Two helicopters collide on the Gold Coast 02/01/23

[Garfly]

1 hour ago, Thruster88 said:

Imagine you are inbound to this airport. How many radio calls would it take to get situational awareness versus what can be seen in a few seconds on a screen. The future is here, we just all have to get on board.  

Precisely!   

 

                   ... or this airport. 

 

 

I'm pretty sure the final report of this accident will say again what was said of the tragic Mangalore midair (where again, both involved PICs were experienced instructors); that even quite affordable, readily available tablet based CDTI gear (cockpit display of traffic information) could well have averted this accident.  How long will the "strictly eyes-outside-the-cockpit " principle stand in the way of so obvious a safety improvement? (Cue image of pax frantically tapping shoulder of pilot peering out ahead.) It's a kind of mindless ideology lag at the core of the problem. Look how long it took for the safety benefits of GPS tech to be accepted - and finally embraced (well, by most, anyway). It took a good generation or more. That's human factors of the group-think variety!

 

ATSB MANGALORE.pdf

 

 

 

 

 

 

Edited March 8, 2023 by Garfly

[old man emu]

15 minutes ago, Garfly said:

Look how long it took for the safety benefits of GPS tech to be accepted - and finally embraced (well, by most, anyway).

Touche .

 

There's a time and a place for fun flying and other for being damned serious. Carriage and use of radio was a great safety advance. The modern digital stuff is probably even greater.

 

QUESTION:

Can helicopters operating from a helicopter pad just buzz off anywhere they like, or do they have to fly in some sort of regulated pattern as fixed-wing aircraft do when landing and taking off from a runway?

[kgwilson]

"The ATSB's review said both aircraft had collision avoidance systems installed but they were not fully integrated and did not provide visual information to the pilots". Was that TCAS or ADSB? An audible warning through the headset is going to be harder to ignore than any visual warning and what is actually meant by "Not fully integrated".

 

The FR 24 data gives appropriate info but can be up to 5 minutes old before you see it on screen. The same goes for data through Ozrunways or Avplan as it has to transmit through the cellular phone system. Only ADSB in/out in the aircraft is in real time to the second.

 

A real life example is a mate in the  Outback Air Race noticed an aircraft on a converging path with his aircraft on his Avplan display and he called up centre about it. Their response was "It's OK he's already gone past".

[kgwilson]

5 hours ago, old man emu said:

Touche .

 

There's a time and a place for fun flying and other for being damned serious. Carriage and use of radio was a great safety advance. The modern digital stuff is probably even greater.

 

QUESTION:

Can helicopters operating from a helicopter pad just buzz off anywhere they like, or do they have to fly in some sort of regulated pattern as fixed-wing aircraft do when landing and taking off from a runway?

I think the answer is "It depends".

 

If you have a private ALA it is unregulated so there is no defined pattern unless you define it. The company should have defined approach and departure procedures for its pads. These are not controlled by anyone other than the owner and the airspace is uncontrolled.

[derekliston]

As I said the day after this accident occurred and I am still convinced that their procedures were designed for helicopters flown from the right seat and weren’t changed to suit the recently acquired machines which were flown from the left seat. Still the only helicopters that I know of which are flown from the left seat and which had the definite potential to curtail the pilot’s view up and to his right!

[aro]

I think it boils down to having takeoff and landing flight paths that cross is a bad idea.

 

It's tempting to put your faith in a magic gadget but there is a reason separation standards are increased when working from a screen instead of visually. Once you are close enough that collision becomes a risk, you need the real time information that comes from seeing the traffic.

 

I have used Avplan with an ADSB receiver for years, and the reality is that it helps with the "alert" part of alerted see and avoid, not the separation (unless you already have separation e.g. vertical or a couple of miles.)

[Garfly]

Who's talking about "working from a screen" or "separation standards" (whatever they may be in this context)?

It's about habitually glancing at a screen - as at mirrors in our cars - and avoiding mid-airs using real time imagery, whenever 'seeing' and chatting cannot cope.  What's really tempting is to put your faith in the bigness of the sky. 

We can't see through metal and we can't see behind without using "gadgets" of some kind.

There's a reason the US went for (pretty much) universal ADSB/CDTI take-up.

