Ethiopian 737-800 Max crash - No survivors

[Bruce Tuncks]

If you grew up in Alice Springs, I bet you would also reckon that making an airplane safe for a tribesman to fly was a big ask. 

 

Gosh that's an awful racist thing to think, I'll try hard to think better in future.

 

But in the meantime, no way will I be fitting computer-controls to my Jabiru. Those computers caused  terrible problems on my Falcon car and a Massey-Ferguson tractor. So I must be a racist luddite! Bugger, this is not my self image at all.

 

 

[facthunter]

 I fear that is the case. The lack of need for sim or off the line training was a prime factor. This is the reason I've post faith in them after many years of flying them. Bean counters don't always make the safest decisions in such matters. Nev

 

 

[dsam]

Here is a CBC Canada perspective on this issue:

 

 

 

 

 

[poteroo]

Boeing engineer and cockpit designer Rick Ludtke told the New York Times that the 737 MAX's designers were told they "could not drive any new training that required a simulator".

 

"They wanted the minimum change to simplify the training differences, minimum change to reduce costs, and to get it done quickly," he told the paper.

 

I think there are lessons here for all non-airline pilots,( in GA and RAAus) when it comes to flying new types.  Even within certified GA aircraft - many of them have individual 'characteristics' that should not be discovered on your 1st flight solo.  Within the EXPERIMENTAL category of GA/RAAus, you must assume each aircraft is going to behave differently. So, you need to be very wary when jumping into old mates' kit Zenith or Jabiru or RV, because there may be differences in not just layout of instruments, but the aircraft could be rigged and setup to handle quite differently as well. I have flown a lot of RVs, including many test flights,and they are all different to handle.

 

CASA have handballed the responsibility for 'differences' on to each and every pilot via CASR Part 61.385 which states that pilots should know everything about the aircraft they intend to fly and should be 'competent' in it's operation. How exactly this is to be achieved, and what exactly is meant by 'competency' is something the regulator has left for the industry to work out. If it doesn't require a formal endorsement, then all you need is some coaching from another experienced pilot, but obviously, an experienced instructor is better because of their 'eye' for competency.

 

Given that most accidents and incidents with pilots transitioning to a different aircraft will occur within the low hours phase - I strongly advise pilots to take seriously the needs for 'competency' training. 

 

happy days,

 

 

[facthunter]

 Loading your plane outside of the prescribed limits is the easiest way to make it handle unpredictably. I've flown a few that were rigged incorrectly also, which injects a bit of interest into the matter.. On a simple plane this is relatively easy to spot. Check the wing washout visually. and carefully. With the Cof G it's like a model plane it should be about 1/3rd the way of the mean chord back from the leading edge.. Miss rigged it will usually require stick to one side moreso as you get faster and one wing will drop first at the stall point and it usually cruises slower than it should. (for a given power setting).. Nev

 

 

[M61A1]

pilots should know everything about the aircraft they intend to fly

That says just about everything.......WINNER

 

I did some work on someone else's aircraft a while back. Supposedly they were the builder, I have to say there was an awful lot they didn't know about the aircraft  they built.

 

 

[spacesailor]

Building your first kit aircraft IS a learning process, & will show (hopefully) that the beginning is Not as neat & tidy as the last rivet driven,!.

 

spacesailor

 

 

[dsam]

Here is a (somewhat lengthy) article that addresses many of the 737 Max issues touched on by many forum members in this thread.  It is aimed at a more general audience than an aviation community, but still addresses the main foci of criticism in this tragic event.

 

737MAXArticle.pdf

 

737MAXArticle.pdf

[kgwilson]

Here is a (somewhat lengthy) article that addresses many of the 737 Max issues touched on by many forum members in this thread.  It is aimed at a more general audience than an aviation community, but still addresses the main foci of criticism in this tragic event.

