fly_tornado

Tajer said that even though his airline had installed the optional feature and so had a functional warning light, American Airlines pilots are still unhappy at what he described as newly discovered “misdirection” by Boeing. In a Nov. 27, 2018, meeting following the Lion Air crash, Boeing offered American Airlines pilots reassurance that the Lion Air scenario couldn’t happen to them because they had this warning light. The two AOA sensors on the Lion Air jet disagreed by a large margin, about 20 degrees, throughout the flight and even while the jet taxied on the ground before takeoff when both readings should have been zero. Tajer said the American pilots were told in the meeting that on the flight deck of their 737 MAXs, the AOA disagree light would have lit up on the ground and so, because that’s a “no-go item,” the plane wouldn’t even have taken off. However, Tajer said that within the last two to three weeks, “we are now learning that, unlike Boeing told us in November, the warning light actually is inhibited on the ground.” “We are being told by Boeing that the AOA Disagree Alert … is inhibited until 400 feet above ground level,” he said Sunday. “We are currently awaiting written confirmation of this AOA Disagree Alert limitation as it is not detailed in any 737 flight crew manual.” “Having any equipment detailed in the manual that doesn’t actually exist …. has no place in aviation. There’s no fiction in flight, just the facts,” Tajer added. “Literally, lives count on that.” Long before first 737 MAX crash, Boeing knew a key sensor warning light wasn’t working, but told no one

Long before first 737 MAX crash, Boeing knew a key sensor warning light wasn’t working, but told no one Boeing admitted Sunday that it knew well over a year before the first crash of a 737 MAX in Indonesia last October that a warning light linked to a key sensor on the 737 MAX wasn’t working on most of the airplanes, but it informed neither the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) nor the airlines operating the jet about the problem until after that crash. The warning light is significant because it warned of a malfunction in one of the jet’s Angle of Attack (AOA) sensors, a fault that began the sequence of events that led to both the Lion Air crash in October and the Ethiopian Airlines crash in March. The alert worked only on planes flown by airlines that had bought a separate and optional AOA indicator added to the main flight display panel. Boeing disclosed the existence of the problem publicly only last week after a story in the Wall Street Journal. It disclosed its prior knowledge on Sunday only after a follow-up story. Furthermore, even MAX operators like American Airlines that had bought the optional indicator were misinformed by Boeing last year after the Lion Air crash about how the warning light operates. As Boeing deals with the crisis following the loss of 346 lives in two crashes and works to convince the FAA, the airlines and the public that the MAX should be allowed to fly again as early as next month, the lack of transparency and confusion is challenging Boeing’s credibility. “The more and more we learn with each day, the more challenging it is to rebuild the trust,” said American Airlines Captain Dennis Tajer, spokesman for the Allied Pilots Association (APA). “This slow toxic drip of full disclosure only after full discovery … (has) got to stop if we are going to rebuild the trust that has been so deeply violated.” Boeing said Sunday that its engineers discovered that the warning light wasn’t functioning, due to a software mistake, “in 2017, within several months after beginning 737 MAX deliveries” in May that year. Boeing then conducted an internal review, which “determined that the absence of the AOA Disagree alert did not adversely impact airplane safety or operation.” “Neither the (optional) angle of attack indicator nor the AOA Disagree alert are necessary for the safe operation of the airplane,” Boeing said in the statement. Its review concluded “the existing functionality was acceptable,” Boeing said, adding that it decided that the warning light could be made functional later by de-linking it from the optional display indicator during “the next planned display system software update.” That update was never done before the MAX fleet was grounded in March following the second crash. Boeing said that it wasn’t until after the Lion Air crash that it “informed the FAA that Boeing engineers had identified the software issue in 2017.” Its statement seemed to point blame at an unnamed supplier when it stated that the problem was located in “the software delivered to Boeing.” It also made a point of asserting that “senior company leadership was not involved in the review and first became aware of this issue in the aftermath of the Lion Air accident” The FAA, in a separate statement Sunday, said that following the disclosure by Boeing in November, its Corrective Action Review Board “determined the issue to be ‘low risk'” and decided it could be dealt with as part of Boeing’s software update announced after the Lion Air crash and still in the works. The FAA statement then adds: “However, Boeing’s timely or earlier communication with the operators would have have helped to reduce or eliminate possible confusion.” Boeing did not inform the airlines, the pilots and the public until April 29, six weeks after the second crash. Even then, it didn’t mention until Sunday that it had known about the warning light issue since mid-2017. The warning light, standard on the MAX and included in the pilot manuals, is designed to light up if there’s a disagreement between the two sensors on either side of the plane’s nose that measure the jet’s angle of attack — the angle between the oncoming air flow and the airplane’s wing. If it had been working, the warning light would have lit up on the fatal flights of both the Lion Air and Ethiopian jets. Though it might have provided the pilots an extra early clue as to what was going wrong, it likely wouldn’t have made a big difference in either crash scenario. The AOA alert wouldn’t have helped the Lion Air pilots understand their situation any better because they were also unaware of the new MAX flight control system — called Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, or MCAS — and how it was activated. MCAS was not in the pilot manual. The Ethiopian pilots, who after the previous crash would have been keenly aware of MCAS, seem to have realized that system was the problem reasonably quickly and tried to follow Boeing’s recommended checklist of procedures to handle it, though they still were not able to control the plane.

