Phil Perry

I think this is the last in the Falklands series,. . .so I thought I might as well post it to conclude BP's rather good series of essays on the subject. The Battle of Goose Green 28-29 May 1982 Politics Overriding Military Necessity “No battle plan survives contact with the enemy.” Helmuth von Moltke COMPANY ORDERS – THE ADVANCE TO CONTACT All timings are local Situation Enemy ForcesFriendly ForcesAttached/DetachedIntelligence reports that the enemy numbers approximately one to possibly three Argentine Infantry Companies.2nd Battalion the Parachute Regiment consisting of three rifle companies, one patrol company, one support company and one headquarters company. SAS flanking forces.Three 105 mm artillery pieces with 960 shells from 29 Commando Regiment, Royal Artillery; one MILAN anti-tank missile platoon and Scout helicopters as support elements. In addition, close air support available from three Royal Air Force. Golf Romeo Three Harriers, and naval gunfire support to be provided by HMS Arrow in the hours of darkness. Detachments nil. Commander’s Intent With the bulk of the Argentine forces based in positions around Port Stanley, 50 miles east of San Carlos, the Argentine garrison at Goose Green and Darwin pose a low threat and have limited offensive capability. However, politicians in London and senior commanders in the UK feel that although British Forces are digging in around San Carlos prior to pushing east, this seeming inactivity means the momentum of the campaign is slowing. The British Joint Headquarters has come under increased pressure by Her Majesty’s Government, for an early ground offensive for political and propaganda value. There are also fears that the United Nations Security Council would vote for a cease-fire, maintaining current positions. If the Darwin-Goose Green isthmus could be taken prior to such a decision, British forces would control access to the entire Lafonia and thus a significant portion of East Falkland. On 25 May Brigadier Julian Thompson, ground forces commander, commanding 3 Commando Brigade, has been ordered to mount an attack on Argentine positions around Goose Green and Darwin. Brigadier Thompson has ordered 2nd Battalion of the Parachute Regiment (2 Para) to prepare for and execute the operation as they are the unit closest to Goose Green in the San Carlos defensive perimeter. He orders Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert ‘H’ Jones, officer commanding 2 Para, to carry out a raid on Goose Green isthmus and capture the settlements before withdrawing in a reserve for the main thrust to the north. Ground The settlements of Goose Green and Darwin are located on an isthmus that connects Lafonia to Wickham Heights, the two main areas of the East Falkland Island. The ground is rolling, treeless and covered extensively with gorse. The ground is frequently sodden in the southern hemisphere’s winter from May to August. Movement, especially at night is exhausting and drizzly rain occurs at least one out of every three days. Winds are continuous and the cover is sparse. The two settlements dominate the isthmus. Darwin to the North and Goose Green to the South. Goose Green has a grass airstrip. Map of Goose Green and Darwin. Note that Mount Pleasant Air Base had not been constructed in 1982. Enemy Forces Unusually, the SAS intelligence regarding Argentine forces defending the settlement was well wide of the mark, with their estimate being of one enemy company. The Brigade intelligence was much closer to actual enemy forces. Unfortunately, Lieutenant-Colonel Jones made his planning assumptions on the SAS reports as he felt that being on the ground, their reports were likely to be more accurate. The Argentine forces defending the isthmus, known as Task Force Mercedes consisted of two companies with a third deployed on Mount Kent. It also contained a company of Rangers from the 25th Infantry Regiment, six 20mm Rheinmetalls anti-aircraft guns, and two radar guided Oerlikon 35mm guns from the 601st Anti-aircraft Battalion. The task force also had a battery of three 105mm howitzers and air support from Pucaras based at Stanley. Minefields had alse been laid in tactically important positions. Lieutenant-Colonel Italo Piaggi had a command of over 1,083 men. The BBC had already been in action against the British Task Force. A news report had picked up the fact that a large number of Argentine bombs were not exploding, despite hitting their ship targets and in some cases going right through them. A BBC television report helpfully speculated that the Argentine armourers were fitting the wrong fuse settings on the bombs. To avoid the high concentration of British air defences, Argentine pilots were releasing their bombs from very low altitudes, giving the fuses too little time to arm before impact. The BBC broadcast this information and was severely criticised by the task force Commander, Admiral Woodward, who blamed them for alerting the Argentines to the supposed fault. Interestingly, Colonel H. Jones, also accused the BBC of giving information to the enemy when the BBC Overseas Service reported on the movement of 2 Para and capture of Goose Green before it actually happened and he had threatened to bring charges of treason against the Board of Governors. Sadly he was killed at Goose Green before he could pursue the charge. The Argentine forces in the settlements couldn’t fail to work out British intentions. On 4th May Sea Harriers had attacked the airfield at Goose Green and one Harrier had been shot down and the pilot killed. On 21st May, the SAS had launched a diversional raid on Darwin to cover the amphibious landings in San Carlos and Argentine scouts spotted 2 Para reconnaissance parties as they scouted the routes into the settlements. On 27th May RAF Harriers again attacked the airfield, again an aircraft was lost and the BBC put the cherry on top of the cake when it announced that the 2nd Battalion of the Parachute Regiment was poised and ready to assault Goose Green and Darwin. It hardly required a Bletchly Park and thousands of codebreakers to work out what the British were up to. Execution Timings and preliminary moves (All local)Scheme of manoeuvre over six phases: Phase 1 (Quiet) 0300L C Company is to secure the start line Phase 2 (Noisy) A Company is to launch the attack from the start line on the left (Darwin) side of the isthmus. Phase 3 B Company is to launch its attack from the start line directly after A Company has initiated contact and would advance on the right (Boca House) side of the isthmus. Phase 4 Once A and B companies have secured their initial objectives, D Company will then advance from the start line between A and B companies. A and B companies are to “go firm” on having exploited their objective. Phase 5 This will be followed by C Company, which is required to pass through D Company and neutralise any Argentine reserves. Phase 6 C Company will then advance again and clear the Goose Green airfield after which the settlements of Darwin and Goose Green will be secured by A and D companies respectively. Burntside House The majority of the helicopter heavy lift capability had been lost on the Atlantic Conveyor, so 2 Para was required to march 13 miles from San Carlos to the forming up point at Camilla Creek House. At 2200L on 27th May C Company and the engineers moved out to clear the route and the start line for the other companies. A fire support base was established by the support company and three 105mm guns and ammunition were in place by 0200 on the 28th. The guns and ammunition had been flown up by Sea King helicopters. The attack was due to commence at 0300 but delays in registering fire support from HMS Arrow delayed the start until 0335. HMS Arrow opened fire at 0335, the first round of the 22 star shells and 135 4.5” HE shells she would fire during the battle. In the fight for Burntside House twelve Argentine Marines were killed as they fought a delaying action, before falling back to Darwin Ridge. D Company was slowed and halted by the unexpected, stiff Argentine resistance, until Lance-Corporal Bingley and Private Grayling went out from cover and charged the Argentine machine gun position that had been stifling the advance. Bingley was killed and Grayling severely wounded. Bingley was later posthumously awarded the Military Medal and Grayling the Queen’s