a flying fish. It is also an anti-shipping missile that can be launched from submarines, surface ships, helicopters and fixed wing aircraft. The Exocet designed and built by Aerospatiale and Nord is a compact missile that is most effective against small to medium sized targets such as corvettes, frigates and destroyers. The missile is guided inertially during its approach phase and then switches to active radar homing as it enters the final target acquisition phase. To avoid detection, the missile surface skims at one to two metres depending on sea state. This effectively means that the missile approaches below the ship’s radar and usually can only be detected at a range of around 6,000 metres before impact. This gives the target ship precious little time to deploy countermeasures and activate the close-in weapons system (CIWS). The missile’s range is 70km.

 

So how did a pariah state run by a military Junta, which tortured and disappeared tens of thousands of its own citizens and foreign nationals as well, get its hands on such a sophisticated and deadly weapons system. The simple answer was that the French gave it to them, with tacit approval of the French government. But before we start our howls of protest, let’s not forget that the British government had already sold Argentina warships that defence cuts had decided were too expensive to run, man and keep in service.

 

The French had been training Argentine pilots, mechanics and support staff at Landivisiau in France since 1980. The missiles were shipped to Argentina where French technicians would set up and calibrate the systems. The French had set up an arms conduit to Argentina via Peru, but MI6 was well aware of this, as was Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher who sent the following telegram to the French President.

 

 

France was playing a double game during the Falklands War. Her government was saying that technicians had been withdrawn from Argentina, when in fact they were not ordered home and actively encouraged to stay. The French knew they had a potentially, extremely lucrative missile system and they wanted to test it on Royal Navy ships. Killing British sailors was a bonus. If diplomatically things started to get a bit uncomfortable for the French, Israel could fill the gaps. British diplomats cited evidence that Israel had supplied the Argentine military junta with arms that were used against the Task Force during the campaign to liberate the islands. Israeli military exports before the war included the Skyhawk jets that would later be used to bomb British warships, killing dozens of soldiers, sailors and marines. (Source, Daily Telegraph 24th August 2016). As soon as the cease fire agreement was signed France resumed their shipment of the remaining 7 (of 12) Super Etendard and their missiles to Argentina.

 

First Strike – HMS Sheffield

 

On the early morning of the 4th May 1982, the main force of the British Task Force was 75 nautical miles south-east of Port Stanley. The fleet was in a high state of readiness as there had been several reports of Argentine air activity. A second Black-Buck mission had taken place, Vulcan B2 XM607 had bombed Stanley Airfield the previous night. Lynx helicopters patrolled in the vicinity of Stanley to pinpoint the locations of the Argentine radar sites. At 0815 an Argentine Neptune maritime reconnaissance aircraft detected the radar emissions from one of the British type 42 destroyers. The position was plotted and the assumption made that where there was a Type 42, it was more than likely there was one of the carriers. Ninety minutes later two Super Etendards of 2nd Escuadrilla de Caza y Ataque, each carrying the air-launched version of the Exocet anti-ship missile, took off from their base at Rio Grande on Tierra del Fuego. Unlike a previously attempted raid, the Etendards successfully refuelled from a Hercules tanker and then descended to sea level as they approached the estimated position of the British fleet. With the Neptune acting in an AEWAC capacity, the two Argentine jets approached under the radar and in radio silence.

 

At 1035 the Neptune climbed to just under 4,000 feet and detected a large and two medium sized contacts and this information was relayed to the Super Etendards. The bombers climbed but failed to locate the contacts and dropped back down. They covered another 25 miles and tried again. This time targets appeared on their radar screens. The Argentine pilots inputted the coordinates into their weapons system and launched their Exocet missiles at a range of approximately 25 miles. Their job done, the Super Etendards turned for home, landing at Rio Grande at 1204. The Argentine air tasking that morning had consisted of the two Super Etendards, the KC130 tanker with an escort of two Dagger fighters, the Neptune and Lear Jet in support.

