vme

ABC reporting that the pilot has been transferred to a Brisbane hospital with serious injuries.

The missing figure surely is how many registrations are awaiting RA-Aus approval.

Maybe the CEO knows something. CASA has started a project to gain access to ATSB investigations. Is that something we would want?

Used to, but not any more. No explanation, just no maps.

Herewith Cloud Dancer exemption: http://HTTP://www.casa.gov.au/wcmswr/_assets/main/lib91212/casaex104.pdf

From ASRA Guide to Flight Rules and Procedures for Gyroplane Pilots: Gyroplane operations are not permitted inside controlled airspace except that classified as Class E airspace. (CAO 95.12 and CAO 95.12.1)

Russ .. Unfortunately, unless you hold a private pilots licence or better, you cannot enter controlled or active restricted airspace - irrespective of Air Traffic Control's assistance.

TF .. Derby is about 80 miles from Broome and has an avgas bowser. You could stay there overnight and have some local flights around the coast. Just keep an eye on Curtin (RAAF). It takes out Derby when activated, but doesn't happen often. If you leave Derby at first light, you will be able to make Broome before the 7.15am activation and get refuelled by the tanker and bail out early morning when it suits. Derby is within easy reach of Halls Creek. Good luck.

Note that Broome is now a controlled airport.

Broome and Karratha will be off-limits to the vast majority of RA-Aus pilots (those without PPL) in a week. From November 18, 2010 both airports will have control towers from early morning to night, seven days. For aircraft without endurance, it will also mean an end to coastal transit of northern WA. And with Airservices evaluating remote tower operation, the situation will only get worse. USA sport pilot certificates - the direct equivalent of RA-Aus pilot certificates - can get control zone access with just additional training and testing .. no PPL, no medical. What does CASA know that the FAA doesn't? Why should we accept anything less?

There ARE change bars at the side. Unfortunately, it is a requirement to have a current ERSA on board.

It is a real problem as ANR headsets become more efficient. I find that I cannot hear the stall warning sound and only just detect GPS beeps. GPS is easily fixed by wiring it into the audio, but don't know about the stall horn. Have made it a practice to turn ANR off for takeoff and landing.

Cable connection also possible.

Not in Australia unfortunately Howard. Airservices have said they are not interested in providing TIS.

HPD .. This is exactly the arrangement I am looking for. Can you advise where I can get info on the certified quick-release fuel fittings? Many thanks ..Vince

What BLA said.

Hi Ian .. Have you thought of providing a PayPal donation facility to assist with forum costs? Regards ..Vince

And just to confuse things further, the new 103 appears to say membership of Ra-Aus will, in fact, be optional ... Part 103 will also establish a 'parallel pathway' for CASA to administer these activities when individual participants, for whatever reason, choose not to participate as members of an administering organisation. (From CASA intro to NPRM 0603AS - Sport and Recreational Aviation Operations.

Dear John .. The following is what you said last April. Do you see any inconsistency? Regards ..Vince

Hi John Only prelim at this stage. http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2007/AAIR/aair200704734.aspx Regards ..Vince

http://sliderule.ozmanor.com/man/files/kane-01.zip http://sliderule.ozmanor.com/man/files/kane-02.zip These are zipped jpegs of the manual from "Greg's Slide Rules" ..Vince Sorry .. just noticed they are already referenced in this thread.

Dynon v. TruTrak That's an interesting assertion. Could you please give examples compared with say a TruTrak Sorcerer. Thanks ...Vince

