Ethiopian 737-800 Max crash - No survivors

[Thruster88]

"Actually I think that they are and they train for it a lot." Thruster 88

I don't think that they were given the tools to train for this contingency and I think THAT is the nub of the matter. To insinuate such a poorly thought out and undeveloped "solution" to a major instability issue is, to say the least, reckless.

I will say it one more time, runaway trim however it is caused is a memory item for a ATPL. Agree MCAS is a crap system.

 

 

[M61A1]

An 8000hr captain flying for an airline which is well regarded and has passed the IATA Operational Safety Audit (IOSA) benchmark for global safety management

There have been plenty of high hour, well regarded pilots that made serious errors resulting the deaths of many.

 

unsafe derivative of an early '60's plane which had control issues which were not published by the manufacturer on spurious economic grounds. Whichever way you like to slice and dice it, this is a catastrophe greater than the de Haviland Comet disaster

What part of the Safety Bulletin after the first crash did you miss? You might be able to blame the first crash on lack of education by Boeing, but the Ethiopian crew had the information acted on it then undid their actions and crashed. The Comet problem resulted in aircraft falling apart mid-air, but if the MCAS syatem has a problem you turn the trim off it will fly just fine, how you can compare the two is beyond reason.

 

 

[Methusala]

I understand that restoring the equilibrium of the Max 8 required the trim to be reset using electric trim before disabling the circuits. The reason for this is that electric trim operates at least 10x faster than trying to trim manually. This can be seen in the cockpit video of electric trim in operation vis the speed that the manual trim wheels revolve. When electric trim is selected I believe that MCAS is operational so electric trim is overridden. Never the less, the MCAS system requires an intimate knowledge of its full implications. Boeing (or failing this, an over-arching regulatory body)should have grounded the aircraft prior to the 2nd disaster. The primary problem was that the manufacturer, short circuited normal conservative airworthiness standards for commercial reasons, ie; Introducing a very different aircraft posing as the previous marks. Re-training was not only not offered but was considered unnecessary.

 

 

[Marty_d]

I'd suggest that letting the airline manufacturer certify their own designs is at least part of the problem.

 

If there was an objective eye cast over MCAS at the design stage, there's a high probability that someone would have said "but what happens when that ONE AOA sensor returns a wrong reading?"

 

 

[IBob]

There have been plenty of high hour, well regarded pilots that made serious errors resulting the deaths of many.

What part of the Safety Bulletin after the first crash did you miss? You might be able to blame the first crash on lack of education by Boeing, but the Ethiopian crew had the information acted on it then undid their actions and crashed. The Comet problem resulted in aircraft falling apart mid-air, but if the MCAS syatem has a problem you turn the trim off it will fly just fine, how you can compare the two is beyond reason.

You certainly seem hell-bent on attributing the blame to the aircrew, M61A1.

 

Has it occurred to you that in the short space of time before the crew turned off the servos, the aircraft may have already been so far out of trim as to render it impossible for the crew to recover? And that their re-engagement of the servos could well have been a last-ditch effort to re-trim faster?

 

 

[dsam]

M61A1, you seem unaware that the MCAS jackscrew operates the whole horizontal stabiliser, not the elevator trim. At its extreme nose down angle, no amount of electric trim + full “back-stick” will correct it!  At this point, the forces on the tail surfaces are so extreme, that even with MCAS finally switched off, the manual trim wheels might be impossible for pilots to move without “porpoising” the stick forwards to momentarily un-load the jack screw enough to manually wind the trim wheels back back - a very brave manoeuvre when you are already aiming at the ground!

 

 

[Thruster88]

Has it occurred to you that in the short space of time before the crew turned off the servos, the aircraft may have already been so far out of trim as to render it impossible for the crew to recover? And that their re-engagement of the servos could well have been a last-ditch effort to re-trim faster?

The flight data recorder post #131 does not show that.

 

 

[IBob]

How do you read it, Thruster88?

