Instructor not familiar with type?

[Hargraves]

I have had personel experience with instructor not (as experienced on type) as myself, which resulted in an inflight fuel transfer from the auxilliary tank to the gravity fed main, overflowing and painting the aircraft with fuel until turned off. Despite the time to transfer being questioned by me due to the differance in tank capacitys which would result in overflow. The very valuable lesson I learnt from this was that student or not, nav lesson or not, when you know its wrong and your flying her, insist that proceedures be done the right way, as YOU know it.

 

 

[facthunter]

If you don't do it inflight , it's no use talking about it later. Don't take this as a personal criticism but there's only one chance to make things right before the error becomes a problem. You can always apologise if you are wrong , later. Nev

 

 

[turboplanner]

You are really in kindergarten with the holier than thou, attitude. If an CFI cant fly these bats in their sleep, then run away from them.

The following information comes direct from the RAA Accident and Defect Summaries for 2018, 2017, and two from 2016, involving people who apparently were not familiar with the Aircraft handling, Radio, Procedures - all training related.

 

Moorabbin - 6/2/18 - A22LS

 

Whilst conducting circuit training in the late afternoon, the aircraft breached last light.

 

Moorabbin – 23/1/18 – A22LS

 

Runway incursion; aircraft entered a runway without clearance.

 

Private – 12/2/18 – A22LS

 

The aircraft landed roughly, resulting in damage to nosewheel.

 

Moorabbin – 2/1/18 – AP22LS

 

After landing on runway 17R, we vacated as soon as practicable, we followed a yellow taxi way off to the right leading onto Bravo1. However, after making the right turn to vacate, we continued the turn to the right and entered runway 13R by mistake, which incurred an inactive runway.

 

Bendigo – 17/12/17 – A22LS

 

Summary: As the student applied full power and we started to conduct the take-off roll on runway 17, there was a slight crosswind from the left, student did not use correct crosswind technique. The nose of the plane started to veer to the left. At this stage the instructor started to take control of the aeroplane, applied right rudder to straighten the nose. At the same time, the student applied back pressure on the controls, over rotated, and resulted in tail strike. Instructor tried to push the control forward to regain control of the aircraft. However, the student had frozen on the controls. The aircraft gained height, but due to high nose attitude, the aircraft stalled and the left wing dropped. As the wing dropped it clipped the ground, which spun the plane 180 degrees and nosedived into the ground.

 

Moorabbin – 5/12/17 – A22LS - Instructor PIC

 

The aircraft departed to the south for an instructional flight in the YMMB training area from RWY 31R. Standard procedure for a departure to the south is a right-hand circuit however, the pilot made a left had turn. Usually RWY 31R is for Circuits at YMMB, and the instructor mainly use 31L for departures to the south. However, on this date, only RWY 31R was in use as per NOTAM and Circuits were not being done. The instructor didn’t recall departures from 31R were in the opposite direction and conducted a departure as if they were taking off on 31L. Tower notified the pilot of the error but as there was no risk of collision with another aircraft they continued with the original departure track.

 

Private – 1/11/17 – A22LS

 

The pilot was approaching to land at Mt Jack Station, they were using the rudders to maintain runway alignment and noticed the right rudder had no response to inputs and only had left rudder control. The aircraft was almost at touchdown when the aircraft did a sharp turn to the left and the pilot attempted to control the aircraft keeping the wings level but the aircraft landed off the airstrip and flipped over coming to rest inverted.

 

Bendigo – 1/10/17 – A22LS

 

A student’s first solo at Bendigo Airport after completing CCTs with a Senior Instructor was incident free until the flare. As the aircraft entered the flare the nose yawed slightly to the left and the student immediately attempted to correct this with right rudder (which felt a little stiff). As the wheels hit the runway the aircraft banked to the right scrapping the right wing before tilting the nose forward and contacting the prop with the tarmac.

 

Caboolture – 16/9/17 – A32 Vixxen

 

While landing during circuit aircraft landed heavily on the rear wheels and bounced before settling on the second attempt. The pilot noticed some heaviness on rudder controls but was uncertain if this was normal as he is new to this type of aircraft. The next pilot to use the aircraft determined that the heaviness was not normal and took aircraft to maintenance for inspection. Outcome: The syndicate pilot voluntarily undertook additional training with the local CFI focussing on management of the aircraft in the landing phase to the satisfaction of the CFI. The aircraft was inspected and appropriate repairs carried out by an authorised maintainer.