quiet a good background

because rules

once they do the risk assessment is done, it will be a game of risk minimization. RAAF to take ownership of Temora aircraft Changes at Temora The Temora museum marks its 20th birthday next year and its aircraft will play an important part in the RAAF’s 100th anniversary celebrations in 2021. Picture Credit: Colin Turner 30 April 2019 A substantial change to the Temora Aviation Museum comes into effect on 1 July this year when the RAAF takes over ownership of 11 of the museum’s fleet of warbirds. Nearly two years in the making, this has been done to ensure the museum’s future and has no effect on its day-to-day running. Visitors to the museum’s Showcase flying days and future Warbirds Downunder shows will notice no difference. Most importantly, the aircraft must remain at Temora under the terms of the contracts which have been put in place. Key points: The arrangement covers an initial period of five years starting 1 July 2019 and will be reviewed annually. The aircraft being transferred to the RAAF are Spitfires VH-HET and VH-XVI, Hudson VH-KOY, Boomerang VH-MHR, Ryan STM VH-RSY, Wirraway VH-BFF, A-37 Dragonfly VH-XVA, Canberra VH-ZSQ, Vampire VH-VAM, Meteor VH-MBX and Tiger Moth VH-UVZ. Those not being transferred are Dragonfly VH-DLO and Cessna O-2 VH-OII. The aircraft will remain based at Temora. Temora Aviation Museum Engineering Pty Ltd will continue to provide maintenance and engineering support for the aircraft, under contract to the RAAF. Temora Historic Flight Club continues as the museum’s flying operations entity. Selected civilian pilots flying the aircraft will be offered appointment to the RAAF Reserve as ‘specialist capability officers’ to satisfy the various legal and regulatory requirements. The museum’s top management remains as before: chief executive Murray Kear, general manager Peter Harper and chief engineer Andrew Bishop. Privately-owned visiting warbirds will continue to fly at the museum’s events. The museum marks its 20th birthday next year and its aircraft will play an important part in the RAAF’s 100th anniversary celebrations in 2021.

the empty weight on a Grunman is 460Kgs Specifications (AA-1A) Data from The American Trainer Owner's Manual[8] General characteristics Crew: one pilot Capacity: one passenger Length: 19.24 ft (5.87 m) Wingspan: 24.46 ft (7.46 m) Height: 6.80 ft (2.07 m) Wing area: 98 ft² (9.11 m²) Empty weight: 1,018 lb (461 kg) Max. takeoff weight: 1,500 lb (680 kg) Powerplant: 1 × Lycoming O-235-C2C flat-four engine, 108 hp (80.6 kW)