 

At 1000 HMS Sheffield was at defence watch readiness two. She was acting as Anti-submarine Warfare (ASW) picket for the Task Force. The main threat was seen as one of the Argentine 209 submarines, which had been given a higher priority than the air threat. HMS Glasgow was on high readiness and detected the two Super Etendards on her main surveillance radar 40 miles out and immediately communicated the warning “Handbrake.” Sheffield failed to go to action stations because its own radar and ECM hadn’t detected aircraft or missiles. The captain wasn’t informed and no countermeasures such as activating the Sea Dart missiles or deploying chaff were considered.

 

Finally, Sheffield picked up the incoming missiles on her type 965 radar, the Ops Officer informing the Missile Director. Sheffield was not fitted with ECM equipment and still did not go to action stations. Deck crews spotted smoke and glows low on the horizon, five seconds later an Exocet hit the destroyer midships, eight feet above the waterline. The second Exocet missed and splashed harmlessly into the sea, half a mile off her port beam.

 

There is some dispute as to whether the main charge of the Exocet’s warhead actually exploded, however, whether it detonated or not, the ensuing fire gutted the ship and killed 30 sailors. Standard operating procedures were adapted so that ships under attack would turn into the direction of attack, activate all ECM if fitted, release chaff and put up a barrage with everything they could. It was all too late for the “Shiny Sheff” and her crew.

 

 

A Mortal Blow – The Atlantic Conveyor

 

The Atlantic Conveyor was a 14,950 ton roll-on, roll-off container ship, registered in Liverpool and taken up from trade by the MoD in April 1982. She was refitted to enable her to operate S/VTOL Harrier operations and heavy lift helicopters. The ship was not fitted with either active or passive defensive measures, as someone in the MoD (as always it’s impossible to find out who), decided that she was not a “high value” target. Sailing for Ascension Island on 25 April 1982, Atlantic Conveyor carried a cargo of six Wessex helicopters from 848 Naval Air Squadron and five RAF Chinook HC.1s from No. 18 Squadron RAF. At Ascension, she picked up eight Fleet Air Arm Sea Harriers (809 Squadron) and six RAF Harrier GR.3 jump jets.

 

 

On the ship’s arrival at Ascension, one Chinook was unloaded to support operations on the island. It continued south and arrived with the task force in mid-May. The GR3s went to HMS Hermes, while the Sea Harriers were distributed between the squadrons operating from both Hermes and Invincible. The freeing up of the Atlantic Conveyor’s flight deck allowed the Chinooks to be prepared for operations.

 

The 25th of May was Argentina’s National Day and in the afternoon. HMS Coventry was attacked by Argentine fighter bombers and sunk with conventional bombs. HMS Broadsword picked up the survivors from Coventry. Many miles away to the east, on board Conveyor preparations were being made for the ship to sail into San Carlos through the night to be ready to unload helicopters and stores at first light. This part of the mission carried a relatively high risk that the ship would be found and attacked before the disembarkation was complete. If everything went wrong then the plan was to beach her and to try and rescue as many stores as possible. If the Conveyor survived, she was to be used a helicopter support ship. The crew members were each issued with a copy of the ‘Geneva Convention’ rules for prisoners in case of capture.

 

Around dusk on the 25th, The Atlantic Conveyor was sailing in formation with the ammunition ship RFA Regent and the carrier Hermes. One of the Atlantic Conveyor’s Chinooks, Bravo November was moving stores from ship to ship. The off-duty helicopter aircrews were relaxing in the wardroom with a few beers, before continuing operations the next day.

 

Two Argentine Super Etendards had taken off earlier in the afternoon, and with the aid of air-to-air refuelling, had flown a long dogleg to attack the carriers from an unexpected direction. They had been practising attacks on the Argentine ships sold by the MoD, because their radar profile was similar to the Royal Navy ships. They had perfected a technique known as “pecking the cone,” where they flew below the radar, occasionally popping up so that a passive radar sensor in the aircrafts’ tail fin could detect the strength and direction of the British ships’ active radar emissions.

