I borrowed this from Garfly's post. (I'm not saying he agrees with me or does not agree with me and have not discussed borrowing his post with him.)
Alerted See & Avoid
In the modern age of electronic flight bags (EFBs), GPS, TCAS, and other electronic devices, pilots are more distracted inside the cockpit than ever before! Combine this with inconsistent radio communications, increased traffic density, and more frequent RPT traffic in regional areas, and the holes in the swiss cheese start to align!
Near miss and loss of separation events are the fourth most common occurrence type reported to RAAus. Now, more than ever, it is important that pilots maintain regular and consistent radio calls and look out techniques in order to maintain situational awareness.
Pilots must avoid the temptation to become dependent on position information displayed on EFB or TCAS displays - This technology relies on the fitment of similar equipment in other aircraft, often resulting in inconsistent traffic displays and the potential for traffic to go unnoticed. Whilst this technology is valuable in assisting situational awareness, it must not replace the requirement for pilots to maintain a constant lookout and the need for regular radio calls for efficient alerted see and avoid principles.
Head of Training Development, Neil Schaefer, recently observed the importance a maintaining a visual scan when conducting a flight review with an RAAus pilot. The pilot, who was using a SkyEcho ADS-B receiver, showed signs of complacency by relying on traffic information displayed on their iPad. During the flight review Neil visually spotted two aircraft in the local area which were not identified by the pilot in command - Neither aircraft was displayed on the pilots EFB.
https://members.raa.asn.au/safety/safety-focus/alerted-see-and-avoid/?
Since about the 1980's people have been trying to decrease accidents in complex systems by doing a so-called root cause analysis (RCA) following a near miss and accident. The RCA tries to uncover the factors that contributed to the accident and happened earlier than the last error that actually caused the accident. For example, if the ergonomics of a cockpit contributed to pilot error, then the ergonomics of the cockpit were also a cause, even though the cockpit was designed years ago.
In order for RCA's to work, the people who made the mistake need to be willing to come forward completely voluntarily and tell the truth. They will only do that if they feel safe that they will not be punished. This is what it means to have a just organisational culture (JC) (acronyms are my own, not official) (Basically, if someone is reckless or impaired by drugs, then they should be punished, otherwise they should not. Different organisations draw this distinction a bit differently.) When all the information is collated, all the underlying causes of the problem can be addressed and the organisation and its safety improve.
The above example is contrary to organisational safety because it is contrary to RCA and JA.
• JA: people are going to be discouraged to come forward when they see that someone who made a mistake is publicly criticised like this. There was no need to label an attitude as "complacent". They could have said that the pilot was looking at the iPad instead of having their head on a swivel.
• JA: they said, "signs of complacency". This suggests to the reader that no one bothered to ask the pilot about it. If they had asked the pilot about it, they would have been able to find out if the complacency was real. I think that having an iPad is the opposite of being complacent. It seems that the RA-Aus people spoke about it behind the pilot's back and decided to big note themselves, on the Net, about it.
• JA: they could have used the pilot as a role model by having them write a near miss piece for the RA-Aus website. Instead, they wanted to look like superior aviators.
• RCA: there was no consideration of the factors that lead up to the pilot relying on their iPad instead of looking out the window, or why the other planes did not show up on the iPad. There was no consideration of the possible upstream factors that could have contributed to the problems or where RA-Aus fell down on the job of fixing them.
• As I understand it, different electronic flight bags show up different sets of planes. RA-Aus has not been trying to get all traffic on all iPads
• How did the pilot come to think that traffic would be on the iPad. RA-Aus has allowed things to be marketed without sufficient warnings.
• How come the pilot was not aware of the other aircraft because of radio calls?
• Was the pilot safe because other safety layers, like doing proper circuit procedures kept people safe?
I will be complaining to RA-Aus about their stupidity and encourage you all to do so too. I'm pissed that RA-Aus are wrong *and* happy with themselves.