Wagners to take $10m hit in cement dispute Wagners has suspended deliveries to Boral, which takes about 40 per cent of its cement. By Nick Evans 12:00AM April 24, 2019 2 Comments Building products group Wagners will take a $10 million hit to its earnings after calling in the lawyers on its biggest cement customer and launching action in the Queensland Supreme Court over a pricing dispute. Wagners shares slumped last month after it said its key cement buyer, construction giant Boral, was trying to force down its contract prices because it had been ­offered cheaper prices by an unnamed competitor — believed to be Cement Australia, a 50-50 joint venture between Swiss giant ­Holcim and HeidelbergCement’s Hanson. The company suspended deliveries to Boral, which takes about 40 per cent of Wagners cement, while it disputed the bona fides of the rival offer through dispute resolution procedures in its contract. Wagner admitted last night that that process had failed, in a disclosure released after the close of the market, saying it would seek a ruling on the contractual stoush through the courts. It stripped $10m from its annual earnings forecast due to the dispute, saying it now expected its profit before tax and interest would fall to as low as $25m-$28m for the financial year. That would be around half its pro-forma earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation for the 2018 financial year of $50.3m. Wagners shares have plunged from an all-time high of $4.29 in October last year to below $2 late last month, on the back of a softening outlook for building construction in the company’s main markets in Queensland, delays in major infrastructure announcements, and the dispute with Boral. Wagners floated at $2.71 a share in ­December 2017. Cement is the group’s most profitable product, and analysts say the Boral contract makes up about a third of Wagners’ earnings. The company said last month that the decision to suspend supply to Boral, for up to six months, would cost it $20m in lost revenue. In its statement last night, the company said the earnings downgrade factored in the loss of revenue from Boral, “the disruption faced by the cement business as well as the impacts that will flow into the concrete market, conditions in the precast concrete market and delays in projects starting”. While analysts have flagged the potential loss of Boral’s business as a major threat to Wagners’ outlook, the company said last night its forecast earnings and revenue would be restored if the courts took its side in the dispute “Upon resolution of the ­dispute, the sales and volumes are expected to return as provided for under the Cement Supply ­Agreement,” the company said. It is the second time Wagners has lowered its earnings guidance this year. The group in January downgraded its expected full-year EBITDA to a range of between $35m and $38m, down from $39.5m previously. The group attributed that move to “substantial investment” in the business in readiness for domestic and international growth, as well as the timing of major projects that were yet to begin. Wagners’ shares closed yesterday at $2.26, down 4c, or 1.7 per cent.

Qantas Pilot Academy could hold 840 students 23rd Apr 2019 5:00 AM Subscriber only THE Qantas Pilot Academy at Wellcamp Airport could host 840 students a year within eight years if all stages of the project materialise. The development application submitted to the Toowoomba Regional Council last week by Precinct Urban Planning, on behalf of Wagner Corporation, revealed the school could have a much larger number of students than the 250 places Qantas announced last year. The academy will be built on 94.53 hectares of land adjacent to the Wellcamp Airport runway, on the opposite side to the terminal building. Stage one will see the construction of an air training facility, hangar complex, aircraft parking area and an accommodation village including accommodation for 84 students and the initial recreation facility, gym and outdoor courts. This would further expand to include accommodation for 192 extra students, 276 total, during stage two of the project. Plans for the Qantas Pilot Training Academy at Wellcamp Airport. Tobi Loftus The air training facility will include classrooms, briefing rooms, flight simulator room, staff rooms, offices and amenities. The duplex-style accommodation buildings will comprise of units containing six bedrooms per unit, a kitchen, two bathrooms per unit and a laundry. The hangar will be adjacent to the runway of the airport with access to the tarmac via a sealed taxiway. The Wagners are seeking an extended approval period of eight years to complete stage three to seven of the project, which would see accommodation facilities for 840 students, extensions to the air training facility, a second recreation centre and a ground training facility. Toowoomba Mayor Paul Antonio said he was excited to hear the development application had been submitted to the council. "This is a project, not only of regional significance, but one of state and national significance," Cr Antonio said. they will definitely be looking for instructors @mnewbery

you make a very good point @mnewbery

and flying around Indonesia would be bit pretty hairy in the wet season.

