US Air Safety Institute's McSpadden killed in C177RG crash • Oct 1 2023

[Garfly]

 

 

 

 

 

Two killed in Lake Placid airplane crash identified | News, Sports, Jobs - Lake Placid News

WWW.LAKEPLACIDNEWS.COM

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LAKE PLACID — The two people killed in an airplane crash at the Lake Placid Airport on Sunday have been identified as Russ Francis, a former NFL tight end who

 

 

Air Safety Institute's Richard McSpadden Dies In Crash - AVweb

WWW.AVWEB.COM

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Richard McSpadden, the senior vice president of the AOPA Air Safety Institute died, along with one other person, in the crash of a Cessna 177RG near Lake Placid Airport in upstate New York Sunday...

[facthunter]

The RG Cessna's have the most drag from the gear when it's 1/2 retracted .  Nev

[pmccarthy]

I watched him in many videos. Now killed by the impossible turn.

[onetrack]

I wouldn't be so sure it was the impossible turn. The news items state the C177RG went straight into trees off the end of the runway. The 70 yr old pilot was a skilled and passionate aviator and had owned a number of warbirds, including a P-51 and a Sea Fury.

 

The terrain around Lake Placid airport looks rather uninviting for an emergency landing.

 

https://www.adirondackdailyenterprise.com/news/local-news/2023/10/two-killed-in-lake-placid-airplane-crash-identified/

 

Edited October 2, 2023 by onetrack
age correction...

[RossK]

Reports of an attempted turn back

 “The airplane attempted to return to the airport but failed to make the runway,” the statement reads.

Doesn't look to be many good options departing from Lake Placid.

He was in the right seat apparently, so not PIC, but still a bit of a surprise, considering this video he did in 2021.

Impossible Turn

 

Terrible loss, his videos were always informative and I found them helpful.

Edited October 4, 2023 by RossK

[kgwilson]

I had to look up what a tight end is as it sounds very uncomfortable.

[Thruster88]

In the 2021 AOPA turn back vid there is a sound like a stall warning during the super cub turn back, the same sound can be heard during the landing, I thought it was not a good look for a safety video. The impossible turn may be impossible in some aircraft but it will only kill you if the aircraft stall/spins. The stall warning should not sound at best glide speed. Going below best glide speed is stupid.

[RossK]

15 hours ago, Thruster88 said:

The stall warning should not sound at best glide speed. Going below best glide speed is stupid.

And this is the part that gets people killed in the impossible turn.

From the vidoes I've seen online, and my own trials (with an instructor at altitude), to make the turn work, you need to bank hard (60deg angle) and keep the turn tight. Hard bank increases the load factor and the stall speed. The increase in load factor increases the stall speed pretty much to the best glide speed for most aircraft.

What people forget is during the turn, you need to push the nose down to keep the airspeed up - higher than best glide speed

Doing that with the prop stopped would take every ounce of your mental and physical courage to resist the urge to pull.

 

 

[facthunter]

The stall warning goes off at a margin above the stall including the higher speed dynamic stall because it's the Angle of Attack that initiates it. A low rate of turn will  not work best  in a turn back. It takes too long.  A failed engine will often still windmill but will be worse than an idling one.  A CS prop may give more drag than a fixed pitch one. Obviously the turn is sometimes possible but to lose control is dire and you generally land at a higher ground speed than you are used to since you are downwind.     Nev

[Thruster88]

In the AOPA vid they used 45° angle of bank, a stall speed increase of 1.2. Best glide in most light aircraft is 1.4 times clean stall speed so the stall warning should not be sounding. Regardless of why or even if the sound is a stall warning it was not a good look for a safety vid about turning back when stalling is only thing that matters.  

