poteroo

Maize = Corn. In older UK farming pubs I see 'corn ' being used for wheat grain. Differential power is useful with twin tail draggers as you can keep straight without braking on a wheeler. A touch on either brake will indicate if one is weaker than the other but a grabbing brake is hard to recover from. Tailwheel locked only slows the groundloop but an essential check list item nonetheless. (I'm sure that some C185s I've flown did have a t/w lock control on the central area nr the flap lever.). But keeping some power on the upwind engine is useful, especially as the tail is descending toward t/w contact and the airflow is masked from a single fuselage rudder.

The take-off, even @ MTOW, used to be less of a problem in PNG ops because most strip's had significant slope. 5 - 10% was usual. But, there was a climb limit for most fully loaded aircraft. I think it was about 6% and was shown on our PK charts. It became a worry if you got airborne ok, but then needed to climb to perhaps 4000ft higher to get through a ' gap ' We used a rule of thumb to add 3000ft to our pressure altitude to calculate DA.

There have been several wind related upsets on 07 at Bunbury over the years. DPW,(formerly CALM), had a few in their Cubs. One CPL did his C182 an injury that I remember. There's a lot of mechanical turbulence over the trees on the S side and this requires some skilful handling. Hope he makes it, and I hope his accident account serves a solid lesson to all pilots.

Did they overshoot or undershoot? Looks to me that they flew quite a long final, which is tempting fate if you are struggling with perhaps a partial loss of power, but still flying a power on profile. I'm a born pessimist, and hangin very close so that a short final can be flown in the glide. But, they all got out, and that's the result we all strive for.

I dislike autopilots, and that places me in the dinosaur category. If I have to learn a new A/P, I try not to read the whole POH and confuse myself : I take it in small bites, eg, set power and manually trim to keep altitude and heading constant. Only then, do I dare turn on one or other function. Perhaps ALT HOLD first, and see whether A/P will hold ALT with small power changes. Then, when I'm happy with that, I'll try HDG, and check whether it will actually hold the manually set HDG, then check it's adjustment. I never touch the VS setting/adjustment until I'm at altitude, and have checked the ON/OFF switch a few times, just in case the VS adjustment develops a mind of it's own. In the case of this US accident - what more can be said? At 400TT the pilot should have had a good working grip on every system and switch in that Debonair. I fear that these types of pilot induced incidents are going to push our regulators into requiring either a signoff in the pilots log for each system in an aircraft, or, require the system to be disabled unless the pilot has demonstrated competency in operating it. Seems that pilots are becoming their ' ówn worst enemy ' by not learning each and every system in the aircraft they fly or hire.

My particular interest here is not with the legalities of this operation, nor whether any pilot, regardless of LL experience, should be stooging around mountainous terrain in a high performance aircraft when the wx prognosis was poor. It is more about how it appears to have been carried out on the day. The Cessna 182RG was in good order, and everything was serviceable. There was far more fuel onboard than rquired. The CPL /IFR pilot had 12,000 TT, of which all but 1000 was in helicopters. He had 400 in the 182RG. He held LL approval, but only for helicopter. He was current under 90 days rule. What shocked me, was to read on p46 of the ATSB report, that the average speed of this aircraft was recorded as from 120-140kts. During the latter part of the flight it conducted turns of 35-39 degrees AoB. The ATSB belatedly, on p48, mentions 'slowing down ' as a suggestion. Now, I thought it was common knowledge that pilots slowed the aircraft down when forward visibility began to reduce, and especially where LL flight might become a necessity. The POH for this RG182 specifies full fine pitch, 65KIAS and 20 deg flap for Precautionary Flight - which gives plenty of margin over Vs = 54, or Vso = 50. Personally, I'd use 70 and 10 if light, perhaps 70 and 20 if faced with any tight turning. Not only does slower flight allow you more time to manoeuvre around obstacles, but you can do it in a smaller radius turn, at a lower AoB, and with less stress. Everyone also knows that in reduced visibility, refraction of the airborne particles plays a role, and causes the pilot to believe that objects are more distant than they actually are. A bloody good reason to be slower, and more manoeuvreable. The 182 airframe is excellent for slow flight, (trim the b... thing!), and with positive use of power in 30deg/70kt turns, it is around on the proverbial sixpence. (<500m). At high cruising speeds, (eg, 120+), a higher AoB, (40-45 deg) is needed, and the turn radius blows out to 3x that needed for 70kts/20deg. G forces increase, and that does not help pilot wellbeing or thinking ahead. One of the problems with faster IAS below cloud layers is that just the slightest back pressure can cause a 100-200ft climb straight into the murk - and then you cannot see ahead. It just isn't sensible to be blasting along at 2x your preferred low level operating speed when there is marginal visibility. At 70KIAS, it takes 2.6 mins to cover the 3nm vis that you should have, but at 120KIAS - that reduces to 1.5 mins. If you can't see 3nm, then you should be turning already. That extra minute could be worth your skin. Now, we're discussing a real accident here, and I hope this post isn't taken as criticism of the pilot. I wasn't there on the day, so I don't know what really happened. But, for those of us flying RAAus aircraft - the principles remain the same. Carry lots of fuel, slow down from 100 to 60 - your aircraft won't fall out of the sky unless you misconfigure or hamhandle it. Keep out of the cloud base, make early turn decisions, and, keep your backdoor open with your entry track easily regained if needed.