my brakes specify Automatic transmission fluid

the problem for most African and Asian airlines is the growth in passenger volumes is huge and its hard keeping up when you don't have the training infrastructure that is common in the west

It all comes back to training really

if the AOA sensor gets damaged the autopilot should be able to work that out, the same as a blocked pitot tube

I reckon that if they hadn't grounded the MAX8s they would have been another crash eventually. the MCAS system should be overridden by the autopilot and ignore a faulty AOA sensor.

you're never going to get the cream of aviation flying in africa or south east asia when the chinese and middle eastern airlines offering much better money. I can't understand how when the autopilot is engaged the MCAS system is also active? seems like having 2 systems active at the same time is a recipe for a conflict. Also why does the AOA device not shutdown when it goes off the scale after a bird strike?

UPDATE: Aviation crash investigators are expected to arrive at a Cunnamulla property tomorrow where a 21-year-old pilot died in a light plane crash on Sunday. Isaac Bain was the sole occupant of the Foxbat A22LS ultralight plane and was contract mustering on Aldville Station north of the rural township when the aircraft crash landed. Condolences to everyone who knew Isaac.

you sort of imagine that the Gen 1,2 and 3 engines will continue to hurt Jabiru's reputation for another 15-20 years

its more about ex-ADF people finding no market for their skills in the civilian job market and deciding that claiming compo is a lot better than the dole. It only takes a few months for word to get around that someone got a big payout because they tripped over in the dark.

the early ones were found to get unstable if around lightning

this was an A model that went missing

Japanese F-35 Lightning II Stealth Aircraft Reported Missing Over The Pacific Ocean About David Cenciotti 3699 Articles 2-3 minutes File photo of a Japanese AIr Self Defense Force F-35 (Image credit: Lockheed Martin). According to several Japanese media outlets, an F-35A Lightning II belonging to the Japan Air Self Defense Force is currently reported as missing during a mission over the Pacific Ocean. The F-35 launched from Misawa Air Base, in Aomori Prefecture, in the norther part of the country. Misawa is the home of the 302 Hikotai (Squadron), the unit previously operating the F-4EJ “Kai”, that has officially moved to Misawa air base to operate the JASDF F-35A 5th generation aircraft after retiring its last Phatom on Mar. 26, 2019. According to the JASDF, the aircraft had taken off from about 7 minutes, as part of a 4-ship formation, when it disappered on Apr. 9, at 7:27PM LT on the Pacific Ocean about 135 km east of Misawa. Japan Maritime Self Defense Force search and rescue vessels have been dispatched to the area where the aircraft disappeared. If confirmed, the Japanese loss would be the second involving the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighters. The first one occurred on September 28, 2018 when a U.S. Marine F-35B Lightning II crashed near Beaufort, South Carolina. The pilot ejected safely. As a consequence of that mishap, almost all the F-35s were shortly grounded on Thursday, October 12, 2018 for safety inspections of their fuel flow systems. Japan’s program of record is 147 aircraft says the official Lockheed Martin website. “In December 2018, the Japan Ministry of Defense announced its decision to increase its procurement of F-35s from 42 to 147. They stated the aircraft will be a mix of 105 F-35As and 42 F-35B STOVL (Short Take Off and Vertical Landing) aircraft.” 13 F-35A are currently based at Misawa AB, based on Japanese media reports. We will update the story as new details emerge.

Do we have any hard data about how many landing fees are actually being avoided? If every RAA aircraft avoided paying a $10 landing fee once a year that would be a whopping $33k lost revenue. Goes to show you just how willing the RAA is to sell out its members to keep CASA happy.

no more carb ice, less likely to burn out an exhaust valve, engine runs lean of peak all the time

not if they buy avgas