[facthunter]

. The Point is don't attempt a return unless you CAN do it. Everyone I know teaches land straight ahead only turning to avoid obstacles and NEVER lose control of the plane.  The quicker you do commence the turn is also important as you don't go so far away. This is ALWAYS a critical manoeuvre not always impossible but frequently fatal and often initiated instinctively rather that by good decision.. It's always going to require above average skill even when it's possible. Generally, DO NOT do it.  Nev

[Thruster88]

The AOPA safety vid shows a women doing it easily in a 172. I mean no disrespect to women.

[turboplanner]

4 hours ago, Thruster88 said:

The AOPA safety vid shows a women doing it easily in a 172. I mean no disrespect to women.

We had a guy on the forum who was talking it up, promoting it; he didn't make it when it was his turn; died in the flames.

 

 

[facthunter]

It has to be different IF you're ready for it.  Nev

[Roundsounds]

5 hours ago, Thruster88 said:

In the AOPA vid they used 45° angle of bank, a stall speed increase of 1.2. Best glide in most light aircraft is 1.4 times clean stall speed so the stall warning should not be sounding. Regardless of why or even if the sound is a stall warning it was not a good look for a safety vid about turning back when stalling is only thing that matters.  

Stall warnings systems in many light aircraft are inaccurate, are misunderstood and relied upon way too heavily.

[turboplanner]

If you go back through the pages of this forum, you'll find the turnback story at regular intervals, at first cautious, recommending never to do it, then the posts saying it can be done if......etc.

 

Recreational flying lost a lot of pilots to engine failures from about 2010; way more than they should have.

Given the very low stall speed built into RF specifications, there should be virtually no fatalities from an engine failure at 80 km/hr, less if you pull it in to hit the ground tail first in a very low stall. That's assuming you are not flying over a forest you can't possibly survive from.

 

Some were not turnbacks:

One forum member in a sea plane with its engine high on a pod behind him was too slow to push the nose hard down when thrust quickly turned to drag and the resulting moment, not present with an engine in line with the fuselage ripped the nose up.

 

A couple just pulled the stick back so they wouldn't go down..........at 1,000 feet, in both cases about landable ground.

 

Then there were the turn backs.

 

In several of the discussions, apart from the old theories that you could, if you did this or that were people that went up in their airctaft and practised turn backs, some at normal takeoff heights. Where these people went wrong is that in practice, they knew what they were going to do, they knew when they were going to do it, and it all worked.

 

We all have a good reaction time when we take a reaction test. For the average person the result is about 50/100 second from the random signal to the person's action. Doing it over and over again will get you in the groove; get you much faster; a Formula 1 Driver will be around 20/100.

That's also when they knew there was a signal coming and they knew how they are going to react.

 

Even when we practice EFATO and Forced landings, the Instructor tells us he's going to pull the power, or we know he's likely to and when we practice solo, we also have that information.

 

The real thing is quite different; we are not expecting it; it doesn't happening in a convenient place; we may have no idea of wind direction; we may loose 2 to 3 seconds before the penny drops that we have no power and we have to do something, we may lose a few more seconds checking the controls or trying to restart the engine of just saying "What's Happening", we may just sit there thinking this can't happen, but the usual situation is that instead of the 50/100 second reaction time to get the nose down and start the glide to a landable or near landable space, disregarding potential damage to the aircraft, usually several seconds have elapsed, making the test flights useless. There's a further delay if the pilot starts analysing and trying to work out the wind, when he should do this etc. so by the time he gets the forced landing underway, it's looking nothing like his tests, and he stalls in or lands into trees when he had the potential for an un-injured landing ahead. Trying to save the aircraft at all costs is often the cause of these turnback failures. The belief that you can only land on a runway is another.

 

Practicing EFATOS with "NOSE DOWN" first, second, third.......before anything else, and then figuring out a drop zone ahead or within 30 degrees either way, and drumming that into your subconscious has better percentages; your hand will start doing what they should be doing in that sub 1 second range. How many student pilots have been suprised to find one day that driving along the road in a crosswind they are actually turning the steering wheel to keep the car in a perfectly straight line; that;s te subconscious working. I watched a video once of a Drifter EFATO. The pilot had a camera looking towards him and when the engine cut he was clearly terrified, unable to process what had just happend, but the nose was pointing down and he was going straight ahead; he made the landing in the paddock but bent the undercarriage in a ditch which was a pity, but as terrified as he was, he was able to get out and walk around.

