The 'impossible turn' - a known killer.

[Guest Maj Millard]

I must again thank Pioneer200 for his thread on power failures, which also mutated to spinning. A valuable contributation indeed, and no doubt all who participated would agree, that to discuss and think about one's actions, goes a long way towards helping achieve a successfull outcome, if and when we may be faced with either.

 

It's timly now to discuss another regular killer of good pilots, the often involentary turn-back to the runway, after a power failure, at the worst possible time - right after take-off.

 

This turnback often leads to a power-off, low-speed stall in the turn, which then leads to loss of control, followed by an uncontrolled, and often fatal crash.

 

The alternate of course is to continue to aviate, with a controlled descent straight ahead, with minor deviation if height allows, leading to a controlled flare, and contact at minimum speed, which often proves survivable.

 

The 'impossible turn ' is well named, even though some hero occassionally pulls one off successfully.

 

When flying my Drifter in the past, I had decided that above 300 ft I could probabilly excucute a succesfull 180 deg turn, back onto the runway. But not a foot below 300 FT. Bare in mind that I have a lot of Drifter hours, lots of years flying ULs, and many hours under my belt. Lately I am more often found in Lightwings or Tecnams. Would I try the same thing in those heavier type aircraft ?..not a chance Jose'.

 

I was involved in an 'impossible turn' accident back in 1974 in a Cessna 182, whilst engaged in parachuting activity. This particular accident was a classic turn back example, and was written up in the CASA 'crash comic' under the title "Inviting Disaster-invitation taken".

 

After a total, and abrupt power failure at about 100-150ft, the capable, experienced commercial pilot initiated a deliberate, immediate,and heavily banked turn to the left. The left wing stalled immediatly, and we impacted the ground in what I estimated to be less than four seconds later, in a very uncontrolled nose down condition. It was not a good day for the two in the front, but myself and a lady friend in the rear seat were lucky enought to survive, and recover from our serious injuries.

 

I would like to hear other pilots' views, and my hope by starting this discussion, is that it may save at least one good pilot, experienced or rookie, from the 'Impossible turn'. I can tell you folks, don't try it, it don't work.

 

 

[Tomo]

Thanks Maj...:thumb_up: I will always keep that in the back of my mind

 

 

[motzartmerv]

Good on ya Marj, a good post.. That must have been quite an experiance, did the pilot and front pax not survive??..

 

The topic is a very valid one and as youve said, it is the bain of all pilot's existance.. We all train extensivly (don't we) for engine failures at various altitudes and a bit of EFATO, but how many of us would really have the goods if it came to the crunch..

 

I can only speak for myself, i try to practise as much as possible, but in some places the practising can be a dangerous undertaking, and in poor climbing acft its worse..

 

I am a huge fan of the pre takeoff safety brief. I know its not a new idea, but i am religeous with it. To the point where even if i give it (or hear it from a student) and then do a full stop and line back up, i want to give it (or hear it ) again..

 

Study's have shown that you are far far more likely to react properly and initiate a plan if youve just SPOKEN it moments before..

 

The time it takes to register whats happend and then react accordingly is too long in low inertia acft. And the instinct to return to the field would be overpowering im sure.

 

This is the brief i give...

 

"in the very unlikey event of an engine failure on takeoff, i will take over and immediatly lower the nose to maintain airspeed and assess the situation. If we have saficient room to land on the strip in front i will do so useing flap as required, if there is insuficient room i will choose a paddock, road or path of least resistance within 30 deg of the direction of the aeroplane and use flap as required. I WILL NOT ATTEMPT TO TURN BACK BELOW XXXX feet (which varies with acft and location).

 

I say this to myself outloud even when alone, just prior to takeoff..

 

Other then being aware of the exact height you CAN turn back at, i think this is a real wepon to help combat the impulse to try the Impossible turn...

 

Cheers

 

 

[Guest pelorus32]

Good Topic!!

 

Can I suggest that these two pages:

 

Knowing the aircrafts

 

Loss of control in turns

 

Are almost "mandatory" reading on the subject.

