Ethiopian 737-800 Max crash - No survivors

[IBob]

Nev, I've lost the thread here (!) What have you never heard, that's not likely to be correct?

 

 

[facthunter]

That it's just done so it "feels" normal or like the older version.. Most of these guys are on autopilot at that stage anyhow. It reacts to an AoA indicator and THEN  you are just  going along for the ride. Nev

 

 

[IBob]

I was quoting the pundit Juan Browne. According to OneTrack here, he said:

 

"Because MCAS is not there to make the aircraft stable, it is there to make the aircraft handle and feel like previous iterations of the 737"

 

And as I recall now, it was around the time he began pushing that particular angle that I stopped following him.

 

 

[onetrack]

Well, I think Juan Brownes assessment is pretty right. The simple fact remains that Boeing produced an aircraft in the 737 MAX, that essentially became unstable under full throttle conditions - against all basic aircraft design rules.

 

But Boeing didn't see the 737 MAX for what it was - a basically unstable design - they saw it as a modified design, that only needed some software added to the flight computer, to make it "feel just like any other 737".

 

Then the problem is that aviation software writers and coders cannot possibly see the whole picture of what they are doing to the aircraft design and operation with their "software upgrade".

 

Add in management driven by economic decision-making, and a mentality that everything can be fixed with a software upgrade. Not with a basically unstable design, it can't. 

 

Aircraft like military fighters and bombers might be able to operate with a basically unstable design, all controlled by sensors and computers - but they have ejection seats, for that very same reason.

 

Maybe the Boeing military software designers got the job of designing the MCAS, and they thought they could make it pretty foolproof.

 

But they might have forgotten they were working with commercial aircraft design, too - not military aircraft design.

 

The basic design problems with the 737 MAX need to be addressed - it's not an inherently stable aircraft, as all commercial aircraft need to be.

 

The bloke in the blog below - a software developer and a pilot - has an interesting take on where Boeing went wrong with the 737 MAX.

 

He indulges in some laymans over-simplification, but essentially, he pins the problem to one of getting too far away from the KISS system in design.

 

https://spectrum.ieee.org/aerospace/aviation/how-the-boeing-737-max-disaster-looks-to-a-software-developer

 

 

[facthunter]

I don't think that lengthy dissertation simplifies/ explains  the situation and many assumptions are just that. Statements that could /should be questioned. Comparisons that are not necessarily valid.  ie ".Pushing" the nose down.  Little (ie NO) separation of Stab and elevator function .Wrong concept of what trim does. Pitching with power change, gear extension, flap settings has always been with us and is even used to fly "control failed" aircraft. Pilots are trained and used to that.   There are procedures for dealing with runaway electric trim or trim systems jamming. PITCH is the most critical of all of the 3 axis controls. Without it working properly, you're dead.

 

  The failed LOGIC and lack of consideration of the likely consequences of the MCAS in operation  is one thing. The basic instability of the EVOLVING design is the main reason it's not flying.. The politics and marketing aspects and eventual consequences to Boeing of this flawed process  haven't played out yet. It's a staggering lack of attention to BASIC rules of systems function and fail safe considerations sacrificed  just to make money. There's significant quality control things happening to other  Boeing products as well. Cost cutting is catching up with them. Nev

 

 

[spenaroo]

Aircraft like military fighters and bombers might be able to operate with a basically unstable design, all controlled by sensors and computers - but they have ejection seats, for that very same reason.

 

Dont forget that they have 3-4 of everything (both sensors and the computers they feed to), just for this reason.

and also have the ability to manually turn off specific sensors (like when refueling, they can shut off the probe side)

 

as they like to call it, its fly by vote

 

The Fighter Pilot Podcast has some really good episodes which discuss this.

 

 

[Yenn]

They had two angle of attack sensors and there was no connection between them that could accommodate them not having the same A of A indication.

 

That is a stupid way to design anything aeronautical.

 

If the sensor had not been faulty, would the accident have happened? I think the answer is No. That points up the fact that Boeing stuffed up. They cannot blame the pilots, even though some could handle the same fault and survive it. It just should not have happened.

 

 

[IBob]

One of the things that happens when big outfits come publicly unglued is they hire 'experts' for damage control. (In this case, reputational damage control, it being tragically too late to do anything about the collateral damage.) These 'experts' will be trying to advise Boeing on what to say and when. And they will also be trying to manage what info appears, via various channels, in the media: they will do that by feeding their preferred view to the media, and they will be endeavouring to do that via the most effective channels they can find.

 

So, a certain amount of what we are now seeing and reading will certainly be the story as Boeing (and it's 'experts') would wish us to see it.

 

 

[M61A1]

They had two angle of attack sensors and there was no connection between them that could accommodate them not having the same A of A indication.

 

That is a stupid way to design anything aeronautical.

 

If the sensor had not been faulty, would the accident have happened? I think the answer is No. That points up the fact that Boeing stuffed up. They cannot blame the pilots, even though some could handle the same fault and survive it. It just should not have happened.