 

This story shows that even a top pilot can stuff up if he decides he can beat the averages.

 

The Turnback story, "Fighter Pilots", Jon E. Lewis

 

Story by Duncan Grinnell-Milne, training for military service in WW1, in 1915

 

At the aerodrome a treat was in store for us. A brand-new aeroplane of the most modern type had just arrived on a visit. It was being flown around the country upon a series of test flights by a well-known pilot from the Royal Aircraft Factory at Farnborough, accompanied by a civilian expert.

 

We gathered in wonder, mindful of the pilot’s request that we should not touch anything......

 

.....I gazed at the pilot with envy while my imagination soared faster than the swiftest biplane.

 

Someday I too would wear Flying Corps “Wings” upon the left breast of my tunic, I too would steer a wonderful B.E.2c, and learn to manoeuvre it with graceful ease. I would fly such a machine in France; my wings would darken the skies above the expectant battle-front.......

 

At lunch in the Mess that day we were very quiet, listening in awed silence to the instructors and the pilot from Farnborough, discussing technicalities almost entirely over our heads.

 

It was thrilling to hear the names of famous airmen bandied familiarly about , to hear of all the different types of aeroplanes with exaggerated speeds which we might hope to fly, and particularly to hear this so experienced pilot (a test-pilot!) give his views on how to do this and that, how to turn quickly and with almost vertical banking, how to do a spiral glide, how to deal with the ever mysterious “spinning” and so on. It was rumoured that this pilot had frequently looped.

 

......He decided to leave. We hurried down to the aerodrome to watch him go.

 

The beautiful machine was wheeled forward, her engine started, warmed up. The test-pilot and his civilian passenger donned much leather flying clothing, climbed into their seats.

 

The engine having been run up and found satisfactory, the wooden chocks were removed, and the machine turned and taxied out to the far side of the aerodrome.  A short pause, and the pilot gave the engine full throttle, taking off obliquely towards the sheds.

 

Against the wind the machine rose at once and began to climb steeply. The pilot waved farewell as he passed us by, about fifty feet up, heading west into the sunlight.

 

Against the bright sky the machine was silhouetted, hard to see beyond the end of the sheds. But, as we watched, shading our eyes, there came to us suddenly the spluttering of a starved engine.

 

The steady roar of the exhaust died down, the nose of the machine dropped.

 

And now this too expert pilot made his great mistake.

 

In the course of the short flight, he had attained a height of about one hundred and fifty feet and had crossed the boundary of the aerodrome.

 

A road, a line of telegraph wires were beneath him, ahead a series of small meadows intersected by ditches. Rough ground, but possible in an emergency, especially as the strong wind against him would make the run on landing exceptionally short.

 

There was, strictly speaking, no alternative for a safe, a wise pilot.

 

But this pilot was exceedingly clever, and he wanted to save his beautiful machine from damage. Not that it would have suffered anything worse than a broken under-carriage, possibly a smashed propeller, from the forced landing; he wished to avoid even that much.

 

And so he tried something which, in this instance, he had not one chance in a thousand of bringing off.

 

He turned back to the aerodrome.

 

In the very few seconds that followed I remember feeling, in spite of my utter ignorance of piloting, an intense admiration for the brilliant way in which he handled the machine. Without a moment’s hesitation he turned down wind as quickly and as flatly as possible so as not to lose the little height he had gained, held a straight course for an instant, then over the shed began another sharp turn that, when completed, would bring him into wind with a space of fifty to sixty yards of smooth ground on which to land.

 

Actually it was just possible of achievement, although as I see it now he was taking a terrible risk; but the whole performance was cut too fine. He failed by much more than inches.