[ATTACH]39158[/ATTACH]

Interesting article, not least because it concurs with most of my own thinking. The final line though leaves you wondering if the author is indicating that there should be a complete redesign of the 737.

 

 

[M61A1]

Below are two parts of this document that I think are likely to be true, but I think the author needs to do more research, as there a appears to be a few errors in his understanding of how the flight control system works.

 

I do not know of a single aviation accident involving the

 

737 that was the result of an inadvertent stall by its pilots. I can only speculate, but I speculate

 

that – even without MCAS – that would have continued to be true of the 737 MAX.

 

It is likely that MCAS, originally added in the spirit of increasing safety, has now killed more

 

people than it could have ever saved. It doesn’t need to be “fixed” with more complexity, more

 

software. It needs to be removed, altogether.

 

 

[facthunter]

Unlikely in the extreme that such a system would be installed if it was not needed to CORRECT a serious problem of Pitch stability. Ie a design fault.  The amount of time   this has now been going on indicates that a simple software mod is not going to be enough.. Nev

 

 

[Litespeed]

Agreed Facthunter,

 

Reminds me of Ralph Nader's book about pathetic car safety in the US of the 60's etc.

 

"Unsafe at any speed".

 

It should never have received certification irrespective of training.

 

Did anyone pick up the fact the pilots manual only mentions MCAS in the glossary of terms, not how it works, how to overcome it or diagnose a issue with it. That's from a 737 pilot.

 

That really says enough to me.

 

Corporate manslaughter times 300 for management. At best but really second degree murder on mass.

 

All 737 max should be pernamently grounded and scrapped.

 

But what of the workers ? Sorry keeping a job is no excuse to allow people to die for aircraft sales.

 

And the shareholders? Deserve total loss and chapter 11 bankruptcy, live by the sword, die by the sword.

 

You can bet if it was Airbus that's what the yanks would demand.

 

 

[kgwilson]

It is absolutely obvious that commercial considerations completely trumped safety considerations. Boeing was so desperate to get back in the single aisle jet sales race to recoup some lost market share that their financial masters called the shots. The MCAS detail was deleted from the manual and they forgot to remove its definition from the glossary. This simple error shows to me when those people who were told to make the changes did so under some duress and while it could have been an oversight it also may not have been.

 

 

[Methusala]

This story reported today says that a report in the Wall Street Journal published on Sunday states that neither Southwest Airlines nor the FAA (Boeing’s primary federal regulator) were aware that a safety feature intended to alert pilots to a potentially malfunctioning ‘angle of attack’ sensor – in other words, a feature that might have prevented both the crash of ET302 and the Oct. 29 crash of a 737 owned by Lion Air – had been disabled on the new 737s is simply staggering.

 

The link to the whole report is below:-

 

Boeing Didn't Tell Southwest or FAA that It Had Disabled Critical Safety Alerts on 737 MAX - Global Research

 

This adds weight to the argument that Boeing personnel have committed acts of reckless negligence and they should be investigated for their criminal conduct.

 

 

[IBob]

Much of this update is about Boeing dollars, but it seems to me to take a strange turn at around 10.00, claiming that the 737MAXcannot be an unstable design, because it could not be certified if it was...

 

then at 10.58 'the MCAS system is not a system to make the aircraft stable.....'

 

then 'the MCAS system is not an anti-stall program........'

 

then it is 'simply an FAA requirement to make the aircraft.........etc

 

 

[kgwilson]

 

After his initial critical and informative clips about the 737 Max he now seems to has taken a defensive role which is a surprise. Putting engines that are too large to fit where they should be and increasing the power quite a bit has IMHO altered the longitudinal stability of the aircraft. If it didn't then there would be no need for the MCAS system to deal with that. The bean counters determined the pathway, the engineers had to make sure that they kept on the path & then the bean counters tightened the path demanding no new SIM training and removal of MCAS from the manual. What seemed at first to be a bit of a smell has turned out to be a major stink. Boeing & FAA may not be able to defend this one successfully.