Do you mean as in more violent wx events due to ' climate change '? If I remember correctly this strip is uphill several degrees to the west - which would require your go round to be initiated earlier? Most pvt strip's only have a single windsock, often lost to sight on short final. Makes it hard to detect a late wind change. RLOC strikes again!

Nothing beats manual flaps for gaining lift quickly, especially if trying to make minimum radius turns. The earlier Cessnas had a 4 position flap lever and on the 180 & 185 this was very reassuring as you kept your eyes outside while extending or retracting flap. Kept you much safer. happy days,

Did my early cotton spraying in a Pawnee, and of course in the early 70s they were in good shape. Get a few thousand litres of corrosive spray and solids dust through them, x 20 years, and the corrosion runs wild. In any event, no sane Aggie would do a rolling pull up like that as it really stresses things.

Well, I thought it was the best example of a water ditching that I have ever seen. I know that the PIC received absolutely the best instruction in this procedure, was very competent, was current, and was cool under pressure. You can't get better than this. bravo,

FYI, I conducted Hayden's RPC test, and found him very 'switched on ' He's very thorough, and his handling skills were above average. In a windy place like Esperance, flying a Jab 120 is often a fair challenge. With his round Australia flight, he'll grow as a PIC, and will increase his experience store. Whether CASA relaxes the Class 2 Medical requirement for RAAus instruction may take some time, but it offers hope for pilots in Hayden's cohort, alongside those of us who have lost a Class 2, but can fly perfectly well. It's certainly in the best interests of RAAus to broaden the instructor base - or the industry will just wither-on-the-vine. happy days,

Probably a combination of oldies retiring, other schools with declining student numbers, and others closing because they simply can't make ends meet. In WA, it has been a rapid decrease in schools, with almost no schools remaining outside of greater Perth, Bunbury and Busselton. In WA, it has been paralled by a decline in GA activity as well. I'll describe our, (Albany) experience over the past 35 years. We have had a solid GA school operating 2,3 Cessnas, but they are closing the doors this 30/6 because the CFI has, essentially, had a 'gutfull of the CASA red tape' and with rising operational costs, and despite still reasonable student numbers, has reached her limit. (thank G that RAAus isn't anywhere as nitpicky as CASA, and that's been the difference between the schools). Gone is a really excellent CFI/ATO with 10,000 hrs TT. So far, there's not been any whisper of a new entry, but who knows. In my case, its' a different path to retirement. I've held a CPL since 1965, and after 5 years in PNG, moved to WA where I finished off my long held over IR, and just took on part-time instructing, specialising in tailwheel, low level, and experimental stuff. In 2005 I moved to Albany and setup an RAAus school, in full collaboration with the GA CFI. This ran successfully for 15 years, but increasing difficulties with CASA AVMED saw me lose my Class 1/2 in 2022, (at age 81 though). I had 15 students at the time, and we certainly didn't close because of lack of business. (Albany is a city of 36,000, with a large hinterland of very good farming country.).The cost of doing the seemingly endless tests, and the uncertainty and frustration of the whole process became too much for me. I quit! Now, I'm also lost to the industry, with 15,000 hrs and a wide experience to pass onward. So, with both schools closed, this once very active training location has nothing left. I charged out a new Brumby at $220/hr, and this pretty much paid for it's running costs. There was nothing leftover for any salary though. Unforeseen maintenance items, and the real cost of a good LAME soon pulls the inputs back. Add to this the spiralling costs of insurance and fuel, and the ever rising charges applied at a full security regional airport, and I would have needed to raise charges this year to around $240-250/hr. That's not to say that an energetic new instructor couldn't make a go of things here - the big problem is the startup costs, and the need to be supervised by a CFI in the initial phases. Once we oldies lose that Class 2 medical, we cease to be able to supervise a new instructor - which I find really difficult to accept. Why can't this happen, because there is no risk to the junior instructor or SI, because they remain PIC for any flight checks. Even were the unthinkable to happen, (perhaps a medical with the I or SI), we oldies could still manage to save the day. After all most of us are probably still actively flying with an RPC. I hate to think of the future for RAAus unless there is some move to help younger pilots into instructing, in the regions, before it all becomes city centric. happy days,