Mr James Donnelly Manager, Product Safety Bombardier Aerospace, Regional Aircraft 2001 Australasian Air Safety Seminar June 2 - 3, 2001 ..... The final example I'd like to bring before you today also deals with a modified aircraft. Like the first event I described, it's unusual because virtually the entire accident sequence is captured on videotape. The accident occurred in August 1992 at the Gimli Industrial Park in Manitoba - a famous site in Canadian aviation history, where an Air Canada Boeing 767 known as the Gimli Glider was dead-sticked onto a drag racing strip, following fuel exhaustion. The accident aircraft is a highly modified de Havilland aircraft. In this case a Caribou had been converted to turbine power and was operated under the EXPERIMENTAL category of CAR 4b. The conversion was accomplished at Gimli, and the aircraft first flew in mid-November 1991, before accumulating about 23 hours on 12 flights by month end. These preliminary tests revealed the need for the replacement of the aircraft's mechanical vacuum pumps with a Bendix suction system, the addition of in-line fuel boost pumps and the installation of a newly designed hydraulic pump. The accident occurred on August 27, 1992 on the first of several planned trips to flight- check the fuel and hydraulic systems. The aircraft had been hangared in a partially dis- assembled state over the winter, and had only recently been re-assembled, including the re-installation of the complete tail section. I'll let the video show you what happened - and I will caution you right now that this footage is extremely graphic - [Video] The accident investigation used this videotape and some 35mm photographs as a key resource in determining what went wrong at Gimli. With the exception of a slightly higher-than-normal nose attitude at lift-off, the aircraft's initial climb appeared normal. At about 35 feet AGL, the aircraft made a noticeable pitch- up movement. When I tell you that the photography revealed that the elevator control surfaces were observed to pitch trailing-edge-up for rotation, neutralize and then remain in the neutral position through the balance of that short flight, I expect most of you will come to the same conclusion as the Transportation Safety Board of Canada. The aircraft's control gust locks were at least partly engaged. A very close examination of the video does indicate rudder movement and minimal elevator movement, during the start of the takeoff roll. On the standard Caribou, the gust lock control handle is located forward of the power quadrant, and it has two positions - forward for Unlocked, and aft for Locked. If the control surfaces are not in the neutral position when the lock is engaged, any movement of the surfaces through the neutral position will cause the lock to engage. In addition, on the factory-standard Caribou, the control handle is designed so that when it is in the aft-Locked position, the power levers cannot be fully advanced. This is intended to prevent power application and takeoff when the gust lock system is engaged. The accident investigation further revealed that the aircraftÌs takeoff distance was approximately 20 per cent longer than anticipated for the conditions. This may provide further evidence that the gust locks played a part in this event. Analysis of the recovered debris indicated that, although the aileron and elevator locking mechanisms were in their respective Disengaged positions, the rudder locking mechanism was found to have been in the fully engaged position at impact. Further investigation revealed that in fact, it had been jammed there by the forces of the impact. In addition, the analysis determined from the damage evidence that the aileron control lock had been dis-engaged at the time of impact. In its synopsis of the accident, the Transportation Safety Board concluded that the control gust lock system had not been fully disengaged prior to flight and that one or more of the locking pins had become re-engaged after lift-off. What could have prevented this accident? The most obvious solution was that a complete six-point control check prior to takeoff would have revealed that free and proper movement of the control system was compromised. No control check was seen by witnesses on the ground, nor was one recorded on video or still photography. As noted earlier, some rudder and elevator movement was observed, at the end of the runway at the start of the takeoff roll. The CaribouÌs standard procedures do allow for locking the control surfaces for ground operation, but the aircraft flight manual also requires a six-point control check prior to takeoff. Another pointÛalthough not one addressed by the TSB in its reviewÛconcerns the crew. We understand that shortly before the flight, the scheduled co-pilot - a very experienced piston-Caribou captain - was replaced by another pilot with considerably less total time and experience on type. He was, in fact, the aircraft owner's son. We therefore speculate whether a more experienced co-pilot might have caught the missed six-point control check, or might have been more aware that the aircraft was not responding as it should have. During the post-accident autopsy, a knob from the gust lock handle was found embedded in the captain's right wrist. The TSB concluded that the captain was attempting to operate the gust lock handle when the aircraft hit the ground. Our expectation was that the pilot flying would have had his hand on the power lever quadrant, which is located immediately aft of the gust lock handle. It is therefore conceivable that, during the impact sequence, his hand might have moved forward, and that this might account for the autopsy finding. This accident investigation was problematic for us as the aircraft's original manufacturer, as we had not been involved in the turbine conversion, system modifications, or subsequent flight testing. As I noted earlier, the conversion required extensive modification of a large number of the aircraft's systems, and we know from the investigation that these included a re- designed throttle quadrant. The TSB report concludes that the newly designed system did not interfere with the positional relationship between the throttle levers and the gust lock control handle, as full power could not be obtained with the lock handle in the engaged position. However, in our minds, since we did not design or participate in the modification process, we cannot conclusively rule-out interference with normal operation of the aircraft's original systems. In this accident investigation our contribution was therefore essentially limited to the identification of components familiar to us, confirming the operation of the original gust lock system, and confirming the deflection of the control surfaces' spring tabs when operation is attempted against the locks. We had not reviewed the turbine aircraft flight manual but here again, we suspect it was substantially similar to the original aircraft flight manual. ... full paper: http://www.asasi.org/papers/2001/Four%20Unrelated%20Accidents.pdf

Ian, Is this the correct location to post questions about the MM? ... Vince

Look at second last page .. needs high torque servos in both axes: www.aerocraftparts.com/images/Catalog-2006/Avionics%20-%20TruTrak%20Flight%20Systems%20pgs%20261-264.pdf Regards ... Vince