 

 

[IBob]

After his initial critical and informative clips about the 737 Max he now seems to has taken a defensive role which is a surprise. Putting engines that are too large to fit where they should be and increasing the power quite a bit has IMHO altered the longitudinal stability of the aircraft. If it didn't then there would be no need for the MCAS system to deal with that. The bean counters determined the pathway, the engineers had to make sure that they kept on the path & then the bean counters tightened the path demanding no new SIM training and removal of MCAS from the manual. What seemed at first to be a bit of a smell has turned out to be a major stink. Boeing & FAA may not be able to defend this one successfully.

Clearly Boeing will have professionals doing 'damage control' for them. And that will involve communicating with the various media pundits/commentators etc. What form that communication is taking would be anybody's guess: at the least I imagine it involves pointing out the possibility of legal liability should a commentator make damaging statements.

 

We already saw one pilot/commentator do a very hasty job of withdrawing a video where they had recreated one of the crashes in a simulator.

 

My impression has been that this update commentator has presented very informative and unbiased clips.

 

It does seem now as if he is presenting a repositioned view.

 

It will be interesting to see if this aligns with Boeing's stated position as things proceed...

 

 

[facthunter]

Boeing have been intensively cost cutting, very anti union and whistleblowers and farm out work more. and freaked out by Airbus success ..What would you expect to happen in those circumstances when you don't keep a close eye on what's happening. Nev

 

 

[Methusala]

I am very disappointed that the "certainty" that we felt of being on the good side of history has been such an illusion. It is an illusion foisted on us by the established media. We had our first inkling that such was the case in the 60's when we were told that the Vietnam war was to keep us safe against the otherwise irresistible southward march of communism. Overwhelmingly it has been the rise of the www and its uncanny ability to link people around the world that is able to "lift the scales from our eyes". We discovered that every justification for war, at least since 1945, has been a cynical ploy to open up or maintain market share for one system or the other (oil being the great game changer). The story of Boeing's actions, slowly bleeding out, is just another example of how information is kept secret. Being able to read widely on the net enables a clear picture to form and the major players are powerless against this.

 

I cannot imagine how Boeing couldn't see the potential to destroy trust in a (formally perhaps) great product. A headline that I saw yesterday stated that the assembly line workers have stories to tell of shoddy manufacturing on the 787 line. I'm unsure of the truth but unsettling is the feeling one gets. Unlike Facthunter, I spend some time in the cabin of 787's.

 

 

[Litespeed]

If you look carefully the 737 max is just the latest of many scandals that have been covered up.

 

737 neo was built in ways completely different to that mandated by type approval. This has meant survivable rough landings have killed as the fuselage breaks apart with faulty parts.

 

787 been built in southern states are so bad some airlines refuse to accept it unless it was built in Seattle. Workers refuse to fly them.

 

The new air tankers are been refused on build quality and safety grounds.

 

These are the air tankers Airbus won the contract for but Boeing sued and had law change to give them the contract.

 

The litany of dodge just keeps coming .

 

 

[IBob]

I am very disappointed that the "certainty" that we felt of being on the good side of history has been such an illusion. It is an illusion foisted on us by the established media. We had our first inkling that such was the case in the 60's when we were told that the Vietnam war was to keep us safe against the otherwise irresistible southward march of communism. Overwhelmingly it has been the rise of the www and its uncanny ability to link people around the world that is able to "lift the scales from our eyes". We discovered that every justification for war, at least since 1945, has been a cynical ploy to open up or maintain market share for one system or the other (oil being the great game changer). The story of Boeing's actions, slowly bleeding out, is just another example of how information is kept secret. Being able to read widely on the net enables a clear picture to form and the major players are powerless against this.

 

I cannot imagine how Boeing couldn't see the potential to destroy trust in a (formally perhaps) great product. A headline that I saw yesterday stated that the assembly line workers have stories to tell of shoddy manufacturing on the 787 line. I'm unsure of the truth but unsettling is the feeling one gets. Unlike Facthunter, I spend some time in the cabin of 787's.