 

Moorabbin - 5 /9/17 – Vixxen

 

During a dual training flight intended at YMMB, when the student made an incorrect call of being at the holding point Alpha 8 ready for departure to the training area without saying the aircraft was holding at the RWY35L, on the Eastern frequency 118.1 instead of the Western RWY frequency of 123.0. The Controller did not realise this as there was an aircraft of the same colourings other RWY's holding point, and gave the student clearance for take-off. After the aircraft had taken off and the error realised the instructor contacted the Western frequency tower and reported that they had taken off with a clearance on the wrong frequency. OUTCOME: Student pilot selected incorrect SMC frequency for clearance and was cleared by ATC to take off. ATC misidentified similar aircraft on parallel RWY. The instructor also failed to observe the error in SMC frequency selection by student. The incident was reviewed with the school CFI and the Instructor has been provided additional mentoring on command management of all aspects of instructional flight operations. Additionally the correct identification of similar aircraft types is to tabled by the school at the next aerodrome users safety meeting.

 

Moorabbin – 19/8/17 – AP22LS

 

The Foxbat landed on RWY 31L and was told to vacate the RWY as soon as possible via RWY22. The aircraft inadvertently turned right onto 35R instead of TWY Bravo and which took it back onto RWY31 at the intersection of Bravo 1, 35R and 31L. As the aircraft entered RWY31L another aircraft was on its take-off roll and was told to abort. The Foxbat was then instructed to stop by ground, and was directed back to Bravo by the Tower. From there it taxied to the apron. Outcome: RAAus Operations have engaged with the CFI and put measures in place to reduce the likelihood of runway incursions. RAAus Safety have also discussed with the CFI some proactive methods of communication that should improve the awareness of all airfield stakeholders.

 

Moorabbin – 14/8/17 – A22LS

 

The student was conducting run-ups in the Southern Run up Bay, and then departing from RWY17L for a total of 4 circuits. Upon requesting a full stop and landing on Runway 17L, the student exited on TWY Bravo, and requested taxi clearance to the apron. The student was advised to hold short of RWY 17R. After stopping short of the threshold the student checked the time and the VDO and inadvertently rolled across the threshold. The student stop the aircraft at the same time the Ground Controller asked them to do so. Outcome: Reviewed and discussed with CFI as part of monthly Operations review. Internal training actions undertaken with student to mitigate errors in CTR clearance compliance.

 

Gympie – 21/6/17 – A22LS

 

The aircraft bounced on landing and resulted in a loss of directional control causing the aircraft to veer off the RWY. Determined Outcome: Loss of control in the landing phase due to ineffective flare and hold off.

 

Currabubula – 9/6/17 – A22LS

 

The pilot lost control of the aircraft whilst on final with a 10kt crosswind. Outcome: Accident identified as Loss of Control during the landing phase (RLOC). Pilot has agreed to remedial training in advanced crosswind management in his own aircraft when repairs are completed.

 

Warnervale – 12/5/17 – A22LS

 

The engineer employed by Aircraft Owner was taxiing aircraft from its hangar to maintenance hangar for 50 hourly. As the aircraft reached a slight rise, the nose wheel lifted. The aircraft proceeded to leave the taxiway and collided with a fence and flag pole causing extensive damage to the port wing and snapping a propeller blade. DETERMINED OUTCOME: It is possible that the individual responsible for taxiing this aircraft was used to GA aircraft and may not have been familiar with the differences in ground handling characteristics of some recreational aircraft.

 

Moorabbin – 15/4/17 – A22LS

 

During circuit training on RWY 17L at YMMB, after making the final touchdown it was realised there was an aircraft on finals behind them so made the decision of exiting on RWY22. The pilot missed the turn on to taxiway Foxtrot and continued on RWY22. As soon as the pilot realised the error the pilot stopped and contacted YMMB ground. It was concluded that the aircraft had just crossed the holding point for RWY17R, which was also the duty RWY the time. The pilot had the gable markers ahead, indicating the entry into a RWY. OUTCOME: A joint visit was undertaken between Airservices ATC staff, the school's training manager and RAAus Operations to identify specific operational issues and an appropriate working process to address these. Agreed attendance at monthly safety meetings by the Flight school and Airservices and the removal of a taxiway where regular occurrences have occurred has been applied as appropriate mitigation with continued monitoring being adopted.