 

As he came towards the sheds, his speed downwind seemed terrific, yet in trying to maintain his height he had in fact lost the essential flying-speed. He was stalling even as he banked over the sheds. The nose went down with a jerk in the first turn of a spin.

 

He missed the roof by a miracle, but within a second of the machine’s disappearance behind the shed we were horrified to hear an appalling crash.

 

Naturally we rushed forward in spite of the first-shouted order that all pupils should stand back – the sight of a probably fatal crash, it was rightly thought, might - we had to see; we ran for it.

 

Beyond the shed the new aeroplane lay flat on the ground, a mass of wreckage. Both men sat in their smashed cockpits motionless. Unconscious or dead?   We were not long in doubt for worse was to follow. As we came nearer the wreck from which mechanics were already trying to extricate pilot and passenger, there was a flicker of flame from beneath the fuselage. And all at once the mechanic sprang back as with a roar a great flame shot up from the burst petrol tank.

 

It swept back over the passenger; when it reached the pilot he moved uneasily; seemed to shake himself, fumbled with his safety belt, then jumped out just in time, his clothing on fire.

 

There were cries for extinguishers, for axes to hack through broken wings, for help to pull away the wreckage, for the ambulance – for anything and everything to save the passenger. He was still in the machine and still alive. Mercifully he did not recover consciousness – afterwards it was found that his skull had been fractured in the crash – but he kept moving. And we were powerless. The extinguishers had no effect upon thirty gallons of blazing petrol. The strong wind blew the flames into his face. Before our very eyes he was burnt to death, roasted. It took a long time, it was ghastly.

 

The fire died down, smouldered awhile, went out. The wind dropped, the sun set and the sky glowed with rare beauty. But we pupils walked back to the Mess in glum silence.

 

Upon the following morning all officers were summoned to the squadron office. We expected the summons, although I do not quite know what we expected to hear. I suppose that, among other things, we thought to be given news of the pilot in hospital, but possibly to be complimented upon the vain efforts we had made to penetrate the barrier of fire, and upon the sang-froid we had shown afterwards. Perhaps more than anything we hoped to hear that the fire had not been so intense as our eyes had led us to believe, that the unfortunate victim had in some way been protected – by his goggles, by his flying helmet or by his leather clothing – from the devouring fury of the flames, so that there might be a chance of his recovery. Or did we hope to be told that something mysterious had gone wrong with this new aeroplane, something very startling and unusual which could not occur again, that flying was not like this, horrible, cruel?

 

The Squadron-commander strode into the office, flung his cap upon the table, drew a cane chair forward. Placing one foot upon the chair, he rested an elbow upon his knee.

 

“With regard to this unfortunate and unnecessary happening” he began harshly, “the first and only thing to do is to find out the causes of the accident, to see where the pilot was to blame so as to learn what lessons we may.

 

“Now in this particularly stupid case......”

 

I thought him terribly callous.

 

“A pilot must never turn down wind at a low altitude when faced with the possibility of a forced landing.

 

“A pilot in difficulties after leaving the ground must keep straight on.

 

“A pilot must save himself and his passengers first, not the aeroplane. It is better to smash wheels and propeller than burn a man to death.

 

“A pilot must take particular care to maintain flying-speed after engine failure....”

 

Those were the lessons. If the manner of their teaching was hard, it was also effective.

[Garfly]

 

[facthunter]

It's one of those outcomes that has a lot of Pilot people thinking. The terrain at the lift off end of the runway wasn't that flash either. . Brief yourself before the take off is always recommended.   Nev

[rgmwa]

I can do a turnback at altitude in my plane in a practice situation when I'm prepared for it, but if the engine ever stops unexpectedly I will be looking in front of me, not behind.  It is stressful even in practice. It takes some pretty quick and firm control inputs and watching the ball and airspeed like a hawk, and I wouldn't trust myself to pull it off close to the ground in an emergency.

 

[Jabiru7252]

I was taught to aim for the airfield not the runways...