It occurs to me that the crew had not thoroughly briefed as to the duties of the PNF and PF. The PNF should have been acting as an FO, and as such, would have only acted upon the PFs instructions. FO must visually identify any control before adjustment. Seems likely that the PNF was far too casual in respect of his duties,( as an FO), under the command of the PF. After all, the PNF was really the C&T Captain, and would have been looking for the PF, (the pilot under test), to make all the calls otherwise it would not be possible to assess the aspiring Captain, (the PF). I can't understand how the PF would call for flaps 30 when it was likely their IAS was already lower than Vref, and decreasing, and then to commence a turn! Again, the acting FO,(PNF), should have been watching this and calling it. Again, seems they had not really briefed on who was really going to do what. Not as if flying in the Himalayas isn't dangerous enough, without letting HF become the cause. RIP.

Only if you don't look after it. The 9A has such capable pitch control that it can be taxied nosewheel off. No need to have it touch until well under 35 kts. 12 years owning one. happy days,

It's a physical impossibility to instantly slow from cruise IAS down to below Va when the gap is 30kts or more. It matters not whether it's Va, or Vc that's important. The answer is to be prepared for turbulence by understanding the wx on track, have calculated your Va off your TOW/Vs, learn what constitutes low,moderate and severe turbulence, and learn to fly it smoothly in rough air. BTW, a parallel discussion on pp agrees with the above. It also contains some perceptive views on the content of both CPL and instructor training.

Have been traversing the Nullarbor since 1971, in everything from a Jabiru 120 to a Beech Baron 55. It hasn't become any shorter, nor the winds really any different. You do need to heed a few common sense rules-of-thumb though: 1. Always use GS, because your TAS will vary lots with altitude and power settings. 2. Going East - generally fly as high as you can, and only add 10kts to rough planning 3. Going West - generally fly below 2000 ft to avoid the ever present W/NW, take 20/25 kts off your TAS 4. In winter, keep inland as much as you are able 5. In summer, follow the coast to pickup any onshore breezes, and it's cooler 6. Plan on maximum 8 hrs flight in any one day - see 12. 7. Stay overnight where there is good shelter available for the aircraft, eg, Pirie, Nullarbor, Forrest, Border Village, Caiguna, Balladonia and Myrup (ESP). Ceduna, Esperance and Hopetoun are very exposed. 8. Call ahead to check fuel availability status, ie, both AVGAS and PULP 95/98 9. The weather systems almost always lie NW/SE. They usually move at 20-30 kts. Going W, the wx always seems to be faster than you planned. It fills the sky alarmingly fast. 10. Summer systems are trough lines which are small TS, with lots of lightning, not much rain, but sharp NE/NW/W winds - keep your eye on the ground for dust disturbance and slow down to <Va when cutting through the trough line, but always on the NW side of any TS or cell. 11. In winter, divert inland so that the cold front will be narrower, keep heading NW until you can see well ahead. You have diversion options always on that side. 12. appropos the flying time per day - you must plan for the worst case scenario in that you could easily need to divert late in the day when you hoped for destination has a screaming crosswind with blowing dust. Aim to get to your destination min 2 hrs before last light while holding an alternate plan for 1 hrs flight time. 13. carry water + food + warm clothes with you - cringing o/n under a line of mallee on a remote station strip is always more bearable if you are not thirsty, hungry or freezing. The Nullarbor coast, but really everywhere from Ceduna to Albany, is subject to very strong seabreezes in summer, and the temps fall well into the 10-15 range...despite a day temp of 30-40. 14. Make sure that you have any and every station and mining strip co-ords in your GPS. Remember the old adage - 'much better to be safely sitting down here, than being up there and wishing you were not. Happy NY...cheers,