Gallantry Medal. Burntside House was cleared for the cost of three Paras killed. Sunray is down! The British advance continued south, but the Argentine Marines made a determined stand on Darwin Ridge. As the Para’s A and B Company advanced they received enfilading sniper and machine gun fire from concealed Argentine positions. Taking heavy casualties, the British advance faltered and was stopped. The Paras were in a grim position. A Company was stuck in the gorse line at the bottom of Darwin Hill while entrenched Argentine positions were able to fire down on the Paras. It was now daybreak and a frustrated Colonel H Jones led a charge by members of the HQ Company up a small gulley. The Adjutant Captain Wood and the 2IC of A Company, Captain Dent were killed with Corporal Hardman. Seconds later, Colonel Jones was seen running to a narrow re-entrant followed by his bodyguard. He ran up the hill towards the Argentine position, was hit once and went down, he got up and was then hit again from the flank. He fell short of the Argentine trench line with wounds in his back and groin and he died within a few minutes. His men radioed for a hot casevac, but the Scout helicopter sent in was shot down. For his action leading his men, Lieutenant-Colonel Jones’ widow would receive the Victoria Cross. At 1030, A Company made a third attempt on Darwin Hill, but this too was defeated by the dogged defence by the Argentine 1st Platoon of IR25’s Company C, commanded by 2nd Lieutenant Estévez who also brought down 105mm artillery and 120mm mortar fire on the Paras. During this period of stalemate, the Para’s support company had fired over 1,000 3” mortar rounds to suppress Argentine forces, otherwise British casualties would have been horrendous. It was just before noon when the British advance resumed and Major Farrar-Hockley’s A Company of the Paras cleared the eastern enemy positions on Darwin Ridge. On the other flank another fierce firefight was taking place around the ruins of Boca House. Major Crossland’s C Company took the western sector of the ridge after the Support Company brought up Milan anti-tank missiles to destroy the Argentine bunkers. The Milan is a tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided missile (TOW). The Argentine defenders in future battles, would come to hate the bobbing and jinking balls of fire from the missiles’ rocket motors heading inexorably towards their bunkers. A and C Companies rolled up Darwin Ridge with rifle butts, grenades and bayonets, opening the way to the airstrip and Goose Green. For exemplary leadership, Majors Farrar-Hockley and Crosland each won the Military Cross. The Argentine forces had courageously held the ridge for over six hours against a numerically superior British elite force. 2nd Lieutenant Estévez who was mortally wounded in the fighting, would later receive the deserved and grandly titled Argentine Nation to the Heroic Valour in Combat Cross. QuestionConsiderationDeductionChanged Situation Reiterative process throughout the operation. Has the situation changed since the orders were received? What has changed? No change – confirm mission. Same mission, same plan. Same mission, amend plan. New mission, new plan. Refer to superior commander or if not possible, act in support of his main effort, taking into account his intent. The Airfield and Darwin School From Darwin Hill, C and D Companies headed for the airfield and Darwin School after a quick and dirty amendment of the original plan. C Company took heavy losses when they were targeted by Argentine 35mm anti-aircraft guns. Up to 20% of the company became casualties to these effective and well dug-in weapons. The Argentine Air Force gunners were forced to abandon their guns after the Para’s Support Company brought down fire on their positions. Also hampering the Paras advance were air attacks by Pucaras from Stanley, but fortunately the boggy ground absorbed much of the bomb blasts. The Argentine defenders of 25th Regiment ambushed D Company on the airfield and the Para’s Platoon Sergeant led a charge on the enemy positions with his machine gun, killing four. Private Carter won the Military Medal by rallying No. 12 Platoon and leading it forward at bayonet point to take the airfield. Under a single rear-guard action by Sergeant Sergio Ismael Garcia, the Argentine defenders withdrew into Darwin Settlement. For this action Garcia would receive the Argentine Nation to the Valour in Combat Medal. At this point three RAF Harrier GR 3s made an attack on the airfield’s anti-aircraft positions and this together with the shooting down of two Argentine aircraft by a Blowpipe missile, raised the Paras’ morale at a crucial time. The attacking Harriers had been misidentified by Sea Harriers led by Lieutenant Commander Ward and Flight Lieutenant Mortimer of 801 Squadron RNAS and were nearly shot down during their bombing run. Situation at Dusk 28th May By last light the situation for 2 Para was not good. They had failed to take all of their objectives and the timescale of the operation was massively behind schedule. B Company, which had swung much further south in an arc towards Goose Green was isolated and under constant Argentine fire. To make matters worse, eight Argentine helicopters landed south-west of B Company’s position, bringing the remaining Company B of IR12 (Combat Team Solari) from Mount Kent. C Company brought down artillery fire on these enemy troops and they dispersed towards Goose Green settlement. C Company’s IC was wounded and the 2IC unaccounted for. The Paras redistributed ammunition, but were short of food and D Company was out of water. Major Keeble had taken command after the death of Lieutenant Colonel Jones and he took stock of the situation. The Paras had surrounded the enemy forces, but the Argentines were still very much “in the game” and Keeble had to consider the fate of the Falkland Islanders who were effectively hostages within the settlements. Rather than fight in the settlements, the Major decided to call for an Argentine surrender. Should that fail, his second course of action was to flatten Goose Green with all available support firepower and launch an all-out simultaneous attack with all of his bayonet strength. He requested support and J Company of 42 Commando and another mortar battery were helicoptered down to the isthmus. Keeble had a message sent via CB radio from San Carlos to Mr Eric Goss, the farm manager at Goose Green, giving the terms of the surrender. Goss relayed this to Colonel Piaggi, the commander of the Argentine garrison. After midnight, two Argentine POWs were sent into the settlement, requesting that the Argentine commander met a delegation from the British. Piaggi agreed and mulled over the terms. He concluded that reinforcements were unlikely, his troops although in good order and with plenty of small arms ammunition, were surrounded and the British could raise the settlement any time they wished. He also had the lives of civilians to consider and because he was an honourable man, Colonel Piaggi agreed to unconditional surrender all Argentine forces at the settlement, the following morning. The next morning, the Argentine troops had a short parade, burned the regimental flag and lay down their weapons. Aftermath Around 50 Argentinian troops were killed and 86 were wounded. The British lost 18 killed and 64 wounded. History was not kind to Lieutenant-Colonel Piaggi. Because he surrendered on the Argentines’ National Day he was forced to resign from the Army. And his competence was constantly questioned. After a long fight in the civilian courts, Piaggi had his retired military rank and pension reinstated. He died in 2012. The Battle of Goose Green was spun as a resounding British military victory against a resolute and well dug-in foe. But many within the Task Force and 2 Para itself, questioned the need to fight a vastly numerically superior enemy force, which could have been isolated and bypassed. It also came as a profound shock that a third-world, largely conscript Army could fight so professionally and doggedly. The skill and bravery of the Argentine air force had already been proven and recognised, but the Argentine defence of Goose Green was a harbinger of battles to come. The politicians with their 8,000 mile long screwdriver had blood on their hands. Blown Periphery 2018. Going Postal Blog.

