dsam

My ADSB-in (raspberry pi) device also made me look outside keenly in exactly the right direction. Often, in good VFR with my 20/20 vision I still couldn’t see the oncoming “paint” aircraft until the last 15 seconds, (thankfully with good spacing each time). I believe pilots often overestimate their visual capabilities, and oncoming speeds leave little time for evasive action. I’m a big advocate for flarm and ADSB-in traffic awareness systems.

Terribly sad incident. Condolences to the families of the deceased. Answers must be found, and lessons learned.

Agreed. I’ve experienced blinding dusty conditions as a passenger in a heavy helicopter departing from Karratha some years ago. I’ve also driven through the USA crash area, and that sort of dust obliteration doesn’t really happen there, particularly on rapid decent from cruise altitudes (aka CFIT). The decision to stay on the ground IMHO should have been made at the outset.

I think I read that: - the pilot was IFR trained, but not current. - the aircraft was not IFR equipped - the flight was initially conducted as VFR, with requested special VFR - the crash site was in IMC at the time and place of impact. As pilot in command, you would have authority to tell PotUS you can’t and won’t fly in IMC, so he’d better call for a taxi (granted, you‘d need a good backbone). If my reading of the main points is accurate, I’m inclined to criticise the pilot’s failure to rightfully stay on the ground, as the chief cause of the deaths (Ie. poor airmanship by attempting the flight). I suppose the NTSB official report will show whether my conjecture is accurate...

I well remember the toughest time I said “no”. Family and friends gathered for a series of (much anticipated) local joy flights that were planned some days in advance. A strong, gusty crosswind steadily got worse shortly after I arrived. I disappointed adults and kids alike when I made the call to tie-down for the day. I kept telling myself of my greater responsibility to my passengers - injuring somebody I loved felt unimaginable, and that strengthened my resolve to stay tied-down. I’m certain I made the right choice saying no, that afternoon.

I’ve never forgotten my student pilot days observing a glider (that I was meant to fly in next) try to stretch a final approach above a wire. Stall and cartwheel was the sad result. Luckily they survived, but I never forgot the lessons: 1) If you see a wire at the last moment, go under it. 2) Under 200 ft AGL on approaches, always expect a (previously unseen) wire. 3) Set up your final leg a bit high, and sideslip to steepen the glide angle when near the threshold - especially at unfamiliar fields (or do a precautionary flyover above 200 ft.).

Another part of Boeing’s remedy involves software changes to limit the envelope so less nose down jack-screw will be required! It’s becoming obvious that this re-vamp to an existing airframe has been a “dogs breakfast” from start to finish!

I heard that with the horizontal stabiliser jack-screw in full nose down, the forces are so strong that the manual trim wheels need to be forced back by both pilots whilst “porpoising” the control column forward to un-load those forces momentarily! Not really intuitive with the ground rushing up at you. Of course pilots were meant to recognise the fault long before the jack screw gets to that extreme - sadly two crews didn’t. I believe that part of Boeing’s resolution of the problem will now limit the travel of the jack-screw into the nose down direction.

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-11-19/australia-day-swan-river-fatal-plane-crash-atsb-final-report/11718076

Here is an insightful analysis of the latest hearings:

Yes, I deliberately posed my question as a hypothetical, - it wasn't intended to directly relate to the actual cause of this crash, just as a way for me to clarify what training & procedures are considered with EFATO in multi-engined aircraft. Facthunter was able to provide me with the answer I sought.

Hypothetical question for multi-engine pilots - I'm certainly not one ?. I accept that EFATO often leads to dangerous asymmetrical thrust, quite possibly beyond rudder control to correct it at low airspeed while attempting to climb. Does it ever get recommended that in this scenario, the best option might be to reduce thrust from good engine(s) to minimise asymmetry effects, and stabilise for a (possibly inevitable) off-field forced landing with much-improved controllability/survivability. Granted, reducing power from a good engine is counter-intuitive, but you might just manipulate things to get a better outcome... just some musings from a former glider pilot that practiced winch-break exercises....

“Wrong Way” Corrigan probably demonstrated a wilful disregard for regulatory authority and adventuresome spirit that many lament about today:

It’s not exactly a time zone issue, but early Canadian bush pilots had very short daylight hours, long inhospitable distances, high winds & blizzards, whiteout weather, as well as large & rapidly changing magnetic variation to account for when navigating the north. Not for the faint hearted.

Spare a thought for Canada with 6 time zones! Being close to the geographic North Pole, the lines of longitude narrow considerably, especially in the arctic regions. The north magnetic pole is actually wandering about within Canadian territory - just to add to the navigational complexity. Northern bush pilots really have their work cut out for them! https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-00007-1