I have something of the same thoughts, Methuselah: it feels as though we lived through a post WW2 period of great (if naive) hope, with the sense that there would be peace and progress. I'm not sure that I blame the established media for not warning us otherwise: they were times of increasing prosperity for a number of countries, and where there were signs all was not well, in retrospect they were there for all of us to see. Perhaps we found it better and easier to be optimistic?

 

I agree that the www has blown the lid off much of this: it has become very difficult to keep anythings secret, and so propaganda now has a very short half-life. But I think the www has also aided and accelerated aspects of what we now have: a sort of winners-take-all goldrush. And while I am not a religious man, I think we have moved away from creeds that at least offered the assumption of decent behaviours, and nothing has filled the void that left. I think that's part of it too.

 

Um. And now I'll get back to fitting my instrument panel...

 

 

[kgwilson]

Building a good product has to compete with the rise of nationalism in this global economy. Boeing was for a very long time the unassailable leader until the upstart European consortium Airbus entered the fray. Unfortunately for Boeing they build very good competitive products and pioneered fly by wire and side sticks with efficient wings to challenge the (Boeing) establishment. When Boeing has to have laws changed to protect its market, nationalism wins but this can only occur when there is some government intervention. The free market, where it still exists, will determine the success or failure of products.

 

The high public profile of this issue and plethora of expert opinions, videos, whistle blowers, and public perception will hopefully result in a total rethink. Boeing is like an empire. It has risen to dizzy heights and its hierarchy has become complacent basking in its success while turning a blind eye to creeping corruption and failure to recognise the reality of a true competitive rival.

 

Airbus on the other hand has recognised the failure of its most costly and ambitious project but is moving on with other things like the new A350 and existing A320 NEOs. They don't have to do anything but build honest, high quality competitive products. Boeing has the biggest hurdle it has ever faced, regaining public trust.

 

 

[facthunter]

The problem with Boeing, like so many super competitive airline activities is the " cheapest at any price" ideology of just cost cutting without maintaining quality assurance. There can be no "race to the bottom" without consequences.... Nev

 

 

[fly_tornado]

Long before first 737 MAX crash, Boeing knew a key sensor warning light wasn’t working, but told no one

 

Boeing admitted Sunday that it knew well over a year before the first crash of a 737 MAX in Indonesia last October that a warning light linked to a key sensor on the 737 MAX wasn’t working on most of the airplanes, but it informed neither the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) nor the airlines operating the jet about the problem until after that crash.

 

The warning light is significant because it warned of a malfunction in one of the jet’s Angle of Attack (AOA) sensors, a fault that began the sequence of events that led to both the Lion Air crash in October and the Ethiopian Airlines crash in March.

 

The alert worked only on planes flown by airlines that had bought a separate and optional AOA indicator added to the main flight display panel. Boeing disclosed the existence of the problem publicly only last week after a story in the Wall Street Journal. It disclosed its prior knowledge on Sunday only after a follow-up story.

 

Furthermore, even MAX operators like American Airlines that had bought the optional indicator were misinformed by Boeing last year after the Lion Air crash about how the warning light operates.

 

As Boeing deals with the crisis following the loss of 346 lives in two crashes and works to convince the FAA, the airlines and the public that the MAX should be allowed to fly again as early as next month, the lack of transparency and confusion is challenging Boeing’s credibility.

 

“The more and more we learn with each day, the more challenging it is to rebuild the trust,” said American Airlines Captain Dennis Tajer, spokesman for the Allied Pilots Association (APA). “This slow toxic drip of full disclosure only after full discovery … (has) got to stop if we are going to rebuild the trust that has been so deeply violated.”

 

Boeing said Sunday that its engineers discovered that the warning light wasn’t functioning, due to a software mistake, “in 2017, within several months after beginning 737 MAX deliveries” in May that year.