 

 

[Thruster88]

How do you read it, Thruster88?

Click on it to expand, each line is labelled and significant events are noted.

 

 

[IBob]

Yes, I see that.

 

I was referring to your earlier post and asking for your interpretation?

 

 

[M61A1]

M61A1, you seem unaware that the MCAS jackscrew operates the whole horizontal stabiliser, not the elevator trim. At its extreme nose down angle, no amount of electric trim + full “back-stick” will correct it!  At this point, the forces on the tail surfaces are so extreme, that even with MCAS finally switched off, the manual trim wheels might be impossible for pilots to move without “porpoising” the stick forwards to momentarily un-load the jack screw enough to manually wind the trim wheels back back - a very brave manoeuvre when you are already aiming at the ground!

I am quite aware that the trim on a 737 works via a jackscrew which moves the whole horizontal stabilizer. Yes, I also understand that the higher the load on the stabilizer the more difficult the manual trim wheel may be to operate, up to the point that it may not physically be possible. By the reports, they had it stabilized, despite being grossly out of trim, and taking a lot of force to hold, not "aiming at the ground",  but then the trim was turned on again. 

 

I also understand that possibly they turned the electric trim back on in order to manually (electrically) drive the trim, but you have to wonder why they left it on, and why the throttles remained wide open until impact.

 

They were doing over 500kts when the impacted, the overspeed clacker was going off long before that, and the faster you go, the more you load the stab.

 

You certainly seem hell-bent on attributing the blame to the aircrew, M61A1.

What I'm hell-bent on is not crucifying the manufacturer just yet. Many here just seem hell-bent on blaming Boeing, they aren't my favourite people, but most of the online screeching seems to be from people who appear to have no understanding of the aircraft system an no interest in understanding it. There is a lot of evidence shown that suggests that the aircrew has some or a lot of responsibility here.

 

I know it's easy to criticize after the event, but the actions and inaction of the crew is difficult to explain away.

 

Methusela's comment that pilots shouldn't have to make complex decisions is just plain wrong. That is exactly what is required of a modern airline pilot with the amount of automation in a modern airliner.

 

Having said that a decision about the operation of the system that is being blamed is far from complex (at operator level).

 

I'd rather have a good pilot who knows their machine, flying me in a piece of junk than someone in a shiny suit and a nice resume flying a flash looking new aircraft.

 

 

[IBob]

M61A1 I don't see post here which are screechy, or from people who appear to have "no understanding of the aircraft systems and no interest in understanding it".

 

I suspect the real problem here is that others have minds of their own, and are failing to entirely embrace your expert views?

 

 

[dsam]

Rather than squabble on this forum, I suggest we let the various lawyers biff it out!  I think most of us here can recognise (to widely varying degrees) blame apportioned amongst:

 

- Accountants in the manufacturer & airline companies looking to cut costs,

 

- design engineers & software coders,

 

- regulators being too closely allied with manufacturers,

 

- crash investigator’s rather slow release of clear findings after the first crash, 

 

- insufficient flight crew training & aircraft manuals (particularly after the first crash)

 

- crew skill demonstrated on the day

 

This list isn’t exhaustive, but it shows how most crashes have numerous factors that culminate in tragedy. 

 

I can see all this taking years to sort out in the courtrooms. Unfortunately none of this will erase the sadness of the families that lost their loved ones. 

 

 

[M61A1]

M61A1 I don't see post here which are screechy, or from people who appear to have "no understanding of the aircraft systems and no interest in understanding it".

I suspect the real problem here is that others have minds of their own, and are failing to entirely embrace your expert views?

If you were actually interested in understanding the system and the events that occurred, you could find pretty much all the information you need in minutes. You asked for link to a document you could have found yourself in 10 seconds and an then implied that it was too complicated, so I would assume you aren’t really that interested in  the  facts, just getting on the anti Boeing bandwagon. A few here have told us how they would have designed the system to fix it, and in doing so demonstrated a lack of understanding of both AFCS and the certification process. 

