Oscar

Oh gods, it is still ALIIIIIVE... next, we'll be seeing the opening of the FTburger franchise chain.... strictly for vegetarians, because its menu will be based on organic patties produced by free-range bulls... ( See" 'Stripes') It appears to me that that table is produced from ATSB data - and ATSB data could never be correct, could it - unless it proves (with the caveat that OF COURSE, there are hundreds of unreported incidents) that Jabiru engines have a deadly serious problem, when it becomes magically, gospel. FT and Donald's Rump have a lot in common, other than of course wealth and the fact that at least some of his constituency actually believe in him ( Rump, not FT...) The most obvious difference between them, however, is that in Rump's case the hair between his ears is mostly on the outside.

Nev's warning is one which should be taken seriously. While I believe that Skidmore is sincere and committed to changing the culture at CASA, people should read the history of CASA internal machination s to see how effective that has (n't) been in the past. Paul Phelan's article in Pro Aviation ( http://proaviation.com.au/2014/02/22/proaviations-submission-to-the-asrr/ - scroll down past the actual submission to the part entitled 'Palace Revolution') is an entirely accurate, and actually fairly restrained, description of internal opposition to Bruce Byron's attempts to make similar change. It's an eye-opener for those who may think that CASA is inherently a good organisation that just stumbles a bit now and then. Sober reflection and some not-too-fanciful extrapolation on how the Jab. situation has progressed should give people concerns. As Nev has said: 'What comes next?' Well, here's a possible scenario. Let us assume that there is a 'high profile' accident involving an aircraft that is somewhat over-represented in the serious accident /hours flown tables - and without doing any finger-pointing here, we all know that there are some that fall into that category. A quick glance at: https://www.google.com.au/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0ahUKEwj72YfDu9_LAhXENpQKHasHDZMQFggbMAA&url=http://jabiru.net.au/images/The%20Aviation%20Consumer%20-%20LSA%20Accidents.pdf&usg=AFQjCNFLMJ995QOeUQRA6KAdAD_1uhikQQ&bvm=bv.117868183,d.dGo&cad=rja presents some names familiar to us all, with numbers that could trigger some reaction from CASA. Let us also assume that the 'finger of blame' is directed at, say, the occupant safety features or certain aerodynamic features that are believed (even if not conclusively demonstrated) to be a significant factor. Inadequate analysis, you might say: well, from where does THAT sound familiar? Now, an engine is a discrete component that can be removed, changed, replaced (with admittedly, varying degrees of complexity and not always without other consequent work needing to be done, but in broad terms, an engine is a lump out the front (in most cases) that one can more or less isolate for action. IF one starts to look at other factors such as occupant safety / aerodynamics, it's going to get extremely difficult for changes to be made in many cases without serious re-design and manufacture - IF that can in fact be done at all. We talk about the possibility that there are Jabs. sitting in hangars unused because of the engine problem, and that may well be true - but a revised Jabiru /CAMit engine can be substituted fairly easily ( though at obviously a cost that many owners would not have anticipated to be suddenly stuffed before them). Yes, there are regulatory difficulties and hurdles to be surmounted - but your basic Jab. airframe remains usable, in the long run. But you can't go out with a tin of resin and some fibreglass and change basic structure or form in, for example, a c/f aircraft that is manufactured using autoclaved procedures. For those, you might as well take out the Rotax and throw the airplane away...

Guys: we progress! A chapeau to all. Who did what to whom, when, is no longer important. What is important, is how the f%ck we can get Recreational Aviation out of the mess that has been caused, with a still reasonable chance that our only serious Australian aircraft manufacturer and definitely the only Australian certified aero-engine manufacturer, can remain in business. It would be a rather nice result - don't you think - if such things as training costs, the opportunity to own an aircraft but recoup some of the expenses through cross-hiring etc., could be kept as low as possible? That is NOT going to happen if Jairu and CAMit go out of business. So: can we all take a deep breath here, accept that our different positions and perceptions have been aired - and seek to fight the enemy rather than ourselves? Has - surely - to be worth a shot.