 

It's perfectly good method of redundancy. The pilot gets information from the left side, and the co-pilot gets information from the left side. The autopilot won't engage when there's a discrepancy. A minor error might be difficult to spot but 70° should be pretty easy to spot.

 

The connection between them is the aircrew and I think the Indonesian investigation was fairly spot on. There were multiple factors and the aircrew were responsible for a lot of them.

 

 

[IBob]

'There were multiple factors and the aircrew were responsible for a lot of them.'

 

Maybe so, but the killer factor that the aircrew were not in any way responsible for was a piece of unbelievably bad automation that rendered the aircraft unfliable.

 

 

[Litespeed]

When the first Max 8 went down, I checked on the 737 ng and made the bold claim they were also a safety problem waiting to fail.( on HBA forum)

 

I was shouted down as anti american and biased. 

 

The Neo was never ever legally certified, as fraud on parts was endemic also paperwork.

 

Under strict law the neo should be grounded pernamently and chopped up.

 

The same with the max 8.

 

Never happen

 

 

[M61A1]

'There were multiple factors and the aircrew were responsible for a lot of them.'

 

Maybe so, but the killer factor that the aircrew were not in any way responsible for was a piece of unbelievably bad automation that rendered the aircraft unfliable.

 

One could argue that the aircrew were quite responsible because they failed to turn the trim off as other crews before them did several times. The aircraft was perfectly flyable with trim turned off, as demonstrated by the previous crews. I don’t see  Boeing as completely innocent, but I know a witch-hunt when I see one. 

 

 

[Litespeed]

If anything the sensor is just the tip of the Iceberg. 

 

Using a single sensor setup and no visual indicator of failure causing the MCA's to activate is negligent.

 

The indicator light was a high cost option to indicate a problem with the system. That a light was considered a need then changed to a expensive option speaks volumes for profit over any safety expense . 

 

How many pilots were fully informed and trained to deal with the changes of a Max 8- answer is simply none. Even the test pilots were kept out of the loop in development.

 

The mcas information is a few lines that do nothing to illuminate the pilot out of a 1600 page manual. They even wanted that kept out of the manual as it would indicate a need to train.

 

The whole max 8 project was a exercise in getting big profits and purposely disregarding safety and legal certification.

 

They are criminally negligent, and must be treated to the full extent of the law. That's at least manslaughter times 350? .  

 

This was a easily foreseeable result of their actions on a corporate and also individual level.

 

Dependant on the law of the land prosecuted in, it should be the USA. It could easily be murder second degree- actions that a reasonable person would consider lead to ones death. 

 

The company deserves to have its liberty taken away as well. Shareholders must also be held accountable by losing their shares. They have gambled in the market and hitched their shares to a criminal enterprise. Live by the corporate sword, die by the corporate sword.

 

The poor families of the dead should be given ownership of Boeing.

 

Imagine how that would change corporate culture.

 

 

[Litespeed]

One could argue that the aircrew were quite responsible because they failed to turn the trim off as other crews before them did several times. The aircraft was perfectly flyable with trim turned off, as demonstrated by the previous crews. I don’t see  Boeing as completely innocent, but I know a witch-hunt when I see one. 

 

Yes,

 

the poor pilots are responsible if they do not follow their training. The other crew stuffed up not telling about the issue and also how they dealt with it. 

 

But that crew even though they became overwhelmed after a long fight for control did not make a cascade of fundamental errors. The cascade was already in place from the moment it left the factory and they self certified. 

 

Unfortunately this crew was not perfect on the day. If it takes a perfect crew to fly it and not die when fundamental baked in flaws start cascading, it aint safe for anything but a lawnbench.

 

The Ethiopian pilots never really had a chance even on a perfect day. We are yet to see that investigation.

 

We can jump up an down about substandard safety in other countries and training  standards but that is Boeings target, they didn't even train them or tell them about MCAS because that's what Boeing wanted.

 

It ain't a witch hunt when wee can see a smoking gun in Boeings hand.

 

 

[M61A1]

We can jump up an down about substandard safety in other countries and training  standards but that is Boeings target, they didn't even train them or tell them about MCAS because that's what Boeing wanted.

 

Actually a Safety Bulletin was released after the Indonesian crash. The Ethiopian crew should have been aware of it. The Indonesian crews probably knew about it too as previous crews on the same aircraft did what the checklist said, turned the trim off and kept flying.

 

 

[Thruster88]

Not knowing anything about MCAS would actually help the pilot(s) diagnose the real problem, runaway trim.  They were flying familiar aircraft in perfect weather. If the aircraft is pitching down and the control is getting heavy there is only one reason.   

 

If my family had been involved I would be equally pissed at Boeing and the airline.

 

 

[Yenn]

If the blame could be laid at the hands of the pilots, you can bet that Boeing would have done that ages ago. It could not and the fact that some pilots survived the same fault and some didn't does not mean that it is the pilots fault. This would not have happened if Boeing had done the right thing and told the pilots how to work the system. They chose to keep the pilots in the dark and therefore the responsibility sits in Boeings lap and of course also the FAA. 