Strewth mate,. . . . your SMS alert must be a joy to behold. . .I miss most text message alerts when driving as my Android phone doesn't have a loud enough alert function . . . .

You may larf and dismiss this as bullcrap BUT,. . .a local farmer that I know personally has been helping the highways authority to clear snowdrifts from the local roads using his tractor, fitted with a snow blade. . . He has done this for a few days, expecting no thanks from the council, as they are complete and utter assholes, only interested in their expenses and other interests. . . He asked if the local council would at least cover the costs of his diesel fuel for clearing the roads,. . .and their response was to threaten him with penalties for using Red dieisel ( Farm diesel ) to run his plough tractors on the highway. . . . . I HATE THESE FECKING ASS HOLES to the bottom of my heart and wish them all a painful death.. . . .who the hell voted for these creeps anyhow . . . . they certainly are not qualified members of the Human race. . . .

On my VERY FIRST proper nav cross country excercise from Casey airfeld,at Berwick, (several NM South West of Melbourne, in the Dandenong direction. . .). . . I was flying a C-172 to Deniliquin and return,. . .and after saying G'day to Melbourne ATC, after clearing their airspace around the Eastern route around the zone. . . to the North,. . .I had ( I thought ) put the mike down on the right hand seat,. . .we didn't have headphones back in them days, and used the classic Cessna Mike, which was a 'D' shaped tubular device, which fitted into a clip bracket on the panel,. . only, the clip was broken on this aircraft and I put the mike on the other seat out of the way. . . this iem got jammed down (somehow ) between the seats. I was operating on Sartime,. . so did not have to make regular reports to an FSU, so did not require the radio. When I called Deniliquin,. . .can't remember if I had to change frequency, . . .might have been the usual 119.1, the channel used for most non controlled country airfields at the time, ( I thought ) that I found the mike was jammed between the seats. . . When I got near to Deniliquin, I noticed the problem. . . .. I got a Right Royal Bolllocking,. . . .How they knew that it was ME I don't know,. . .but the only thing which cheered me up was the Lady who did the refuelling for me,. . .I think that her name was Mel,. . .she had on a very short Mini skirt and it was a Joy to a young man to see this vision of 30 year old loveliness on the ladder pumping the fuel that I had asked for. . . In fact, I could have watched her all day but I digress.. . .Keith Hatfield, the owner of the Groupair Aviation Company shielded me from any repercussions as a 'Student' making a silly error. . . . Being a Radio Techy nowadays, I realise that as I flew further away from Melbourne, the signal strength from the Cessna's radio ( 7 Watts RMS ) would have reduced considerably, thereby allowing other aircraft to use the frequency with only a small, and mildly annoying heterodyne in the background. . . I Have had WORSE JAMMED MIKE incidents on Amateur Radio,. . .one night on Mount Dandenong Restaurant car park, the Missus and I had ,. . .well,. . .sort of Mild disagreement,. . which, due to a jammed mike allowed most of the Melbourne radio hams to have a giggle about. . . when you're parked at 2,000 feet AMSL, the signals on VHF tend to travel a long way. . . .

Indeed Sir. I have decided NOT to tell him, as I've already had the 'Grammar Nazi' cartoon posted under some of my corrections in the past,. . . However this does not detract from the fact that you are quite correct to point it out. . .