 

The first British ship to spot the incoming aircraft was the outlying destroyer HMS Exeter, which detected the Super Etendards as they popped up to acquire the targets. The notified the flag ship and the frigate Ambuscade fired chaff. The Argentine pilots spotted two carrier-sized targets, locked on and fired two Exocet missiles at a range of 30 miles. The missiles’ tracks were heading straight for Hermes.

 

 

On the Atlantic Conveyor, the crews watched the ships manoeuvring frantically and the clouds of chaff erupting in the sky. The Conveyor had been stern on to the missile attack, but the flagship ordered her to turn hard to port exposing the full radar profile. Hermes was tucked in behind the RFA and the Conveyor. The two missiles appeared through the Ambuscade’s smoke and slammed into the port side of the merchant ship. As well as the explosions, the Exocets’ fuel ignited flammable stores within the ships open internal decks. The crew attempted to fight the fires, but the order to abandon ship was given and a few hours later the bow magazine exploded, gutting the ship. Twelve of the Atlantic Conveyor’s crew were killed including the captain. Nothing on board was recoverable and she sank on the 28th May whilst under tow.

 

HMS Glamorgan

 

The ubiquitous HMS Glamorgan was a County Class cruiser. As well as supporting the raid on Pebble Island by Special Forces, she had been guarding the repair and logistics area 200 miles away from the Falkland Islands. On 11th June she was ordered to provide fire support to the Royal Marines during their attack on Two Sisters Mountain. On the morning of 12th June, Glamorgan was hit by an Exocet fired from the shore by an improvised missile launcher. She was steaming at 20 knots some 18 nautical miles from the shore and detecting the incoming missile, attempted a rapid turn away from the incoming Exocet. The missile struck the port side, adjacent to the ship’s hangar. The turn had prevented the missile penetrating and raking the stern.

 

The blast travelled forwards and penetrated the hangar door, destroying the ship’s Wessex helicopter and causing a fierce fire. Fourteen crew members were killed, but the fires were extinguished and the ship underway by 1000. Repairs were conducted in San Carlos Bay. The Argentine garrison on the Falkland Islands surrendered on 14th June and Glamorgan arrived back at Portsmouth on 10th July 1982 after 104 days at sea.

 

 

Approximately 50% of the Exocets fired during the Falklands War hit their targets. The missiles gutted one ship, sank another and severely damaged a third. Fifty-six British and other nationalities in British service were killed. Over a hundred were burned, blinded maimed and traumatised. The missiles had caused severe wobbling by some members of Margaret Thatcher’s War Cabinet and completely changed the conduct of the war. It’s not difficult to imagine what would have happened if missiles had hit either of the carriers, both militarily and diplomatically. The French certainly seemed to have got their money’s worth.

 

Lest we forget.

 

Blown Periphery 2018

 

Goingpostal Blog

 

 

[Phil Perry]

The Air War and the Battle of San Carlos

 

Operation Sutton 21st – 23rd May 1982

 

 

As a prelude to the British Landings, the Argentine observation post on Fanning Head needed to be neutralised. Fanning Head is a towering headland nearly 800 feet high and overlooks San Carlos Water. This operation was conducted by HMS Antrim, two Wessex helicopter, around thirty-five men of SBS, a Royal Marine interpreter and a Naval Gunfire Support Officer. A helicopter flew in a pathfinder party from the SBS who had been issued with thermal imaging equipment. They identified the Argentine positions for the main party, which arrived later.

 

The SBS “killer group” took up positions overlooking the Argentines who were dug in, while HMS Antrim shelled their positions. Captain Rod Bell RM, who spoke Spanish, called out to the Argentines an invited them to surrender. The thermal imagers identified that the Argentines were moving towards the British. The SBS unleashed a torrent of hate until Captain Bell asked them to check fire and once again asked for a surrender. The Argentines ran up white flags and were captured. When their positions were searched later, eleven bodies were found in the rough ground.

 

Diversionary attacks were carried out by the SAS on Darwin and Goose Green, while HMS Glamorgan operating in Berkeley Sound shelled Argentine positions around Port Stanley. During the SAS raid on Darwin and Goose Green, the Argentine garrison estimated that they were being attacked by a unit of Battalion strength. The garrison at Goose Green airfield was subsequently heavily reinforced.

