Oscar

The way in which the regulations have developed, is intellectual laziness at its most extreme. The FAA has been the world leader in this area, both BCAR and JAR/EASA have followed the FAA lead (and to be fair, CASA has actually at times been a leader for intelligent consideration of the issues, though in recent years it has retreated behind blind observance of other standards, because that removes from it the responsibility for actually making a decision and taking ownership of it). I call it the 'rope syndrome'. This is an EXTREMELY simplistic expression of an idea, but bear with me for a moment, because I believe it has a kernel of truth. The theory goes: an Authority decides: 'There are too many suicides. A majority of those are accomplished through hanging oneself. Most of those hangings use rope. Therefore, if we ban the sale of rope, suicides will diminish in number. Mission accomplished' . It is - surely - blindingly evident that this logic is so flawed that it should be ridiculed (not a good word to use in context). MTOW per se is absolutely the WRONG metric to use. Stall speed has some reasonable validity, because kinetic energy is: KE = 0.5 • m • v2. An aircraft that goes out of control at a higher speed will have MORE kinetic energy that a somewhat heavier aircraft at a lower speed - thus presenting more potential danger for the aircraft structure and the area of impact. The question of an 'optimum' MTOW for small aircraft, is vexed. Many factors need to be considered. I personally believe that around 750 kgs allows for a decent structure, engine, fuel load, usable weight, for two persons. Two persons is an arbitrary figure in itself: it seems to me that this is a 'magic' number decided to be the 'acceptable' fatal consequences of a single crash before it becomes a 'media catastrophe'. However, two persons is the minimun possible to allow in-air flight training, so let's accept it as reducing the 'catastrophe' headlines to the practical minimum. A cold-blooded approach? - well, just think about this: commercial-vehicle-based 'people carriers' are exempt from the minimum ANCAP standards (AFAIK, that may have recently changed). You can carry up to around seven people legally in a suitably-equipped 'passenger' vehicle: or cram 80-plus into a bus, even without seat-belts. HOWEVER: all of this is not the issue here. The issue is: what is the LEGAL MTOW? The LEGAL MTOW is the figure at which the (ICAO-responsible) certificating authority certificated the aircraft. It is NOT the figure that the manufacturers deems 'safe'. For any aircraft 'certificated' by the Czech equivalent of RAA, that is limited to 450 kgs.

[quote="AAAA, post: 567801, member: 14419" The Sabres where imported from 2004 to 2008. The original European certification from the manufacturer was 450 kg. That would make the aircraft unsalable in this and most countries. I went to the Chech Repuclic and convinced the manufacturer to make changes so it could be registered at 544 kg. The aircraft then arrived in Australia and was registered and approved by AUF at the time and I have those certificates as well as the manufacturers original so there is no problem here at all. For someone to be able to 'convince the manufacturer to make changes' which would have any legal validity in terms of the MTOW restrictions in force upon the ICAO-accepted Authority, is a neat trick indeed. If it were me, I'd be doing 'due diligence' from BOTH RAA AND CASA as to what certification actually is valid. It's your $95k - if you want to spend that and then fight the regulations, good luck to you.

Luck, nothing - intelligent planning.

Jw - not meant to chastise at all! The whole story of the Jabiru / CAMit engine development is quite complex - as I understand it - and I am sure it would make for a fascinating study of how there came to be successful Australian companies producing aero-engines from what were, realistically, humble and rather speculative beginnings - it's not as if there was any known path to tread for those guys in the early days!. Seriously, one has, I believe, to admire both Rod (and Phil Ainsworth) and Ian Bent for everything that has been achieved - especially when one takes into account that neither Bombadier nor Textron have managed to actually get a successful aircraft AND engine package for this class of aircraft despite their huge resources and experience.

Jw, Gandalph is absolutely correct - I don't know the details and it would not be my place to discuss them even if I did!

Firstly, the CAE engine is not a 'clone', it (in the 'core rebuild) configuration, is different in most respects with the exception of the shaft and rods. Secondly, you do not know the shared IP situation.

Hi, iedave. Sorry, slightly faulty memory there, it's Avtech, not Aerotech. It's the legal entity that Jabiru use for their manufacturing, so e.g. the TCDS for the type-certificated aircraft and the engines is legally held by it. The IP on the Jab. engine is a complicated issue and really doesn't affect the legal responsibility for the engines.

You might think that, I could not possibly comment.. ( with deference to Francis Urqhart).