The Air War and the Battle of San Carlos Operation Sutton 21st – 23rd May 1982 As a prelude to the British Landings, the Argentine observation post on Fanning Head needed to be neutralised. Fanning Head is a towering headland nearly 800 feet high and overlooks San Carlos Water. This operation was conducted by HMS Antrim, two Wessex helicopter, around thirty-five men of SBS, a Royal Marine interpreter and a Naval Gunfire Support Officer. A helicopter flew in a pathfinder party from the SBS who had been issued with thermal imaging equipment. They identified the Argentine positions for the main party, which arrived later. The SBS “killer group” took up positions overlooking the Argentines who were dug in, while HMS Antrim shelled their positions. Captain Rod Bell RM, who spoke Spanish, called out to the Argentines an invited them to surrender. The thermal imagers identified that the Argentines were moving towards the British. The SBS unleashed a torrent of hate until Captain Bell asked them to check fire and once again asked for a surrender. The Argentines ran up white flags and were captured. When their positions were searched later, eleven bodies were found in the rough ground. Diversionary attacks were carried out by the SAS on Darwin and Goose Green, while HMS Glamorgan operating in Berkeley Sound shelled Argentine positions around Port Stanley. During the SAS raid on Darwin and Goose Green, the Argentine garrison estimated that they were being attacked by a unit of Battalion strength. The garrison at Goose Green airfield was subsequently heavily reinforced. In the hours of darkness on 21st May 1982, the British Amphibious Task Group landed 4,000 men on the beaches in and around San Carlos Water, a bay that faced into Falkland Sound. The Men of 3 Commando Brigade comprised of the following: 2nd Battalion the Parachute Regiment from the RORO Ferry Norland. 40 Commando Royal Marines from HMS Fearless, 3rd battalion the Parachute Regiment from HMS Intrepid. 45 Commando from RFA Stromness. In addition Rapier point air defences batteries and 105mm guns were put ashore by helicopter. There were however delays in setting up the Rapier as they had been stored well below decks to protect the delicate electronics. By dawn on 22nd May the troops secured the bridgehead. 2 Para and 40 Commando pushed forward and secured the heights of the Verde Mountains and the Sussex Mountains, which dominated San Carlos and they overlooked the bays and Falkland Sound. While the Paras were clearing San Carlos settlement, a Gazelle helicopter was hit in the tail rotor and crashed into the sea. Argentine machine guns fired at the crew in the water and Sergeant Evans later died of gunshot wounds. A second Gazelle went to the assistance of the first and it too was shot down, crashing into a hillside. Both crew members were killed. During the first day of the landings, the RAF Harrier GR3s were in action providing close support to a patrol of the SAS who had discovered an Argentine helicopter hide. The helicopters were moved from Port Stanley at night to an area near Mount Kent to protect them from a Pebble Island type of raid. The SAS patrol reported that they could be attacked at first light, before being moved back to Stanley. A brace of GR3s went in to attack the helicopters with their 35mm cannons. Squadron Leader Pook and Flight Lieutenant Hare made several passes over the base and destroyed a Chinook and two Pumas. A second brace of GR3s were sent on an armed reconnaissance to Port Howard. The lead aircraft could not retract its undercarriage and had to return to the carrier. Flight Lieutenant Glover pressed on alone to attack Argentine positions. The forward air controller asked Glover to photograph the area and as it passed over them, the Harrier was hit three times in the port wing. It rolled and Glover waited for the aircraft to right itself before he ejected. Glover seriously injured his shoulder as the rockets blew him clear of the aircraft, and had to be rescued from the sea by civilians and Argentine troops. He was treated for his injuries and taken to Argentina, to be released after the war. A field hospital was set up in disused buildings at Ajax Bay. From that night, and every night until the 14th June Argentine Air Force (FAA) Camberras attempted to bomb the troop concentrations in and around San Carlos. These became an irritant, which kept the troops awake at night. The bombing attacks by day were in a totally different league. The FAA fielded A4 Skyhawks, Israeli-built Daggers, Mirage IIIs and Pucaras operating from the many improvised airstrips around the islands. The fast jets had to operate from mainland Argentina because the RAF’s Black Buck operations had effectively interdicted Port Stanley Airport to fast jet operations and only the A4s could have operated from the short runway in any case. The Argentine fighter bombers were carrying a minimum of bombload with a maximum amount of fuel. But by God, did their pilots know how to fight their aircraft. The Argentine pilots had a difficult run-in to their targets, which were the ships in San Carlos. They had to follow the terrain across West Falkland to avoid the radar and anti- aircraft defences, flying a high-low-high mission profile. They would be easy meat for the Harriers coming in laden with bombs or going home, short of fuel. An approach from the north or south would make them dangerously short of fuel for the return flight. As they came in across Falkland Sound into San Carlos, the Argentine pilots had a minimum amount of time to visually acquire their targets. But it was a double-edged sword. The ships’ radar had a minimum amount of time to acquire, lock on and fire the anti-aircraft missiles. The British ships’ issued GPMGs and rifles to every member of their compliments’ with eyesight and a pulse, with orders to fire at every fixed wing aircraft they saw. The Harrier CAP wisely gave San Carlos a wide berth. It quickly became obvious that the British ships’ anti-aircraft defences weren’t up to the task. The anti-aircraft systems were having the same problems of acquisition and lock-on as the Argentine pilots. The performance of the Rapier missile system was particularly disappointing. HMS Ardent was sunk on 21st May. HMS Antelope was sunk on 24th May. HMS Coventry was sunk when she was ordered to draw the Argentine aircraft away from the other ships in San Carlos, a mission she successfully completed. HMS Argonaut and HMS Brilliant were badly damaged when multiple bombs hit the ships but failed to detonate. Dug in on the Sussex Mountains, the men of 2 Para watched the little fighter bombers jinking through the ships and the maelstrom of fire and tracer below, the light reflecting off their twisting wings, like sunlight off minnows at the bottom of a pond. They mounted a running commentary; oooooohhhs and ahhhhhhs for particularly impressive displays of Argentine airmanship. Spontaneous applause when an aircraft was hit by a missile and cheers when the pilot ejected safely. Military personnel can be a perverse and difficult bunch to understand for some, but they tend to admire bravery and tenacity, whoever displays it. The Argentine pilots were pushing their envelope by the time they made their final approach to San Carlos Water. No air-to-air refuelling for them. That was for the elite pilots of the Exocet-carrying Super Etendards who were tasked to sink the British carriers. The fighter bombers had the long transit across the South Atlantic in single engine aircraft. Any malfunction or flame-out and they would die alone and never found in the Southern Ocean and most of their aircraft were over fifteen-years-old. The Argentine Airforce was the Cinderella Service of the Military Junta because the lion’s share of the Defence budget had been allocated to upgrading their Navy. To avoid the concentrated fire in San Carlos, the Argentine pilots flew and released their 1,000lb British-made bombs at ultra-low level. The bombs were fused by an impeller which had to spin for a required number of revolutions before the bomb became armed. The bombs themselves were retarded so that the explosions didn’t hit the dropping aircraft and many of the pilots were not climbing to the necessary release height before dropping their bombs. They did manage to solve the problem by fitting improved retarding devices. Admiral Woodward in his autobiography blamed the BBC World Service for disclosing the information, which led to the Argentines changing their fuses and settings. He described the BBC as being more concerned with being “fearless seekers of the truth,” than the lives of British Servicemen. Some including me would probably consider the BBC to be a bunch of traitorous bastards. But of course it is a national treasure because of the unique way it’s funded. Thirteen bombs hit British ships without exploding. HMS Ardent and HMS Antelope were lost despite the failure of the bombs and were destroyed while attempts were made to defuse the unexploded ordnance. Lord Craig, the Retired Marshall of the Royal Air Force is reported to have said: “Six better fuses and we would have lost.” The British lost one Destroyer and two Frigates, with eight ships damaged and forty-nine men killed. Well done the BBC! The Argentine air force lost forty-five aircraft including helicopters. Fifty-five Argentine aircrew were killed. Sea Harriers claimed to have shot down twenty-one enemy aircraft for no loses in air-to-air combat. I know that I would rather share a slit trench with an Argentine Air Force pilot than a BBC reporter. © Blown Periphery 2018 Going postal Blog.

