Oscar

Guys: Tempers are flaring, and in that situation the peanut gallery can always find a way to stir the pot to nobody's advantage (as we see). The Ornis's of this world are fun for providing humorous videos, but contribute less than nothing in terms of useful input. Frankly, I am not at all convinced that simply identifying the 'sources' who may have initiated action by CASA, takes us anywhere in terms of remediation of the effects of the action. I am very sure that any suggestion - as has been made here - that this is a useful 'starting point', is a complete nonsense. The horse has bolted, guys, and the CASA instrument has been executed and renewed. Simply knowing who was responsible for stirring CASA into action takes us precisely nowhere. Full disclosure of the correspondence within CASA and between CASA and external correspondents, MIGHT be of use - if it demonstrates malfeasance on CASA's part. In the current governmental environment, FOI compliance is not enthusiastically supported. Quite possibly only a Senate Inquiry, with the attendant penalties for withholding / falsifying information, would suffice. Lying /obfuscation to Parliament is held as a far more serious offence by any government authority than doing the same to the general public. I suggest, that following up on the 'data' and the way in which CASA has used it to underpin its action, is likely to be more productive. The link provided in Post #56 is something that everybody should read closely. Even the damn title provided by CASA: https://www.casa.gov.au/standard-page/disclosure-log re-iterates the '46 engine failures' implied furphy maintained by CASA from the start. Look at the document; count up the number of 'engine failures' - GENUINE 'engine failures' - you can see from the scant details. Jabiru saw those details and suggested that 12 was the correct number; I am less hard-line and would allow, on the stated details, perhaps 18. There are three points, I believe, that are pivotal to contesting the justification of the CASA action. These are: a) CASA has at no time ever stated what is an 'acceptable' failure rate for RAA-class engines - it has simply drawn a comparison between one brand and the Jabiru brand; b) CASA has NOT enforced any restriction on engines other than Jabiru that have a statistically-demonstrated failure rate of more than the 'baseline' it has adopted: the Rotax 912x c) CASA has NOT provided any specification of what 'remedial' action would be required by Jabiru, to have the restriction lifted. The fact of the abominable data compilation and (non-existant) analysis used to support the CASA action is crucial evidence to support the case that CASA did NOT undertake any proper analysis (as supported by RAA comments), but it is only one chamber of the revolver. Amongst others, is the time-line analysis of the CASA action. From the compilation of evidence and opinion from various sources, I am convinced that the action against Jabiru was motivated by politics within CASA - and I believe that that can be convincingly demonstrated. Some of us are working on how most effectively to deliver that message. Suffice it to say, at this point, that identification of the initial 'complainants' to CASA is incidental to the main story, and is unlikely to feature. There are more important and pertinent issues.

Keith - could you give me a bit more of a clue about your thoughts of the Instrument being 'a retaliatory action'? It's certainly a possibility and one that might make a great deal of sense, but I'm not sure what 'action/s' might have contributed to this 'reaction' on CASA's part. I am most definitely interested in seeing if there is a credible argument here.

Col: they are not MY statistics, they are - as referenced by Jabiru - ATSB statistics. I don't agree that 'engine failure' rates are per se the correct measure of 'safety'. Engine failure is a cause of an incident/accident - but the result of that accident is the measure of 'safety'. If you are, statistically, 16 times more likely to die after having taken off in a Lightwing than after having taken off in a Jabiru, does it matter whether your death results from an engine failure or any other factor? Your are still bloody well DEAD.

