ATR72 crash in Nepal 15/01/23

[kgwilson]

Each of the controls has a different tactile shape and feel & they require gate locks to be pulled up to move them to prevent inadvertent change. If you are in the right seat when you are normally in the left seat you are also using a different hand. In this case the wrong control was moved by mistake. How such high hours pilots made this mistake is difficult to fathom. 

 

The thing is one of them realised the flaps were not down to the 30deg position and moved them to 30 deg. The most unfathomable part of this tragic error is how neither pilot noticed that the prop pitch levers were at feather position but both noticed they were getting no power.

[facthunter]

You are moving TWO levers also. Do the  engines get shut down that way? (When you've finished the day? I also find it difficult to imagine WHY this happened.  Nev

[facthunter]

As soon as you started to fly it you would be aware of the risks of doing this and those guys had plenty of time on it.. It's no doubt got to have the button in the centre depressed to enable it to move and the flap is a totally different shape ,colour and look and would be lifted out of a notch. to move it. Nev

[poteroo]

It occurs to me that the crew had not thoroughly briefed as to the duties of the PNF and PF.  The PNF should have been acting as an FO, and as such, would have only acted upon the PFs instructions. FO must visually identify any control before adjustment. Seems likely that the PNF was far too casual in respect of his duties,( as an FO), under the command of the PF. After all, the PNF was really the C&T Captain, and would have been looking for the PF, (the pilot under test), to make all the calls otherwise it would not be possible to assess the aspiring Captain, (the PF). 

 

I can't understand how the PF would call for flaps 30 when it was likely their IAS was already lower than Vref, and decreasing, and then to commence a turn!  Again, the acting FO,(PNF), should have been watching this and calling it.  Again, seems they had not really briefed on who was really going to do what.

 

Not as if flying in the Himalayas isn't dangerous enough, without letting HF become the cause. RIP.

 

 

[Thruster88]

Alternatively there may have been some tension in the cockpit, perhaps due to some cultural issue. 

 

We don't know which pilot called for the opposite runway after ATC had cleared them for a straight in approach, was it part of the test?

 

The preliminary report gives no airspeed information. We know the aircraft was at 720 AGL when the propeller(s) were feathered. 60 seconds later when the aircraft stalled it was at 311 AGL and about 2000 metres from the runway. 

 

 

[facthunter]

There'd probably be evidence of that on the CVR. Some people move controls like light switches, instinctively and without really thinking. Ther's plenty of reports of that in the files.. I had a blue with a checkie who said I was hesitant to which I countered DELIBERATE. He was a $#!t Pilot who compensated who was useless in a real emergency situation which I later experienced with him. Nev

[Thruster88]

An ATR 72 captain's take on the report with systems explained.