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Update to my post ( #36) OF JANUARY 2016. . . I have tried to contact the owner of the Balerit at OTHERTON without success. It is still there in storage and the management say there has been no rent paid on the hangar for some time. . . Will keep trying. Phil.

Not only that,. . .IT COULD encourage Larrikin Lancaster owners to engage in potentially dangerous low flying too. . . :-)

I know. . .I know. . .I'm just into PlanePorn. . . . . .

Apologies if this has been posted before. One of the pics in this series. The Right Place at the Right Time > Vintage Wings of Canada

Over the years, when I've been invited to land for social visits on private farm land in ultralight as well as light aircraft. I always declined until I had visited any site by road first to check for overhead wires and other little concealed surprises which may not be visble from above, nor obvious to non aviating landowners. There is a three phase. three cable 10KV power line running across the approach track to my local airfield, well marked on the airfield directory diagrams, and not high / close enough to present a danger to air traffic UNLESS you suffered an EFATO on one particular RWY . . . just nice to know that it's there as it is invisible from the air and many of the timber poles are hidden by a line of small trees. . . . we've been there since 1992 and no unfortunate has collided with it thus far.

First I'd heard about this. I'm assuming that the red bits are Poppies. . . . Nice Idea though.

Private and public enterprise, Part two 20th February 2018 Tachybaptus Engineering, History, Science 2054 Comments R101 at the mooring mast at Cardington The story of the R100 and R101 airships by Tachybaptus The lure of new ideas The building of R101 was a glamorous public project carried out with a fanfare of enthusiastic publicity. It was quickly announced that she would be ready in two years and would be able to fly to India in the spring of 1927. This was sheer rubbish. R101 was, as originally conceived, 737 feet long and 131 feet wide, a little longer and a fraction narrower than R100. Her design was innovative. The Director of Design, Colonel Vincent Richmond, decided to make the frame not from Duralumin, as had been used for the Zeppelins and R100, but from stainless steel. Steel is much stronger than aluminium alloy but, as any bicycle owner will know, it’s impossible to make a steel structure as light as an aluminium one of the same strength. The frame was designed to be stiff enough to largely avoid the need for bracing cables, but this caused it to protrude into the interior of the hull, reducing the space available for gasbags. The designers were haunted by the memory of the collapse of R38, and whenever there was a choice between a lighter component and a more durable one would choose the second. All these factors added up to one thing: less lift. The problem was made far worse by the choice of the Beardmore Tornado diesel engines. The combined weight of the five fitted, including their accessories ,was nearly 19 tons, offset by a saving of only 6 tons in the smaller amount of fuel they would use on the voyage to India. Even the supposed safety of using non-inflammable diesel fuel was lost because these massive engines needed small petrol motors to start them. Plans to replace the starter motors with oil engines were never realised. One of the Beardmore Tornado engines in its pod Not only were these engines absurdly heavy, they would prove a source of unending trouble. They could never be run at their maximum speed and power, and failures of components were frequent. The original plan had been to use metal propellers with movable blades that could be angled backwards for reversing, but these disintegrated during testing and were abandoned in favour of simple wooden ones. The engines had no reversing gear, so it was decided that four would be used for forward flight and one kept purely for going backwards – almost four tons of dead weight for most of the time. You will remember that R100 had six engines which could deliver their full 650 hp, far beyond the faltering output of the Tornados, and two of which had mechanical reversing gear. R101 was dangerously underpowered. A lot of money was wasted. There was a plan to recommission the old airship R36 and fly her to India to try out the feasibility of the route. After R36 had been restored, the plan was abandoned. A whole section of R101’s hull was built for stress tests and scrapped after testing. The Air Ministry bought tons of ferro-silicon, used in making the steel alloy for the frame, decided they had bought too much, sold it, found that in fact they needed it and bought it back for five times as much. The design team kept changing things. As a result, the contract with the firm making the girders was broken and the firm had to be compensated. This caused further delay. One economy was made – a false one. The design team wanted a mechanical calculating machine to ease their task. This would have cost £50. Their request was refused, so calculations continued to be made by hand, at much greater expense in wages. The team’s enthusiasm for innovation attracted new and sometimes dubious designs. One of these was for the gas valves. As an airship rises, the air pressure outside it falls. The gasbags couldn’t adjust to this by swelling more and more like a rubber toy balloon, partly because the goldbeater’s skin they were made of was not strong enough, and partly because the gasbags would touch the frame and this would chafe holes in them. Both R100 and R101 were designed to have a ‘pressure height’ of 1000 ft. This was the height at which the gasbags would be fully expanded. To rise to their proposed cruising height of 1500 ft they would need to vent off gas through valves. It was also necessary to vent gas when descending to a mooring mast. On previous airships the valves were simple large spring-loaded flaps at the bottom of the gasbags. The designers of R100 followed this well-tried design. They didn’t even make their own valves – they bought them from Zeppelin. Colonel Richmond and his assistant Squadron Leader F.M. Rope had what they thought was a better idea, and designed new valves which were fitted halfway up the gasbags. They were extremely sensitive to changes in pressure, and would vent gas if the airship rolled as little as 5° – which she often did even at her mooring mast. Gasbags are attached to the hull of the airship with a harness of wires, which must keep them from chafing against the hull. Richmond and Rope designed novel harnesses of great complexity which were supposed to spread the load on the hull evenly if a leak caused one gasbag to deflate. This didn’t work at all well, and allowed the gasbags to chafe against the frame. Later, one bag was found to have 103 holes in it. The usual way of covering the hull of an airship at this time was to attach cotton canvas and then paint it with cellulose dope, which waterproofs and strengthens it and also causes it to shrink, so that it clings tightly to the frame, increasing its rigidity. Richmond had a different idea, which he had invented for the fabric of balloons during the war. This was to pre-dope the fabric and, when it was draped on to the frame, to draw it tight with strings glued to the fabric with rubber solution. It’s difficult for a modern reader to grasp how primitive materials and adhesives were in the 1920s. Like R100, R101 was built with only 16 main longitudinal girders. Richmond realised, rightly, that the enormous space between then would allow the covering to flap, so he added another 16 lighter longitudinal braces midway between the girders, which were also used to reef in the covering to tighten it. But in the event this seems not to have worked, as we shall see. The calculations of R101’s designers showed that the huge rudder