 

French Island (Vic) – 25/2/17 – A22LS

 

The pilot landed the aircraft on a beach, then taxied to what appeared to be a flat rocky surface, however this turned out to be mud with about 20cm of water beneath the surface. The nose wheel then sank under the mud and the aircraft bogged. The pilot turned the engine off and tried to pull the aircraft from the soft ground and to locate firmer ground to take off from. When the pilot started the aircraft and tried to taxi the aircraft to the harder ground it bogged again, this time with the tip of the propeller making contact with the muddy ground. The pilot immediately shut the engine down, closed the fuel valves for both wings and turned off the electric system of the aircraft then called for assistance as it was unknown how long it was until high tide. OUTCOME: The pilot elected to land on a beach however the surface was not appropriate and the aircraft became bogged. The pilot moved the aircraft to what was believed to be a more suitable location, however during the take off roll the aircraft sank into soft sand and the propeller impacted the sand. The aircraft was disassembled and removed for an assessment of the engine to ensure no damage occurred. The pilot has undertaken further research and determined landings on beaches must include an independent assessment of the surface suitability prior to landing.

 

Private – 25/2/17 – A22LS

 

Upon return to a private strip, after waiting for a local shower to pass, the pilot carried out a normal approach and landed. The strip had just been mown and was covered with grass which caused the aircraft to skid when the brakes were applied. The aircraft overran the strip impacting with the fence at the end of the RWY. Upon exiting the aircraft it was noted that the prop had impacted a star picket and there was some minor damage done to the cowlings and a branch had touched the leading edge of the left wing leaving a small indent and scratching underside of left flaperon. OUTCOME: RAAus Operations Managers have reviewed this report and the pilot identified that due to the wet grass (that was cut that day) it caused an increase of the aircraft speed off the runway. The pilot also observed that the wind had dropped to nil which also was a factor. Additionally the limited overshoot area contributed to the incident and with an additional 20 metres or more would have avoided any impact. As such the private strip will now be extended to overshoot / undershoot by 75 metres and include an installation of a 2.8 metre windsock.

 

Quirindi – 11/2/17 – A22LS

 

The aircraft suffered a heavy landing causing nose wheel leg to be bent. Determined Outcome: Due to the approach speed not being managed appropriately, the aircraft suffered a hard landing and damaged the nose gear. PIC noted HF and inappropriate approach speed and steep angle. Pilots are reminded of the importance of a stabilised approach at the manufacturer's recommended speed according to the POH.

 

Moorabbin – 5/2/17 – A22LS

 

On final landing of a circuits session in gusty conditions, the student straightened the nose but didn't flare quite enough causing plane to land reasonably gently but flat resulting in a small bounce of approximately 3ft height. The student steadied well initially but the nose then dropped quickly, partly due lack of control by the student and partly sudden lull in wind. When the nose dropped the nose wheel landed firmly first with audible thud. The Instructor went to take over at first sense of nose dropping but was not quick enough to go around before nose landed due to being about to land. OUTCOME: Instructor has had debrief with CFI and Operations on control management practices, student control limits and instructional policies that have been implemented and reviewed to prevent further re-occurrences of this nature.

 

Moorabbin – 29/1/17 – A22LS – Instructor PIC

 

During a trial instructional flight the aircraft entered Controlled Airspace without a clearance. OUTCOME: The Instructor was distracted during delivery of a lesson and violated Moorabbin airspace. The CFI has required further retraining and a flight review prior to conducting further instruction to prevent a recurrence.

 

Townsville – 1/12/16 – A22LS

 

Flying from Bluewater Park to Townsville. On descent left rudder felt heavy and rudder pedals would rest at full left stop if the pilot did not maintain foot pressure. The pilot was not very familiar with the type at the time and felt this might be unusual. They decided to ask tower for visual inspection of undercarriage in the event of damage during take-off roll. No damage or anomaly sighted by tower. Aircraft flew normally as speed reduced to normal level flight and approach configurations. The pilot did not request any further assistance from the tower or ground support and the aircraft landed normally. Aircraft was fully inspected by a LAME on the ground at the GA parking. The pilot since learned that this aircraft type does not have the usual self-centring arrangement the pilot is used to on tricycle undercarriage types. Determined Outcome: The PIC has self-identified that he did not understand the effects on the handling characteristics of the aircraft that can occur with an aircraft fitted with all-terrain wheels. When events such as these occur, RAAus recommends a report is submitted via the OMS for information purposes and allow assessment of the benefits of education to members. Nothing further was required of the pilot as the aircraft characteristics are correct relevant to the type of tyre used on the aircraft.