The Jabiru missive raises some very cogent issues. However, I think that CASA is actually safe against a claim that, as a result of the restrictions, someone has 'been forced into a Statistically Less Safe Aircraft' ( though that is the de facto situation, for early solo pilots just for openers), since it can argue that nobody is 'forced' to get into ANY aircraft - it is their choice. Such a defence is likely to work in a Court - even though it is an absolute dingo of an argument because CASA would ALSO argue against the corollary proposition that getting into a Jabiru is therefore ALSO and EQUALLY my choice and the restrictions should not have been imposed on the grounds that there is a 'heightened level of risk'. That is, in essence, the very basis of the CASA action. What the figures delivered by Jabiru show - and this has been appreciated by just about everyone in the rec. av community bar our own resident Foghorn Leghorn, BSC - is that there is very good statistical evidence that many other aircraft NOT powered by Jabiru engines, have a safety record demonstrating a 'level of risk' of many, many multiples over that experienced by Jabiru aircraft over a long - and I would think, statistically reliable - base period. Now, here is where that leaves CASA: From the statistics (and crudely, obviously) - individual aircraft will have far better than average statistics, but that is not the point: the point is that CASA singled out Jabiru-engined aircraft as having 'a heightened level of risk'. The raw statistics frankly show this is bullsh1t, you are 12 times as likely to be killed by flying in any other RAA aircraft, than in a Jabiru. Make that 16 times, if that aircraft is a Lightwing. You are 9 times as likely - in Australia - to be killed in a Cessna 172 - the world's most populous light aircraft. Unless being killed is less of a risk than enduring a forced landing - and most would likely accept that the inconvenience of an interrupted planned flight and some bruises is preferable to death - CASA has left itself HUGELY open to being sued for negligence if it does NOT impose similar or even more draconian restrictions on all aircraft with a statistically-demonstrable worse safety record than Jabiru. Why? - because, by the action against Jabiru, CASA has stated there is a 'safety case' for the imposition of restrictions. That, both de facto and de jure I believe, says that IF there is a 'safety case' to impose restrictions, on Jabiru then by failing to impose at least equivalent restrictions on aircraft with statistically demonstrated worse fatality rates, CASA has been negligent in its duty of care to aviation users/'sufferers'. Since CASA has used 'statistics' (albeit, such badly-assembled statistics that public exposure to then will render CASA as an object of derision) to put to trial and summarily convict Jabiru, it cannot argue that statistics are not a basis for requiring action against other brands of aircraft/engines. Just look at the list of aircraft that have worse fatality statistics than Jabirus, and try to imagine the ultralight scene in this country with increasing levels of restrictions appropriate to the fatality rate using the Jabiru restrictions as the baseline. To use a colourful and socially-acceptable phrase, slightly modified: CASA have pursued Jabiru into the swamp, and are now realising that they, like Jabiru are surrounded by alligators that will have no desire to differentiate from the fat CASA presence to the thin Jabiru one. Or, in a less elegant but more quintessentially appropriate one: CASA has put its reproductive organ in a vyce and tightened the screw in order to 'get' Jabiru. And Jabiru - by opening the statistics for inspection - has set fire to the woodshed..