and elevators on the tail fins, each one 44 ft long, would be too heavy to move by hand, and would need power assistance. Accordingly, large servo motors were installed to move them. The calculations of R100’s designers showed that no power assistance would be necessary, and this was borne out in practice – though there was a moment of panic at Howden when they heard that R101 had servos, and did all their calculations again. So construction proceeded with much revision, and many novel devices burdening the airship. In September 1929 the time came to fill her with hydrogen and discover the amount of lift she would provide. They discovered to their horror that this was not the 60 tons they had expected, but barely 35 tons – 27 of which would be taken up by a full load of fuel. The weight of the airship had grown from the projected 90 tons to 113 tons 12 cwt. Not much could be done about this immediately. In the face of excited public expectation, they had to get her out of the shed and into the air. Winds were unfavourable for a while, but finally, on 12 October 1929, she was walked out and hung in the air, her fabric gleaming with fresh aluminium dope. Her number R101 was proudly painted on her side, and below it her British registration G-FAAW. Despite the delays she was actually launched two months ahead of R100, whose construction had been slow because of a lack of staff and tools, but had at least proceeded in a straight line. Two days later R101 made her first flight, going around Bedford where huge crowds had come to view her. She was flying on only two engines, as the Tornados were giving trouble. Subsequent flights were made as far as Belfast, all in calm weather. On one trip she managed an average speed of 60 mph. While she was moored at her mast, she survived a gale with gusts up to 83 mph. Outwardly, all seemed well. But the fact remained that with a full load of fuel she could barely carry ten tons of crew, passengers, baggage and stores. There was a desperate attempt to lighten her by removing as much unnecessary weight as possible, including the servo motors in the fins, and by letting out the wire harness of the gasbags as far as possible to allow more hydrogen to be put in. These measures gained six tons of lift, still not nearly enough, and increased the problem of gasbags rubbing against the frame and being holed. Desperate measures were called for. They decided to add 40 feet to the middle of the airship, enough to put in an extra gasbag. Another problem appeared in the summer of 1930. The canvas covering, doped before being put on by Richmond’s patented process, started tearing. They found that it had rotted. Also, the rubber solution used to glue the tightening cords to the cords to the fabric had reacted with the cellulose dope and caused further damage to the fabric. The whole covering would have to be removed and every trace of it carefully scraped off before re-covering the frame with canvas applied in the conventional way. The annual RAF display at Hendon was coming up, and R101 would have to perform a flypast (at this time R100 was about to fly to Canada and couldn’t take part). They patched up the holes and set off on 27 June. The airship behaved disquietingly poorly, pitching so much that one of the cables supporting the gasbags snapped. The outer fabric flapped but couldn’t be tightened because of its frail condition. Holes in the gasbags, and the novel and oversensitive gas valves, caused considerable loss of gas. Large amounts of ballast had to be shed. They barely made it back to Cardington. Then R101 was put back in her shed to be lengthened, which was not such an arduous task as you might suppose. She was kept inflated, held in place by ropes with weights, and simply unbolted in the middle. The halves were pulled apart and the new section bolted in. At the same time, all the rotten covering was stripped off and replaced. The insane plan of using only four of the five engines for forward propulsion was abandoned. They modified two of the engines so that they could be stopped and restarted turning backwards, which was done by altering the camshafts – this must have reduced their performance further. The engines were still incapable of running at full speed and R101 remained gravely underpowered, a problem made worse by her extra length. She emerged from the hangar on 1 October, now 777 feet long. It’s hard to imagine what she looked like in the air, and contemporary photographs and film don’t fully capture it. But consider this: the enormous tower at Canary Wharf in east London is only 771 feet tall. Imagine this turned sideways and floating in the air. The hubris of Lord Thomson On 5 June the previous year Ramsay MacDonald had returned as Prime Minister of a Labour-Liberal coalition, and Lord Thomson was again Air Minister. He was avid to see R101, his giant baby, give a triumphant demonstration of the wonder of public enterprise. It had to be done quickly: R100 had flown successfully to Canada, and it was simply impossible to let his glorious venture be upstaged by a cheap capitalist exploit. Also, Thomson had political engagements and had to be back in London by 20 October at the latest. At Cardington, those who knew more about the airship’s weaknesses hid their foreboding. Under pressure from Thomson, the final tests were rushed, and there was just one 24-hour test flight. It was impossible to do a speed test, as the engines were playing up again. R101 had been hastily given an Official Permit to Fly over the telephone. Her full Certificate of Airworthiness was issued on 2 October, before the full report on the recent changes had been completed. R101’s Certificate of Airworthiness The departure for India was finally scheduled for Saturday 4 October 1930. There was no time for any more testing: the interior had to be spruced up for the distinguished passenger and his retinue. As the passengers boarded, there was a final blow to R100’s feeble lifting capacity. The baggage allowance for each passenger was 100 lb. But Thomson arrived with so much luggage that it took two journeys of the lift in the mooring mast, capacity twelve people, to bring it up. It was not weighed but the lift attendant, Herbert Mann, reckoned it at 1800 lb. The weather was foul, with wind and rain, and forecast to get worse. They had never been out in conditions like this – but R100 had survived a storm in Canada, and they were obliged to equal that performance. Nothing could stop them now. Piloted by Flight-Lieutenant H. Carmichael Irwin, R101 left at 6 pm, as the sun was setting invisibly behind the thick clouds. She passed over the Isle of Dogs, rolling heavily and all the while losing gas from her ill-designed valves. East Enders who had turned out to watch her pass could see little but her navigation lights in the murk, and hear a faint roar of engines. Yet again, one of the engines had to be stopped, this time because of a faulty oil pressure gauge. It was restarted, but another engine was running rough, backfiring with showers of sparks from the open exhausts. As she crossed the coast at Hastings, watchers were shocked to see how slowly she was moving. She had lost altitude, and one observer estimated her height at only 500 feet above the cliffs, less than her length. To stay on course, she was travelling at a large angle to the wind. Over the Channel, passengers and crew alike were alarmed by the closeness of the waves. Using the elevators and the lift given by her passage through the air in a nose-up attitude, she clawed her way up as she neared the French coast. She sent a wireless message in Morse: To Cardington from R101 2400 GMT. 15 miles SW of Abbeville. Average speed 33 knots. Wind 243 degrees 35 miles per hour. Altimeter height 1500 feet … Weather intermittent rain. Cloud nimbus at 500 feet … All essential services are functioning satisfactorily …. At 1.45 her wireless