 

Regards

 

Mike

 

 

[Guest ozzie]

Malor, another name for this turn, is the "split XXXX turn" I have heard it debated amongst pilots several times over the years that correctly executed it can be done with very little height loss.

 

The only turn backs i have wittnessed first hand were from the ground (phew) involved twins with the expected results.

 

1974 was the year before i stated jumping. from memory it was a horror year for jumping.

 

Ozzie

 

 

[Guest Brett Campany]

This is a great topic and something to come back and read on a regular basis. Thanks guys!

 

 

[turboplanner]

Yes, very well put for something which has been a killer since the beginning of flight. Here's an extract from "Fighter Pilots", in their own words, edited by Jon E. Lewis (This story by Duncan Grinnell-Milne) prior to WW1. He was part of a student team training on the old Maurice Farman Long-horn bi planes (Rag, bone and wires all over the place).

 

"At the aerodrome a treat was in store for us. A brand new aeroplane of the most modern type had just arrived on a visit. It was being flown around the country upon a series of test flights by a well- known pilot from the Royal Aircraft Factory at Farnborough, accompanied by a civilian expert. We gathered about it in silent wonder, mindful of the pilot’s request that we should not touch anything.

 

“It was sheer joy to examine such a machine at close quarters. Those of us who had flown as passengers before coming to Shoreham had seen a good many sorts of ancient aircraft; all the greater now was our interest and admiration. The engine of this biplane was in front (like some German machines I had seen before the war), whereas most of those we knew by sight had it astern – “pushers” – and the body was long, narrow, neatly shaped. The wings were thicker than those of the Maurice Farman machines; they looked solid, strong. The bracing wires were no longer cable or piano, they were of a new design” “streamline”. In the pilot’s cockpit was a neat dashboard with instruments. The controls were operated by a straight “stick”, not “handlebars” as in the Long-horn; there was a rudder bar instead of pedals. The tanks were said to contain fuel for nearly four hours flying, and it was evident than in addition to the passenger this aeroplane would be capable of carrying a machine-gun or bombs. An improvement upon the older models of the same type, it was believed to attain no less than seventy six miles an hour at full speed. It was known as the B.E.2c, its engine was the 90 horse-power “R.A.F.” – the letters standing for Royal Aircraft Factory, the home of those expert minds whose latest and most immaculate conception this aeroplane was….

 

“…At lunch in the Mess that day we were very quiet, listening in awed silence to the instructors and the pilot from Farnborough, discussing technicalities almost entirely over our heads. It was thrilling to hear the names of famous airmen bandied familiarly about, to hear of all the different types of aeroplanes with exaggerated speeds which we might hope to fly, and particularly to hear this so experienced pilot (a test pilot!) give his views on how to do this and that, how to turn quickly and with almost vertical banking, how to do a spiral glide, how to deal with the ever-mysterious “spinning” and so on. It was rumoured that this pilot had frequently looped, and had even looped a B.E.2c! We listened attentively, trying to pick up what crumbs we might from his learned conversation.

 

“There had been talk of the test-pilot staying the night at Shoreham; he had landed because of bad weather. But during the afternoon it cleared up considerably and the wind, although still strong, showed signs of abating. He decided to leave. We hurried down to the aerodrome to watch him go.

 

“The beautiful machine was wheeled forward, her engine started, warmed up. The test-pilot and his civilian passenger donned much leather flying clothing, climbed into their seats. The engine having been run up and found satisfactory, the wooden chocks were removed, the machine turned and taxied out to the far side of the aerodrome. A short pause, and the pilot gave the engine full throttle, taking off obliquely towards the sheds.

 

“Against the wind the machine rose at once and began to climb steeply. The pilot waved farewell as he passed us by, about fifty feet up, heading west into the sunlight. Against the bright sky the machine was silhouetted, hard to see beyond the end of the sheds. But, as we watched, shading our eyes, there came to us suddenly the spluttering of a starved engine. The steady roar of the exhaust died down, the nose of the machine dropped. And now this too expert pilot made his great mistake.