[Thruster88]

- NTSB issues the preliminary report into the fatal accident involving Richard McSpadden and Russ Francis in a Cessna 177RG Cardinal RG, N545PZ, that occurred on October 1, 2023, at Lake Placid Airport (LKP/KLKP), Lake Placid, New York:

On October 1, 2023, at 1608 eastern daylight time, a Cessna 177RG, N545PZ, owned and operated by Lake Placid Air Service was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Lake Placid, New York. The pilot and pilot-rated passenger sustained fatal injuries. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 aerial photography flight.

The purpose of the flight was to photograph the accident airplane while airborne for later publication in a magazine article. According to witnesses, there were two airplanes that made up the flight. The lead airplane was a Beech A36 with a photographer onboard, which took off first from runway 32 at Lake Placid Airport (LKP), Lake Placid, New York. The accident airplane took off about 700 feet behind the Beech A36. The pilot/owner was to fly the airplane during the takeoff and climb out, and after joining up in formation, the pilot rated passenger would have taken over the controls and flown the airplane during the photo shoot.

During taxi out, witnesses heard the engine of the accident airplane running when the Beech A36 pulled up next to it. The accident airplane’s engine then shut off, and about 10 seconds later, the engine restarted. During the takeoff roll, a witness described that the engine sounded as if the propeller was set for “climb” and not takeoff, then he heard the engine surge. During the initial climb, the witness further described that the engine did not sound as if it was running at full power. The accident airplane then made a gentle left turn while it was 300 to 400 feet above ground level to join with the Beech A36. As the accident airplane closed to within about 1,000 feet of the Beech A36, it suddenly made a hard right turn back toward the departure airport. During the turn, the pilot of the Beech A36 heard the passenger in the accident airplane transmit on the common traffic advisory frequency, “We have a problem and we’re returning to the airport.”

The accident airplane subsequently impacted an embankment in a right-wing, nose-low attitude about 15 feet below the top of a plateau on airport property. The airplane then slid about 30-feet down the embankment and came to rest on the side of the slope upright, perpendicular to the embankment with its left wing oriented toward the upslope, and its right wing oriented downslope. The initial impact point on the embankment was located about 440 feet from the approach end of runway 14, approximately 250 feet left of the runway centerline. The downslope angle was about 70-degrees with a ravine at its bottom.

Lake Placid Airport was located at an elevation of 1,747 feet above mean sea level, and it was equipped with a single runway in a 14/32, runway configuration. Runway 14/32 was comprised of asphalt that was in good condition, was 4,196 feet-long by 60 feet-wide, and was marked with non-precision markings in good condition that featured a touchdown point. Runway 14 was equipped with medium intensity runway edge lights and a 2-light precision approach path indicator on the left side of the runway which provided a 3.50° glidepath to touchdown. Obstructions existed in the form of 77-foot-high trees located 884 feet from the runway, 334 feet left of centerline, which required an 8:1 slope to clear. Additionally, there were 13-foot-high roads 45 feet and 145 feet from the threshold, and 12-foot-high trees 93 feet from the runway end, located 132 feet to the right of centerline.

The recorded weather at Adirondack Regional Airport, Saranac Lake, New York, located about 13 nautical miles northwest of LKP, at 1551, included wind from 010 degrees true at 7 knots, 10 statute miles visibility, clear skies, a temperature of 23° C, a dew point of 12° C, and an altimeter setting of 30.20 inches of mercury.

According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records, the pilot held a commercial pilot certificate, with ratings for airplane single-engine land, multiengine land, and instrument airplane. He also possessed a type rating for the DC-3, and private pilot privileges for rotorcraft-helicopter. His most recent FAA-issued second-class medical certificate was issued on January 6, 2023. He reported on that date, that he had accrued approximately 9,000 total flight hours.