operator took cross bearings from local transmitters, and signalled that they were near Beauvais. This was confirmed by a reply from Le Bourget aerodrome. At 2.07 and again at 2.13, Le Bourget asked for further information, but received no reply. Then news came in from observers on the ground, and the signal went out: G-FAAW a pris feu. The final minutes R101 had struck a ridge at Allonne, just southwest of Beauvais, and caught fire immediately. Forty-six people were killed on the spot; two more died in hospital. There were just six survivors: H.J. Leech, foreman engineer; A.V. Bell, J.H. Binks, A.J. Cook and V. Savory, all engineers; and A. Disley, wireless operator. With a certain rough justice those who who must bear the greatest part of the blame for the disaster – Lord Thomson, and Richmond and Rope – all perished. But so did Major Scott, who had piloted R100 on her successful flight to Canada. The wreckage of R101 The survivors were in various parts of the airship away from the bridge. Leech, off watch, was dozing in a chair in the metal-walled smoking room. So was Disley, in the chart room. The engineers were in various engine pods, whose position outside the hull helped to save their lives. The commander of the airship, Flying Officer Maurice Steff, who had taken over from Irwin a few minutes before, was among the dead, so there can never be a full story of what happened in those last minutes. The nearest eyewitness to the crash was Eugène Rabouille, who had gone out in the storm to set snares for rabbits. He recalled, ‘Suddenly there was a violent squall. The airship dipped by the nose several times, and its fore part crashed into the northwest edge of the Bois des Coutumes. There was at once a tremendous explosion, which knocked me down. Soon flames rose into the sky to a great height – perhaps a hundred metres. Everything was enveloped by them. I saw human figures running about like madmen in the wreck. Then I lost my head and ran away into the wood.’ At the enquiry it was thought that the cause of the fatal pitching was that the airship’s covering had torn open at the nose, and the inrush of wind had ruptured the bow gasbag. A survivor related that when the airship began to pitch, a rigger, S. Church, was sent forward to release the emergency ballast bags in the nose, but it was too late. Shortly before she struck the ground, an order was sent to the engine pods to reduce speed. This was a fatal decision. R101 had been held up only by lift generated by her forward speed. When she slowed she sank irretrievably. Several suggestions have been made about what started the fire so quickly. It may have been sparks from the exhaust of the malfunctioning engine. When the drifting hydrogen caught fire, it burned so fiercely that supposedly non-flammable diesel oil leaking from the smashed fuel tanks also caught, turning the ground into a field of fire. The bodies of the dead were placed in hastily collected coffins in the black-draped town hall before being sent back to England. The funeral was on 12 October 1930, exactly a year after R101 had first been walked out of her shed. R100 hung, serviceable but unusable, in the shed at Cardington. There was talk of continuing tests and even building a successor, but understandably it came to nothing. After a year she was hacked up with axes and her delicate lattices steamrollered flat. The scrap metal was sold for less than £600. What might have happened? Suppose that R101 had survived her first night. Probably she would have faltered on for a few more miles and, in the absence of a mooring mast, been ditched somewhere in France and abandoned by crew and passengers. The contest would have been over, with R100 a clear winner. And further suppose (and it’s a big supposition) that the government had played straight, and had gone on to build R102 and subsequent airships as improved versions of R100. As long as Vickers could keep away from the idiotic decisions of committees, it would have been possible to rectify the design faults of R100. The overlarge fabric panels could have been stiffened in a better way than on R101. Building the airships in the cosy hangar at Cardington would save the need to apply tons of varnish to the duralumin frame. There were already proposals to lengthen R100 to provide more useful lift. It would even have been possible to use diesel engines – and not the monstrous Beardmore Tornados. In 1932 a diesel version of the R100’s own engine, the Rolls-Royce Condor, was tested. Extra strengthening to withstand the higher stresses of a diesel increased its weight by only 124 lb, and its more frugal consumption would have more than offset that, since less fuel would be carried. Power was down from 650 bhp to 480, but that would have increased with development, and R100 was overpowered anyway. So, by the early 1930s, there would have been a British airship service to Canada and India and beyond. Until when? There was bound to be a hydrogen-fuelled disaster in the future. But in the event it happened to the Hindenburg, at Lakehurst, New Jersey, in 1937. Perhaps we were lucky that we had to stick to ordinary aircraft. After some early and inconclusive attempts, in 1937 Imperial Airways set up a service using Short Empire flying boats to hop along seas and inland lakes, first reaching Cape Town and then, in 1938, going all the way through India to Australia in ten days. The service was not without accidents, but by the time World War II brought it to a halt it had shown that intercontinental passenger air travel was possible, and laid the foundations for today’s long-distance airline services. ********************************* There is a strange tailpiece to this story. Much of my information about R101 was got from James Leasor's excellent book The Millionth Chance. Leasor ends his book on a brilliant and weird note. Two days after the crash the notorious spiritualist flimflam merchant Harry Price was trying, with the air of an American woman medium, Eileen Garrett, to contact the spirit of Sir Arthur Conan Doyle. Instead, they were led by Mrs Garrett's 'spirit guide', called 'Uvani', to someone who said he was called 'Irving' or 'Irwin'. Flight Liuetenant H. Carmichel Irwin was the pilot of R101 for the first eight hours of the fatal flight. She uttered a lot of garbled but reasonably convincing technical information, which you can read at http://www.harrypricewebsit... A few weeks after the crash Major Oliver Villiers, who had known several of the people who died in R101, met someone interested in spiritualism who knew of Mrs Garrett's seance. Villiers didn't believe in spiritualism, but he had a vague feeling that the ghost one of his dead friends was hovering around trying to say something important, and he agreed to consult her. There were seven further seances, the first on 31 October, three days after the opening of the oficial enquiry when not much evidence had yet been presented there. Garrett, now much more coherent, seemed to be channelling Irwin again, and also Major G.H. Scott, the senior pilot of the airship project, and Villers's own friend Sir Sefton Brancker, Director of Civil Aviation, who had died in the crash. Garrett had no technical knowledge, but came up with all kinds of fluent technical explanations, using the correct terms, presenting a very plausible account of how and why the airship had crashed. These seances were recorded in a private document. Leasor's abridged transcript of it can be downloaded as a Word document from http://s000.tinyupload.com/... It's all very creepy and convincing. But of course the stock in trade of a medium is to be convincing, and it's quite possible that Garrett, having advance warning of how she was expected to perform, had consulted someone with the necessary knowledge who had also been listening to the rumours that circulated after the crash, many of which were roughly correct.