 

“In the course of the short flight he had attained a height of about one hundred and fifty feet and had crossed the boundary of the aerodrome. A road, a line of telegraph wires were beneath him, ahead a series of small meadows intersected by ditches. Rough ground, but possible in an emergency, especially as the strong wind against him would make the run on landing exceptionally short. There was, strictly speaking no alternative for a safe, a wise pilot. But this pilot was exceedingly clever, and he wanted to save his beautiful new machine from damage. Not that it would have suffered anything worse than a broken under-carriage, possibly a smashed propeller, from the forced landing; he wished to avoid even that much. And so he tried something which, in this instance he had not one chance in a thousand of bringing off. He turned back to the aerodrome.

 

“In the very few seconds that followed I remember feeling, in spite of my utter ignorance of piloting, and intense admiration for the brilliant way in which he handled the machine. Without a moment’s hesitation he turned down winds as quickly and as flatly as possible so as not to lose the little height he had gained, held a straight course for an instant, then over the sheds began another sharp turn that, when completed, would bring him into wind with a space of fifty or sixty yards of smooth ground on which to land. Actually it was just possible of achievement, although as I see it now he was taking a terrible risk; but the whole performance was cut too fine. He failed by much more than inches.

 

“As he came towards the sheds his speed down wind seemed terrific, yet in trying to maintain hi height he had in fact lost the essential flying speed. He was stalling even as he banked over the sheds. The nose went down with a jerk in the first turn of a spin. He missed the rood by a miracle, but within a second of the machine’s disappearance behind the shed we were horrified to hear an appalling crash.

 

“Naturally we rushed forward in spite of the first-shouted order that all pupils should stand back- the sight of a probably fatal crash, it was rightly thought, might upset some of us – we had to see; we ran for it. beyond the shed the new aeroplane lay flat on the ground, a mass of wreckage. Both men sat in their smashed cockpits motion-less. Unconscious or dead? We were not long in doubt for worse was to follow. As we came nearer the wreck from which mechanics were already trying to extricate the pilot and passenger there was a flicker of flame from beneath the fuselage. And all at once the mechanics sprang back as with a roar a great flame shot up from the burst petrol tank. It swept back over the pasenger; when it reached the pilot he moved uneasily, seemed to shake himself, fumbled with his safety belt, then jumped out just in time, his clothing on fire.

 

“There were cries for extinguishers, for axes to hack through the broken wings, for help to pull away the wreckage, for the ambulance – for anything and everything to save the passenger. He was still in the machine and still alive. Mercifully he did not recover consciousness – afterwards it was found that his skull had been fractured in the crash - but he kept on moving. And we were powerless. The extinguishers had no effect upon thirty gallons of blazing petrol. The strong wind blew the flames into his face. Before our very eyes he was burnt to death, roasted. It took a long time; it was ghastly….

 

“The fire went down, smouldered awhile, went out. The wind dropped; the sun set and the sky glowed with rear beauty. But we pupils walked back to the mess in glum silence.

 

“Upon the following morning all officers were summoned to the squadron office. We expected the summons, although I do not quite know what we expected to hear. I suppose that, amongst other things, we thought to be given the news of the pilot in hospital, but possibly to be complimented upon the vain efforts we had made to penetrate the barrier of the fire, and upon the sang-froid we had shown afterwards. Perhaps more than anything we hoped to hear that the fire had not been so intense as our eyes had led us to believe, that the unfortunate victim had in some way been protected – by his goggles, by his flying helmet or by his leather clothing – from the devouring fury of the flames, so that there might be a chance of his recovery. Or did we hope to be told that something mysterious had gone wrong with this new aeroplane, something very startling and unusual which could not occur again, that flying was not like this, horrible, cruel?

