One of the issues with the Tomahawk was that different examples of the type behaved differently and none conformed to the type design data per the prototype used for stall/spin testing.
Yep, Cessna designers "lost it" for the Skycatcher at first.
I have run numbers on quite a few aeroplanes using that method and, as it says here, it is quite good to use in preliminary design.
The report detail is at http://naca.central.cranfield.ac.uk/reports/arc/cp/0195.pdf
The NACA Tail Damping Power Factor is more simple but not as good as a predictor https://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/19930082166.pdf
It is not the only aeroplane around with those instructions - the early Robin 2160 is another however the Robin has a very big rudder but when they went for American certification the FAA insisted on PARE to stop the spin per FAR 23.I'm certainly interested in seeing the spin test report for the Bristell. Even for types which are not approved for intentional spins the scope of testing is quite comprehensive.
Similar type to the Bristell:
I agree.For example, from one of the forums I attended at Oshkosh this year:
Aft cg limit is commonly determined from compliance with spin recovery requirements.
Another point is that there are some aeroplanes around where, at aft cg, the stick position to hold a steady airspeed does not vary much so the term "stall stick position" is of little use as a cue.
As a comparison, the Decathlon spin doesn't vary much in behaviour between the forward and aft limits although at fwd cg it may tend to enter a spiral dive. Misuse of of aileron and/or power will flatten it regardless of cg; forward stick prior to rudder on recovery will steepen the nose down attitude (an accelerated spin) which can significantly delay the recovery.
Your hints weren't consistent with the DR-109 either but I thought that I would try to flush it out - certainly looks like it started life as a DR-109.
You had a first class instructor in Alf! One of my students is listed on that old page too. It would've been at GFS then - training records were in the Scouts filing cabinet so perhaps the filing cabinet is still with someone or at MFS (or even at Oxford)- worth asking around? I'll make some enquiries.
Do you remember who did your GFPT test?
The GFPT should’ve been notified to CASA back then so, I agree, the logbook would be very useful especially as it should have the GFPT sticker in it. No reason for a school to keep training records for that long, perhaps your logbook was left at SAS so an extremely small chance that it is buried somewhere. Recall names of any instructors?
Looks like you’ll have to start from scratch and notch up the minimum hours at least.
Your GFPT will get you an RPL with a little bit of paperwork so saves doing a test at the end of your refresher training, just a flight review. Absence of a logbook after all that time doesn’t matter at all.
One of my friends was in a similar situation except that he had his logbook but no-one was interested in the contents.
AOPA and SAAA are not "shooting down the GFA and RAAus privileges", to the contrary, the letters I see applaud those privileges however they are angry at RAA trying to stop some of those same privileges being given to those who fly under CASA rules - safety is the consideration not protection of someone's empire.
The last flap position was removed by CASA (their predecessor actually) via AD due aileron overbalance at low airspeed.
http://services.casa.gov.au/airworth/airwd/ADfiles/under/vat/VAT-018.pdf refers.
This later AD introduced springs into the aileron to increase the force required to deflect the aileron - the last flap position could then be reinstated but I am not aware of any which did. http://services.casa.gov.au/airworth/airwd/ADfiles/under/vat/VAT-034.pdf
A Sling 4 POH (dunno if it applied to that example) that I found online clearly indicated that it was extremely easy to load outside the allowable CG range. Not too hard to take the hint from the sample loadings in that POH.
Stall stick position also depends on power setting and loading on the controls. I have previously posted data on stick position vs AoA for specific aircraft - one in which stick position would be particularly useless in indicating an approach to a stall - regardless, it is a sensible cue. Unless one has one of these new-fangled AoA indicators fitted but many don’t. Unfortunately many people don’t sense stick position, instead they are generally aware of stick force hence the choice of that link I recently posted.
Some good advice by Jim at http://www.dylanaviation.com/dont-stall/
Despite my briefing to wait until established on final before reducing airspeed, pretty much all of my tailwheel students lose airspeed during the base to final turn so they purposely pull back and increase the angle of attack - definitely not a good habit.
The turn method of "bank ... balance ... back pressure" used in initial training has its place but not in this situation.
See the video and a witness statement: "It, like, lost control, and it was twirling, and the more twirl, the more lower it came down and then we heard the bang,"I can only recall that NTSB forum again per my prior post.
So many accidents (per the NTSB Forum that I attended at Oshkosh) ... turn .. stall .. spin .. crash ... burn ... die ..
Might not be relevant to this accident, my comment is generic, I can wait for the final report ...
I wouldn't think a "major control failure" would result in: "A witness who was on the mountainside at the time of the crash told the 20 Minutes newspaper that "the plane turned 180 degrees to the south and fell to the ground like a stone"."