 

 

In the hours of darkness on 21st May 1982, the British Amphibious Task Group landed 4,000 men on the beaches in and around San Carlos Water, a bay that faced into Falkland Sound. The Men of 3 Commando Brigade comprised of the following:

 

2nd Battalion the Parachute Regiment from the RORO Ferry Norland.

 

40 Commando Royal Marines from HMS Fearless, 3rd battalion the Parachute Regiment from HMS Intrepid.

 

45 Commando from RFA Stromness.

 

In addition Rapier point air defences batteries and 105mm guns were put ashore by helicopter. There were however delays in setting up the Rapier as they had been stored well below decks to protect the delicate electronics.

 

By dawn on 22nd May the troops secured the bridgehead. 2 Para and 40 Commando pushed forward and secured the heights of the Verde Mountains and the Sussex Mountains, which dominated San Carlos and they overlooked the bays and Falkland Sound. While the Paras were clearing San Carlos settlement, a Gazelle helicopter was hit in the tail rotor and crashed into the sea. Argentine machine guns fired at the crew in the water and Sergeant Evans later died of gunshot wounds. A second Gazelle went to the assistance of the first and it too was shot down, crashing into a hillside. Both crew members were killed.

 

During the first day of the landings, the RAF Harrier GR3s were in action providing close support to a patrol of the SAS who had discovered an Argentine helicopter hide. The helicopters were moved from Port Stanley at night to an area near Mount Kent to protect them from a Pebble Island type of raid. The SAS patrol reported that they could be attacked at first light, before being moved back to Stanley. A brace of GR3s went in to attack the helicopters with their 35mm cannons. Squadron Leader Pook and Flight Lieutenant Hare made several passes over the base and destroyed a Chinook and two Pumas.

 

A second brace of GR3s were sent on an armed reconnaissance to Port Howard. The lead aircraft could not retract its undercarriage and had to return to the carrier. Flight Lieutenant Glover pressed on alone to attack Argentine positions. The forward air controller asked Glover to photograph the area and as it passed over them, the Harrier was hit three times in the port wing. It rolled and Glover waited for the aircraft to right itself before he ejected. Glover seriously injured his shoulder as the rockets blew him clear of the aircraft, and had to be rescued from the sea by civilians and Argentine troops. He was treated for his injuries and taken to Argentina, to be released after the war.

 

A field hospital was set up in disused buildings at Ajax Bay. From that night, and every night until the 14th June Argentine Air Force (FAA) Camberras attempted to bomb the troop concentrations in and around San Carlos. These became an irritant, which kept the troops awake at night. The bombing attacks by day were in a totally different league. The FAA fielded A4 Skyhawks, Israeli-built Daggers, Mirage IIIs and Pucaras operating from the many improvised airstrips around the islands. The fast jets had to operate from mainland Argentina because the RAF’s Black Buck operations had effectively interdicted Port Stanley Airport to fast jet operations and only the A4s could have operated from the short runway in any case. The Argentine fighter bombers were carrying a minimum of bombload with a maximum amount of fuel. But by God, did their pilots know how to fight their aircraft.

 

The Argentine pilots had a difficult run-in to their targets, which were the ships in San Carlos. They had to follow the terrain across West Falkland to avoid the radar and anti- aircraft defences, flying a high-low-high mission profile. They would be easy meat for the Harriers coming in laden with bombs or going home, short of fuel. An approach from the north or south would make them dangerously short of fuel for the return flight. As they came in across Falkland Sound into San Carlos, the Argentine pilots had a minimum amount of time to visually acquire their targets. But it was a double-edged sword. The ships’ radar had a minimum amount of time to acquire, lock on and fire the anti-aircraft missiles. The British ships’ issued GPMGs and rifles to every member of their compliments’ with eyesight and a pulse, with orders to fire at every fixed wing aircraft they saw. The Harrier CAP wisely gave San Carlos a wide berth.