 

Private - 7/11/16 – A22LS

 

During take-off the pilot opened the throttle to get up to speed however the aircraft did not seem to be performing, despite the gauges reading okay. The pilot decided to abort the take-off however was too late to pull up before the end of the RWY. The aircraft went through a ditch and several bushes, coming to a stop approximately 45m from the end of the RWY. After inspection it appeared that the handbrake of the aircraft may have been engaged. OUTCOME: Investigations revealed the hand brake of the aircraft may still have been engaged reducing the performance of the aircraft. Pilots are reminded of the importance of using checklists to ensure the aircraft is configured correctly for the intended phase of flight, and early actions to reject take-off if reduced aircraft response is recognised.

 

 

[APenNameAndThatA]

Wow, what a list. Good thing the nose wheel crumples instead of the firewall. None of the mistakes were made by instructors unfamiliar with the type. The STOL capabilities of the Foxbat do seem to make it harder than a normal plane to land. A C172 would be easier but will not do what I need. Thank you for the post. It also seems that I will have to make sure the instructor does not try and kill me. Seems an attentive instructor will be better than an inattentive million hour instructor.

 

 

[Roundsounds]

I haven’t seen any output from the RAAus Safety Management System (SMS) to address the issues quoted by Turbo.

 

An effective SMS would result in some form of action / output to address common causes relating to recorded incidents, I cannot find anything on the RAAus Safety pages.

 

 

[APenNameAndThatA]

I haven’t seen any output from the RAAus Safety Management System (SMS) to address the issues quoted by Turbo.An effective SMS would result in some form of action / output to address common causes relating to recorded incidents, I cannot find anything on the RAAus Safety pages.

No need. The RA-Aus site already tells us that flying is already safe!

 

 

[Roundsounds]

No need. The RA-Aus site already tells us that flying is already safe!

Of course, what was I thinking! Must achieve targets in order to obtain bonus!

 

 

[Roundsounds]

Private - 7/11/16 – A22LSDuring take-off the pilot opened the throttle to get up to speed however the aircraft did not seem to be performing, despite the gauges reading okay. The pilot decided to abort the take-off however was too late to pull up before the end of the RWY. The aircraft went through a ditch and several bushes, coming to a stop approximately 45m from the end of the RWY. After inspection it appeared that the handbrake of the aircraft may have been engaged.

OUTCOME: Investigations revealed the hand brake of the aircraft may still have been engaged reducing the performance of the aircraft. Pilots are reminded of the importance of using checklists to ensure the aircraft is configured correctly for the intended phase of flight, and early actions to reject take-off if reduced aircraft response is recognised.

Interesting, whoever investigated this incident mustn’t have reviewed the distributors takeoff checklist. It would seem the pilot did indeed follow the written before checklist, it tells you to engage the brakes but not release them.

 

http://www.foxbat.com.au/public/editor_images/Daily%20&%20Prestart.pdf

 

 

[pylon500]

The following information comes direct from the RAA Accident and Defect Summaries for 2018, 2017, and two from 2016, involving people who apparently were not familiar with the Aircraft handling, Radio, Procedures - all training related.

OK Turbo, I don't usually waste to much time with your armchair expertise, but I thought I'd review this list thinking there may be some systemic problems with the operations of Foxbats...?

As you said, most occurrences were training related, so I studied them (knowing the aircraft intimately), with a view to operational habits characteristic to the 'Bat.

 

The following is my interpretation of how the aircraft being a Foxbat, as opposed to being any other type of aircraft, was relevant to incidents put forward;

 

1 Irrelevant.

 

2 Irrelevant.

 

3 Pilot error, partially relevant.

 

4 Irrelevant.

 

5 Poor instructing, partially relevant.

 

6 Irrelevant.

 

7 mechanical fault?, partially relevant?