An exasperated ATSB must be close to recommending we do the same.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Edited March 8, 2023 by Garfly

[aro]

6 hours ago, Garfly said:

avoiding mid-airs using real time imagery

It's not real time. It's close to real time, most of the time - where the exact meanings of "close to" and "most of" are variable.

 

When you see an aircraft you can pickup up e.g. a turn maybe 10-20 seconds before it is obvious on the screen - if you are looking at the screen regularly. Inside 1-2 miles, the situation can change a lot in 10-20 seconds.

 

Personally, I use the traffic display approaching an airport. By about 3 miles I should know who is there, where they are and what they are doing. At about 3 miles I put the screen away and work visually. Sometimes I might use it longer if someone else is inbound at the same time, but it's only really useful to verify that you are passing behind someone. Obviously that plan only works for one of the aircraft.

 

If you're still trying to track traffic on the screen in the circuit area you are flying blind. In the case where it would be really useful e.g. when you are in the circuit and someone is flying a straight-in, the potential delay makes it useless or dangerous - you really do need to judge visually or based on the other pilots radio calls.

 

The more useful thing in the circuit is traffic announcements through the headset. I haven't had any yet that have been significant, but I can see the potential.

[RossK]

You would think that this could have been avoided with a simple procedure like;

all approaches from the east, all departures to the west.

Flight paths never cross.

[spenaroo]

24 minutes ago, RossK said:

You would think that this could have been avoided with a simple procedure like;

all approaches from the east, all departures to the west.

Flight paths never cross.

My understanding is that this was the case here,
they both flew the same flight path. problem is that they are operating from two different pads,
200m away from each other. the crossover occurred in that 200m space between the pads.

 

Edited March 9, 2023 by spenaroo

[Garfly]

2 hours ago, aro said:

It's not real time. It's close to real time, most of the time - where the exact meanings of "close to" and "most of" are variable.

 

When you see an aircraft you can pickup up e.g. a turn maybe 10-20 seconds before it is obvious on the screen - if you are looking at the screen regularly. Inside 1-2 miles, the situation can change a lot in 10-20 seconds.

 

Personally, I use the traffic display approaching an airport. By about 3 miles I should know who is there, where they are and what they are doing. At about 3 miles I put the screen away and work visually. Sometimes I might use it longer if someone else is inbound at the same time, but it's only really useful to verify that you are passing behind someone. Obviously that plan only works for one of the aircraft.

 

If you're still trying to track traffic on the screen in the circuit area you are flying blind. In the case where it would be really useful e.g. when you are in the circuit and someone is flying a straight-in, the potential delay makes it useless or dangerous - you really do need to judge visually or based on the other pilots radio calls.

 

The more useful thing in the circuit is traffic announcements through the headset. I haven't had any yet that have been significant, but I can see the potential.

 

Aro, I don't notice the lag you speak of, other than with internet based displays, of course [as opposed to ship to ship systems - including SE2].

 

Even from the ground, I can see the target turn as soon as the aircraft in sight does. [I suppose there's some delay, even with radio TX/RX.] 

 

Anyway, with the accident we're discussing here, there were, what?, twenty long seconds wherein a quick scan - in either cockpit - might have done the job.

 

And yes, normally, in the circuit we are 95% eyes outside - sometimes pre-alerted, sometimes not.  Still, we spare a second or two for the ASI, the fuel pump, hatches, harnesses ,Ts&Ps, fuel quantity and, depending, maybe even a second or two for a traffic display. After all, we're aware of how many times one aircraft has descended, oblivious, onto another on final - after having been converging for a good half minute or so.

 

I'd guess that any road user with some miles under the belt can recall times when that last-second, double-check of a side mirror has saved them swapping paint with a fellow traveler - mere inches away.  I don't see a big diff. 

 

BTW I think that it's in the circuit that aural traffic alerts might be distracting and more trouble than they're worth.  (Nothing's quicker at getting 'the picture' than the visual cortex  ;- )

 

 

 

 

Edited March 9, 2023 by Garfly

[Garfly]

This is a follow-up study by the ATSB into the "see and be seen" implications of the Mangalore accident.

Feel the exasperation. It seems the lag to fear most is the one due to ideological inertia.

 

https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2022/aair/as-2022-001

 

What the ATSB found

The study found that the pilots of both aircraft were unlikely to have acquired the other aircraft visually due to meteorological factors, aircraft closing speed and shielding of the opposing aircraft by cockpit structure with 2 of the 4 pilots likely having the opposing aircraft shielded from their view at key moments. The ATSB analysis indicated that even in clear conditions, more favourable to visual acquisition, the closing speed and shielding by the aircraft structure would have limited opportunities to acquire the other aircraft.