 

It quickly became obvious that the British ships’ anti-aircraft defences weren’t up to the task. The anti-aircraft systems were having the same problems of acquisition and lock-on as the Argentine pilots. The performance of the Rapier missile system was particularly disappointing. HMS Ardent was sunk on 21st May. HMS Antelope was sunk on 24th May. HMS Coventry was sunk when she was ordered to draw the Argentine aircraft away from the other ships in San Carlos, a mission she successfully completed. HMS Argonaut and HMS Brilliant were badly damaged when multiple bombs hit the ships but failed to detonate.

 

Dug in on the Sussex Mountains, the men of 2 Para watched the little fighter bombers jinking through the ships and the maelstrom of fire and tracer below, the light reflecting off their twisting wings, like sunlight off minnows at the bottom of a pond. They mounted a running commentary; oooooohhhs and ahhhhhhs for particularly impressive displays of Argentine airmanship. Spontaneous applause when an aircraft was hit by a missile and cheers when the pilot ejected safely. Military personnel can be a perverse and difficult bunch to understand for some, but they tend to admire bravery and tenacity, whoever displays it.

 

 

The Argentine pilots were pushing their envelope by the time they made their final approach to San Carlos Water. No air-to-air refuelling for them. That was for the elite pilots of the Exocet-carrying Super Etendards who were tasked to sink the British carriers. The fighter bombers had the long transit across the South Atlantic in single engine aircraft. Any malfunction or flame-out and they would die alone and never found in the Southern Ocean and most of their aircraft were over fifteen-years-old. The Argentine Airforce was the Cinderella Service of the Military Junta because the lion’s share of the Defence budget had been allocated to upgrading their Navy.

 

To avoid the concentrated fire in San Carlos, the Argentine pilots flew and released their 1,000lb British-made bombs at ultra-low level. The bombs were fused by an impeller which had to spin for a required number of revolutions before the bomb became armed. The bombs themselves were retarded so that the explosions didn’t hit the dropping aircraft and many of the pilots were not climbing to the necessary release height before dropping their bombs. They did manage to solve the problem by fitting improved retarding devices.

 

Admiral Woodward in his autobiography blamed the BBC World Service for disclosing the information, which led to the Argentines changing their fuses and settings. He described the BBC as being more concerned with being “fearless seekers of the truth,” than the lives of British Servicemen. Some including me would probably consider the BBC to be a bunch of traitorous bastards. But of course it is a national treasure because of the unique way it’s funded.

 

Thirteen bombs hit British ships without exploding. HMS Ardent and HMS Antelope were lost despite the failure of the bombs and were destroyed while attempts were made to defuse the unexploded ordnance. Lord Craig, the Retired Marshall of the Royal Air Force is reported to have said: “Six better fuses and we would have lost.” The British lost one Destroyer and two Frigates, with eight ships damaged and forty-nine men killed. Well done the BBC! The Argentine air force lost forty-five aircraft including helicopters. Fifty-five Argentine aircrew were killed. Sea Harriers claimed to have shot down twenty-one enemy aircraft for no loses in air-to-air combat. I know that I would rather share a slit trench with an Argentine Air Force pilot than a BBC reporter.

 

 

© Blown Periphery 2018

 

Going postal Blog.

 

 

[Kenlsa]

I had just left the Australian army at this time ( March 92) where I was with 16 Air Defence Regiment;we had the Rapier missile system as well as Stinger. It was a delicate little petal and we wondered how it would actually perform in battle. All reports, confirmed by the above post, I received said it was a waist of time carting it all that way. Australia fired off the last of the missiles a few years ago to quit the stock. No rapier missile has ever downed an A/C in anger, anywhere. Let's hope our Rbs 70 system is up to the task, of that I have no idea.

 

Ken

 

 

[Jabiru7252]

waste not waist.

 

 

[Phil Perry]

waste not waist.

Indeed Sir. I have decided NOT to tell him, as I've already had the 'Grammar Nazi' cartoon posted under some of my corrections in the past,. . . However this does not detract from the fact that you are quite correct to point it out. . .

 

 

[Kenlsa]

Hi Kev, you didn't quite edit it properly as the fat fingers hit "92" instead of "82" .

 

Ken