 

I don’t know that it will make a difference to you knowing that I am a maintainer. I have worked on earlier 737s and still work on other aircraft with AFCS.

 

In the past I have found Boeing engineers to be extremely conservative and risk averse, perhaps things change, but we live in a risk averse society so I doubt that.

 

 Methusela’s rant about jailing Boing executives is definitely screeching. 

 

 

[IBob]

M61a1 and I doubt it will make any difference, but I am an industrial automation engineer, design, build, maintain.

 

Suggest you stick to what you know and I'll do the same.

 

The only one ranting here is you.

 

Give it a rest, mate.

 

 

[M61A1]

I will consider myself chastised. I should have known better than to think that facts and industry knowledge would be welcome in an internet discussion. 

 

 

[kgwilson]

Facts and industry knowledge do not apply to opinion though. Example is putting blame on the poor training standards of so called "3rd world airlines". Ethiopian has an excellent safety and management record

 

 

[fly_tornado]

and flying around Indonesia would be bit pretty hairy in the wet season.

 

 

[M61A1]

Facts and industry knowledge do not apply to opinion though. Example is putting blame on the poor training standards of so called "3rd world airlines". Ethiopian has an excellent safety and management record

Yep, that one is my opinion. They don’t make the top 20 list and according to Wikipedia they’ve had quite a few accidents and incidents. (61).

 

You can fly on them anytime you like, but you won’t get me on them. 

 

 

[Thruster88]

Just on the culture in organisations I would like to know and it will come out in the final report(s) did the  two crews of lion air that successfully  overcame MCAS on that accident aircraft give a heads up to the chief pilot, and was this passed on to all other crew and Boeing. 

 

I believe crew no 3 trimmed against MCAS 29 times so I am thinking they did not get it. 

 

 

[Thruster88]

Yes, I see that.

I was referring to your earlier post and asking for your interpretation?

I have made my position clear, anyone interested can form their opinion and see if they were right when the final report is out. Just have to wait a few years.

 

 

[Garfly]

 

 

 

 

[Yenn]

The big question in my mind is why did Boeing provide two angle of attack indicators, but one to dominate the whole system. Always in the past if two indicators disagreed, the system would revert to the pilot having to take over. In a lot of cases, there were three indicators and the majority ruled.

 

 

[Thruster88]

The FAA is not taking anymore chances grounding the Cirrus jet over AoA issues. 

 

https://www.flyingmag.com/faa-grounds-cirrus-vision-jets

 

Totally agree Yenn, there must have been a fair number of people involved with the engineering, surely a few would have raised concerns.     

 

 

[kgwilson]

Totally agree Yenn, there must have been a fair number of people involved with the engineering, surely a few would have raised concerns.     

I'm sure they did but economics is a powerful voice. Below is part of a report published today.

 

To understand how Boeing has found itself in this predicament, it pays to get familiar with the story of the 737's direct competitor, the Airbus A320.

 

In 2010, the European manufacturer announced plans to create a new version of the aircraft, the A320neo (short for "new engine option"), which promised airlines greater fuel efficiency at a time when the Boeing 737 models in service — the Next Generation series launched in 1993 — could not compete.

 

So, a race quickly ensued after Airbus fired the starting gun.

 

At this point, Boeing found itself at a crossroads: make a new version of the 737 from scratch or retrofit the existing Next Generation series with newer technologies.

 

Boeing went with the latter, which meant that an existing 737 frame was fitted with larger, more fuel-efficient engines that altered its aerodynamics in a way that made it prone to tilt up during flight.

 

Boeing engineer and cockpit designer Rick Ludtke told the New York Times that the 737 MAX's designers were told they "could not drive any new training that required a simulator".

 

"They wanted the minimum change to simplify the training differences, minimum change to reduce costs, and to get it done quickly," he told the paper.