Ethiopian 737-800 Max crash - No survivors

[facthunter]

 "Boeing pilots are not co operating". Well ONE certainly isn't and it's not just a common variety of Boeing pilot either. It's one significantly involved with critical processes and policy that had a big bearing on the accidents.

 

       Yenn I don't agree with your assertions in the last two sentences..  The "hidden"  FIX is for an instability problem inherent in the design and the plane is still grounded. Not requiring sim or extra training time for the NEW planes was a marketing decision.  as the "competing " Airbus designs didn't have the pitch up problem as the engines had more room under the wings and didn't have to go so far forward. Nev

 

 

[Yenn]

Indonesias report on the Lionair accident is out and it looks as if Swiss cheese is the problem. They say there are 9 contributing factors.

 

The design was faulty, relying on one sensor when there were two on board. The pilots were incompetent, with the FO having a poor record especially and another new factor to me was the fact that the AOA sensor had failed in the past and was rebuilt, but not properly calibrated.

 

A sad tale of incompetence, which scares me.

 

 

[facthunter]

People always go for the cheapest fares.. That's surprising when it can be your life,  so the cost saving is what it's about even with the builders (Boeing). and the Airlines that purchase the planes. Don't forget this plane is/ was a faulty object..  proven to be unsuitable for purpose  in some critical ways. The  "differences" training was not specified  to make the plane competitive  and has been grounded for a lengthy period of time now and the executives of Boeing are resigning /being dismissed.. In an enquiry all matters get examined and some  may contribute  to the outcome and others appear more incidental. If it was just a matter of extra training,  the type would have been back flying long ago.  Aircraft builders always get involved with training for new  or modified planes with Airlines to ensure their reputation isn't adversely affected. That's only common sense and acting responsibly. In this case they played down any need to have pilots "off line" and have extra training for  a  sales benefit.. Nev

 

 

[Thruster88]

Have read some of the report, not able to post a link. The captain on the previous flight to 610 having no or limited knowledge of MCAS treated the unwanted and undesirable trim input from the malfunctioning system as runaway trim and cut the two trim switches from memory check list. The flight continued for 1.5? Hours to the intended destination using manual trim. Sadly the next crew had no ? Knowledge of what had occurred on the previous flight.

 

This is just one of the nine factors   

 

 

[Student Pilot]

Read somewhere it happened on 4 previous flights and they managed to land. Indonesian aviation runs on corruption and nepotism not expirence, skill or quailifications, from the bottom to the top including the regulator. A pilot would not question any orders from higher up and would do what they're told. Engineers do what they are told even if that goes against manufactures recommendations on parts life or repairs, replacing critical parts with locally made or conterfeit parts.

 

Even though smoking is not permitted in the passenger cabin you can smell the flight crew light up when they are taxying and the stench last till you deplane at destination. 

 

 

[kgwilson]

It was a sobering report. I just went through the summary. Poor training, poor maintenance, poorly serviced equipment, faulty software, no documentation. Scary stuff. It took the co-pilot 4 minutes to find the section in the manual. By then I'd say that tunnel vision had begun to set in. There was just no time left to work anything out & lastly panic. The Ethiopian crash was worse having less altitude & time. It will be interesting to see when that report is released if there are similar swiss cheese scenarios.

 

 

[bexrbetter]

 

Even though smoking is not permitted in the passenger cabin you can smell the flight crew light up when they are taxying and the stench last till you deplane at destination. 

 

Most Asian men smoke, 99% of Chinese men smoke.

 

I used to swear someone was smoking somewhere on Chinese flights, but what it is, is the stench of all their clothes coming through the air con/air recycling system.

 

There is no smoking on Chinese trains by the way, so the azzholes all stand in the carriage joins and smoke, also the toilets of course. But absolutely not on the Bullet trains, they stop for about 2 mins at some stations and they all dive off, draw the hell out of a ciggy and quickly cram back on, really pathetic to be a slave to something like that.

 

 

[IBob]

Dennis Muilenberg under the Members of Congress pump:

 

"At the hearing, the Connecticut Democratic senator Richard Blumenthal sharply accused Boeing of engaging in “a pattern of deliberate concealment”, noting that Boeing’s 1,600-page pilot’s manual mentions the so-called MCAS anti-stall system just once. Blumenthal accused Muilenberg and Boeing of supplying “flying coffins as a result of Boeing deciding to conceal MCAS from pilots”.

 

At issue are recently disclosed internal instant messages that Boeing had not previously handed to committee investigators. The messages, sent by Boeing’s chief test pilot Mark Forkner in 2016, complained of “egregious” erratic behavior in flight simulator tests of the MCAS system, and referred to “Jedi mind tricks” to persuade regulators to approve the plane."