Neither accident aircraft was equipped with ADS-B IN systems. The study shows that had the aircraft been equipped with this technology the pilots would have been alerted to the position of the other aircraft much earlier than by visual acquisition. Both a cockpit display of traffic information with an ADS-B traffic alerting system or an electronic conspicuity device connected to an electronic flight bag application could have provided this. // ...

[Garfly]

 

 

 

[aro]

8 hours ago, Garfly said:

This is a follow-up study by the ATSB into the "see and be seen" implications of the Mangalore accident.

Feel the exasperation. It seems the lag to fear most is the one due to ideological inertia.

 

The Mangalore accident is different because it was under IFR. The ADSB issue in that case is a diversion from the real problem: we operate in a stupid, stupid system where ATC do not do the job ATC was designed to do - separate IFR aircraft. For some reason the entire industry is opposed to ATC separation of aircraft under IFR, away from the major centres. But ATSB are not allowed to criticise the regulator, so they come up with a reason it was the pilot's fault, and the issue of ADSB traffic displays as a decoy.

 

I'm not an IFR pilot, but my understanding is that IFR generally fly fixed paths for approaches etc. that guarantee terrain clearance, and don't have the freedom to manoeuvre off track to avoid other aircraft. So what is an IFR aircraft supposed to do if they're in IMC and their traffic display shows another aircraft on the approach path, between them and the missed approach?

 

That's why they need ATC - ATC have procedures, and a unified plan to manage all aircraft. Not one plan per aircraft, with no-one knowing exactly what the others are going to do.

 

Here's another IFR incident. A 737 and A320 near Launceston. Cocked up self-separation under IFR badly enough to end up in an ATSB report, despite being able to see the other aircraft on an in cockpit traffic display:

https://www.atsb.gov.au/sites/default/files/media/1573068/ao2008030.pdf

 

IFR aircraft need ATC separation, not DIY.

[Carbon Canary]

My understanding is even under IFR and under ATC direction, the ultimate responsibility still rests with the pilot to ‘see and avoid’ possibly even in IMC.  In other words, it’s always at least one pilots fault if there is a mid-air.

I’m not an IFR pilot and may well be talking through my hat. But I attended a CASA Avsafety seminar last night and that was the gist of some of the side conversations.

 

Someone please correct me.

[Garfly]

 

This is the video the ATSB posted to accompany its "cockpit visibility study", a follow up to it's Mangalore final report: 

 

 

 

 

 

And the still image below is from a series used to illustrate the limitations of "see and avoid" in this case.

It shows the 13-seconds-to-crash view from the Left Seat Pilot's perspective. 

In fact there'd been some clouds about - making it worse - but this imagery uses CAVOK for a best-case outlook.

The lower left section shows what a standard CDTI (cockpit traffic display) would have shown the pilots had one been installed.

The yellow text is the aural warning that such a system would have provided at that point (not the first warning, BTW; aural or visual ).

 

CLICK THUMBNAIL TO EXPAND:

 

A Sky Echo2 type conspicuity device would have displayed the threat differently - on a tablet device -  but, in the ATSB's view would likely have served the same collision-avoidance purpose.

 

Anyway, there's lots more detail in the actual report  https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2022/aair/as-2022-001

 

 

 

 

 

 

Edited March 9, 2023 by Garfly

[turboplanner]

On 08/03/2023 at 11:39 AM, Garfly said:

How long will the "strictly eyes-outside-the-cockpit " principle stand in the way of so obvious a safety improvement?

 

Even some basic research on Public Liability law will explain why that is nominated as the procedure, and why these days we have audits rather than inspections, and why benchmarks, such as Australian Standards, SAE standards etc have become so important to your defence against negligence.

 

Have you found a regulation AGAINST having your favourite alternative method on board?

 

 

[Garfly]

59 minutes ago, turboplanner said:

Even some basic research on Public Liability law will explain why that is nominated as the procedure, and why these days we have audits rather than inspections, and why benchmarks, such as Australian Standards, SAE standards etc have become so important to your defence against negligence.