While it is a reasonable statement that 'Jabiru hasn't done much significant to alter CASA's point of view', the flip-side of that coin is: 'what COULD they have done to change CASA's point of view? For Jabiru, it is a very complex situation. CASA did not identify any particular item/s it considered to be 'defective' nor specify to what standard these needed to be rectified (and remember, even for the highest-level of specification, a 100% non-failure rate is not required and nor is it possible to prove compliance even if it were). So, for Jabiru to 'change' anything, there is a real, and serious, juggling act - and it's anything but trivial. Firstly, there is absolutely no certainty that any change, no matter whether minor or major, cheap or expensive, will satisfy CASA - so the very first decision Jabiru has to make is: will whatever investment we have to make, be successful in having this restriction lifted? Once one starts to think about the position CASA has put itself in, the intelligent answer to that is: on the balance of probability - probably NOT. The CASA instrument makes it effectively impossible to make any calculation of ROI for any change. Secondly, in the absence of any specification by CASA of changes they wish to see incorporated, for Jabiru to voluntarily embark on a programme of change/s 'under duress' as it were, of the restriction, MIGHT be taken by a litigiously-inclined owner/operator as an admission that there is an existing defect that Jabiru had resisted changing earlier. Now, all manufacturers discover problems and address them via SBs and airworthiness authorities discover problems and issue ADs; it is generally accepted, I think, that this is fairly much a part of the natural pattern of development and maintenance. Rarely (but certainly not never), if something is found that is either so glaringly wrong as to support a culpable negligence claim / is an obvious candidate for a consumer claim ( 'not fit for purpose' etc.), then the march towards a Court is pretty inevitable. However, once again, the very lack of any specificity in the CASA instrument tends, I suggest, to make it extremely difficult for Jabiru to embark on any programme of change without opening itself up to possible litigation - an almost Catch-22 situation forced upon it as a consequence of the very nature of the Instrument. One would hope that this is simply an unintended consequence of the rushed and ineptly-handled action rather than a determined and considered outcome - I don't believe that CASA in fact has the corporate intelligence to plot something that devious. In a somewhat perverse twist that would get both Jabiru AND CASA off the hook here, would be for Jabiru to adopt / endorse fitting of the CAE engine (at least, in LSA-registered aircraft, once the CAE engine is LSA certified). CAE can easily demonstrate to CASA the range of 'improvements' it has made, without that in any way being a cause for Jabiru to be held liable for 'failing to fix' something: 'new and improved' does NOT imply that what has been superceded was faulty, it merely says: 'this is better'. Jabiru would have, in effect, a 'clean sheet' engine to install on its factory-built aircraft; CASA has already stated that the CAE engine is NOT a 'Jabiru engine'. The other possibility, I suggest, is for CASA to be forced to state what changes and level of performance it requires of Jabiru - but as things stand now, I believe that would be resisted strongly by CASA because it would, quite correctly, demonstrate that the original instrument was executed without adequate research and determination by CASA - which is exactly the position taken by RAA in the first instance. I don't see any chance of that unless by the directive of the Minister responsible for CASA, and good luck with hoping for that.

Bruce: those are all questions to which I do not know the answer - and to be honest, I do not have the background knowledge to even ask the right questions! I did note that they appear to be focussed on deep-cycle applications, and as a boat-owner I understand the differences, but this is an area where a forum such as this - or even perhaps RAA - could provide a set of guidelines for those of us who do not have the knowledge to make an informed decision. I am thinking here, of perhaps a 'cheat sheet' of the essential electrical parameters that would lead a knowledgeable person to a 'go/no go' decision. Perhaps I am untypical, but I am intensely interested in using a LiFePo4 battery in my own aircraft, for a number of reasons: a) I want to trade some changes in my Jab. that will add weight over standard, with the weight advantage of a LiFeP04 battery to still retain the best usable load I can get; b) In general terms, the low-discharge when unused and high-cranking power characteristics are the best match for my likely type of operation; c) I have had less than wonderful experiences of lead-acid and AGM batteries in 'unusual' circumstances, and the LiFePo4 batteries seem to me to be more 'robust' when considered in terms of package size and electrical capability. As an aside, but of interest to me, is the fact that it seems as if LiFeP04 discharge characteristics are almost the perfect match for an EFI installation. If things on the charging side go pear-shaped, the LiFePo4 battery will continue to fire the injectors up to the last gasp, giving the best possible 'emergency landing' choices. If those - and there are obviously quite a few of you out there - with the expertise to sift the wheat from the chaff of advertising blurbs for the rest of us could produce a set of guidelines for choosing a LiFePo4 battery, I for one would be extremely grateful.

Personally, I found that fairly reassuring. For sue, you wouldn't want that happening inside the occupant container, but if that situation happened on the cowl-side of the firewall, a properly set-up engine installation should be able to survive it. In real life, I'd be more worried about the situation of what had CAUSED the dead short, and whether THAT had started a fire.

Does anybody have any experience of the Aussie-made Fusion LiFePo4 batteries?: http://www.fusionagmbatteries.com.au/tabid/323/cid/8/Products/LithiumIonPolymer.aspx Allowing for typical advertising hyperbole, they seem to be by specification, pretty competitive with the better-quality o/s batteries.

