Skybaum the issue isn't that it has a unique identifier, indeed thats a good start. However what they should have done is take that a step further...
Non-repudiation is about being able to say "that adsb transponder made the signal, and no other could have.". Without non-repudiation its pitifully easy to generate or duplicate a 24 bit identifier. Hell, the computer i'm typing on now can generate the complete number range of that 24bit identifier in a second or so. Its only 0 to 16 777 215 (about 16 and 3/4 millionish) after all.
In order to be non-repudiated the signal could be digitally signed - see Bas's link above. Its a really straight forward process thats been around for donkeys ages. Its cheap too.
The idea is that having a non-repuditated signal would limit the damage any signal transmitter can do to the trust thats placed in the system.
Think of it like this. A commercial airliner is flying along, minding its own business when its ADSB-in receiver starts saying "turn right for collision avoidance" "descend for collision avoidance" turn right for collision avoidance" "descend for collision avoidance" ad nausem. It wont take the pilots long to either a) decend far enough that they an interface with terrain, or b) (far more likely) turn the damn thing off.
What happens if you do that to an airliner in the queue to land at any major airport? What happens if you do it to two airliners landing on parellel runways, with one turning left for avoidance of fictional traffic and one right. Its going to get exciting awfully fast.
Anyway, i recognise that i'm presenting worst case scenarios, and the current system isn't much better. The thing to keep in mind though, is that the current system doesn't provide the position data - so the damage is limited by the limited functionality.