Ethiopian 737-800 Max crash - No survivors

[Methusala]

Better be careful making blanket statements about "3rd world airlines". Engage brain BEFORE mouth.

 

 

[M61A1]

Well, first off, after the first crash, Boeing 'sat down' with SW Airlines pilots, and also the US pilot's union(?) or some such, and gave them some info on the MCAS system. If you look back in this thread, you will see that they were reported as being 'furious' that they had not been properly informed on the system.

So, it sounds like essential extra info was delivered verbally to US pilots at that time.

 

From there, it seems likely this info would have spread informally and in an uneven fashion.

 

I see no mention of any formal transfer of information from Boeing to owners/operators until after the second crash, but possibly I missed that bit???

Actually, Boeing issued a "Safety Bulletin" after the Lion Air crash in 2018. These don't get distributed unevenly, they are sent to all operators.

 

According to information posted in the videos here previously, the Ethiopain airline crew followed the amended procedure, then for some reason turned MCAS back on. 

 

@ Methusela.... I stand by the third world airline comment. Brain is in gear. Go and have a look how operators work over there and open your eyes. Western aviation is not representative of the whole world. 

 

 

[IBob]

M61A1 did we get a look at this "Safety Bulletin" and when it was isued???

 

 

[M61A1]

M61A1 did we get a look at this "Safety Bulletin" and when it was isued???

Here's just one of many links. I chose this one because it shows actual pages of the bulletin.

 

https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-safety/boeing-nearing-737-max-fleet-bulletin-on-aoa-warning-after-lion-air-crash/

 

 

[IBob]

So if the

 

'....nose down stabiliser trim...can be stopped and reversed by use of the electric stabilizer trim switches...'

 

but

 

'...do the Runaway Stabiliser NNC ensuring the Stab Trim Cutout switches are set to Cutout........'

 

but

 

'Note..............Electric stabilizer trim can be used to neutralise control column pitch forces before moving Stab Trim Cutout switches to Cutout......'

 

Really??????????????????

 

 

[M61A1]

So if the

'....nose down stabiliser trim...can be stopped and reversed by use of the electric stabilizer trim switches...'

 

but

 

'...do the Runaway Stabiliser NNC ensuring the Stab Trim Cutout switches are set to Cutout........'

 

but

 

'Note..............Electric stabilizer trim can be used to neutralise control column pitch forces before moving Stab Trim Cutout switches to Cutout......'

 

Really??????????????????

If you have trouble understanding that, don’t fly anything more complicated than a hang glider. 

 

 

[Thruster88]

So why have western nations not crashed any despite reporting similar events?

I think a significant portion of the blame is squarely on the shoulders of third world airlines and their pilot training. ( and possibly third world ground handling for the damage they do to aircraft)

 

I'd be more careful WHO you fly with than worry about the type of aircraft.

Totally agree M6A1 but it's not a popular position here. One thing i would like to know is did lion air 610 crew get a heads up from the two previous lion air incidents. By the time of Ethiopian 409 a drovers dog knew it would be a bad idea to retract flaps in the situation they faced. ATPL's need to be able to handle any type of emergency,  QF32, US Airways 1549 etc. Agree the MCAS mk1 is piss poor engineering. 

 

 

[fly_tornado]

I reckon that if they hadn't grounded the MAX8s they would have been another crash eventually. the MCAS system should be overridden by the autopilot and ignore a faulty AOA sensor.

 

 

[M61A1]

I reckon that if they hadn't grounded the MAX8s they would have been another crash eventually. the MCAS system should be overridden by the autopilot and ignore a faulty AOA sensor.

And where do you suppose the autopilot gets it's information from?

 

The aircrew need to understand the systems they are using. It was exactly the same with the early Airbus crashes. They all flew aircraft into the ground because they didn't understand how it worked.

 

 

[fly_tornado]

if the AOA sensor gets damaged the autopilot should be able to work that out, the same as a blocked pitot tube

 

 

[dsam]

I’m not sure what software changes have been made to fix the problems, but number 1 on my list would be to disengage MCAS every time the autopilot is disengaged.  The crew should never be left wondering what flight surfaces are still under automated control, (as in the original software setup where it remained active with autopilot off).

 

Number 2 “fix” would always compare data from both AoA sensors (Perhaps even have a 3rd one added).

 

 

[IBob]

And where do you suppose the autopilot gets it's information from?

The aircrew need to understand the systems they are using. It was exactly the same with the early Airbus crashes. They all flew aircraft into the ground because they didn't understand how it worked.

Come off it, M61A1.

 

From what we now know of this MCAS, it is a lethally flawed system.

 

In an aircraft that was sold as same-old, when it wasn't same-old at all.

 

But you're right when you say the aircrew need to understand the system they're using.

 

We can all agree on that, looking in the rearview mirror, eh?

 

 

[M61A1]

Come off it, M61A1.

From what we now know of this MCAS, it is a lethally flawed system.

 

In an aircraft that was sold as same-old, when it wasn't same-old at all.

 

But you're right when you say the aircrew need to understand the system they're using.

 

We can all agree on that, looking in the rearview mirror, eh?

Seriously?  That Safety Bulletin couldn’t be any clearer, yet the crew failed to manage essentially a minor failure and made a big hole in the ground. They were clearly aware of it as they did what it said, then undid it. You’ve been told it’s “lethally  flawed” by media, but The evidence is there that the crew had all the information necessary to safely put that aircraft on the ground, but failed to do so.