KP - absolutely, I am NOT suggesting that there should be - or have been - the use of this non-specific type of action - where by 'specific' I mean that the cause/s and remedy/ies were /are not detailed so that a clear path to ending the restriction through an acceptable solution can be demonstrated. Where there is an identified specific safety issue, for example a component that is not to specification, a faulty manufacturing technique etc., then obviously action needs to happen and the normal mechanisms of ADs / SBs has served the aviation community well. AFAIK, the imposition of a blanket restriction on a particular brand, with no more than in effect a statement that 'we consider that something is happening and we're going to slap an action on this mob generally until it stops happening' is a new tactic for CASA, and one with potentially dire consequences for the industry and the sport.

Please provide us with your wisdom: what ARE 'the issues listed in the instrument?'

Perhaps, but apparently you do not have the wit to understand the situation.

Of course CASA Legal Dept. is holding up any lifting of the restrictions - because it has realised that to do so places it in an extremely exposed legal position. Many people have seen this one coming - and quite a few could see it, and were howled down when they foresaw it, even before the action was put in place. It's really quite simple: In its unseemly and wildly executed lunge at Jabiru's throat, CASA left itself with NO way out of the restrictions, in terms of any metric by which it could say: 'this is what is considered satisfactory; when this is met, the restrictions will no longer be needed.' NO specific issue was noted. The situation can be summed up as: If CASA lifts the restrictions without issuing a statement that a specific issue/issues have been satisfactorily addressed (and whatever was identified as an issue/s would have to stand up to scrutiny in a Court of Law), then one OR BOTH of the following circumstances could easily arise: a) an action by Jabiru / a class action on behalf of owners/operators for loss of income, value, reputation, utility ( and there are probably more than just these) is very likely to succeed because CASA would have de facto admitted that there was no specific 'safety issue' that has now been rectified; AND ( not OR): b) in the event of a future crash in circumstances prohibited under the restriction, those affected by that crash could sue CASA for lifting the restriction without any palpable reason, thus compromising the 'safety' mantra that was invo0ked in the first place. The action by CASA has been a monumental, intercontinental, fur-lined, multi-coloured hypersonic cluster-f%ck. If we had an effective Parliament - rather than a useless Opposition and a Government doing nothing but walking around with its hands covering its groins to avoid the kicks coming from everywhere - there would be an enquiry followed rapidly by the public lynching of Farqharson, Jonothan Aleck and quite probably all of the Sport Aviation department crew. Don't blame Skidmore for the situation: he was ambushed and nailed to the wall by Farqharson in the last HOURS of Farqharson's tenure of the office. In terms of the survival of an Australian aviation industry - albeit in a small, but internationally-significant way - this is a national disgrace. In terms of 'maintaining aviation safety' - it is an administrative-failure disgrace that would - in a democracy with any sort of effective government pursuing the 'business of government' - have the agency responsible dismembered and rendered 'dead, cremated, and its ashes scattered to the winds'.

And it would work independently of the steering pushrod assembly PROVIDED you can push the rudder cables. Normally, that is not an effective methodology for a control mechanism, but perhaps Tornados have a different arrangement with basic physics.

And - if the answer is 'YES', then you look for a simpler way...... and if the answer is 'no, but Citroen would', then you go have a stiff drink and start again from scratch..

Absolutely agree - the separate latching mechanism is the way to go. One does the 'full and free' controls check AFTER setting the pedal position (in a glider - you can't reach forward down the cockpit feet tunnel with your hand to check it), and I'd done that, but that hadn't included load on BOTH pedals simultaneously. Possibly, the lateral load from one pedal applying load only had allowed the pedal mechanism to rock and wedge before full load came on the detente pin... Having a separate latching mechanism allows you to 'rock' the pull load against the feet load and get the locking handle down to its correct position - I like that notion. If I may be allowed an observation - and ABSOLUTELY not meant as any sort of 'patronising' comment, because I genuinely appreciate the thought that goes into 'doing things correctly', it seems to me that everything you are doing is backgrounded by having looked at, analysed, and extracted whatever lessons there are to be learned from exposure to numerous examples of good and bad practice. Since just about everything I understand about aircraft design has come from exactly that process with the explanations passed on by a family member whose living has mostly been made from correcting design f%ck-ups, it's really inspiring to see someone conscientiously avoiding those problems rather than designing them in...