 

“The Squadron-commander strode into the office, flung his cap upon the table, drew a cane chair forward. Placing one foot upon the chair, he rested an elbow on his knee. “With regard to this unfortunate and unnecessary happening” he began harshly, “the first and only thing to do is to find out the causes of the accident, to see where the pilot was to blame so as to learn the lessons we may. Now in this particularly stupid case….” I thought him terribly callous “A pilot must never turn down wind at a low altitude when faced with the possibility of a forced landing. A pilot in difficulties after leaving the ground must keep straight on. A pilot must save himself and his passenger first, not the aeroplane. It is better to smash wheels and propeller than to burn a man to death. A pilot must take particular care to maintain flying-speed after engine failure”

 

“Those were the lessons. If the manner of their teaching was hard, it was also effective.”

 

 

[HEON]

Am currently undertaking a tail wheel endorcement with the third instructor with whom I have spent time in my limited 200+hr flying time.

 

At the start I was a bit misterfied on his on his desire for me to repeat to him just prior to powering on for take off words to the effect of in the event of engine failure land straight ahead.

 

He is a very high hour crop dusting based CFI and the first of my instructors to make me restate something we ALL KNOW just before the take off.

 

It has not taken me long to realise its a good idea as it puts the idea in your mind just before it may be needed.

 

Being one who likes checklists, it will be added as the last item on my own aircrafts pre take off check list for future reminding.

 

 

[turboplanner]

Heon, I saved myself from many, many injuries at high speeds in speedway racing by doing this, driving the evasive action for any common incident into the brain and the subconscious.

 

As we saw in the "Reaction Time" thread, subconsious reaction takes 50/200 of a second or less - I think one guy got down to 18/100, but making a conscious decision can take two or three seconds - sometimes too long, but, as in the case I posted earlier, often long enought to lead to uncertainty or a bad decision.

 

Example: I was running side by side down the straight on the outside of an older driver. There was a flash in front as a car was hit and flicked around sideways, and I became aware that my mate was no longer beside me. As I continued around the pile up under the yellow lights I saw him reforming with us for the restart. He had immediately flicked his car on to the infield while still 20 metres away from the accident.

 

Afterwards he explained that whenever cars hit, the kinetic energy involved makes their path totally unpredictable, so if you steer to the outside, they could roll into your path and vice versa, and the following drivers often swerve erratically and take you out.

 

"There's going to be a retsart anyway and the worst that can happen is you start a few places back, but that's better than having a wheel knocked off and being out of points for the night, or being injured." he said.

 

It made sense to me because I was frequently rebuilding the car after similar tangles, and that was costing me points. I put the concept to good use a number of times, because from then there was no doubt about what I was going to do.

 

 

[Guest pelorus32]

The Mantra

 

Am currently undertaking a tail wheel endorcement with the third instructor with whom I have spent time in my limited 200+hr flying time.At the start I was a bit misterfied on his on his desire for me to repeat to him just prior to powering on for take off words to the effect of in the event of engine failure land straight ahead.

 

He is a very high hour crop dusting based CFI and the first of my instructors to make me restate something we ALL KNOW just before the take off.

 

It has not taken me long to realise its a good idea as it puts the idea in your mind just before it may be needed.

 

Being one who likes checklists, it will be added as the last item on my own aircrafts pre take off check list for future reminding.

Years ago as a young glider pilot the sport was staggering under a rash of stall spin accidents - generally on turn backs though not only. I flew from winch launches at first. From almost the first lesson we did stalls and spins and had drummed into us a mantra that I will never forget: "In the event of a cable break, lower the nose, if you can land ahead, do so". I remember asking the CFI "what if I can't land ahead". He looked at me and said "well then you're @#$%ed".

 

Apologies for the french but that was exactly as he said it. It's remained with me to this day.

 

I was talking to girl child about this at the weekend - the importance of a personal brief just before throttle opening, just as it's important to give yourself a go around brief a some point on downwind.

 

Regards

 

Mike

 

 

[Guest Maj Millard]

Turboplanner, That's a great bit of reading, and yes the lesson is well demonstrated there, with also the usual unfortunate ending. I just love reading that WW1 stuff, and I have many WW1 books in my library also. In so many ways early UL flying was very similiar to those times, except we wern't shooting at each other....much.