 

8 partially relevant?

 

9 Ambiguous, partially relevant?

 

10 Irrelevant.

 

11 Irrelevant.

 

12 Irrelevant.

 

13 Pilot error, partially relevant.

 

14 Pilot error, partially relevant.

 

15 partially relevant.

 

16 Irrelevant.

 

17 Irrelevant.

 

18 Overestimated aircrafts abilities, partially relevant.

 

19 Pilot error, partially relevant.

 

20 Pilot/Instructor error, partially relevant.

 

21 Irrelevant.

 

22 Partially relevant

 

23 Pilot error.

 

Seeing a list of incidents put forward as you did, and saying they were all endemic of problems that could be associated to Foxbats is very misleading, and likely to cause anxiety to people buying and or learning to fly in said Foxbats.

 

All 'Ultralights' have their little quirks, but on the whole, are reasonably easy to fly.

 

If anything, I rate the Foxbat as one of the easier aircraft to fly, bordering on too easy, but still a great trainer.

 

 

[Hargraves]

Quite right Nev, one of the truest statements i,ve heard re flying was, now you have your licence you can really learn to fly, cheers Hargraves

 

 

[turboplanner]

OK Turbo, I don't usually waste to much time with your armchair expertise, but I thought I'd review this list thinking there may be some systemic problems with the operations of Foxbats...?As you said, most occurrences were training related, so I studied them (knowing the aircraft intimately), with a view to operational habits characteristic to the 'Bat.

The following is my interpretation of how the aircraft being a Foxbat, as opposed to being any other type of aircraft, was relevant to incidents put forward;

 

1 Irrelevant.

 

2 Irrelevant.

 

3 Pilot error, partially relevant.

 

4 Irrelevant.

 

5 Poor instructing, partially relevant.

 

6 Irrelevant.

 

7 mechanical fault?, partially relevant?

 

8 partially relevant?

 

9 Ambiguous, partially relevant?

 

10 Irrelevant.

 

11 Irrelevant.

 

12 Irrelevant.

 

13 Pilot error, partially relevant.

 

14 Pilot error, partially relevant.

 

15 partially relevant.

 

16 Irrelevant.

 

17 Irrelevant.

 

18 Overestimated aircrafts abilities, partially relevant.

 

19 Pilot error, partially relevant.

 

20 Pilot/Instructor error, partially relevant.

 

21 Irrelevant.

 

22 Partially relevant

 

23 Pilot error.

 

Seeing a list of incidents put forward as you did, and saying they were all endemic of problems that could be associated to Foxbats is very misleading, and likely to cause anxiety to people buying and or learning to fly in said Foxbats.

 

All 'Ultralights' have their little quirks, but on the whole, are reasonably easy to fly.

 

If anything, I rate the Foxbat as one of the easier aircraft to fly, bordering on too easy, but still a great trainer.

You're right; not one of those things was the fault of the aircraft.

 

 

[Camel]

I have experience on many types GA and RAA with some hours in Foxbats ! The Foxbat is a very easy, stable and good performing aircraft ! It has a low stall speed and a reasonable cruise speed ! It is also part of the reason the high performance and low performance endorsement was replaced by type as the Foxbat easily fits in both categories !

 

It can easy handle various conditions that other aircraft are not so easy ! In my opinion a very easy aircraft to learn to fly or teach with and probably too easy !

 

I agree totally with pylon500 comments !

 

 

[turboplanner]

Please go back and read the OP post; this thread is not really about Foxbats, it's about people, and the research I did shows the OP was very astute to ask the question he did.

 

The OP either owns a Foxbat, or intends buying one, so he has no question about the aircraft, or how easy it is to fly.

 

Student training is the safest time for pilots, so I didn't expect to see any serious accidents, but what struck me was the sheer number on the RAA records, and this was just more or less one year.