Say what? Better we spend our 'basic research' time on History and Social Psychology to explain why we humans tend to cling to principles and dogma beyond their obvious use-by date - not to mention countless other unforced group-think errors.

 

1 hour ago, turboplanner said:

Have you found a regulation AGAINST having your favourite alternative method on board?

I don't catch your drift.

Yes and no.  Nobody can transmit 1090 Mhz signals without government approval [ADSB-OUT]  Anyone can receive/display such signals.

The liberty to have either IN or OUT on board would be meaningless if your likely 'collidees' had neither. 

Our regulators are not the problem here. They have been warning against relying on "see and avoid" for at least 30 years.

[turboplanner]

42 minutes ago, Garfly said:

Our regulators are not the problem here. They have been warning against relying on "see and avoid" for at least 30 years.

I haven’t seen any regulator messages of warning, an implication that something isn’t safe. Just the neutral statement that in certain class airfields separation is by see and avoid. This took ATC out out of separation by radio, so no liability to eliminate reasonably foreseeable risks and no drain on the taxpayer.

[Garfly]

 

41 minutes ago, turboplanner said:

I haven’t seen any regulator messages of warning, an implication that something isn’t safe. 

 

Basic research might lead to this ATSB safety report from April 1991:

 

A few excerpts:

 

"The see-and-avoid principle serves a number of important functions in the Australian air traffic

system. However, while it undoubtedly prevents many collisions, the principle is far from reliable. The

limitations of the see-and-avoid concept demand attention because increases in air traffic may

impose an accelerating level of strain on see-and-avoid and other aspects of the air traffic

system."

 

"Perhaps the most damning evidence against see-and-avoid comes from recent trials carried out

by John Andrews in the United States which have confirmed that even motivated pilots

frequently fail to sight conflicting traffic."

 

"See-and-avoid has been described as a maritime concept originally developed for slow moving

ships which is now out of place in an era of high speed aviation (Marthinsen 1989)."

 

"The Americans, having recognised the limitations of the concept, are looking to other methods such as the automated airborne

collision avoidance system (TCAS) to ensure traffic separation."

 

Sounds like a warning to me.

 

 

 

see_and_avoid_report_print.pdf

Edited March 9, 2023 by Garfly

[turboplanner]

4 hours ago, Garfly said:

 

 

Basic research might lead to this ATSB safety report from April 1991:

 

A few excerpts:

 

"The see-and-avoid principle serves a number of important functions in the Australian air traffic

system. However, while it undoubtedly prevents many collisions, the principle is far from reliable. The

limitations of the see-and-avoid concept demand attention because increases in air traffic may

impose an accelerating level of strain on see-and-avoid and other aspects of the air traffic

system."

 

"Perhaps the most damning evidence against see-and-avoid comes from recent trials carried out

by John Andrews in the United States which have confirmed that even motivated pilots

frequently fail to sight conflicting traffic."

 

"See-and-avoid has been described as a maritime concept originally developed for slow moving

ships which is now out of place in an era of high speed aviation (Marthinsen 1989)."

 

"The Americans, having recognised the limitations of the concept, are looking to other methods such as the automated airborne

collision avoidance system (TCAS) to ensure traffic separation."

 

Sounds like a warning to me.

 

 

 

see_and_avoid_report_print.pdf 859.05 kB · 1 download

CASA and RAA are the Recreational Flying Regulators.

What I was talking about was nothing to do with one way of doing something vs another.

It was about prescribing a system a pilot must use, thereby having a duty of care vs stepping back and letting pilots do their own avoiding in which case the taxpayer is not shelling out for infrastructure and training  and anyone hurt will be suing a pilot that didn't see him.

[Garfly]

34 minutes ago, turboplanner said:

CASA and RAA are the Recreational Flying Regulators.

What I was talking about was nothing to do with one way of doing something vs another.

It was about prescribing a system a pilot must use, thereby having a duty of care vs stepping back and letting pilots do their own avoiding in which case the taxpayer is not shelling out for infrastructure and training  and anyone hurt will be suing a pilot that didn't see him.

 

 

Yes, I totally agree that the system is biased so that, in the end, it's mostly the pilot who's to blame.

Which is why, in my view, we end up with endless reams of barely decipherable NOTAMs, all of which,

we're, nevertheless, obliged to absorb in every last detail before we take-off. (And I note that the NTSB quite agrees with me  ;- )

 

Anyway, I'd be happy to substitute "aviation officialdom" for "regulators" in regard to the ATSB's long lasting campaign to push for CDTI. 