HITC - as usual, construction porn; those toe brake pedals are verging on adults-only viewing... The pull-back cable for adjusting the position of the pedals is very 'standard glider'; have you worked out how to secure in position? I ask, because I had an 'interesting' experience with just such a system years ago. Glasflugel Hornet, my familiarisation flight. I am not exactly sure of the mechanics, but suffice it to say that the pull-cable first disengaged some sort of detente pin and then allowed the pedals to be pulled back to suit the customer. All of that flight was 'interesting', and I won't go into the rest of it, but since I was to take it for a 300k attempt next day, I decided on approach to see just how short I could get it in. Allowed myself 50 feet or so over the fence, pulled full brakes ( actually, 90-degree flap position) - which were so powerful that pushing the nose down to keep the speed up, caused my sandwiches to fall forward from the parcel shelf and hurtle past me on the way to the nose. I caught them, but in so doing, wriggled slightly loose in the harness, which allowed me to come forward a wee bit, against which I braced my feet on the pedals - as one does instinctively. Obviously, I had not managed to fully engage the position detente pin in the holes in the position rack - and the rudder balance spring(s) pulled the pedals fully forward and way out of my leg reach (being Cherman, the Hornet was no doubt built for large buggers). So: no rudder... and the rudder adjustment handle was designed to be used BEFORE one strapped in, and not reachable from the supine seating position when strapped in, even if I'd hand a spare hand apart from the one holding the stick and applying secondary effects of ailerons to get me around the sod who had, without looking, decided to drag his landed glider across the strip right where I needed to round-out and the hand playing the flap/brake handle to get me some more room. The Hornet's owner ( and CFI of the operation) was not best pleased with my wobbly-appearing landing, since this was his personal racing machine, but when I explained the circumstances ( and since I hadn't bent it..) he was somewhat mollified. 'Yes, that can happen, you need to really test the rudder pedal security before you take off' was his comment, so I imagine this was not the first time the pedals had made a break for freedom.

The whole left-right driving thing is EASY. I spent a bit over a week at the NASM restoration facility at Sliver Hill; had picked up a rental Thunderbird at Dulles, experienced the Beltway, found my hotel ( complete with a permanent Cop car parked outside - a new experience in citizen safety for me) - 'this is a no-brainer'. NO WORRIES with thinking about 'left' vs. 'right' hand driving - just remember, the car that will hit you comes through the driver's side window. Just transpose left and right - simple as. Except that this, being the days before GPS, anywhere I wanted to go, I had to memorise the map before setting out, and having worked out a flight path: " Two blocks down, turn right, three blocks later, turn left" etc. - when transposed - produced some interesting journeys, including through areas of Washington DC where white folks are not supposed to go. Mostly innocuous, but having headed out for a friendly drink with one of the Silver Hill NASM guys and finding myself on a small side road stopped by a boundary fence for Andrews AFB, with, on the other side, a guard of dark complexion, huge size, mammoth weaponry and a less-the-amused expression while I consulted a map, tended to diminish my confidence in my own abilities.

Um - and connecting this and the 'Eagle Strike' thread.... http://www.couriermail.com.au/news/queensland/eightmonthold-koala-bob-recovering-after-being-dropped-10m-from-eagles-talons/news-story/00f7074835067cba596b9d11484be849 To quote the wonderful ( and sadly, recently deceased) British author Terry Pratchett, from his fantasy story 'The Last Continent', which centres on a mythical land called 'XXXX' (pronounced: 'Fourecks'), and in cartography, 'Terror Incognita', Death, having called upon his magical library to provide information of the dangerous creatures therein, is flattened by the falling volumes. Upon his release from the avalanche: 'Death picked up a book at random and read the cover. DANGEROUS MAMMALS, REPTILES, AMPHIBIANS, BIRDS, FISH, JELLYFISH, INSECTS, SPIDERS, CRUSTACEANS, GRASSES, TREES, MOSSES AND LICHENS OF TERROR INCOGNITA', he read. VOLUME 29C, he added. OH, PART THREE, I SEE'. Drop Bears are but a fraction of what awaits unsuspecting tourists. Sasquatches are just American cousins of Clive Palmer.