You'd probably have to sign a 'no disclosure' affadavit!. That bunch would have more knowledge of both aero-engine design, development and certification, and the entire aircraft regulatory scene, than possibly any group of four in the entire Southern Hemisphere.... Quite a few years ago now, there was a meeting between CASA and the majority of the major CAR 35 engineers in Australia, including Alan Kerr, Dafydd Llewellyn, Bill Whitney, Bob McGillivray, Bob Scott, Graeme Swannell and a few others. When 'introductions' were completed around the table, it turned out that there was considerably MORE actual CASA senior-level experience amongst the CAR 35 group than CASA could bring to the meeting..

A CAE-plated engine was specifically stated by CASA, quite early on, to be 'not a Jabiru engine' - therefore, exempt from the conditions applicable to a Jabiru engine. That is in part (at least) a recognition that there is a legal difference in status: Jabiru ( or specifically, Aerotec, it's engine company) has all responsibility for its engines, either as the TCDS holder (for the 2200C engine) OR as the LSA certifying agent (for the 3300 and 2200 A series engines). However a CAE 'core rebuild' - which has a great many improvements, and combines 7/16 through-bolts (though not of Jabiru design), solid lifters, different valve actuation gear etc., thus addressing the major concerns outlined in the CASA 'Analysis' paper - is only acceptable at this time as an 'experimental' engine. Hence, it has to operate under the operational conditions relevant to 'experimental'/ 19-reg - thus cannot be used for FTF or line-hire work. Because CASA has approved the ASTM standard as an acceptable standard, (which is not under its control), it cannot force acceptance of a CAE engine by Jabiru as an 'acceptable' replacement. That authority resides wholly with Jabiru. Since there is no 'reliability' component of the ASTM standard, it is - to me - an interesting legal point as to whether CASA had ANY authority to impose the Instrument in the first place on Jabiru LSA-certified aircraft!. I'd like to have a quiet beer with Spencer Ferrier over that one...

The damn rush was, I suggest, the fact that following the election there will be roughly the same governance of CASA and Senator O'Sullivan's thoughts of a Senate Inquiry might just not have gone away..

Actually, and on considered reflection, I believe I used the wrong term when I said 'ineptitude'. I meant to use a term more consistent with a logical arrangement of the words: 'backside', 'both hands', 'map, mirror and shouted instructions,' and 'not a chance of finding'. Choose your own sequence.

Latest advice from RAA shows up the basic ineptitude of CASA in drafting the new Instrument.

Frank - I most certainly haven't - it was why I decided not to renew my RAA membership!. I emailed Lincke on the matter and got no response. But as you say, that is not directly a Board statement. I would assume that some members of the Board pulled Lincke aside and tried to instill a bit of wisdom, but it would have been a difficult look for them to publicly repudiate his statements when he was but a few days into the job, and I doubt anybody at that time would have seen the CASA freight-train headed for them. The old 'when in a hole, stop digging' probably applied, and I think anybody would agree that the Board ( in the public form of Micheal Momcke) came out swinging pretty hard when the shot hit the fan.

I have to say, that I believe you have got the cow by the wrong teat here. RAA did NOT help to create this mess - though one Board member of RAA certainly stirred the pot excessively, but that was on his own initiative and NOT RAA policy. RAA went vigorously into combat against the entire CASA action. I am not even a member of RAA, but I think it only fair to defend RAA against unwarranted claims of complicity. I know - from first-hand experience - that members of the RAA Board were trying to head this action off at the pass in the face of an impossible demand for information from CASA, into the wee small hours of the mornings in the few days they had been given. Seriously - your charges against the RAA Board, are unfair, unjust, and unwarranted. ONE member of the Board maintained a campaign against Jabiru, and had a few followers who were vociferous in their support. That Board Member is no longer with us to defend his actions, so there is NO value in pointing the finger. With only one exception, his 'followers' have effectively ceased their diatribe. Give it a rest - seriously.

It would appear that Gandalph gets the 'neatest correct entry ( post #1230) award. Well done, that man.

Then, you guys know how to operate Jab. engines intelligently. My 10-bob is on the bar that you'll get the same results from the new one - or better. Just watch the fuel quality.

18 months today, I believe, since CASA dropped the bomb. Anyone care to comment on what that has achieved?

A mitre drawing programme is useful, but it's not a huge amount of help if you don't understand the shrinkage associated with building a multi-tube structure. As the number of members of what is essentially a truss increases, the stiffness of the truss increases and it becomes impossible to get an accurately-cut tube to actually join into the structure. The mitre programme provides a cutting guide. Most I have looked at do not provide a construction sequence, without which a multi-tube truss-type structure will end up either distorted / having very large locked-up stresses. Don't mistake a handy tool as the answer to the Maiden (constructor's) Prayer! There is more to be gleaned from HITC's build log than just the basics of welding tubes together!