Nev - I see what you were driving at there, but I think we should all avoid the use of any reference to 'criminals' (even though the CASA action smacks of Napoleonic justice, where the accused is deemed to be guilty until proven innocent). There have been some comments - directed against in particular, Rod Stiff - that have been so libelous as to beggar legal action. One of those was fairly immediately deleted from the site, it was a vicious tirade. Another suggested that Rod Stiff was taking action to remove himself from any liability in regard to the company future, and that was immediately taken up by our resident legal expert and the illegality of such a move was made abundantly clear. In both cases, criminality was directly either stated or imputed. While I certainly agree with the thrust of your comments - that CASA's treatment and lack of consideration for all sides of the situation (a significant comment in the Forsyth Review that was recommended for a complete overhaul) amounts to de facto treatment of everybody affected with far less than acceptable justice - I suspect this is one area where angels will not blithely be strolling along.

Don, Russ - put down the pistols and send the seconds back from the duelling ground. This is a very, very vexed issue and both of you have strong feelings - and as is often the case, I am quite sure that there is considerable basis for having those opinions. Don: at one stage, in early 2014 from memory, it is correct that at least one Member of the Board was openly stating on this forum that 'RAA was 'going to do something' (that is not a verbatim quote, but pretty damn close) and adding commentary that the RAA Board was not going to fail to protect the safety of its members (again, not verbatim, but close enough). The CEO's statement immediately following the Runcorn incident - and I accept that he considers he was misquoted- most certainly gave the clear impression that this was the last straw and some sort of 'action' by the RAA was imminent. Those are checkable facts, and while it is a very long bow indeed to suggest that they were an accurate summary of the Board's position at ANY time, it is extremely unfortunate that they were ever uttered. I completely accept that - by the time that CASA actually started obvious action - the Board position was unanimous. I also know that some Board members at least, were concerned at the earlier commentary and I would assume that that concern was expressed as required, since that line of commentary ceased soon afterwards. Russ: I know from first-hand experience, that when CASA demanded the data from RAA, a number of members of the Board were working feverishly to assemble what CASA had requested; I was personally in touch with one member at after 1.30 a.m. tying to clarify certain information during that period. I have every reason to believe that he was just one of a group relying on caffeine and adrenalin to meet the ridiculous deadline imposed by CASA. I also draw your attention to the fact that the Michael Moncke, speaking absolutely FOR RAA, was out of the blocks extremely strongly and immediately with trenchant criticism of CASA's utilisation of the data without any obvious analysis (which statement has been shown to be lamentably true). I believe that I am known to be an obvious combatant against the CASA action. AFAIK, the RAA Board has throughout this business acted responsibly and as strongly against what transpired as I believe it could have done.

Strange - never had that comment made to me...

If it's a tail-dragger Cessna you are looking for, I saw a spectacularly beautiful C190 in Dave Dent's hangar at Camden a couple of weeks ago, though if I were the owner I'd be wanting a security deposit of at the least a block of flats AND Tasmania, and probably tender parts on one's anatomy, to let someone jump in the LH seat... (Also saw forum member Dutchroll's Pitts S12 there on Thursday and it's also stunningly beautiful, but jeez, that's a lot of engine in front of not much aircraft!)

Well, that information at least supports one part of the debate - that FTF's using Jabs. were heavily affected. But let's look at the other side: how many of those three you mentioned, had had engine-related incidents /accidents in the previous 1500 total flying hours? What was the safety result of those? It's that level of comparison that we need to get to, to understand what actual safety improvement there has been as a result of the imposition of the Instrument.