The dog in the back seat probably thought something rhyming with "DUCK", though with a slightly later-occurring (alphabetically) consonant as the first letter. Even if the Duck concerned isn't a little black one, with the initials 'D.D.' Of course, this sort of occurrence is always going to happen as the airspace gets evermore over-regulated and pilots (and eagles) have to spend too much time checking their WAC charts, NOTAMS etc. to make sure they are flying in the legally-correct bit of air. The less time you spend looking outside., the more time there is for an object to intersect your flight path. Seriously: At even 100 kts, an object with a small frontal area on a collision course that does not have flashing / intense warning lights, is bloody nearly invisible - especially if it has colouring even vaguely similar to the background. Eagles do not have fluoro-orange chests or led strobes... Personal experience: on a 300k declared flight out of Narromine, in a Libelle. I'd taken off about 30 minutes after a German pilot in the Narromine Janus (a 20-metre span two-seater - not a small aircraft). I rolled out of a thermal at about 7,800 AGL, tracking to my first turn-point of Coonamble, and going like the clappers: 100 kts or so) because I knew I could get there and back to that thermal, which was roughly on-track for my second leg of the flight, if I didn't dick around. On the way in, a radio communication, all in German: ' Umlaut chowdermarcherz COONAMBLE whatzeestuffernezz neezupmutherbraun" OK, I haven't a clue what he was saying BUT that sounded like a turning-point call for Coonamble - and I'm headed for there. Let's just keep the old eyes peeled... HOLY DUCK, here he comes - 100% reciprocal - he'd been (presumably) doing exactly what I planned to do, and since that thermal was well-established, from the same starting height and position, it was almost predestined that two people doing the same flight path would intersect. We both did the classic diving turn to the right simultaneously - obviously he'd seen me at the same moment I saw him - and as we levelled off, we could see each other wave 'thanks'. Passed maybe 100 feet apart. I reckon the closing speed was 200 kts, and the time between recognising this was another aircraft on a reciprocal heading and potential impact, was maybe two seconds. AND: we were both in shiny stark-white aircraft, very much larger than an eagle and highly more visible against the Aussie background. The point I am trying to make here, is that the sky is NOT devoid of things to be avoided, and the more time we have to spend with our eyes INSIDE the cockpit to ensure we are keeping clear of restricted airspace, on frequency for the local traffic area, have adjusted our altimeter for local QNH etc. etc., the less time we have our eyes outside the cockpit checking for things that could cause us to crash. Large birds do NOT make radio local area traffic awareness calls, in my limited experience. All of which - in an extremely convoluted way - brings me to one of my bete noirs with the current light aviation/recreational aviation scenario. The advances in the ability and the reliability of EFIS is the only effective answer for a single-crew PIC to navigate the increasingly complex skies in which we travel. The argument that ' well, mechanical ( or in this case, electronic) systems can fail" is so far beyond its use-by date by proper risk-analysis for flying complex skies, as to make it a no-brainer. What we need, is reliable electronics to report to us that we are flying correctly according to regulations and safely according to the flight parameters of our aircraft. THEN: we can actually spend time looking at what's happening north of the windscreen - and adjust things accordingly if required.