 

egregious = outstandingly bad/shocking

 

https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/oct/29/boeing-dennis-muilenburg-congress-testimony-737-max-mcas

 

 

[kgwilson]

It's no wonder Boeing Executives are beginning to jump ship. They initially thought that they were too big and powerful for any sort of axe wielding from the government, customers, pilots and employees so withheld or denied everything. The trickle of information eventually became a flood and revealed that corporate greed outweighed good governance and safety. They made that bed now they must lie in it.

 

 

[Student Pilot]

It's no wonder Boeing Executives are beginning to jump ship. They initially thought that they were too big and powerful for any sort of axe wielding from the government, customers, pilots and employees so withheld or denied everything. The trickle of information eventually became a flood and revealed that corporate greed outweighed good governance and safety. They made that bed now they must lie in it.

 

So they'll jail a few lower middle management execs and chastise a few head engineers then give the rest a pay rise and the CEO will retire on a record pay out, justice will be done in Merrycar.

 

 

[M61A1]

Have read some of the report, not able to post a link. The captain on the previous flight to 610 having no or limited knowledge of MCAS treated the unwanted and undesirable trim input from the malfunctioning system as runaway trim and cut the two trim switches from memory check list. The flight continued for 1.5? Hours to the intended destination using manual trim. Sadly the next crew had no ? Knowledge of what had occurred on the previous flight.

 

This is just one of the nine factors   

 

 

 

Read somewhere it happened on 4 previous flights and they managed to land. Indonesian aviation runs on corruption and nepotism not expirence, skill or quailifications, from the bottom to the top including the regulator. A pilot would not question any orders from higher up and would do what they're told. Engineers do what they are told even if that goes against manufactures recommendations on parts life or repairs, replacing critical parts with locally made or conterfeit parts.

 

Even though smoking is not permitted in the passenger cabin you can smell the flight crew light up when they are taxying and the stench last till you deplane at destination. 

 

 

 

It was a sobering report. I just went through the summary. Poor training, poor maintenance, poorly serviced equipment, faulty software, no documentation. Scary stuff. It took the co-pilot 4 minutes to find the section in the manual. By then I'd say that tunnel vision had begun to set in. There was just no time left to work anything out & lastly panic. The Ethiopian crash was worse having less altitude & time. It will be interesting to see when that report is released if there are similar swiss cheese scenarios.

 

I got flamed a while ago for daring to suggest that "third world" airlines played a significant part in this problem.

 

If you value your life, don't use them. They're cheap for a reason.

 

 

[Yenn]

Third world airlines may be cheap, but first world executives are also cheap and corrupt. This whole episode stinks. I used to think Boeing was a safe manufacturer, but that has gone now. Along with just about everyone else in any position of authority, the executives of Boeing disregarded safety and now want to be seen as being reliable. Too bad, we cannot trust them, nor the FAA.

 

Remember when similar things happened in Australia, The legislators overlooked Ansetts  poor safety record, until it became too blatant for them to avoid doing something. maybe that is why CASA is so officious.

 

 

[M61A1]

I'd rather fly in a Boeing 737 Max with a good airline than anything else with a sh1t airline.

 

 

[dsam]

Here is an insightful analysis of the latest hearings:

 

 

 

[IBob]

 

I'm not entirely sure about this guy. It seemed to me, at one point earlier in the whole debacle, that he suddenly changed his tone and pitch quite markedly. It made me wonder at the time if someone had warned him off....or taken him on as a useful pundit.

 

In any case, I prefer my info from the source rather than filtered through the opinions of others, as this is. But how you get to the source of anything nowadays, I have no idea.........

 

 

[onetrack]

Juan Browne has nailed it, with this explanation - and no-one has yet properly explained why it wasn't done (apart from pilot retraining costs, which surely would not have been that huge).

 

"(the) 737 MAX is based on the original 1967 type certificate for the 737 100 series of aircraft, and it has been subsequently modified 14 times since. Folks, now understand, that MCAS was put into place to make the 737 MAX design feel and handle like previous iterations of the 737. Had Boeing decided to drop the 737 design, or at least get a separate type certificate for the 737 MAX, MCAS would not have been needed at all. Why? -Because MCAS is not there to make the aircraft stable, it is there to make the aircraft handle and feel like previous iterations of the 737"...

 

 

[onetrack]

I'm not entirely sure about this guy. It seemed to me, at one point earlier in the whole debacle, that he suddenly changed his tone and pitch quite markedly. It made me wonder at the time if someone had warned him off....or taken him on as a useful pundit.

 

He's not the best speaker one could ever find - and he worsens his approach with his style of videoing, where he does what he calls, "jump cuts".