Nev, I don't know that we are being treated as criminals by CASA - but I am damn sure we are being treated as mugs. A huge part of that, is the underlying premise that 'safety' - written in large letters, and spoken loudly and repeatedly - is a major, major opiate of the masses. If one DARES to raise a counter-argument against a 'safety' initiative, no matter how inane, misguided or just plain wrong it is in concept, there is inevitably an upswelling of noise - and the loudest from the proponents of the initiative - that somehow, one is thereby condemning innocent people to danger or worse. Here's how stupid it can get. I was one of those who campaigned years ago for the adoption of 'advanced driver training'; I took that right up to Federal Parliament, appearing as a witness before a House Committee on Road Safety. We were looking for training in proper braking techniques, skid control techniques, emergency situation reaction techniques. We had some fairly reliable studies to support the arguments. This was, of course, in the days before ABS and t/c were even being thought about. Some years ago, that re-surfaced as an issue in NSW - and the NSW RTA argued against it because 'if you teach people how to skid, they'll go around trying to do it and people will be injured or killed.' I am being serious here! From memory, they even drummed up support for that position from that peanut from the 'Pedestrian's Council' who became a legend in his own lunchtime for commenting on ANYTHING to do with motor-vehicles... The NSW RTA made mutterings about banning 'Advanced Driving Schools' from teaching such techniques, but were howled down on that one because even vision-impaired Freddy could see that the proposition that one should NOT be taught essential skills because that might mean you might drive less safely, was a crock. So what we have, is the situation where anything that can be wrapped up in a parcel labelled 'safety', is supposed to be untouchable - no matter how badly the contents of that package may stink. If you re-watch the CASA/O'Sullivan exchange, you will note that CASA argued their case based purely on the 'number of in-flight engine shotdowns (or words like that, several times) by comparison to other engine makes'. There was a clear jump from that 'statistic', to the conclusion that this was a serious safety problem. At no time, did CASA produce any statistics of the actual results of the Jabiru shut-downs (or whatever') adverse safety implications: fatalities, injuries, danger to third-party lives or property. I think we could all be somewhat excused if we took the view that it is CASA's unspoken position that 'if the engine stops, everybody is going to die'. Frankly, by the same false logic, it would be quite easy to prove that there are other brands of aircraft out there where the end result of taking-off has been a 'safety incident' - and for some, the incidence of that would be far worse than for Jabirus. So perhaps here is one possible way to progress this situation: have a comparative study undertaken of the ACTUAL 'safety result' of Jabiru engine 'problems' in say the last five years prior to December 23rd 2015 and the period since then - and let's see if there is any quantifiable reduction due to the operation of the instrument. No hypotheses, no speculation on potential problems averted - just a straight-out examination of the facts.

Russ, I sincerely believe that only one on the RAA Board was 'in the mix' - and he's no longer with us. The current CEO doesn't have the expertise in aviation to be a 'player' - though he's made some damn stupid statements and the previous one was as useful as teats on a Bull. But - apart from the personal satisfaction of being able to beat the cr@p out of some people that have bought pain - it won't change the situation to know who they were. What we have here - is a SITUATION - and that is caused ultimately by CASA. What we need is a Senate Inquiry - and thanks to the current political BS, we may not get that. The bast@rds in CASA that bought this into being, may once again escape.

Nev, I believe it was a bit more serious than that. I have seen a copy of correspondence TO CASA, reproduced BY CASA, that indicated some very, very serious axe-grinding and stirring up taking place - and given the antipathy of certain people in high places in CASA to Recreational and Sport aviation, that was grist to their mill. HOWEVER - there is absolutely no value in now chasing those who prodded the tiger; they had no power to direct the action that CASA took. They may have handed CASA the ammunition, but the aim and firing, was CASA's alone. Long-time forum members will have a pretty good idea of the heat of the debate that raged well prior to the CASA action, with some people shouting for caution while others sought Jabiru's blood. People were temporarily /permanently banned from this site over their comments and some valuable members simply quit contributing altogether in disgust. In the long run, none of that made the slightest difference to what transpired, and revisiting that ground is a fruitless exercise. What has been done, cannot be undone: the egg has been scrambled and it appears that it cannot be unscrambled -that is the nature of such an event and an entirely forseeable consequence of the agitation placed before CASA for 'action'. We are now in the fifteenth month of operation of an 'Instrument' originally slated for 6 months of operation. Can anybody realistically point to an improvement in safety as a result ? Are Jabiru-powered aircraft suddenly no longer being involved in accidents that caused fatals / injuries / damage to third-party people or property compared to their previous record - because their previous record is pretty damn good for all of those points. And before certain people - and we know who they will be - claim that 'potential' safety issues have been averted - the actual statistics for one of the longest-serving ( and certainly hugely the most numerous of the Australian-manufactured RAA-class aircraft) do NOT support any conclusion being drawn that Jabiru-powered aircraft have, from their power-plant, a high likely incidence of fatalities / injuries / damage to property. The argument that 'potential' outcomes from engine failures 'might have been worse' - is a complete BS argument. Jab. engines have failed, for sure - but the result of that has been in almost all cases, a bent aircraft - not wholesale devastation of life, limb and property. The 'potential' argument is complete manure: there is 25 years of data to the contrary. Other than having driven Australia's most successful - by a vast margin - aircraft manufacturer and its only manufacturer of certificated / certified engines to the brink of extinction, ripped out the guts from the majority of the Recreational Aviation training facilities and de-valued at least one-third of the Rec. Av. fleet - what has CASA's Instrument achieved?