 

Ozzie, Yes 1974 was not the best of years, I lost the two friends in the front of the 182. I did get back jumping later in the year, (despite much medical advice against) only to be at the Rylston Kandos Xmas nationals for the unfortunate double night fatality, the day before the cyclone hit Darwin!. So lost another couple of friends there. A memorable year for all the wrong reasons. The 'Split axsx turn' you mention may also be the stall turn, a manouver at low altitude best left to very experienced aerobatic, or ag pilots, who do them regulary.

 

And MMerv, yes you are right, the pre-takeoff briefing is a great way to go. Generally my last thought before pushing the throttle foward, and blasting down the runway is..'where are we going if the donk quits'... and it does help you get organized in that respect. You just have to remember to say it, and I do forget sometimes. I always do a fairly aggresive climb out, and I'm always happy to get to 300 or so feet, where I start bringing the throttle back, and get rid of the flaps.

 

Power failure right after takeoff can be our worst nightmare, if there is no runway ahead. The aircraft at that point become redundant, no matter how much you may love it. It is also a difficult thing to train for safely, unless you have a real long runway. The urge to turn back is very powerfull, as the airstrip falsely represents safety, but must be resisted. A controlled crash, will always beat an uncontrolled crash !

 

And always much easier to replace an aeroplane, than a life.

 

 

[Guest brentc]

I don't subscribe the the minimum altitude for a turn-back maneouvre as there are always so many variables, such as headwind, crosswind, aircraft weight, climb rate etc. If I climbed out steep I might end up quite high, but overhead the field, or if I climbed out shallow, I'm going to be further away for the same altitude.

 

I don't think that having an altitude in mind is the safest scenario.

 

I like to look ahead and around me for places to land and unless I'm 100% confident that I'm high enough for a turn-back, I won't consider it, but, how I put a figure on that altitude is anyone's guess!

 

 

[Guest Maj Millard]

Yes Brentc, I would agree with that thinking. There is however an altitude where you feel more comfortable, and you know you have more time, and chance, of selecting a more suitable emergency landing site. Cheers

 

 

[lazerin]

My instructor and I have set a limit of 600ft AGL for a successful turn back in the Sportstar. The most useful thing was that she pulled the power on me just past 600ft and I was able to turn back and reach the runway quite easily without ever being in a steep turn or dropping the airspeed below Vbg.

 

It was also useful to see the effect of having a tailwind on your landing and how much faster everything seems as your groundspeed is higher.

 

I highly recommend going out with an instructor and doing at least one practice of turning back to the runway at a safe nominated altitude with an EFATO.

 

 

[Guest High Plains Drifter]

EFATO - lower nose, then, maintain Airspeed Airspeed Airspeed Airspeed Airspeed Airspeed Airspeed Airspeed Airspeed.....

 

 

[Guest brentc]

Lazerin, tread carefully with 600ft in the back of your mind. Things will be completely different if there was a 30 knot breeze blowing.

 

 

[Guest keeffe]

A Canadian study found that pilots turning back were 8 EIGHT times more likely to die, than pilots that flew the plane to the ground.

 

I have practiced turn backs in my drifter over and over. on the right day 200 feet is still ample but if I could land straight ahead in a real time failure I would, especially two up.

 

Mike

 

 

[gofastclint]

For your own aircraft a rocket booster is a good way of getting out of trouble, one that is positioned right with just enough power to get you high enough to make a 180 turn and make a safe landing. an engineer will be able to show the correct place for it, plus refills are so cheap. If someone asks you what is is say its a decoration.

 

What seems like a laugh now will become normal if it works well and no one has a better idea.

 

http://www.ausrocketry.com.au/component/option,com_frontpage/Itemid,1/

 

My dad used to be big on rockets and the amount of crazy things he made fly were cool for me as a kid, the best was a 5 stage rocket with falling smoke bombs between the stages, from a distance it looked like a blue tower 1 km high.