 

 

[facthunter]

Student training HAS been relatively safe over a fair period of time in RAAus

 

. Arthur The term "pilot error" is really misleading and an oversimplification. and doesn't have a great standing in accident and incident analysis. People make errors for a lot of reasons. They rarely set out to make errors. IF they haven't been trained properly or fully Pilots will do more things that can be called errors..IF certain trends emerg, design changes or flying techniques get revised. or modified. If you just put it down to "pilot error" nothing gets changed. .No improvement happens. Nev

 

 

[turboplanner]

Student training HAS been relatively safe over a fair period of time in RAAus. Arthur The term "pilot error" is really misleading and an oversimplification. and doesn't have a great standing in accident and incident analysis. People make errors for a lot of reasons. They rarely set out to make errors. IF they haven't been trained properly or fully Pilots will do more things that can be called errors..IF certain trends emerg, design changes or flying techniques get revised. or modified. If you just put it down to "pilot error" nothing gets changed. .No improvement happens. Nev

I just quickly summarised the list into:

Technique - 12

 

Procedures - 9 including one Instructor, and recommended retraining on communications for one CFI

 

Radio - 1

 

All of these relate to either failure in training, or failure to absorb the training the pilot was given, so all are relevant to the OP question, and his question is valid.

 

There are some locations which come up multiple times.

 

A lot blamed the aircraft

 

One blamed wet grass for skidding into the end fence, and compounded that by extending the undershoot and overshoot areas. Most telling was the addition of a new wind sock, possibly indicating why he floated over most, if not all of the strip.

 

One wasn't used to the non-centering steering, and you'd have to wonder why, if he'd had any training.

 

These issues certainly don't apply to all RA instructors. Two that I had were the best in the business, and I use things they taught me every flight, but as others have said, not all are at that standard.

 

Re the discussion about preference for an Instructor with 250 hours of Foxbat experience vs thousands of hours airline experience, when you look at the list of incidents I posted:

 

1. You're going to want to avoid some of the damage to your aircraft that some of these incidents produced

 

2. You're going to want to know about some Foxbat characteristics that featured in incidents (and you can go back much further on the RAA site)

 

3. I had an ex airline instructor with around 20,000 hours at one stage in a Jab J170, and after spending the cost of three one hour lessons with him, during which he just repeated I was doing well but didn't show me anything, I saved myself more expense and went for a Jab guy. I was floating, same as some of the guys in the Foxbat incidents, and the next instructor retrained me from my low wing technique to one which suited the Jab.

 

 

[pylon500]

Student training HAS been relatively safe over a fair period of time in RAAus. Arthur The term "pilot error" is really misleading and an oversimplification. and doesn't have a great standing in accident and incident analysis. People make errors for a lot of reasons. They rarely set out to make errors. IF they haven't been trained properly or fully Pilots will do more things that can be called errors..IF certain trends emerg, design changes or flying techniques get revised. or modified. If you just put it down to "pilot error" nothing gets changed. .No improvement happens. Nev

After reading this two or three times, I was going to go all grammar nazi on it, but then figured you probably posted this from a phone?

 

 

[APenNameAndThatA]

OK Turbo, I don't usually waste to much time with your armchair expertise, but I thought I'd review this list thinking there may be some systemic problems with the operations of Foxbats...?As you said, most occurrences were training related, so I studied them (knowing the aircraft intimately), with a view to operational habits characteristic to the 'Bat.

The following is my interpretation of how the aircraft being a Foxbat, as opposed to being any other type of aircraft, was relevant to incidents put forward;

 

1 Irrelevant.

 

2 Irrelevant.

 

3 Pilot error, partially relevant.

 

4 Irrelevant.

 

5 Poor instructing, partially relevant.

 

6 Irrelevant.

 

7 mechanical fault?, partially relevant?

 

8 partially relevant?

 

9 Ambiguous, partially relevant?

 

10 Irrelevant.

 

11 Irrelevant.

 

12 Irrelevant.

 

13 Pilot error, partially relevant.

 

14 Pilot error, partially relevant.

 

15 partially relevant.

 

16 Irrelevant.

 

17 Irrelevant.

 

18 Overestimated aircrafts abilities, partially relevant.

 

19 Pilot error, partially relevant.

 

20 Pilot/Instructor error, partially relevant.

 

21 Irrelevant.

 

22 Partially relevant

 

23 Pilot error.

 

Seeing a list of incidents put forward as you did, and saying they were all endemic of problems that could be associated to Foxbats is very misleading, and likely to cause anxiety to people buying and or learning to fly in said Foxbats.

 

All 'Ultralights' have their little quirks, but on the whole, are reasonably easy to fly.

 

If anything, I rate the Foxbat as one of the easier aircraft to fly, bordering on too easy, but still a great trainer.