 

Boeing then conducted an internal review, which “determined that the absence of the AOA Disagree alert did not adversely impact airplane safety or operation.”

 

“Neither the (optional) angle of attack indicator nor the AOA Disagree alert are necessary for the safe operation of the airplane,” Boeing said in the statement.

 

Its review concluded “the existing functionality was acceptable,” Boeing said, adding that it decided that the warning light could be made functional later by de-linking it from the optional display indicator during “the next planned display system software update.”

 

That update was never done before the MAX fleet was grounded in March following the second crash.

 

Boeing said that it wasn’t until after the Lion Air crash that it “informed the FAA that Boeing engineers had identified the software issue in 2017.”

 

Its statement seemed to point blame at an unnamed supplier when it stated that the problem was located in “the software delivered to Boeing.”

 

It also made a point of asserting that “senior company leadership was not involved in the review and first became aware of this issue in the aftermath of the Lion Air accident”

 

The FAA, in a separate statement Sunday, said that following the disclosure by Boeing in November, its Corrective Action Review Board “determined the issue to be ‘low risk'” and decided it could be dealt with as part of Boeing’s software update announced after the Lion Air crash and still in the works.

 

The FAA statement then adds: “However, Boeing’s timely or earlier communication with the operators would have have helped to reduce or eliminate possible confusion.”

 

Boeing did not inform the airlines, the pilots and the public until April 29, six weeks after the second crash. Even then, it didn’t mention until Sunday that it had known about the warning light issue since mid-2017.

 

The warning light, standard on the MAX and included in the pilot manuals, is designed to light up if there’s a disagreement between the two sensors on either side of the plane’s nose that measure the jet’s angle of attack — the angle between the oncoming air flow and the airplane’s wing.

 

If it had been working, the warning light would have lit up on the fatal flights of both the Lion Air and Ethiopian jets. Though it might have provided the pilots an extra early clue as to what was going wrong, it likely wouldn’t have made a big difference in either crash scenario.

 

The AOA alert wouldn’t have helped the Lion Air pilots understand their situation any better because they were also unaware of the new MAX flight control system — called Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, or MCAS — and how it was activated. MCAS was not in the pilot manual.

 

The Ethiopian pilots, who after the previous crash would have been keenly aware of MCAS, seem to have realized that system was the problem reasonably quickly and tried to follow Boeing’s recommended checklist of procedures to handle it, though they still were not able to control the plane.

 

 

[fly_tornado]

Tajer said that even though his airline had installed the optional feature and so had a functional warning light, American Airlines pilots are still unhappy at what he described as newly discovered “misdirection” by Boeing.

 

In a Nov. 27, 2018, meeting following the Lion Air crash, Boeing offered American Airlines pilots reassurance that the Lion Air scenario couldn’t happen to them because they had this warning light.

 

The two AOA sensors on the Lion Air jet disagreed by a large margin, about 20 degrees, throughout the flight and even while the jet taxied on the ground before takeoff when both readings should have been zero. Tajer said the American pilots were told in the meeting that on the flight deck of their 737 MAXs, the AOA disagree light would have lit up on the ground and so, because that’s a “no-go item,” the plane wouldn’t even have taken off.

 

However, Tajer said that within the last two to three weeks, “we are now learning that, unlike Boeing told us in November, the warning light actually is inhibited on the ground.”

 

“We are being told by Boeing that the AOA Disagree Alert … is inhibited until 400 feet above ground level,” he said Sunday. “We are currently awaiting written confirmation of this AOA Disagree Alert limitation as it is not detailed in any 737 flight crew manual.”

 

“Having any equipment detailed in the manual that doesn’t actually exist …. has no place in aviation. There’s no fiction in flight, just the facts,” Tajer added. “Literally, lives count on that.”

 

Long before first 737 MAX crash, Boeing knew a key sensor warning light wasn’t working, but told no one