 

 

[Guest pelorus32]

I'm struggling a bit here. It's a warm day in Melbourne and even with "air conditioning" it's hot inside.

 

My brain is hurting trying to understand some of the turn back assertions made here. The reason I'm struggling is this. A turn back seems to mean different things to different people.

 

For me for instance when I'm talking about a turnback (or not actually) it is as a result of an EFATO and my mental definition of an EFATO is something that occurs before I have turned crosswind and before I am stabilised on crosswind. Now my definition happens to suit the kind of medium performance a/c I tend to fly - Tecnams, Storms etc.

 

I know from practice that once I am stabilised on crosswind - 650-700 feet AGL - I have a reasonable chance of turning downwind (90 degrees) then turning "base" and "final" (180 degrees). My wings will be rolling level as my wheels touch most times.

 

Just as an aside that's not a turn back - it's an abbreviated circuit to me.

 

So for me any time before that is an EFATO and I'm not turning back - (except perhaps if I have just started my turn to crosswind and then It's just more of what I'm doing. But I'm feeling pretty wary about even that). If it's a long strip I'm landing ahead on the strip - otherwise it's 30 degrees either side of straight ahead.

 

Now the thing I want to say is that your mileage will undoubtedly vary - these are my rules for the a/c types I fly often. They have published glide ratios around 11-12.

 

What I'm struggling with is that as I understand it the Drifter (for example) doesn't glide well. It isn't capable of doing a glide ratio of 11 or 12. So I'm struggling, really struggling, to understand how you could get back to the strip from 2 or 300 hundred feet. I know that there are many pilots with much better S&R skills than me - my daughter tells me that often. But they have to be really superb in an a/c with a poor glide, high drag and whilst you are wondering what the hell just happened in any case.

 

I really would like to be enlightened here because I feel like I'm missing something vital in the conversation.

 

I just keep having visions of this - and I've seen far worse than this:

 

YouTube - How not to land a glider

 

Kind regards

 

Mike

 

 

[Guest keeffe]

Yes, well I suppose you are correct. 50 feet of altitude is classed as a completion of a take off. My drifter comfortably get a L/D ratio of 9-1 and If I turn down wind and fly it at best glide I can get 14-1 even saw 20-1 once :)

 

It's all about keeping a flat turn in a drifter, you can afford to as you are travelling at 43 knots in my machine at best glide. Which allows for small radius turns.

 

I have practiced turn backs from a range of heights and at all speeds. And 10-15 degree turns are much more efficient than 45 even though it is claimed that 45 is the more efficient change of direction for height loss.

 

Mike

 

 

[Guest ozzie]

Gee from 300ft i have 2 minutes then again it takes me 2 minutes to get there (on a good day)

 

remember i you have to land straight ahead. a hedge is better than a fence a bush is better than a tree. and look for the power lines. keep flying until the dust settles

 

 

[BLA82]

I just keep having visions of this - and I've seen far worse than this:

YouTube - How not to land a glider

 

Kind regards

 

Mike

Mike,

 

That video is a horrible sight I would hate to find myself in a situation like that,

 

On the bright side there is people who can pull of amazing landings!!! Check this guy out

 

YouTube - Gliding Rope Break

 

 

[BLA82]

What seems like a laugh now will become normal if it works well and no one has a better idea.

Never let your imagination get in the way of a good story GFC. I really can't see an idea like that becoming the norm mate. I think instead of using technology to make flying easier, we should hone our skills to make OUR flying safer.

 

In the time wasted reaching for a rocket handle we could be choosing a more appropriate landing spot.

 

Leave that to the Thunderbirds:wasnt me:

 

 

[turboplanner]

Or trying some of BigPete's Camomile tea!

 

 

[Guest Maj Millard]

Pelours32, Checked out the glider not landing, and ouch that hurt. The inside wing stalled then the nose dropped, lucky they were not 20 ft higher at the stall. Classic example of an uncontrolled crash.