When you have an aircraft with a cruise in the 145-150KIAS range, but, a Va of 123KIAS, (@MTOW), there's potential for 'both long term progressive, or immediate, airframe damage. If the aircraft has had a long history of low level survey, and a high TT, say 15,000+ hrs, then there's further potential for there to have been many, many stresses on the airframe. If you look at Va a bit further, then with a light load of 2 people, plus probably low fuel load, the Va is going to be much less than that quoted in the POH. (Lower weight = lower Vs = lower Va). Couple the above with flying during the wet in northern Australia, with lots of thermal activity, and there's real potential for airframe breakup. The sad aspect of the past 210 accidents is that less experienced CPLs appear to be involved. What is being taught to them, either in their commercial training or on the job? Is there too much çommercial' pressure to get the job done today, or is it the more common peer group pressure that most of us felt in our early years pushing tired old 200 series Cessnas around the tropics?

I'm not surprised that an experienced VFR pilot, (with IFR and extensive country experience), would try to find a way under the cloud, regardless of terrain. What I found concerning was that they tried again - a recipe for more determination to get through. The other thing that I found concerning was that there was no flap deployed. If you are intending to look for a low level pathway, then you need to be able to give yourself more time to manoeuvre ie, use minimum radius turns. The 182 is far more controllable at 70-75 kts and 20 flap. A lesson for everyone here. RIP.

No, the so called 'impossible' turn is through 180° back to the runway. The safest turn from upwind is into wind. Forget about always going left. You can sensibly call 'making RH turn after takeoff' on Multicom and that would be understood by anyone. What price reducing risk?

With a gusty 20 kt easterly reportedly blowing, it would be a brave PIC trying either a takeoff or landing on 04 at Caiguna. There is substantial bush 10-15m high, some 150-200m east of the runway. This always seems to create a lot of wind speed and direction change. I have seen a J170 rolled over in a 20kt SE wind on strip 22, clearly by a gust and it wasn't pretty. There is a windsock to the NW side, but you can't watch this while in the critical stages of t/o or ldg! The strip is quite wide, and it does allow for some 'angling' of the ground roll to reduce the x/w and increase the h/w - if you have the skill to fly this. Be warned about windy wx at Caiguna - it's a difficult location so check 1st.

We need to consider each pilots experience ahead of just age. A long term, high TT pilot would rarely, rarely, break their good flight discipline: a result of years of real VFR experience. FWIW, my take is that one or the other aircraft was changing level and may not have called it. But, there are many ways to have an aviation accident and none of them novel. RIP.

Big tick for high wings!

At the very least, not unless you have had low level training, and you delegate the non-flying stuff to the passenger while you just fly the aircraft.

Emergency extension is very simple and usually works on the legs which haven't suffered any mechanical damage. Nose gear seems most prone to this, hence the pilot visible ng indicator below inst panel. One item can be a cause of system failure is the emergency gear winder handle. If it's not restored correctly after practice emergency extensions, it can catch on clothing, books, ropes etc - causing the cb to trip. Clear and stow,reset cb, and try again. FWIW, I'd consider engine shut down only early in a faster roundout because a stopped prop may save your engine needing a bulk strip. You really need to be a top driver in good practice to do this. Lot of stress in gear events!

One of the certainties in the US aviation industry is that they have the skills, the available materials, and the money to rebuild anything : from the data plate only if it's worth doing. What we would see 'written off' here, isn't usually in the US.