 

If they had understood their aircraft’s systems and applied the information supplied they and many others would likely be alive. 

 

 

[M61A1]

Number 2 “fix” would always compare data from both AoA sensors (Perhaps even have a 3rd one added).

The system does compare data from both sensors. if they disagree by a very small margin the crew get a warning telling them so. (common in pretty much all AFCS )

 

Based on that, if they understand which bits do what function, you will know what systems are affected by the side which has an erroneous reading and act accordingly.

 

For example they had a warning that there was AoA disagreement, and that the l/h side was reading over 20° while the horizon and standby instruments tell them that isn't the case. Then they know which sensor isn't working and by default they should know which systems are controlled by the defective sensor.

 

These are things your average airline pilot should know about his/her aircraft.

 

 

[dsam]

I understood the Ethiopian aircraft didn’t have that “optional extra” MCAS connection to both AoA sensors with the “optional extra” disagree circuitry. All it took was for that single AoA sensor to fail and misinform MCAS!  Why all this was an optional extra, I’ll never understand...

 

 

[tafisama]

They should limit travel of the elevator to give some 5 degrees pitch up attitude so that the aircraft continues to climb to gain more height.As long as the elevator is still allowed to be trimmed full down,we will have another incident.How well we handle situations is dependent on a number of factors.

 

 

[M61A1]

I understood the Ethiopian aircraft didn’t have that “optional extra” MCAS connection to both AoA sensors with the “optional extra” disagree circuitry. All it took was for that single AoA sensor to fail and misinform MCAS!  Why all this was an optional extra, I’ll never understand...

According to the reports posted here, the MCAS operates from information on the pilot side AoA sensor. The autopilot had shown an AoA disagree warning. As I said before, if you understand the system you would know that MCAS is relying on data from the pilot side sensor and if the pilot side is telling you that you have 20 degrees AoA when you a clearly nose down, it shouldn’t be hard to to determine which one is erroneous. That is the job of a modern airline pilot. 

 

 

[fly_tornado]

It all comes back to training really

 

 

[M61A1]

It all comes back to training really

Yep, and the sort people you employ. Whether they are pilots, maintainers, trainers or accountants. 

 

Edit: what I mean by that is that the “culture” of the organisation is important. 

 

 

[fly_tornado]

the problem for most African and Asian airlines is the growth in passenger volumes is huge and its hard keeping up when you don't have the training infrastructure that is common in the west

 

 

[Methusala]

An 8000hr captain flying for an airline which is well regarded and has passed the IATA Operational Safety Audit (IOSA) benchmark for global safety management happened to have the worst luck; that is to be flying an unsafe derivative of an early '60's plane which had control issues which were not published by the manufacturer on spurious economic grounds. Whichever way you like to slice and dice it, this is a catastrophe greater than the de Haviland Comet disaster and haven't we learned anything yet about "deregulation" or as some choose to see it "elimination of red tape"? If I had a vote I would vote for industrial manslaughter and see that executives in Boeing served good time in the pen for this. Airline pilots are not expected to make complex decisions involving multiple factors when disaster is screaming at them as the ground is 2 or 3 seconds away.

 

 

[IBob]

An 8000hr captain flying for an airline which is well regarded and has passed the IATA Operational Safety Audit (IOSA) benchmark for global safety management happened to have the worst luck; that is to be flying an unsafe derivative of an early '60's plane which had control issues which were not published by the manufacturer on spurious economic grounds. Whichever way you like to slice and dice it, this is a catastrophe greater than the de Haviland Comet disaster and haven't we learned anything yet about "deregulation" or as some choose to see it "elimination of red tape"? If I had a vote I would vote for industrial manslaughter and see that executives in Boeing served good time in the pen for this. Airline pilots are not expected to make complex decisions involving multiple factors when disaster is screaming at them as the ground is 2 or 3 seconds away.

My thoughts pretty much entirely.

 

And it surprises me just a bit that folk here can continue to roll out their 'shoulds' and their theories, when the practical reality of the situation has been horribly demonstrated, twice over.

 

Is anyone seriously suggesting all we need do is upskill them foreign pilots......and spin the wheel again???

 

 

[Thruster88]

My position has always been that anyone who pilot's any aircraft with electric trim needs to be able to deal with runaway trim (however it is caused ) from memory without delay. It has happened many times and will continue to happen.https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2019/aair/ao-2019-019/

 

MCAS mk1 was piss  poor engineering. 

 

 

[Thruster88]

 Whichever way you like to slice and dice it, this is a catastrophe greater than the de Haviland Comet disaster

I am surprised that no-one has brought up the 737 rudder hard over issue that resulted in two hull losses.  

 

airline pilots are not expected to make complex decisions involving multiple factors when disaster is screaming at them as the ground is 2 or 3 seconds away.

Actually I think that they are and they train for it     a lot.

 

The ground was much much further away because MCAS does not operate with take off flap extended. 

 

 

[Methusala]

"Actually I think that they are and they train for it a lot." Thruster 88

 

I don't think that they were given the tools to train for this contingency and I think THAT is the nub of the matter. To insinuate such a poorly thought out and undeveloped "solution" to a major instability issue is, to say the least, reckless.