Yeah,. .. that was a bit silly since the internet never forgets,. . .and the poster said that the pilot had given him permission to post it on Social Media. . .which means the aircraft was identifiable on the vid. . . .daft really, MIND YOU,. . .Shock can do strange things to people. . .and that would qualify as a bit of a shock in MY book !. . . I vividly remember landing my trike in a field at the at the back of a country pub after an engine fail, only to find that all the vehicles surrounding it were building contractors and it was being re-furbed. . . ie NO BLOODY FOOD NOR BEER ! that was another kind of shock. . . .

What annoys me mate,. . is that, Some people Deserve a bit of luck in a bad situation not of their making,. . . and rarely get it. . . . I wonder if this particular bit of wholly Undeserved luck teaches the bloke something useful. . . .? ( Rhetorical )

This video was advertised with the Caveat, "Any Armchair Experts making derogatory comments re this video will be deleted As the Pilot survived. . ." Well, I tell you what,. . . being a Pilot with over 1500 hours flying experience on Trikes of various types. . .,. . .I said my piece and told him to F*ck off and grow a brain. It is constructive criticism which CAN. . .in certain circumstances, help others to get it right next time and not repeat the stupidity of others. . . Sorry if that comment sounds superior and arrogant. I have no time for cowboy aviators who bring the pastime into disrepute with their activities and in so doing, quite possibly encourage others to copy their actions.

Awwwww. . .I would LURVE a job like that,. . . as long as the island has at least 3G internet coverage so that I could still $hitpost on various websites. . . . . what a wonderful job ! ! ! ! I knew a bloke who had a shack on Moreton Island when I lived in Brissy suburbs in the late seventies,. .. but that was only a weekend getaway. . . .He had a little TVO ( dual fuel) tractor, MF I think, to drag the boat up the beach a bit. . . Brill place though. . .

The tempests were most effective at shooting them down apparently,. . . they were robust enough to fly through the debris of an explosion ( According to the article ) V1 FLYING BOMB © IWM (CH 16281) The only known photograph of a Spitfire nudging a V1

https://www.forces.net/news...

Whilst I was still in training for my first 'Proper' Pilot licence in Vic,. . .I did a Navex to Deniliquin, and since there wasn't a C-150 which hadn't gone 'Tech' (both in the maintenance hangar,) I was asked if I wanted to do a convo onto the 172, and if competent, to take that on my Nav excercise. . I jumped at the chance and did a 1.5 hour conversion. I fell in love with the aeroplane, the fact that it was quite young, ie, it had that, New Car smell about it ( ! ) was nice too. . .It's reg was VH-EJM. . .(and I nearly Bought it later but that's another long story. . .) After landing at Deniliquin and having a good Breakfast, I sat next to a bloke who was an Airline pilot, I guess he would have been in his late thirties then, but who had packed it in for GA flying instruction as He said he just couldn't get on with being away from his home and young family for long periods. This was the first time I ever heard your phrase 'Flying Blocks of Flats'. . . this was his description of his ex job. I wanted to be any kind of Pilot for as long as I can remember Nev, but I couldn't pass the RAF eyesight tests, even though my academic qualifications were more than sufficient. . . having a slightly lazy left eye. I am still happy though, to have gotten away with the flying that I have done. . . I only knew that pilot bloke for around 45 minutes, I think his name was Graham. . .not sure, but Qantas was mentioned as his previous employer and he was from Sydney. . .Nice chap. . .Must have been, as he'd witnessed my bloody crappy landing in gusty hot condx and said I'd done a good job considering my time on type ! ! ! He said the 172 was a 'Lovely' aircraft and just like driving a bus. . .

Anyway,. . .Tachy will be doing the R-101 soon, so you can pick the bones out of that when I repost it on here. . . .

Indeed Nev,. . .I have been involved in the launch and recovery of a 'Small' one. . . an advertising airship which is occasionally launched from Halfpenny Green airfield in the UK Midlands. ( EGBO ) It has suffered a couple of minor disasters where some of the incredibly expensive Helium gas was lost. . . . The Pilots tell me that they are a real Biatch to control in anything above very light winds. I've only had a ride in one on a completely calm day. . .Neutral buoyancy can be a problem when winds are too strong. . . The rotten bugger of a Pilot wouldn't let me touch the controls. . . Unsurprisingly, when you consider that the cost of the Helium in that envelope is probably around the same price as a an average 3 bedroom home and land. . . . . "What ? ? ? You let a Pleb fly it ?. . . . Into a barbed wire fence you twat ? ? ? ?"

No reason for posting this,. . .other than the fact that I personally Love this Aircraft. . . and have met the guy whose lucky shot resulted in it's sinking. . . . Pilot who sank the Bismarck tells his tale after almost 70 years | Daily Mail Online