But, in any case, CASA has been just as keen. They're the ones who (surprisingly, I thought) were quick to facilitate the approval process for conspicuity devices as part of the system.  And, I don't believe either organisation is playing games when it comes to this issue. 

(I can't say the same for ASA, though, with its loopy Class E proposals.)

 

In the end, the regulators are regulated by Parliament. And the Nick Xenophon Senate Enquiry into the Pel-Air ditching was a case where the government actually did its oversight job on behalf of the pilot and of justice.   And in that case the ATSB and CASA stood together in the dock.

 

 

"Additional Comments by Senator Nick Xenophon

Who guards the guards themselves?

1.1        I would like to acknowledge the many submitters to this inquiry, and in particular the individuals who were involved in the incident itself. Their information and testimonies were invaluable to the committee and I appreciate their contributions, particularly in light of how distressing it was for them to relive the accident.

1.2        As the committee states, this inquiry was not an attempt to re-examine the circumstances of the ditching of Pel-Air VH-NGA, or to conduct an aviation accident investigation. Instead, it focussed on the reporting standards and activities of the ATSB and CASA in relation to the ditching, and general governance, transparency and accountability issues.

1.3        However, what is clear from this inquiry is that, while the pilot of the flight did make some erroneous decisions, he essentially became a scapegoat for serious regulatory failures on the part of CASA and the ATSB.  // .....   "

 

https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Rural_and_Regional_Affairs_and_Transport/Completed_inquiries/2012-13/pelair2012/report/d01

 

 

Edited March 10, 2023 by Garfly

[facthunter]

SEE you in court and We've got deeper pockets than you. Thats the usual view and approach  I know of one person who beat them and they handed him 2 more charges as he walked out of court. . It's a blame game and often the real cause is not addressed. Crap equipment and vague rules and information. Nev

Edited March 10, 2023 by facthunter
more content.

[Garfly]

2 hours ago, facthunter said:

SEE you in court and We've got deeper pockets than you. Thats the usual view and approach  I know of one person who beat them and they handed him 2 more charges as he walked out of court. . It's a blame game and often the real cause is not addressed. Crap equipment and vague rules and information. Nev

Absolutely, and Senator Xenophon's concluding points make it clear how widespread the industry's disdain for the Mandarins was and, pretty much, remains:

 

1.22      Ultimately, this inquiry has exposed serious and significant flaws in Australia's aviation safety systems. The general industry attitude towards both the ATSB and CASA is incredibly concerning; it is a mixture of fear, suspicion, disappointment and derision.

1.23      It is my view that CASA, under Mr McCormick, has become a regulatory bully that appears to take any action available to ensure its own shortcomings are not made public. This poses great risks to aviation safety, and the safety of the travelling public. Equally, the ATSB—which should fearlessly expose any shortcomings on the part of CASA and other organisations to improve aviation safety—has become institutionally timid and appears to lack the strength to perform its role adequately. Both agencies require a complete overhaul, and I believe it is only luck that their ineptness has not resulted in further deaths so far. There is an urgent need for an Inspector-General of Aviation Safety, entirely independent of the Minister and his department, to be a watchdog for these agencies.

1.24      In the end, this report raises many questions. But if we wish to bring about change and improve aviation safety, we will clearly need to look beyond our inept regulators and ask: who will guard the guards themselves?

 

Senator Nick Xenophon
Independent Senator for South Australia

May 2013

 

https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Rural_and_Regional_Affairs_and_Transport/Completed_inquiries/2012-13/pelair2012/report/d01

 

 

Edited March 10, 2023 by Garfly

[kgwilson]

10 years later and what has happened? Nothing. CASA directors come and go and the ingrained toxic culture remains to continue to serve its own ends and fail the pilots of Australia from the very top down. Politicians of all persuasions have gone in to bat for sectors within the Aviation community and numerous enquiries have achieved nothing. CASA's motto of "wer'e not happy till you're not happy" is as strong today as it always has been.

 

The only way to sort it out in my opinion would be to sack the lot and start afresh with the only condition being if you were previously employed by CASA that would disqualify you from applying for any role in the new organisation. Utopia though only exists as a TV series.

Edited March 10, 2023 by kgwilson