 

These jump cuts are subliminal and lead to a somewhat disembodied story line.

 

 

[IBob]

Juan Browne has nailed it, with this explanation - and no-one has yet properly explained why it wasn't done (apart from pilot retraining costs, which surely would not have been that huge).

 

"(the) 737 MAX is based on the original 1967 type certificate for the 737 100 series of aircraft, and it has been subsequently modified 14 times since. Folks, now understand, that MCAS was put into place to make the 737 MAX design feel and handle like previous iterations of the 737. Had Boeing decided to drop the 737 design, or at least get a separate type certificate for the 737 MAX, MCAS would not have been needed at all. Why? -Because MCAS is not there to make the aircraft stable, it is there to make the aircraft handle and feel like previous iterations of the 737"...

 

Hold on. How does a system that trims the nose down in big increments make the aircraft handle and feel like previous iterations?

 

 

[Thruster88]

I'm not entirely sure about this guy. It seemed to me, at one point earlier in the whole debacle, that he suddenly changed his tone and pitch quite markedly. It made me wonder at the time if someone had warned him off....or taken him on as a useful pundit.

 

In any case, I prefer my info from the source rather than filtered through the opinions of others, as this is. But how you get to the source of anything nowadays, I have no idea.........

 

As a then current airline pilot I was surprised that he could make the vids. As more info comes to light people can change their views. I would rather get information from this guy than a journalist who has never piloted an aircraft. 

 

 

[IBob]

As a then current airline pilot I was surprised that he could make the vids. As more info comes to light people can change their views. I would rather get information from this guy than a journalist who has never piloted an aircraft. 

 

Fair comment...

 

 

[onetrack]

 

Hold on. How does a system that trims the nose down in big increments make the aircraft handle and feel like previous iterations?

 

 

 

The system was supposed to prevent sudden changes in pitch under power, which might surprise pilots and lead to incorrect handling - but in the way the MCAS worked, it was badly designed, because of the major control inputs, instead of minor and steady control inputs. I have not seen written anywhere, how sudden and sharp those sudden pitch-ups were under power, but obviously, they were of great concern to Boeing test pilots.

 

 

[facthunter]

ALL underwing engines cause a PITCH UP when you go to high power and require a continuous trim action and hard forward stick as they accelerate. These engines are installed higher and further forward because the motors are larger dimensions and the 737 is too low to the ground, and it would be a major redesign to alter that. This engine position has interacted with the wing to cause  still more pitch up so they decided to actuate the stab trim automatically based on the input from an single AoA sensor ,without saying much about it and avoiding taking pilots off line for sim sessions which is considerable cost and lost pilot line time which the main competitor didn't need as it never had the low engine positions to worry about. They were worried about losing sales to a competitor.

 

 If it was pretty simple to rectify it would have been done months ago. AND it hasn't and there's no firm day when it WILL go back into service.  Nev

 

 

[IBob]

For me, the problem with a statement like "Because MCAS is not there to make the aircraft stable, it is there to make the aircraft handle and feel like previous iterations of the 737" is that it may be entirely true...or it may be the chosen 'official line': that being seen to have erred in making an aircraft feel like an older aircraft may be viewed as less culpable than having delivered an aircraft knowing that in some situations it could be unstable.

 

 

[onetrack]

And of course, the rapid changes in stab trim which led to the uncommanded dives in the two major 737 MAX crashes, was caused by faulty AoA sensors, which faulty input obviously was not properly considered in the programming of the automation of the MCAS system.

 

Boeing engineers then apparently realised this faulty AoA input possibility, when they brought out the recommendation to disable the MCAS if there was erroneous AoA data.

 

But they only compounded previous errors by not fully explaining to pilots how the MCAS system actually worked, while they were telling them to disable it under certain conditions.

 

The whole exercise will go down as an example of how not to design aircraft, by trying to add major modifications to existing designs, without starting afresh with a new type certification.

 

 

[facthunter]

 I Bob,  I've NEVER heard that one and it's not likely to be correct. Hydraulic powered aircraft controls have no real "feel" and any they have is artificial to prevent putting big loads in at high speeds where you could /would strain the aircraft if you weren't very careful.

 

   Out of trim stab situations that are opposed by elevator have high loads in the usual screw jack system and a manual recovery is too slow and not likely to be done in the time available. It usually requires a series of roller coaster actions  where a runway trim has happened but the trim brake will abruptly limit that on the earlier designs. when you apply elevator beyond a certain limit . I don't think too many "Base Aces" have stepped up to handle this one as she's heading for the deck at high speed with  far too much down (causing) stab in place very quickly.  Nev