In the case of accident / incident reporting, it is very often the case that the 'result' of the incident is extremely easy to determine - but the 'cause' is not. We have seen the results of someone, apparently expressing an expert opinion, shooting from the hip: in the case of the Runcorn incident, where the CEO of RAA - with about four day's experience of aviation - was reported as saying that ' this is one too many Jabiru engine failures and we are going to act on this'. We know the actual cause of the incident - but that received almost NO publicity. I am reminded of a fatal of a Thorpe T-18 some years ago, where the preliminary investigation suggested an undetected medical emergency. In a way, that was correct - but it took a supplementary autopsy instigated by the expert investigator to determine that there was a toxic level of CO in the pilot's bloodstream, caused by a (quite small) crack in the fuselage undertray combined with a negative cabin pressure to suck CO into the cabin from directly in the path of the exhaust stacks. The pilot was likely comatose something like 20 minutes before impact, and dead maybe ten minutes before impact, by toxicology report. That information took something like 6 months to be produced. As a direct result of the incredibly inept CASA action, we have turned to the situation where an engine failure is regarded as prima facie the most likely cause of a fatal accident. Any intelligent aviator knows that is NOT a direct causal link: propulsion is only ONE of the four forces acting on an aircraft to keep it flying / stop it flying. In fact, it is highly likely that the incidence of serious EFATO results is NOT the engine stopping, but either pilot error in choosing the wrong consequent action OR changed aerodynamics from the lack of prop. thrust on the flying characteristics turning a benign aircraft into a fatally aerodynamically flawed one in the circumstances. This is not the place or time to discuss candidates for that 'club'. Pilot Error - in either flying outside the envelope or entering conditions that could not be handled - is a far more prevalent cause of accidents than mechanical malfunction. In the case of the Yarrawonga accident, I believe that it is entirely necessary to consider a range of scenarios that may have been the cause. The prevailing conditions, the nature of and height at which any manouevers were carried out, MAY be contributing factors in the result. That may become clear in the future, and conjecture at this point is premature. IF - and nowhere have I seen any commentary to either support or refute this - the passenger was carrying a broadcast-quality camera ( as shown in some pictures reproduced pertaining to the circumstances), then I am also reminded of the helicopter that crashed into Goldfields House in Circular Quay many years ago. Though the tail-rotor on that helicopter failed, that was a controllable eventuality - but it was shown that the camera had impacted the pilot's head due to the sudden swing of the helicopter as the tail-rotor failed, incapacitating him to take corrective action. It NEEDS forensic-level investigation to determine the actual causes of incidents, in many cases.

Jeez, Gandalph, you just don't get it do you? Jabiru MADE the fuel, and distributed it and sold it. It was MADE at Wellcamp, using Wagner's facilities. Kindergartens have been razed to the ground with all within them perishing as a result of Jabirus using Jabiru fuel. Get with the programme, or get off the pot.

And that result for the Runcorn incident was known within what - a week or so? - of the incident. CASA had nearly five months to validate the inclusion of that incident as an engine 'failure or malfunction' before it presented its 'facts' to validate the Instrument. Is it any wonder that RAA publicly stated that CASA had not done analysis of the information? For how many of the other 'cases' in the CASA spreadsheet, had inadequate research been done on the actual cause of the result? For those who infest this site with a 'guilty unless proven innocent' approach to Jabiru engines, nothing will suffice and they can be safely ignored. However, CASA (and ATSB) are fundamentally required to be professional, dispassionate and expert in their analysis of facts leading to actions - and increasingly, evidence is coming forward that CASA at least was anything BUT professional, dispassionate and expert. Just as CASA did until whipped into a corner through an FOI demand, ATSB has not released the actual raw data for inspection. A Senate Inquiry into all of this may well prove extremely fertile ground for a flogging of CASA and possibly, more than a glancing blow for the ATSB. If we don't have a sudden DD thrust upon us, Australian aviation might well be the benefactor of a flame-thrower applied to the genitalia of both organisations...

