onetrack

But the electrical pulse is initiated by the closing of switch contacts, which can only happen with the physical movement of the switch mechanism? I would like to see a description of what could cause an electrical pulse to the fuel valves, without any physical switch movement? Then there's the description in the preliminary report that the fuel cutoff switches were moved back to RUN, and an attempt to relight the engines was made - which accordingly indicates the switches were initially placed in the OFF position? Add to that, the report stating there were no reportable 787 issues identified, that needed to be communicated to Boeing?

The chances of an event like that happening are so remote, it's not worth considering. There were no "jolt" conditions on takeoff, and the other wild theories about a manual or iPad falling on the switches are equally fanciful. No professional pilot in possession of an ATPL would have anything loose in the cockpit on takeoff - especially something that could fall on critical control levers or switches. The switches were moved on purpose. Only further, deeper investigation may find the reason why. The switches are a pretty standard Honeywell design that comes in huge variety of design choices and varieties. The part number is 4TL837-3D, and the spec sheet is in the link below. The locking mechanism problem was found to originate in the locking collar becoming able to rotate, enough to misalign the locking collar notches with the projections on the switch body, and thus allowing the locking mechanism to be bypassed. It appears Boeing decided it wasn't a serious enough problem on the 787, perhaps because the AD was issued, which made pilots and maintainers aware of what to check for. I've been on a Virgin B737 flight that stopped on the taxiway and the crew called in an LAME to tighten the thrust levers mechanism, as it appeared the crew became wary of a potential thrust lever rollback, a common Boeing problem. So the crews are well aware of potential controls glitches and faults and I'm sure the pilot and co-pilot of Flight 171 were well aware of the AD relating to the fuel cutoff switches ability to bypass the locking arrangement. https://datasheet.octopart.com/4TL837-3D-Honeywell-datasheet-31974395.pdf?_gl=1*1r8bggd*_gcl_au*NjIxNDk4MTU3LjE3NTIzMjQ2NDk.*_ga*MjA3MTA3MDU1LjE3NTIzMjQ2NDg.*_ga_SNYD338KXX*czE3NTI0MDU1ODkkbzIkZzAkdDE3NTI0MDU1ODkkajYwJGwwJGgw

Lyndon, the following CASA advisory articles are relevant to your planned build. https://www.casa.gov.au/certification-amateur-built-abaa-aircraft https://www.casa.gov.au/sites/default/files/2021-08/advisory-circular-21-04-amateur-built-experimental-aircraft-certification.pdf

I fail to understand how one can design a single rotor helicopter with no tail rotor. What does it use for directional control, if it has no tail rotor?

A gasoline-powered jet! I never knew they were built. But I guess it was the standard fuel of the U.S. military forces at that time, so that makes sense.

Nev - There is a fuel supply valve in the fuel line to the engine that is part of the fuel cutoff system. Activating the fuel cutoff toggle switch in the cockpit closes contacts that sends an electrical signal to the engine ECU, which then sends an electrical signal to the solenoid that activates the spring-pressure loaded HPSOV (High Pressure Shut Off Valve). The HPSOV must be electrically activated to move to either position, On or Off, because the spring-loaded detents hold the HPSOV in whatever position the last electrical signal told it to do. This is Boeings fail-safe system for the HPSOV. As it is obvious from the preliminary report, the fuel cutoff switches were moved in the cockpit - and the crew voices confirm that. As the PF is fully concentrating on the lift-off, and has both hands on the yoke, it seems it was the PNF who moved the switches. I think that the reason why he did so, may never be found. As I understand it, the PNF is carrying out a purely monitoring job, so he has little reason to operate important flight controls - unless he saw an emergency. But no pilot should ever take any drastic engine control measures at takeoff, 400 feet is the minimum critical altitude mentioned in all manufacturer and training information. I feel there's a Boeing design failure here that allows engine fuel cutoff switches to be activated at under 400 feet. The interesting part is that the fuel cutoff switching system is not mentioned in the B787 Thrust Management System, because it is designed only to used on the ground at shutdown - or in an emergency, such as an engine fire. But no pilot would ever shut down an engine that's on fire, when they're at a critical altitude, so that critical altitude protection should now be written into the fuel cutoff switching system logic, to prevent a crash like this one happening again. Boeing 787 Thrust Management System Explained WWW.TRANSGLOBALTRAINING.COM Discover how the advanced Thrust Management System in Boeing 787 enhances safety, efficiency and reduces pilot workload