According to FAA airworthiness and airplane maintenance records, the airplane was manufactured in 1976. The airplane's most recent annual inspection was completed on April 7, 2023. At the time of the inspection the airplane had accumulated 5,352.2 total hours of flight time, and the engine had accumulated 36.7 hours of operation since major overhaul.

The wreckage was examined at the accident site. The right wing had sustained upward buckling from the wingtip inboard to the aileron/flap junction. The fuselage and empennage were slightly buckled along the right side from the aft side of the cabin door to approximately Fuselage Station (FS) 225. Control cable continuity was established from the flight control surfaces to the cockpit controls. The flaps were extended approximately 10 degrees; the stabilator trim was neutral. 

The fuel strainer bowl was fractured during the impact sequence and only a portion of it was observed. The fuel strainer screen was clean. The fuel selector handle operated normally in all positions and positively engaged in the detents. The position of the fuel selector valve was confirmed to be on “BOTH” by rotating the handle through all positions while defueling the airplane through the inlet line of the fuel strainer. The fuel caps were closed and secured. The position of the fuel pump switch could not be determined due to impact damage. There were no obstructions noted in the fuel or fuel vent system from the wing tanks to the inlet of the fuel strainer. First responders reported fuel was draining from the airplane upon arrival. No blockages were discovered in the fuel system and 17 gallons of fuel were recovered from the right wing fuel tank. The fuel was absent of water contamination.

The nose landing gear was crushed aft during the impact sequence and the actuator was separated (its position could not be determined). The main landing gear were in an intermediate position. The single main landing gear actuator was observed attached to its frame. The sector gear teeth were intact. There was no observable damage to the main landing gear down locks or gear legs. The main landing gear wheels were observed in contact with the buckled lower fuselage and not in the wheel wells.

The electrical and lighting switch positions were damaged during the impact sequence and their positions could not be determined. The cowl flap handle was in the “OPEN” position. The mixture control was in the full rich position, the propeller control was in the high rpm / fine pitch position, and the throttle was out about 2-inches and bent slightly up and to the left about 30-degrees. 

The engine remained attached to the firewall through its respective engine mounts. The engine mount sustained damage from the impact sequence in the form of fractures and bends to various tube sections and was canted to the right of the airplane centerline. The engine mount was cut using a reciprocating saw to free the engine from the firewall along with disconnecting or separating various fuel hoses and control cables.

The propeller remained attached to the engine crankshaft. The propeller spinner was impact fractured and only half of it remained attached to the propeller hub. The propeller hub was found cracked and damaged consistent with impact, and one blade was partially dislodged from the hub. The blade exhibited leading edge scratches and gouges. The other blade was bent slightly aft at midspan with an approximate 2-inch curled section of the tip separated. The blade exhibited chordwise scratching and leading edge gouging on the outer 1/3 of the blade.

The top sparkplugs were all found intact, undamaged, and tightly installed in each cylinder. The top sparkplugs were removed, and a lighted borescope examination was conducted on each cylinder. No abnormalities were noted within the cylinders. The engine crankshaft was rotated by the propeller in its normal direction of rotation, and suction and compression were noted on all cylinders through the top spark plug holes, with movement of all rocker arms noted during rotation.

All 8 sparkplugs were removed and compared to a Champion Aerospace AV-27 “Check-A-Plug” Chart. Coloration across the plugs was from normal to black carbon fouled, with normal wear to the electrodes. No mechanical electrode damage was noted or observed on any of the sparkplugs. The bottom sparkplugs for cylinders No. 1 and No. 3 were oil soaked, consistent with orientation of the engine at the accident site and oil within the cylinders. The single drive dual magneto unit was found securely installed to the rear of the engine, after removal of the unit, the single drive was rotated using an electric drill. The magneto produced spark at all ignition leads. No damage was observed to the magneto housing, but both ignition harnesses sustained varying levels of impact damage in the form of cuts and abrasions to multiple leads. 