Well, thanks for clearing that up, 01. If there was an outbreak of lead fouling across the airfield, was there any action taken to investigate the fuel batch? Avgas is USUALLY very reliable for quality - though the infamous problems of an earlier time caused at the very least, 100s of $k in costs to sort out, so it's not infallible. #4 was an obvious nogas problem..... but is listed in the CASA spreadsheet as an 'engine failure or malfunction'. In the comments section, it is noted that 'Maintenance records requested and ATSB formal report and RA-Aus report also requested.' One would have thought that with all of that information available, CASA MIGHT have revised the inclusion of that incident as 'engine failure or malfunction' - but they didn't, quite obviously. And Senator O'Sullivan has them ON TOAST for that - because they stated, in Senate estimates, that an 'out of fuel' incident would NOT have been included, and it is right there, in print...

If #2 and #3 happened on 13/01/14, then they and #4 are most certainly on the CASA spreadsheet that they used to support the implementation of the Instrument. In the CASA spreadsheet, #2 and #3 are noted that - in both cases - ground running could not reproduce the problem.

Lovely work - as always ( and btw, I just caught up with your pedal set-up - that is a work of art and really clever design - tips me lid!.) Interesting chuck - I've not seen one quite like it with what appears to be a removable front plate? Looks as if it has been faithfully serving you for a long, long time! I have two lathes, an old - like 40 years old - small Tiawanese one, and a Smart & Brown 1024 high precision one which I have not yet managed to get into commission. It has both an independent and a centreing 4-jaw chuck ( and a six-jaw as well), and I'm really looking forward to getting it working. The Taiwanese one was always very inaccurate with the three-jaw, but I adapted the S&B collet adaptor and with a full set of collets up to 1", boy has it made life easier!. The range of things one can do better with a lathe, is very considerable...

The J230 airframe has the length and weight of tailcone and the area of tailfeathers - particularly the elevator (to give control authority at the low end of the speed range)- plus the wing-tanks centred on the optimum c/g, to make the Rotax conversion extremely viable. The choice between converting to a Rotax 912/914 or converting to a CAE 3300 ( since both are not certified aircraft) would come down to cost of the conversion and a few kgs in useful load in favour of the CAE 3300. - but if operating out of high and hot country, he 914 has the odds in its favour.

It is anything BUT a moot point - that is an expression borne of prejudice against a particular engine, not one coming from intelligent thought. The restrictions on operation of Jabiru-powered aircraft by CASA have been 'substantiated' - or 'validated' by reference to statistics. The ATSB report - when considered in its entirety - makes it quite, quite clear that Jabiru engine 'high risk' failures / malfunctions are NOT exceptional, over a statistically significant period. Now let's just look at the effects of the CASA limitation. According to RAA representations to CASA at the time of consideration of imposition of the restrictions, around 60% of the entire RAA training fleet, relied on Jabiru aircraft. The ability of FTFs to deliver the full training schedule using Jabirus, has been castrated. Let's just look at what that means, realistically. For FTFs to be able to offer the full range of flight training services for an RPC allowing solo flight x-country - they have to replace their Jabs. (now devalued) with non-Jab. engined, factory-built, aircraft. That means either: Lightwings, Brumbies (if they are still truly in the local market - it seems that has gone quiet recently, but maybe that is because I have no interest in them) or a Euro import. There was a damn good reason that 60% of the FTFs chose Jabirus: cost of purchasing and operation. As a side benefit, they got an aircraft with the best safety record in the business, for the class ( and one of the best in the world for ANY vaguely comparable class). The cost/hour for RPC training using Jabiru aircraft, is ( or WAS) very attractive to new entrants to aviation. Now, let's look at 'liability' issues - because those drive , in particular, insurance: a major cost for the operation of a commercial use of an RAA aircraft - either for an FTF or an owner defraying her/his costs of owning an aircraft by putting it on the line for hire/training use. Does anyone seriously think that the insurance companies, faced with the facts that non-Jabiru-engined aircraft have demonstrably a greater risk factor for fatality / serious injury, will NOT apply normal actuarial factors? I'd be interested to hear your appreciation of the outcome of a Court case where a student pilot has been killed/injured when flying an aircraft that has a demonstrated higher risk of fatality/serious injury than a Jabiru. Want to bet that CASA won't be joined in the case, for having forced the FTF to utilise a less-safe aircraft? Just on costs alone of operating a Jabiru for training vs. a more expensive aircraft: as costs increase, the numbers of participants will diminish. Fewer pilots equates to fewer air movements every year - and for marginal remote facilities, that could well mean that airfields we now enjoy will close down. Councils will sell off airfields. Privately-owned airfields that struggle to achieve a financial return enough to be maintained - won't be maintained. Fuel deliveries to airfields with low demand, won't happen. If your hoped-for vision of RAA aviating in the future is high-cost, limited travel opportunity and a vanishing number of participants, then your position regarding the correctness of the impositions on Jabiru engines, is fair enough. You are entitled to whatever vision you hold. Personally, I'd like to see sports aviation blossom as an activity. Don't just come back with a 'you are full of sh1t, Oscar' response- do us all a favour and at least present cogent arguments against my propositions. Because this is important - lest we find ourselves boxed into a situation where sport/recreational flying is reduced to a few hours a year looking repeatedly at the local view from an elevated position. Or is that too hard for you?