I suggest that it's quite possible that the company (/ies) involved, don't have the expertise to assess the actuarial risk and don't see it as in their interests to gain that understanding; after all, the ultralight market isn't large. I believe - though I am not sure of this - that Rod Stiff / Phil Ainsworth approached QBE very early in the development of Jabiru aircraft and gave them an education on the philosophy and the details of Jabiru construction, repair etc. and were able to negotiate a good rate of hull insurance. That was, I presume, the 'baseline', and if my understanding of how insurance works is correct, it has been adjusted in the light of experience. The incidence of claims resulting from improper operation of the aircraft has, without doubt, unreasonably inflated the cost of claims, thus affecting the actuarial risk. The lack of rigorous investigation of the actual causes of accidents /incidents has done nothing to alleviate the problem.

YES! According to the guy who manufacturers them, Jabs will expel excess oil in the sump due to air pressure from the reciprocating componentry until they reach equilibrium of sump volume. If you're getting excessive oil in the catch-can - you're putting too much oil in. You're not BURNING the bloody stuff - by definition, if it's there in the catch-can, it ain't burnt off. A whole lot of factors will render the actual 'equilibrium' level of oil according to the dipstick marks, including any variation off level for the aircraft between measurements, different loads in the baggage area, and as Bob has said, the time for oil drain-back into the sump following recent flight. His recommendation, for calibrating the CAMit dipstick to the specific engine in the specific aircraft boil down to (and I am extrapolating here from his advice to me for calibrating the dipstick for a CAMit oil inhibitor installation onto an engine which is a Frankenstein monster of a Jab./CAMit combination build and almost absolutely the OLDEST basic Jab engine ever to have CAE improvements added): Get a known flat, level area for checking the oil level. Do a few reasonably brief flights, topping up each time after a decent interval to allow oil drain-back, and note the 'equilibrium' position on the dipstick that the actual engine shows. Then set the top mark on the dipstick to that. The oil performs two functions. The first, is lubrication - and that requires a quite small amount - microns x each sliding surface area, plus enough to fill the pump, galleries and delivery tubes plus a bit to allow for friction losses throughout the system. The second, is cooling and that requires a heat transfer arrangement to a device to exchange heat - an oil cooler / heat transfer surfaces. Once again, (provided there is sufficient oil to effectively utilise all of the available heat transfer volume), there is no reason to carry more oil in the system (apart from enough to actually compensate for genuine losses through use) than is required to meet all of the second case requirements plus the first case requirements. So we're talking, the volume of the oil cooler plus the volume of the oil lines to and from, in addition to the normal engine lubrication requirement plus a 'comfort' margin. Any more than this, is simply carrying excess weight and a heat bank. If you are going from very full to seriously low oil in just a few hours of flight: there is something WRONG with your engine and it needs attention. It is not a well engine - don't ascribe the facts to a basic flaw in oil volume! Holding too much oil has potentially more damaging effects than holding slightly less than the maximum optimal. For a start - no pun intended - UNLESS you have a TOCA installed, bringing the oil up to operating temperature can cook the heads (or some of them, depending on your run-up attitude relative to wind direction). The standard Jab. oil temp probe sits in/close to the area of laminar flow across the sump, so the minimal cooling effect of the sump material in the under-cowl airflow will exacerbate this factor; excess oil in the sump will add to that incorrect reading. We all tend to get very concerned if we find the oil reading low on the dipstick - but what is the incidence of Jab. engines seizing in flight from insufficient oil?

I believe Charles Kingsford-Smith had such a system on the Southern Cross, did he not? It was called the 'Bill Taylor' system..

The CAMit return system is an oil separator and return: check it out at: Breather/Oil Separator Approximately similar in operation to a gascolator. I have no idea of the Jabiru device, it may do the same. Nev's point about returning water-saturated oil to the sump, is extremely important. Not only will it contain sulphuric acid due to combustion, but in extreme cases a high water content being delivered to a high-load area - e.g. the main bearings - will cause flash steam displacing the oil and causing oil starvation scavenging of the bearing surfaces. This has been observed in some Jab engines and incorrectly ascribed to tight bearing clearances.

Everybody.

I don't need any, I don't have your problems. Actually, neither does anybody else.