 

 

[Thruster88]

This would not have happened if Boeing had done the right thing and told the pilots how to work the system. They chose to keep the pilots in the dark and therefore the responsibility sits in Boeings lap and of course also the FAA. 

 

By the time of Ethiopian 302 all the pilots did know how the system worked and what to do if it malfunctioned.  

 

 

[Yenn]

Boeing CEO Denis Muilenburg has kept his job although he has had a drop in his payments. He only gets US$2301 plus13.1 incentives. The reason he keeps his job is because he was aware that the MCAS could have and should have been done better and he has been working to find a fix for it.

 

We may consider Boeing is not doing the right thing, but it is a problem with all big business nowadays. The business exists to pay the CEO and directors, big money. The sharehoders are there to provide the finance and get a few crumbs from the table and the rest of us are there to keep the cash rolling in.

 

In my opinion, anyone who presides over such a fiasco as Boeing should be in the dole queue.

 

 

[Thruster88]

The small (I am guessing) group of engineer's and their management  that decided it would be a good idea to only use one of the two AOA sensors and allow the system to drive the trim full down in the event of a malfunction (if the pilots did not intervene) should be on the dole. To expect the CEO to be across every engineering decision may be a stretch. We will probably never know who knew what and when.  

 

 

[kgwilson]

So Muilenburg has kept his job - for now. Not so long ago he was CEO & chairman of the board. To hold both positions is IMHO a total conflict of interest but seemingly quite common among US corporations & I would hazard a guess that corruption within all those organsations is alive and well. He has worked for Boeing since 1985. He held various engineering and management roles mainly in the Military side till 2013 when he was appointed President, then CEO in 2015 & finally Chairman of the Board in 2016. The problems with poor quality components in the NG series was highlighted in an SBS documentary way back in 2011 by whistleblowers who all got fired and the bean counters won the day which continued up until the Max disasters.

 

Where the hell does the buck stop at Boeing? The Chairman rabbited on at the last press conference that he had complete faith in "Denis" who is right on top of all the issues. What utter horse manure. He should have been on top of everything when employees began complaining of poor quality components in the early 2000s. Those that spoke up were fired & they continued their merry way until the Max crashes. 3 NGs crashed on landing and broke apart due to poor quality fuselage ribs (complained about by the whistleblowers). This had never happened in earlier 737s. Boeings profits have tumbled as has the stock value, the Max is still grounded, there are problems with components in the 787 and the 737 NG pickle fork cracks is the latest hit. Muilenburg has to go along with the current Chairman Calhoun and all the others who are supporting these failures. Boeing is far from the bottom but it has to get there and acknowledge its failings before any recovery can take place but even that may be a bridge too far. Is it like GM "too big to fail"? With the US debt in excess of $23 Trillion it is hard to see the government being interested in a bailout but of course it will happen as it will be in the national interest.

 

 

[mnewbery]

A Boeing engineer named Mark Forkner was alleged to have intimate knowledge of the decisions made regarding MCAS. In early September 2019 he refused to hand over relevant documents or testify, citing his fifth amendment rights. Someone knows the answers

 

 

[Litespeed]

We need to see the criminal negligence in all of this.

 

Forgetting the dead and talking purely poor corporate practice allows the culpable  to get off. They get paid huge sums and know the decisions they make can kill. They knew of the potential for a safety after profit culture could lead to failure.

 

They actively sought as a management group and some engineers to ignore the  required best practice, choose to hide the functions of MCAS from pilots, airlines and regulators to ensure pilot training and fundamental safety were ignored for profit. 

 

A perfect example is the indicator light for MCAS activation was a high cost option. They charged something like $50,000 just to tell the pilot it was on. This demonstrates clearly they have chosen to not just downgrade safety but monetised it. 

 

This goes far beyond mere negligence and even criminal negligence. At the least it is negligent manslaughter for those complicit.

 

I would in American parlance think it is really negligent homicide with hundreds of counts. Mass negligent homicide as the participants illegally conspired and this was a potential outcome.   

 

For Boeing as a entity just like in human terms it is guilty and must be treated as such. The ability of a society to sanction humans or corporates is fundamental. 

 

We can not blame the workers in general of Boeing and to dissolve the company would be unjust punishment on those not actively involved, and the broader local economies etc. But the need for punishment and deterrence is the same.

 

You can not really jail a corporate entity but you can take control and ownership of its shares, management etc. The state becomes the owner  and the victims families get a share. The shareholders have gambled on a company that lost betting against peoples lives. 

 

Deterence must penalise them.

 

Lots of people have died because a group at Boeing were involved in a criminal conspiracy that lead to the foreseeable death of hundreds of people.

 

Long jail sentences are required and a suitably punitive approach to the company.

 

 

[Yenn]

But it is not going to happen.

 

 

[spacesailor]

Definitely Should 

 

spacesailor