Thanks for actually LOOKING at what the ATSB produced, Aro, rather than shooting from the hip without even reading and comprehending what THEY wrote and what I quoted. Perhaps I should have made the 'high-risk' note in very large, bolded, and friendly letters. Since there are about 1300 Jabs. on the RAA register, and I think only about 100 or less on the VH register, then with let us say ( and here I DID take a guess, for sure) about 120 in service with FTFs, that means about 1300 - roughly - in private hands. So: feeding back into the figures you got: yes that would mean roughly, for the six years covered by the ATSB report: one 'high risk' every about 1.5 years across the Jab. private fleet, or 4 in 6 years and one every two years for the FTF fleet, or 3 in six years. Giving us a total of 7 in 6 years. The ATSB report lists the 18 'high risk failures' by aircraft type: and it lists 4 Jabirus. Therefore, I would suggest that my figures, that you have looked at, err on the side of being higher than what the ATSB has actually reported in their 'high risk' category. I didn't make up that category, nor did I make up the listing of aircraft in that category. The ATSB evidently thought it important to provide detailed information about that category, in a prominent place in their report.

You are someone who works with detailed science - electronics design requires calculation of values. So: take the figures and information supplied in the ATSB report, do the maths, prove me wrong. I have put out my calculations fpr inspection. If you have reason to rubbish them - and you may be entirely correct - then do the work and put up the counter-proposition.

Provide me with your calculations from the statistics contained in the ATSB report. If I've made a mathematical error, then I'll happily acknowledge it. Otherwise, just saying 'you're smoking sh1t' is as valid as anything FT posts.

I'd agree: too many engine failures are occurring. However, in terms of relative engine serious SAFETY issues measured by results, the concentration on Jabiru seems to be at the very least, a pre-determined conclusion that the ATSB report sought to validate. Right up the front of the ATSB report: starting on p.8 of 38 pages, is a list of the 18 'high risk engine failure or malfunction occurrences' in the period and for the group under consideration - three of which resulted in fatalities. I count three known Jab. engines in that lot: three in Jabirus - of which two at least were amateur-built ( the LSA, which should have been quoted as an LSA55 to be correct, may or may not have been a kit-build.) Zero fatals. I count four known rotax-powered factory-build aircraft: two Tecnams, one Hughes Lightwing, one Aeroprakt A-22. One fatal. I count three known Lycontinental-powered aircraft: the PA-38, Lancair, and Pitts. One fatal. I count one highly likely VW conversion: the Rand Kr2. Fatal. Of the 7 'unknown' engine aircraft, one - the Super Diamond - was reasonably likely to have been a Jab. engine: fatal. The Rans S7 was almost certainly rotax-engined. The two Visions, the Murphy, the Skyranger and the Pulsar were probably rotax-engined. So: a reasonable assumption ( and why the ATSB report - considering it was focussed on engine reliability - did NOT mention the specific engines for each of the 18 'high risk engine failure or malfunctions' listed is, at the very least, a curious anomaly in the report: if that breakdown was intended to provide authentic information regarding engine failure / malfunction, the engines involved would have surely been included in the explicit summary details?) is that: Four were Jabiru engines; Nine were rotax engines; Three were Lycontinentals; One was a VW conversion. The ATSB report collated statistics over six years of operations. That is sufficient, I contend, to be statistically useful. On a very rough estimate of hours flown, Jabiru aircraft amassed around 450,000 flight hours. Let's say, conservatively, 400,000 hours. That equates to one 'high risk' engine event every 133,000 hours, or an average of one 'high risk' fevent about every two years across the entire Jabiru fleet. At an average of around 50 hours/year for private operation, an individual private Jabiru owner should expect a 'high risk' event once in every 2,660 years of operation: let's be conservative, and say once every 1000 years of operation. To be responsible owners, don't leave your Jabiru to your successors without a suitable 'best use by' date of around AD3100 noted. Across the FTF fleet using Jabiru engines, averaging around 350 hours/year, they should be alarmed as a group to expect a 'high risk' failure once every 380 years of operation. If there are say 60 FTFs using say 2 Jabs. per FTF, then each FTF might reasonably expect a 'high risk' event once in about every three years. I wonder what the GA flight training average 'high risk' engine failure rate is - given that a C172 is less safe than a Jabiru....