The oil dipstick was found securely installed in the filler neck and indicated that 6 quarts of oil was contained in the engine oil sump. Oil was found draining from an area on the No. 3 cylinder exhaust tube that was impact damaged and due to the orientation of the airplane at the accident site. Oil was also found on the accessory section of the engine around the oil filter as the oil filter had sustained a high level of impact damage and was separated from oil filter’s threaded base. A portion of filter element was removed, examined, and found to be clean with no metallic particles or debris present. The oil suction screen plug was found to be tight, and safety wired to the oil sump. The screen was unobstructed and clear of any debris. 

The fuel system including the engine driven fuel pump, fuel manifold, and fuel servo were all found attached to the engine at the time of the examination. The fuel pump’s 45-degree outlet fitting was found slightly loose with the mating hose tight to the fitting. No fuel staining was observed from the fitting or on the fuel pump housing itself. The fuel divider was tightly installed to the top of the engine with all injection lines tight and secure to each injection nozzle. The fuel injection manifold was disassembled with no debris or tears noted to its diaphragm. The fuel servo was attached to the lower side of the engine with all lines tight and secure, but all four hold down nuts were found loose when slight pressure with a wrench was applied. Torque stripes were present on the studs and nuts. The torque stripes did not appear to be disturbed or misaligned. The throttle plate was found in the closed position. When the throttle arm was actuated manually, the throttle plate moved freely within the servo, but the threaded rod for the idle thumb screw adjustment was found fractured and not connected. The fuel injection nozzles were found to be free and clear of any debris.

The vacuum pump was found securely installed to the accessory section of the engine. The rotor and vanes within were all found intact with no fractures or damage observed. The drive coupling was present with no damage observed and the entire unit spun freely when rotated by hand.

The propeller governor was found securely installed to the rear of the engine. Its screen was found free and clear of any debris and oil flowed from the unit when rotated by hand.

The wreckage was retained for further examination.

Conditions at Accident Site: VMC 
Condition of Light: Day
Observation Facility, Elevation: KSLK,1659 ft msl 
Observation Time: 15:51 Local
Distance from Accident Site: 13 Nautical Miles 
Temperature/Dew Point: 23°C /12°C
Lowest Cloud Condition: Clear 
Wind Speed/Gusts, Direction: 7 knots / , 10°
Lowest Ceiling: None 
Visibility: 10 miles
Altimeter Setting: 30.23 inches Hg 
Type of Flight Plan Filed: None
Departure Point: Lake Placid, NY (LKP) 
Destination: Lake Placid, NY (LKP)

Latitude, Longitude: 44.269042,-73.968803 

- Report:
https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/193166/pdf

 

Having the gear out and prop in fine pitch would not have been helpful in attempting to clear the cliff at end of runway.

Edited October 20, 2023 by Thruster88

[facthunter]

As I said at the beginning, this TYPE of Retractable gear has far more  drag when half retracted than when fully down. That is a well known fact and should be taken into account in some situations.  On the fine pitch stop the propellor would give the most power and thrust. It's where it is on take off. IF the motor failed, Coarse will be helpful. Most single engine C/S props don't have Feather capability.  Nev

[Mike Gearon]

I knew about this. Didn’t realise it was the AOPA podcast presenter. Listened to every episode. Quite shocked to turn it on in the car yesterday and instead of a great talk from the presenter I listened to this. (link below)

 

Still, thoroughly recommend these podcasts. Listen intently as if you’re the person going through the experience. Saddest IMO was a father and son in amphibious. For whatever reason the dad didn’t retract the gear and landed. Lost the son and somehow he found the courage to talk to Richard about the experience. 

 

https://www.aopa.org/news-and-media/podcasts/podcasts/there-i-was

 

 

[danny_galaga]

Im a big believer in just not having the impossible turn in my 'vocabulary'.  If straight out of the runway, it's within 30° from straight for me. I'm not an aerobatic pilot with thousands of hours under my belt...

[facthunter]

Sometimes it's NOT impossible but it should be "guaranteed" if it's used, because often failure is catastrophic.  Nev