The German Consul in W.A., imported 2 Klemm monoplanes in late 1929 and early 1930. The Consul, a Mr H.C. Ittershagen, ran a company called the Aerial Commerce Co., and tried to sell the Klemm aircraft with barnstorming sessions, and much advertising and visitations by the aircraft, and giving joyrides, in many rural regions of W.A. H.C. Ittershagen was also the local dealer for German Lanz tractors, and he was intent on selling the Klemm aircraft to wealthy farmers. However, it was the height of the Great Depression, and most peoples thoughts were on survival, not purchasing aeroplanes. The farming community was under stress as commodity prices had collapsed below the cost of production. As a result, sales of the Klemm aircraft failed to eventuate, and I believe the company was wound up before the Great Depression was over (1934). The two seater Klemm apparently survived until the early 1950's, and was apparently flown unregistered and secretly during the War by an unlicenced pilot. https://encore.slwa.wa.gov.au/iii/encore/record/C__Rb1920207?lang=eng&ivts=x9%2FQXzsNh%2Bv1jvs6BeSDUg%3D%3D&casts=xs0LRgWFEu0M%2B8o995kfRA%3D%3D https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/33345002 https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/244479910?searchTerm="Aerial Commerce Co" https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/33346529 https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/32309256 https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/264201167 https://www.airhistory.net/photo/564927/VH-ULU

..........gaps in his maps and charts. However, the novice suddenly became aware, once airborne, that the countryside below didn't seem to match his maps and charts. This led to a great deal of consternation, until he realised that the maps and charts he was in possession of, dated to 1943 and contained information such as "likely enemy target", amongst other things. What was even more unfortunate, was that one of the "likely enemy targets" listed was the Turbine Industries Cat Farm. Upon reading the word "enemy", our novice was overcome with emotions that made him start looking on board for his American flag, and he then sought out the whereabouts of his armaments, which comprised.........

From a Flight Operations Briefing Note: Introduction: The failure rate of aircraft engines has reached an all-time low. This means that many flight crews will never face an engine failure during their career, other than those in the flight simulator. However, simulators are not fully representative of engine failures because accelerations (e.g. due to a failed engine), noise (e.g. caused by an engine stall), or vibrations (e.g. in the event of a blade rupture), are hard to simulate. Consequently, flight crews are not always able to identify and understand engine malfunctions. Incorrect crew understanding of engine malfunctions can lead to unnecessary engine shutdowns, but also to incidents and accidents. Statistics and Background: When the jet engine was introduced in civil aviation in the 1950s (de Havilland Comet, Sud-Aviation Caravelle), the available thrust was less than 10,000 lbs. Today, high by-pass ratio engines produce up to 115,000 lbs of thrust. During the same time, the rate of In-Flight Shut Downs (IFSD) has decreased as follows: IFSD (per 100,000 engine FH) 1960s - 40 Today - Less than 1 In other words: • In the 1960s, on average, each engine failed once a year • Today, on average, each engine fails every 30 years. This improvement in the rate of IFSD has allowed the introduction of ETOPS (Extended Twin Operations) in 1985. Among other criteria, to be approved for ETOPS 180, the rate of IFSD must be less than 2 per 100,000 engine flight hours. This also means that pilots that start their career today, will probably never experience an IFSD due to an engine malfunction. However, despite the significant improvement in engine reliability, the number of accidents (per aircraft departure) due to an incorrect crew response following an engine malfunction, has remained constant for many years. This prompted a study with all major industry actors involved (aircraft and engine manufacturers, authorities, accident investigation agencies, pilot organizations). Among the results were: • The vast majority of engine malfunctions are identified and handled correctly. However, some malfunctions are harder to identify • Most crews have little or no experience of real (i.e. not simulated) engine malfunctions • Simulators are not fully representative of all malfunctions • Training does not sufficiently address the characteristics of engine malfunctions. The following crew undue actions, caused by engine malfunctions, have been observed: • Loss of control (trajectory not adapted to the engine failure) • Rejected takeoff above V1 • Shutdown of the wrong engine • Unnecessary engine shutdown • Application of the wrong procedure / Deviation from the published procedure.