OK, if that mercury thermometer was placed between the bottom of the head and the top fin of the barrel, it would be getting a considerable boost of heat from the barrel. There is a very considerable 'hot-spot' right at the top of the barrel, where the majority of combustion is concentrated. Calibration testing of the CAE thermocouples back to MGL Stratomaster Infinity instruments ( with don't operate through an RDAC with ambient compensation) in a proper installation ( engine test cell, I think you have seen it?) showed a very close tolerance. It is important for accurate reporting that the cold junction is not subject to elevated ambient temp. or the gauge will under-read - the early Jab cht installations were really, really bad for that.

This is actually a topic that deserves far more research and assembly of facts than has been carried out so far. We know - anecdotally at least - that there are some FTFs that experience repeated failures of Jab. engines at quite low hours ( the log books of my own aircraft for the FTF operating it before its last EFATO and crash that, eventually, bought it into my hands demonstrate that very convincingly), while others - such as Gawler - have had a long history of highly successful operation of numerous engines to 1000 hrs and beyond with nary a hiccup. This cannot be just a fluke - in either case - but something that deserves examination of ALL the relevant factors: operating profile, maintenance effectiveness, fuel supply, etc. I don't believe that anybody has assembled a coherent picture of the differences that may exist between those FTFs that have a 'troubled' history of Jab. engine operation and those that have a 'satisfactory' history. It needs an epidemiological study, and Jabiru ought to conduct such a study. In fairness to Jabiru, its recent 'risk assessment' strategy is a first foray into this field. ATSB has conspicuously failed, in my opinion, to do anything even resembling that - it has assembled statistics taken from reporting of highly dubious quality. While it is not unreasonable for people to be somewhat cynical of the evident self-interest in Jabiru's response to the ATSB report, Jabiru has nominated a number of instances where the fact that the failed engine was used in FTF operation, unrecognised by ATSB: that is clearly able to be checked and proven/disproven. Does the type of operation make a significant difference to the likelihood of engine failure? I believe that there are reasons to believe that it does. Ground running is the Archilles Heel for Jabiru engines. If held for any significant period of time across-wind ( e.g. at the holding point for the active runway, while the student goes through the pre-take-off checks, talking them through with the Instructor), temps on the downwind side of the cowl intakes can rise very seriously. THEN: with several pots really hot - the take-off and initial climb at full power and low speed adds significantly to the heat loading in already nearly over-temp cylinders. If the circuit requirements are for a tight and high climb to avoid encroaching on the local area, or because of topographical factors - a Jab. engine is set-up to fail. Can we all be realistic here for a moment? There are operational environments where a Jab. engine is simply NOT appropriate. Just as anybody with a modicum of intelligence wouldn't choose a Lancair 320/360 as their PNG Highlands runabout, or a Holden Maloo ute as their tradie vehicle for servicing the Olgas, it's horses for courses. As a Jabiru owner, I would NEVER recommend them for training out of, say, Wedderburn. Out of Clifton: NO worries ( and that's what they use up there, very successfully). Next issue: the actual cooling performance of a 'standard' Jab. installation can vary very considerably with apparently small differences in installation. I recently spent some time discussing installation issues with someone down at Camden, who has meticulously researched and modified his cooling baffles and cowl extraction in a research project that has taken him months - and has been conducted superbly: even down to wool-tufting and borescope-camera recording of the airflow within individual ram-ducts. His work has been of laboratory quality, and it shows that 'fine-tuning' the cooling airflow requires finesse beyond the factory tolerances - but when correct, produces excellent results: a max. of about 5C between heads right across the flight speed range, at any ambients. He is one happy Jab owner... and Jabiru could do FAR worse than ask his advice! CAE heads are a different - and better - alloy. Keith Rule at Cessnock's comments are absolutely on the money, AFAIK, and so are CAMit's. But you need to recognise that they are talking about different heads!