Turboplanner must have said some really rude things in the past, or something. My own view as not that Turbo was being an armchair expert, but that he came up with a list and was going to let people draw their own conclusions. I don't think that he even hinted that the Foxbat was hard to land. Actually, without even seeing the statistics, I think that it would be fair to conclude that C172's and C152's have tougher nose wheels (and firewalls) than Foxbats. Really, that is a good thing. You can't get a groundroll 1/4 the distance without some compromise. That characteristic is built into the Foxbat design, it seems to me. I can't say from personal experience, but it seems to have a powerful elevator while landing, and/or to have the CofG close in front of the main wheels. It even has a tailwheel. It seems to me that it is designed to land very much on its main gear, which would help in rough strips. Also, with low wing loading it will probably be harder to land than a 172 or 152.

 

 

[APenNameAndThatA]

Student training HAS been relatively safe over a fair period of time in RAAus. Arthur The term "pilot error" is really misleading and an oversimplification. and doesn't have a great standing in accident and incident analysis. People make errors for a lot of reasons. They rarely set out to make errors. IF they haven't been trained properly or fully Pilots will do more things that can be called errors..IF certain trends emerg, design changes or flying techniques get revised. or modified. If you just put it down to "pilot error" nothing gets changed. .No improvement happens. Nev

I agree that pilot error is really not a good thing to say. From the point of view of risk analysis, for example, weak nose gear is a latent error. The reason people fly 172's is that there is less risk of pilot error.

 

 

[facthunter]

No I didn't Arthur. I have been quite involved with accident investigation during my flying career. Pilot error is not a helpful concept and I thought we progressed past it many years ago. It's pretty incompatible with any human factors approach to flying as well.. The more complex a situation is, the more training you need. If you aren't adequately trained you will have problems. and probably stuff up something quite important to get right.. Using the blanket term "pilot error" doesn't get into the reasons. The why and How it happened. Fits in with CASA's current penalty system though. STRICT LIABILITY. but who says that's a good way to run things..Nev.

 

 

[Happyflyer]

I agree that pilot error is really not a good thing to say. From the point of view of risk analysis, for example, weak nose gear is a latent error. The reason people fly 172's is that there is less risk of pilot error.

I would say pilots in 172s make the same errors but the consequences are not the same because the aircraft is built to handle the abuse/error. When some of these pilots try to fly a more lightly built aircraft with the same lack of ability and break it, they blame the aircraft.

 

 

[M61A1]

No I didn't Arthur. I have been quite involved with accident investigation during my flying career. Pilot error is not a helpful concept and I thought we progressed past it many years ago. It's pretty incompatible with any human factors approach to flying as well.. The more complex a situation is, the more training you need. If you aren't adequately trained you will have problems. and probably stuff up something quite important to get right.. Using the blanket term "pilot error" doesn't get into the reasons. The why and How it happened. Fits in with CASA's current penalty system though. STRICT LIABILITY. but who says that's a good way to run things..Nev.

I would suggest though, that the current trend of labeling incidents "Human Factors Related", is just as useless as "Pilot Error".

 

 

[APenNameAndThatA]

I would say pilots in 172s make the same errors but the consequences are not the same because the aircraft is built to handle the abuse/error. When some of these pilots try to fly a more lightly built aircraft with the same lack of ability and break it, they blame the aircraft.

When I said "pilot error", I meant "accident due to pilot error".

 

 

[turboplanner]

I would suggest though, that the current trend of labeling incidents "Human Factors Related", is just as useless as "Pilot Error".

Just at the moment it is because the training syllabus, which includes 1 in a million examples of a pilot diving under the sea then coming to the surface, jumping into an aircraft and climbing thousands of feet into the air, is not going to relate to someone who tries to take off with the brakes on, turns the fuel OFF instead of in the pre start checks, leaves the gear down despite the warning horn etc.

 

 

[Parkway]

I have heard anecdotally that there are a small number (maybe only one) of RAAus flying schools who operate in CTA with apparently some form of dispensation. But those stories were always from people who could not actually verify how or why etc. so take that with a grain of salt.

I think you might be referring to where I learnt to fly, at Jandakot WA YPJT... the Ra-Aus school there has an exemption to operate out of the class D airspace but not the nearby class C of Perth airport YPPH