There is nothing in the information coming out that says the fuel cutoff switches were actually moved. All that has been stated, is that the investigation is "focusing on the fuel switches". No doubt the investigation is carefully studying the maintenance records and interrogating those who last worked on the aircraft. It is a worrying sign that falsified and inadequate aviation records have been provided by Air India Express staff previously.

......horror, as it was suddenly realised by Margot and Rudy (and all the NES readers, too, of course) that the NES had now been infiltrated by a secretive ex-WW2 Messerschmitt fighter pilot, who has admitted to selling Cessnas as a sideline - and even worse - has admitted to being a Tasmanian. One could forgive the new member for supporting one lost cause, but supporting three lost causes is too much, and makes one...........

The "talk of other faults", is what is missing at present. The AAIB preliminary report is likely to be somewhat disappointing, and declaring an open and shut case at any preliminary report is quite likely not ideal, as deeper investigation takes place, that often finds subtle or unrecorded factors in play. What if the fuel cutoff switches are recorded by the FDR as being untouched by the crew, in "run" position, but the fuel supply to the engines was found to be shut off, in contravention to the switch position? That would mean a much more intensive search to find the precise reason for the fuel starvation.

The article says the pilot "fell from the parachute", which appears to indicate he fell out of it, rather than the parachute itself falling rapidly to the ground? If that's the case, then position restraint failure must be the reason behind the fall?

I can attest to the usefulness and durability of pantyhose. Many decades ago, when I was operating in the mining industry, there was a local underground nickel mine which was notorious for working conditions. Nickel sulphide itself is a nasty, highly corrosive ore, but it often comes with volumes of underground water, and that water often contains high levels of nasty chemicals such as arsenic. Many underground miners work in very wet conditions, and if you work in these conditions where the underground water contains a high level of arsenic, you end up with some nasty skin complaints in the tender crotch region. So, it was found that wearing pantyhose was the best protection against arsenic water skin complaints, in those tender regions. So, even rough and tough miners can be seen wearing panthyhose!

The part I find interesting is that according to the B787 drivers, both fuel switches cannot be switched off at once, unless both hands are used. The switch handles need to be lifted against spring pressure, to go through their locking gates. This applies whether you're selecting "run" or "cutoff" with the switch. The drivers say it would require a person using both hands to switch both fuel switches to cutoff at the same time, as appears to be the case here. The fuel switch cutoff is instantaneous, the engine spools down immediately. If the pilot or co-pilot, sitting in their seats, strapped in, tried to switch both fuel switches simultaneously, it would require some extreme body movement, to do so. If the switches were moved to cutoff, one after the other, quickly, with one hand, I would expect to see some yaw, as one engine shut down before the other. I see zero yaw on takeoff, the flight travelled smoothly in one direction only. As the switches are electric-over-mechanical, with spring pressure at the fuel valves holding the valves at the position they're set at (i.e., a power failure does not change the valve position), then the conclusion must be that electric power was supplied to the fuel valves to activate them to the cutoff position - and both at the same time. How that could possibly happen if the switches weren't activated in the cockpit, has to be the main focus of the investigation, now. There is talk that the preliminary report, due tomorrow, will not reveal why the fuel valves were in the cutoff position - only that it happened, and much further investigation is going to be required, before the reason they were in that position, is found.