The energy of a decent bird-strike: Many years ago, 'progressing' homewards to Canberra from a weekend's gliding at Narromine, along the Lachlan Valley Highway just north of Boorowa. Mate's rather non-standard Volvo 122S, with some tasty bits of kit on it - including a brand-new, imported-from-Sweden, windscreen ( the Australian ones were too soft and pitted badly). Anybody who knows the 122 series Volvo, knows the windscreen is little more than a slit-trench firing hole. For reasons which are complex, we had decided (mutually) to distance ourselves from a Police Pursuit Charger helmed by with an officer who seemed keen to sell us a ticket to some official function. Neither of us had much money in our wallets ( as one doesn't after a weekend's gliding) and credit cards were yet to come. As it happened, both of us were doing a bit of club car racing on the side, and travelling at somewhat exaggerated velocities was not an unknown experience. Not to put too definitive a point on it, we were travelling at slightly in excess of the typical cruising speed of, let's say, a J230 with more fuel than daylight left to reach the target destination. About 5km north of Boorowa, a bloody sulphur-crested flew off a post on the side of the road and we hit it with the windscreen dead square in front of the driver. The laminated screen was cracked beyond comprehension - from top to bottom and side to side. The bang when it hit was mega. It did NOT collapse, and by the time we actually got to Boorowa, we'd regained some composure. Seriously: if you hit a bird, even just the size of a large-ish parrot, square-on with an acrylic or Lexan screen on most of our class of aircraft, it is very likely to come through any fairly flat screen, pulling the fastenings out with it, unless it is some sort of bonded-in, structural component. Lexan is far more impact-tolerant than acrylic, but neither is as good as not being in a bird-strike situation in the first place..

The majority of birds seem to have the cognitive ability to calculate a divergence distance to vehicles travelling at up to about 100 - 110 kph ( watch the crows, Magpies, Mynahs etc. on country roads.) Parrots do not.... Budgerigars have difficulty in counting their feet, galahs rarely know they HAVE feet, and sulphur-cresteds are hell-bent on destroying something - anything - anyway. I suspect eagles have sufficient nouse ( and more than sufficient eyesight) to avoid collisions, though in the case of a Drifter, they may simply be irritated at the noise and keen to chase the damn thing out of their area before a headache sets in. If I were an eagle, I would... Ducks flying alongside a Drifter? Bloody lethargic Ducks, in my opinion. Are you SURE none of them were black and lithping in a tharcathic manner? Dethpicable....

Coming back to Canberra one winter's eve from Albury in a small commuter kite (possibly a Queen Air) when the big Pilot's strike was on and Ansett had fired every pilot... sitting first row, rh side, so I could see most of what the pilot did, and I'll stake quids that he was an ex-Ansett Captain. No FO, of course, on something that small. Over Tumut, we were in the middle of HUGE cumulus towers, lightning going off all around. Then I note the PIC reach down and pick up a torch, and look out the left hand side, shining the torch outside.. WTF?? Then he ( nonchalantly) did the same sweep of the rh wing and spinner - there was easy three inches of ice on the L/E and about the same on the nose of the spinner. AHA - says I - we're going to die. On the upside: at least it'll be quick, and there are no fat American matrons shrieking 'OH MY GOD' aboard, as one cannot get up and hit them ( see also: 'Flying High'). Descent into Canberra, heavy rain... well, at least it isn't hail, so we should shed the ice. We WILL survive! Runway lights appear - tracking well over 30 degrees off the starboard bow, Captain.... and the thing is being blown around like a balloon in a hurricane. AHA, says I - at least we'll die where we can be found! Main strip, down the centreline, pointing at the terminal.... then with about 2 feet height to spare, the PIC kicked it straight and deposited us on the tarmac without even a bounce. Taxied in; the Airline staff didn't bother bringing out umbrellas, the rain was torrential and horizontal. I was the last pax out; the pilot was handing out the luggage from the nose, soaked to his jockstrap. There was STILL bloody ice dripping off the wings! Ambient was about 2C, if that. I said to him: "Thanks, that was a bloody wonderful landing in these conditions, and don't these have de-icers?" "Thank you, sir, and yes, they are SUPPOSED to'' - in a voice that suggested somebody in Maintenance was going to be drilled, reamed, punched and bored with exceptional malice.

If Michael Coates swore that the sun would rise tomorrow, I'd be out buying up all the candles I could get hold of tonight.

Who would go to Clifton from Brisbane via Toowoomba? Cunningham highway or cut across from Gatton.

Trevor Bange is a really great instructor and the Clifton site has accommodation at excellent rates - and lots of clear area for flying. Just don't expect to use the strip after it's rained heavily - it's black soil, and becomes hot chewing gum after rain.